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The pu~pose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of 
the theology of liberation, through the study of the influence of the 
hermeneutical circle of Paul Ricoeur on its methodology. 
Ricoeur is an interdisciplinary philosopher whose reflections are the 
product of a Transcendental Phenomenology in dialogue with Human Sciences 
and studies in the interpretation of symbols. Chapter one is an 
introduction to Ricoeur's interpretation theory and his hermeneutical 
circle. Chapter two deals with the specific elements of Ricoeur's Biblical 
Hermeneutic, the dynamic of symbols and the theory of myths. In the second 
part of chapter two we compare these elements with Rudolph Bultmann's 
demythologising project, and describe Ricoeur's most important 
contributions to Biblical interpretation. 
Chapter three studies the development of Ricoeur's Biblical hermeneutic in 
the work of three influential hermeneuticians from Latin America: 
J. Severino Croatto from Argentina, Juan Luis Segundo from Uruguay, and 
Clodovis Boff from Brazil. Each of these has based his interpretation 
theory on Ricoeur's work. We search for the basic tensions and conflicts in 
each of these three theologians, such as that between tradition and 
re-creation of meaning in the Scriptures, and their ways to resolve them in 
a new interpretative synthesis. 
Finally, in chapter four we present our conclusions and reflections. 
1) Ricoeur's contribution to liberation theology in three main areas: 
the search for the Latin American identity, the actual praxis of liberation 
and the development of a concept of positive utopia. 
Z) The influence of Ricoeur in the work of Croatto, Segundo and Boff. 
3) The original contribution of liberation theology to Ricoeur'g 
hermeneutical circle. 
This contribution comes from the hermeneutical function of the Basic 
Ecclesial Communities which complete Ricoeur's own project of a philosophy 
of action. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 
"Ts'ui P~n said once: I withdraw myself to write a book. And another time: 
I withdraw mysel f to bufl d a labyrinth." 
lorge Luis Borges. (1) 
"The universe of semiosis, that is, the universe of human culture, must be 
conceived as a labyrinth of the third type: a) It is structured according 
to a network of interpretants; b) It is virtually infinite ... " 
Umberto Eco. (2) 
Part 1. 
1. Of Labyrinths and Circles: The Geometry of Interpretation. 
No other allegory could have been more appropriate to start this chapter 
than the labyrinthine one. Its describes with creative accuracy the task 
and challenges of the interpretation of literary texts, through the images 
of complexity and options which it brings to our minds. In this sense, a 
---------.---------
(1) J. L. Borges, Ficciones, p. 110. 
(2) U. Eco. Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, p. 83. 
1 
labyrinth is a "living metaphor", a well-spring of imagination and 
intuition, as Ricoeur himself defines this kind of powerful representation. 
The task of interpretation seems to have a preference for geometric images. 
Labyrinths coexist with the "semiotic squares" of Structuralism, spirals of 
interpretation, critical circles, and the "hermeneutical arc" of the 
hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. With them, the theory of interpretation moves 
in terms of space and time, in a synchronic and in a diachronic axis. 
The metaphor of labyrinthine models, as used by Eco in the quotation, 
reminds us of the fact that parallel to a change in the design conception, 
hermeneutical theories also changed. For instance, in garden designs, the 
plain labyrinth was replaced at the end of the Renaissance by the "Maze", a 
new model which offered more alternative paths, and more choices of 
options. More than a coincidence, it was the geometric representation of 
the eruption of a different model of knowledge, and a more subjective 
approach to authority, especially with reference to the role model of 
po~rful institutions such as the Christian Church. 
The Hermeneutical Circle shares with the maze a common origin, because it 
was conceived as a structure of interpretation by humanists of the 
Renaissance. At the beginning, it had been thought to form part of a 
"Relational Theory of Interpretation", a theory concerned with meaning as 
the result of a process of community participation through the process of 
writing, and the work of literary commentaries. It relates thought and 
language, and tries to reply to the problem of how an individual can share 
his/her own perspective of the world with others. The Relational theory has 
many features in common with a later development, Phenomenological 
2 
Hermeneutics. which is represented by the work of thinkers such as Martin 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty. Hans-Georg Gadamer. the "Constance School" with 
proponents such as Wolfang Iser and Hans Robert Jauss (both ex-disciples of 
Gadamer) and Ricoeur. The basic idea of both theories. and the one which is 
of particular interest for our work. is the emphasis on the collective role 
of interpretation, both in relation to the writer (the community as author) 
and the reader (the interpretation as a result of a collective shared 
process) . 
1.1 Precursors of the Hermeneutical Circle. 
At the beginning of the XVI Century, Juan Luis Vives. a Rennaisance 
thinker. conceived the idea of an "interpretative cOlU1\unity" of scholars. 
whose task as literary critics, was to be developed in the light of the 
temporality of truth, according to what was conceived as the fallen nature 
of man, incapacitated to obtain more than a glimpse of knowledge at a 
time. Vives was a perceptualist; he considered that it is only through our 
senses that knowledge could be obtained. 
Vives' ideas were further developed in the XVII Century by Gianbatista 
Vico, an Italian philosopher and author of a treatise about civilisation's 
evolutionary cycles called New Science. In this book, Vico organised his 
"Judgement of Argumentation" around Vives' theory of critical cOJlUJ\entary. 
in the following way: perceiving that there is a relationship between the 
nature ot communication and human language. he concluded that men had 
created reality. according to the "shape of their own mind". but as a 
result ot this process. what they created had re-created thea Such is the 
3 
historical thesis of New Science, supported by the use 01 myths, poetic 
language and linguistics. Vives and Vico have in common a core idea of an 
hermeneutical circle, the concept of the interpretation of the parts by the 
whole; the "totality" is represented in Vives by the thought of the 
community as interpreter, and in Vico as the structure 01 the mind which 
makes sense of perceptions. 
At the end of the XVIII Century, Wilhelm Von Humbolt continued and 
surpassed Vico's ideas, establishing for the first time the role of the 
historian as interpreter. Humbolt, a German philologist and educator, 
defined the historian as the one who needs to produce "a vision" (or idea 
of the historical period), before being able to understand any isolated 
episode. Here we are confronted with the idea that Friedrich Schl eiermacher 
developed in his work Compendium of 1819, in an early definition of the 
task of the hermeneutical circle: 
"Complete knowledge always involves an apparent circle, that each part 
can be understood only out of the whole to which it belongs, and vice 
versa." (3) 
The image of a circle of interpretation, as a metaphor, has other 
suggestive connotations, especially in relationship with the 
phenomenological hermeneutics developed by Rlcoeur. For instance, it speaks 
about a non hierarchical but mutually dependent system (relational), where 
every element is supposed to be in a dialectical relationship. In such a 
circle, to advance means sometimes to go back, either to the interpretative 
(3) Quoted by J. Bleicher in Contemporary Hermeneutics, p. 1. 
community in the past, or to a previous methodological moment of the 
process, to produce a necessary qualitative leap in understanding. 
1.2 Hermeneutics: in search of a definition. 
Hermeneut ics can be def i ned as "The theory or phil osophy of the 
interpretation of meaning' (~). This definition is in accordance with 
Ricoeur, in the sense that a "written text" is not specified as the only 
meaningful human expression of our concern: a novel, a sculpture, a film, 
an archeological site, could all be considered a text. But although in the 
past the texts in which the effort of interpretation lies were exclusively 
written discourse, this idea of other artifacts as conveyors of meaning is 
indeed very old. So old that its origins are related to the etymology of 
the word "hermeneutic" itself. Ricoeur, in his article Existence and 
Hermeneutics (5), analyses the etymology of the term and finds three 
different meanings of the word as given by the Greeks. Such definitions 
are: hermeneutics as a technique. as an intrinsic element of language and 
as interpretation. 
------------------
(4-) F. Schleiermacher, "General Hermeneutics", in M.-Vollner (ed.), The 
Hermeneutics Reader, p. 84-. 
(5) Cf. P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 4- ff. 
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1.2.1 Hermeneutics as a technique 
Hermeneutics is a word in the grammatical root of which we find a reference 
to the Greek god Hermes who, as messenger of the divine pantheon, carried 
the task of delivering the words and secret intentions (codes) of the 
deities to the connon mortals. Apart from carrying a message that needed to 
be deciphered, Hermes himself, by the mere fact of his presence, was a sort 
of "significative text": To see him was the equivalent to know that 
"someone wanted to say something about something to someone" (a definition 
of Hermeneutics used by Ricoeur). In this sense, Hermes was himself a 
living text. But to decipher the messages, which were veiled from hunan 
beings' understanding, it was necessary to develop a technique. 
This is the reason why the word "hermeneutic" in Greek,is always an 
adJective of the substantive "technique": The techne hermeneutike, or 
interpretative art which was carried through the texts of the pythonesses 
and other diviners. 
In those cases, although they were not written texts, they functioned as 
such, because any dialogue between the enquirer and the diviners was 
excluded. They were closed texts, metaphors with obscure references. But in 
other cases, the messages were delivered by dances, movements, colours, 
forms and gestures. 
One century after Christ, the Roman historian Tacitus made this remark 
about divinatory methods concerning the behaviour of horses: 
"They (the diviners) themselves are only the servants; the horses are 
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the confidants of the gods."(6) 
Nowadays, this phrase would take us into Ricoeur's discussion of meaning, 
sign and reference, as we will see in the second part of this chapter 
concerning the hermeneutical circle. 
Although far from the development of a theory which see texts in human 
actions (7), a definition of hermeneut.ics as exceeding the limits of the 
written discourse and the difficulties of dividing between medium and 
message were already acknowledged. A very important point for the furt.her 
ontological aspects developed in XX Century hermeneutics. 
1.2.2 Hermeneutics as an intrinsic element of language. 
Aristotle, in his book Perf Hermeneias which belongs to his work called 
Organon, uses the term hermeneia as interpretation, and as such its Opus 
has been translated into Latin: De Interpretatione. Ricoeur finds that in 
Aristotle's criticism theory, a significative change has been produced. 
Hermeneia with Aristot.le is more than a simple technique used to decipher 
messages from mysterious beings; it is the fundamental power of language. 
manifested as conveyor and interpreter of reality. 
(6) Tacitus, On Britain and Germany, p. 109. 
(7) P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 40. 
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Hermeneutics becomes then an intrinsic element of language, in relation to 
the context of the discourse, and more specifically, to the context of the 
sentence of the discourse. Hermeneutics, according to Aristotle, is related 
to the mediator role of language. (8) 
1.2.3 Hermeneutics as interpretation. 
The concept of interpretation, as expressed by the ~rds Auslegung or 
Deutung in the German language, is a synthesis of the t~ concepts of 
Hermeneutics already described: a technique and an element of language. 
This concept has been developed through many centuries, from the ~rk of 
the School of Alexandria to the hermeneutics of the Protestant Reformers, 
and in the contributions made by Philosophy, Philology and Jurisprudence. 
(9) This hermeneutical synthesis was produced, basically, during the 
Enlightenment Movement. of the Eighteenth Century, when the general 
philosophical principles were found to be valid for every field of 
knowledge where interpretation was necessary. 
-------------------
(8) Cf. P. Ricoeur, D~mythologisation et Her.eneutique, pp. ~ ff. 
(9) Cf. K. M.-Vollner (ed.), op. cit., Introduction. 
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1.3 General Hermeneutics. Some key aspects of its development. 
1.3.1 From the Apologetics to the Ars Critica. 
Alexandria of Egypt was a philosophical centre for Greek. Jewish and 
Christian thought. It was in this city that the Scriptures (both Old and 
New Testaments) were read in the same style as Homer's work or Egyptian 
myths, e.g. as texts which were concealing hidden, allegorical meanings. 
only accesible to the initiated. Gnosticism and speculative syncretisms 
flourished, and the Apologists. who were the first Christian theologians in 
a sense, started to develop their doctrine on the Logos. (10) 
Amongst the many thinkers of that. time, Origen of Alexandria can be 
considered the first biblical hermeneutician of the third century. His 
hermeneutical style is demonstrated in some of the works still available to 
us, such as De Princiipis and the Hexapla. Origen believed in the literal 
inspiration of the Scriptures, and worked to restore the original sense of 
the texts by a system of multiple, comparative translations. Such is the 
work of the Hexapla, where six to nine parallel columns show to the reader 
the Hebrew text, its Greek transliteration. and the versions of Aquila. 
Synunachus, the Septuagint and the translat.ion of Theodotus. At the same 
time, Origen wanted the Scriptures to be interpret.ed spiritually, and 
following Clement of Alexandria, he considered the doctrine of the three 
-------,---------------
(10) cr. J. L. GonzAlez, A History of Christian Thou,ht. Vol. I: From the 
Beginninrs to t.he Council of Calcedon. 
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Bihlical senses, as valid criteria for interpretation. Those criteria were 
the literal, moral and intellectual senses of allegorical interpretation, 
organised not in a hierarchical hut "circular", relational fashion. Origen 
also established the necessity of setting certain parameters of 
Interpretation, ego the restoration of the original sense of the text, the 
historical references, and then the use of allegories 01' a typological 
study, although in other cases a literal interpretation was acceptable. 
Interpretation as such, was part of the theological studies that Origen 
taught in Caesarea, Palestine, and it cont.inued to keep the same status 
during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. An important change, related in 
a sense to the hermeneutical circle of liberation theology in many ways, 
was produced during the times of the Reformation. It consisted in a new 
element of interpretation, called "The Principle of Perspicuity" (11), 
which estahlished the sufficiency of the text, in contrast with the Roman 
Catholic principle of the role of Church tradition. Other changes were, 
----------------------
(11) The Principle of Perspicuity (Perspicuitas), refers to the self-
sufficiency of the Scriptures (Sola Scriptural based in the belief in the 
internal coherence of the biblical text. The continuity of the Scriptures 
and the principle of internal coherence of the text replaced the two main 
hermeneutical principles of the Roman Catholic Church: the Church's 
authority and tradition. For this and other general references concerning 
the hermeneutical development, Cf. K. M.-Vollner (ed.), 0p. cit., pp. 2 
If. 
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for instance, the introduction of grammar in the interpretive process, by 
Martin Luther, and the development of the theories of inner coherence and 
historical continuity of the Bible, still basics of any protestant 
hermeneutics. 
In 1567, an important magnum opus, a compendium of Biblical Hermeneutics 
from Origenes to the present days was WTitten. Its author was Flavius 
Illyricus and his book was called Clavis Scriptura Sacrae ("Key to the 
Sacred Scriptures"). In this book, Illyricus developed the thesis that 
faulty interpretations of the Scriptures were due mainly to a lack of 
linguistic knowledge. In this sense, the work of Illyricus is a precursor 
of modern Biblical Hermeneutics. 
The Renaissance, in general, was a creative period where new perspectives 
flourished, some of them due to the popularity that Roman ideas achieved. 
Interpretation become an ars critica, associated with Philology, and 
Jurisprudence. The necessity of interpretation of the Roman Law, produced 
in Italy during the XII Century a serious work in the Justinian Code, in an 
attempt to rediscover the original meaning of the law. 
In the XVIII Century this philological aspect was stressed more, and 
hermeneutics became, perhaps for the first time, a science, establishing 
categories and distinctions concerning legal exegesis, and classifying it 
into various corrective, extensive, restrictive and declarative aspects. 
An example of this approach can be found in Johannes Von Felde's Treatise 
on the Science of Interpretation (1689), where hermeneutical principles 
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were declared to be valid for the interpretation of both literary and legal 
texts. 
1.3.2 The influence of the Enlightenment Movement 
It is during the Enlightenment Movement, with its emphasis in the 
systematization of human knowledge, and its search tor the basic principles 
which were thought to underlie everything, that hermeneutics started to be 
related with Philosophy. The Enlightenment philosophers returned to 
Aristotle and the Peri Hermeneia, and hermeneutics was related to the field 
of Logic. Perhaps the most important thing is that now hermeneutics became 
a general science, based on the general principles needed for the benefit 
of every particular science. Christian Wolf and Johann Martin Chladenius 
are two hermeneuticians who deserve to be mentioned in this brief account, 
because their contributions have been highly relevant for subsequent 
developments. Wolf, in works published in 1713, divided the texts between 
"dogmatics" and "historics", the first being considered according to the 
quality of their arguments, and the second to the "completeness" of the 
account. By "completeness" Wolf meant the veracity and sincerity of the 
author, since history in itself is remote from us. Sincerity of the author 
was considered in relationship with the literary genre selected for the 
account. The text was Judged by its intention, although not by the 
psychological intention of the author, as Schleiermacher did later on. 
Wolf did not consider the meaning of the text in itself, but developed a 
normative hermeneutics which related the correct use of grammatical 
structures with the right sense conveyed by the reading. 
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Chladenius, who wrote a systematic exposition on hermeneutics, gave an 
important contribution with his notion of the point of view of the author 
(Sehe-Punkt) in the consideration of historical accounts. 
In his book Introduction to the Correct Interpretation of Reasonable 
Discourses and Books (1742), Chladenius, taking ideas from Leibnitz' Optics 
and Monadology. established that different historical accounts might be due 
to different perspectives from different authors, although the event is the 
same. His position does not advocate a relativist dimension, as will happen 
later in a hermeneutics of suspicion, (12) but calls for the role of the 
reader in the clarification of obscure words and phrases. 
Chladenius defined hermeneutics in the following way: 
"Hermeneutics is (the provision of) certain concepts which the 
reader lacks. This can be the matter of few words or an extended 
speech containing many sentences" (13), 
(12) For an early definition on the hermeneutics of suspicion, cf. P. 
Ricoeur, "Interpretation as Exercise of Suspicion", in Freud and 
Philosophy, p. 32. Also cf. this chapter. "The Hermeneutical Circle of Paul 
Ricoeur", 1. 6. 
(13) Cf. K. M.-Vollner <ed.), op. cit., p. 5t. 
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1.4 Philosophical Hermeneutics 
1.4.1 Hermeneutical Theory: Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
"The rules of the art of interpretation must be developed from a positive 
formula, and that is: The historical and divinatory, objective and 
subjective reconstruction of a given statement." 
F. Schleiermacher (14) 
The introduction of Philology in the exegetical process divided for t.he 
first time Christ.ian Dogma and understanding of the Scriptures. The 
Enlightenment put the Bible in the same status of any book for the purposes 
of understanding, since "sense" and "truth" become two different issues. 
Kant, through the development of a Theory of Knowledge, also saw a division 
between understanding (Verstehen) and explanation (Erkl!ren): it was not 
anymore the hidden meanings of a text which were sought after but the 
conditions of knowledge considered necessary to unveil, for the purposes of 
the achievement of a correct interpretation. This Kantian Rationalism, 
which developed the condition of knowledge in relation with the physical 
sciences, was opposed by Romanticism, more preoccupied with the condition 
of knowledge of the spirit and the individual genius. 
(14) F. Schleiermacher, "General Hermeneutics", Introduction. Part 1:111, 
3, in K. M.-Vollner (ed.), Ope cit. 
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Schleiermacher (1768-183~). considered by many as the father of the modern 
hermeneutical theory, tried to reconcile the two aspects, the spirit of 
criticism of Kant and the spirit of creativity of Romanticis~ Philology 
and Exegesis. The task of hermeneutics was then to understand the texts 
through the search for the intuition of the author, and by the study of the 
language as its expression. This was t.o be achieved by a divinatory process 
of guessing, and a methodology which included both grammatical and 
philological analysis. In the divinatory method, the goal of the 
interpreter was to understand the text as the original author did , 
reconstructing his intention; in the second aspect, the comparative method, 
the author was classified in various types of genres. In this way it was 
possible to bridge the cultural distance produced since the texts ~re 
written (and already recognised by the historical sciences) and to regain 
the immediacy of understanding. 
Schleiermacher envisaged Hermeneutics as the product of the dual 
relationship bet~en Thought and its linguistic expression, and he claimed 
that, in fact, the "two tasks are completely equal" <15>' His genius 
consisted in the fact of being the first to recognise the necessity of the 
development of a theory of understanding, with the combining elements of 
reflection and intuition. 
(15) F. Schleiermacher, Ope cit. Introduction, IX, 18. 
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After Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics is no longer confined to textual 
exegesis alone. and universal rules needed to be found in order to relate 
texts with the human creative processes which originated them. 
Rlcoeur admires Schleiermacher's departure trom the physical sciences' 
understanding of the human mind, which set the precedent for a modern 
theory of interpretation, with its concern for understanding in relation to 
textual interpretation. His criticisms are related to what Ricoeur sees as 
the subjective, accent of Schleiermacher's thought, which is part of the 
psychological emphasis of Romanticism. 
1.4.2. Subjective hermeneutics and Christian interpretation 
The problem with both Schleiermacher and Dilthey is that they have 
identified "interpretation with the category of understanding" (16), Ilnd 
by 'understanding' they consider the recognition of the mind of the Iluthor, 
and his/her original intention and purpose in relation with the original 
readers of the text (addressees). Ricoeur finds that this subjective 
conception has had a deep influence in Christian hermeneutics, and their 
search tor the "original event" as normative for our interpretation of 
faith. Ricoeur's criticisms are based on the lack of "dialogue" of such 
interpretations, which could lead to a partialisation ("onesldeness") ot 
interpretation. The key, in our author's conception, is to understand the 
double dialectic-s of event and meaning and sense and referencej 
---------------------
(16) Cf. P. Ricoeur , Interpretation Theory. p. 22. 
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the intention of the author does not need to be excluded, but the discourse 
is a written inscription, and its possibilities "are those of the text" 
(17). To conclude, Ricoeur says that in relation to Schleiermacher, what is 
needed is a redefinition of the hermeneutical task. 
1.'.3 William Dilthey 
"Life consists of parts, of lived experiences which are inwardly related t.o 
each other." 
W. Dllthey (18). 
Dilthey had a stronger influence on Ricoeur than Schleiermacher. To 
understand Dilthey means to acknowledge first of all. the fact that his 
work was developed between the rise and death of ideas belonging to two 
different centuries. At the end of the XIX Century, Philology, which had 
been so important for Schieiermacher, gave way to the study of History. 
Dilthey then started to consider human beings as historical beings. and his 
main questions were related to t.he possibilty of understanding amongst 
them. Following Hegel's ideas, Dilthey understood History as the 
manifestation of the cyclic movement of the World's Spirit, represented 
more as the lives of individuals rather than the "ObJective Mind" of Hegel. 
Hermeneutics then hecomes the science of re-creation of human lives in 
(17) Ihid .• p. 23. 
(18) W. Dilthey, Draft tor a Critique ot Historical Reason in M.-Vollner 
(ed.), Ope cit., p. 151. 
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History, which meaning can only grasped through the fixation produced by 
writing. Dilthey admired Schleiermacher and in 1871 he wrote Life of 
Schleiermacher, although he never finished it. He sees Psychology as the 
science which ~uld open the the psychic elements fixed in the text. 
However he tried to develop a less mechanistic psychological approach, 
replacing it by a descriptive and analytical model concerned with the 
structure of mental activities. Influenced by Husserl's Logical 
Investigations, DUthey perceived the psychic as intentional. From there he 
assumes that it is only through the intention that the expressed meaning 
can be gTasped. 
Dilthey uses Philology in his attempt to give hermeneutics a character of 
obJectivity, which the Positivism of his time demanded. Philology becomes 
ident.ified with underst.anding, but contrary to Schleiermacher 
"Understandin~' (Verstehen) is more than a linguistic phenomenon. but a 
methodological concept originat.ed in the process or category of life itself 
(Lebenskategorie). One important contribution of Dilthey to a Theory of 
Hermeneutics is related to the circularity of interpretation: to understand 
a text, it is required for us to know the whole meaning of the text, and 
vice versa, one cannot gTasp the general meaning without knowing first its 
parts. 
According to Dilthey, the task of Hermeneutics must be concerned with what 
he calls an "Expression of Life" (LehellsSusserung>. This Expression is 
found behind History, and behind the coherence of a text itself, and in the 
last analysiS constitutes our object of interpretation. Subsequently 
Diithey envisaged all expressions as "texts" but Ricoeur criticises this 
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approach because in his opinion. the object of Hermeneutics is the meaning 
of the text, and not the life of the person behind the written discourse. 
For Ricoeur, the search for meaning in the author's genius constitutes a 
"psychological aporia". 
At the end of his career, Dilthey changed positions from historicism to 
logic, under the influence of Husserl and Frege; Ricoeur sees in this an 
important aspect, derived in general from the ant.i-historicist position, in 
relation to his concept of appropriation and its goal of actualisation of 
meaning. This meaning, according to Ricoeur, will not be related to the 
author's mind or his/her historical circumstances, but to "the power of 
disclosing a world that constitutes the reference of the text" (19), 
another perspective or way of looking at reality. 
1.4.~ Ontology and Understanding. 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey tried to understand the text through the 
intention of the author and the grammatical intention at the same time. 
Both of them specified, with different emphases, the use of Psychology. 
With Heidegger, Hermeneutics moves from this psychological preoccupation to 
the ontological concern of the relation of human beings in the world. As 
Ricoeur followed Heidegger in many aspects of his thought. it is necessary 
to give an introduction to this Ontological Hermeneutics, where the work of 
---------------------
(19) P. Ricoeur, Interpretation ___ Theory, p. 92. 
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interpretation is not separable from the interpreted being (20). 
1.4.5 Martin Heidegger and the Emergence of the Word. 
In his essay Heidegger and the Question of the Subject (21), Ricoeur 
considers the development of Heidegger's Hermeneutics in relation to three 
main points: The "Contestation of the corlto, the question of the self, and 
the emergence of the "word". The first point, Is related to the apodictic 
proposal of Descartes Corlto erro sum; this Judgement has not been 
challenged by modern philosophies (although reinterpreted sometimes), and 
as a consequence of that an ontological omission has happened. Ricoeur 
considers the determination of the corito by the sum (I am), because he 
sees that the sum conditions the corito. In this point, Ricoeur quotes 
Heidegger: "what (Descartes) left undetermined when he began in this 
'radical' way [with cogito ergo sum1 was the kind of Being which belongs to 
the res cogi tans, or -more prec i sel y- the meaning of the Be i ng of the sum" 
(22). The meaning of being is Heidegger's main question, which is 
understood as Being-in-the-world; the main task of his hermeneutical 
proposal is then, to understand this Being. In Being and Time, Heldegger 
uses a phenomenological hermeneutics, which means that he leaves the "thing 
itself" to be manifested as it is, and in this case, allowing the Dasein 
(Being there, existence) to reveal itself as transcendence. 
------------------
(20) P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of InterpretatJons, p. 23. 
(21) Ibid., p. 223. 
(22) Ibid., p. 227. 
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Ricoeur points out that the question of the meaning of being for Heidegger. 
displaced the position of the ego in his philosophy. The structure of 
trascendence conSisting of comprehension (Verstehen) and logos (Rede), is 
the component by which Dasein articulates such comprehension through 
language. Dasein and language (as parole/word) are together as the core of 
a philosophy of language, as the problems of Dasein are originated in 
language, and related to the problems of langue (speech) and parole. 
Heidegger takes the human into language and develops an hermeneutics of the 
"I 8.Jn", because I anguage is an el ement which constitutes the worl d. The 
word "names" (and denominates, adds Ricoeur) and expresses the Noein 
(Thought/Discerment), and the Denken (Thought). Ricoeur comments that this 
function of denomination "designates the place and role of man in language, 
and a finite, speaking existent is born" (23), 
l. 4. 6 Understanding as "a mode of being." 
Heidegger considers the two aspects of the word: "to preserve" and "to 
maintain"; "preserving" cone.eals, and is the origin of man's domination 
th h But there i S al so an "emergence of the word". over Being roug reason. 
b d ith th e-.a.rf7'P.nce of t.he "There" ... "as the one who which can e compare w e.~ 0-
enquires into BelnK' (24). Language aprehends Dasein, and humans use and 
are used by it. 
(23) P. Ricoeur, Ope cit. p. 233. 
(24) Ibid. p. 23~. 
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"In Urdichtung, primordial poetizing, the poet testifies to a 
kind of language in which the over-po~ring ot Being founds the 
power of man and his language." (25) 
In the first part of his work Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, entit.led 
Studies in the History of Hermeneutics, Ricoeur, who has considered the 
development of Hermeneutics as a transitional movement from the 
epistemology of Dilthey to the ontology of Heidegger, considers the 
importance of understanding as "a mode of being". Ho~ver, he points out 
what he thinks is the failure of Heidegger <and later on of his student 
Gadamer): the lack of response to the epistemological questions, manifested 
as the problems of interpretation in relation to historical knowledge, such 
as those coming from the exegetical field. This lack of interest in the 
developing of a method creates a sort ot subJectivism, which Ricoeur 
considers negative for an interpretation theory. 
What Ricoeur takes from Heidegger is the ontological interest, the 
"reading" of experience through philosophy of language, but he keeps the 
method of analysis of Husserl, to approach the phenomena through the 
discourse. To conclude this brief analysis, we must say that the 
fundamental difference bet~en Heidegger and Ricoeur in relation to an 
ontological/phenomenological hermeneut.ics is that Heidegger takes "the 
short way", while Ricoeur takes "the long way", t.hrough t.he study of modern 
linguistics and semiot.ics. He aims to explore the self, which is shaped by 
its shaping of the world, by acts of decision, action, and consent. Apart 
(25) Ibid. p. 234. 
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from Linguistics, Ricoeur uses History of Religion, Psychoanalisis and 
Anthropology. 
It is indeed a long route, and quoting Jean Nabert. a French philosopher to 
whom he dedicated hi s book Th~~mbol1sm of Evil, he says that 
"Reflection ... can be and must be an hermeneutics." (26) And Ricoeur adds 
that "the entire sensible world and all beings with which we have dealings 
sometimes appear to us as a text to be deciphered." (27). 
1.5 Phenomenological Hermeneutics 
1.5.1 Phenomenological Principles. 
Edmund Husserl WTote in the first of the series of lectures delivered by 
him in Gijttingen, at the beginning of the century, the following definition 
of PhenomenolOgy: 
"(Phenomenology) denot.es a science, a system of scientific 
disciplines. But it also and above all denotes a method and an 
attitude of mind, the specifically philosophical method." (%8) 
As a method, phenomenology has a descriptive characteristic. It means that 
(26) P. Ricoeur,' Qll_~.it., p. 222. 
(27) J. Nabert. "The Inner Experience of Freedom". p. 77. quoted by P. 
Ricoeur in The Conflict of IllL~r..p.retations. p. 222. 
(28) J. Ferrater Mora. ~Lccjonario de Fl1osofla. tomo I. p. 883. 
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the emphasis is upon the "appearences", "the things as they show 
themsel ves" or phenomena. These phenomena are considered according to the 
intentionality of our consciousness, since as Husserl establishes. 
consciousness is always consciousness of something. The phenomenological 
method questions the "meaning" of the phenomena through the receptivity of 
data or "intuitions" as Husserl calls them; every intuition is concerned 
with a specific intention, although they are not always referred to an 
experience. as in the case of the "empty intentions". 
Ricoeur, in his work The Conflict of Interpretations. finds the following 
thesis from Husserl as a key for understanding his ideas. First of all. the 
process of phenomenological description needs to be studied in the category 
of "Meaning". Second. the subject is the one which conveys meaning, and 
third, the process is carried through the act of "phenomenological 
reduction". Rlcoeur thinks that these three theses are inseparabl e. 
By "phenomenological reduction" we refer to the first moments of the 
Husserlian method, when the subject needs to be free of beliefs and pre-
understandings or theories in order to deepen his/her immediate perceptions 
(29)' This happens in the so called "purgative stage", where all data must 
be reduced to sense data; this is the stage of preparation for Intuitions. 
Husserl considers this first reduction as "transcendental". The second one 
is the "eidetic -J'eduction" (or "eidetic variation"), when the movement is 
(29) For the different stages of the phenomenological reduction cr. s. 
SaJama and M. Kampinen, A Historical Introduction to PhenomenolQgy. 
from the particular essences already found, to the universals. Husserl 
called such movement Wesenschau or eidetic intuition, and as such it is 
considered part of the phenomenology of General Essences. 
1.5.2 French Phenomenology 
The phenomenological method of Husserl received in France the influence of 
existential philosophy. Marcel, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are the thinkers 
who combined this methodology with existential themes such as anxiety and 
nothingness; Existentialism also brought an attitude of suspicion about the 
human being's possibilities of knowledge. Ricoeur mentions the deep 
influence of the French translations of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, 
and what he calls "the masters of suspicion": Marx, Nietzche and Freud. He 
finds the encounter of both philosophies very productive, and as a result., 
the Husserlian phenomenology gained through the incorporation of the tragic 
element of existence, while the Hegelians obtained a "sense of the 
negati ve", necessary to high! ight aspects of human existence. 
Ricoeur has described the changes which Phenomenology suffered through it.s 
history (SO). Husserl started with a phenomenology of meaning in his 
chapter I. Also R. Detweiler, Story. SiiD and Self, chapters I-II. 
(SO) For this point cf. M. Natanson "Introduction" in Essays in 
Phenomenolo&:y. 
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Logical Investigations, moved toward a more transcendental position and 
ended in a "Genetical Phenomenology". Merleau-Ponty followed Husserl in the 
perceptualist emphasis of this last period, considering that perceptions 
guide us to the meaning of things and to the meaning of the subject which 
interprets; he considers an aspect of language which Husserl discussed in 
his first and fourth Lo~lcal Investigations (meaning and expression and the 
rol e of the grammar). From here, Ricoeur el aborates in the dialogical 
fashion, characteristic of his thought, the two trends of phenomenology in 
which he has interest: The existential line from Merleau-Ponty and the 
hermeneutical one from Heidegger. 
1.5.3 Experience and Language. The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. 
Merleau-Ponty follows Husserl in the path of perceptual ism, agreeing with 
the intentionality of consciousness and with the definition of 
consciousness as perception. His phenomenology is existential, and he 
replaces the distance between subject and world of Husserl for the concept 
of the presence of being in the world (~tre-au-monde). The theme of the 
body and incarnation (corps prope/corps v~cu) is another key element to 
underline for a phenomenology which attempts to understand human behaviour 
through the world of perceptual life (Lebens~lt). His aim was to arrive at 
a pre-theoretical world. Merleau-Ponty developed a theory of perception and 
a theory of expression; he starts from the notion of an expressive world, 
where language is born from the silence of the perceptuality. But although 
Merleau-Ponty gives language a central place, Rlcoeur criticises him in the 
formulation of his theory. Specifically, Ricoeur claims that Merleau-Ponty 
has excluded "any connection with modern linguistics, and the semiological 
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disciplines which have been established on a linguistic model."(31) 
Merleau-Ponty opposes dialect.ically two concepts of language: 1) Language 
as fait achmpli, something residual from the past, and 2) Language as the 
subjective dimension of the speaker. He also advances towards an 
ontological development when he refuses to "bracket out" (the use of the 
Epoch~) the problem of Being, that Husserl "suspended" in his 
phenomenology. Ricoeur continues his proposal but through what he calls 
"the long way", by means of a careful c.onsideration of semiology and 
linguistics. 
Merleau-Ponty represents an existential phenomenology of speech, and 
Ricoeur contrasts it with the hermeneutical phenomenology of language of 
Heidegger. 
1.5.~ The Phenomenology of Heidegger 
Heidegger once wrote: "Language is t.he house of Being" (32). And his 
thought is a path (~) which guides us to it. Merleau-Ponty described the 
natural world, populated by silent phenomena and gestures assimilated into 
words. from the experience of perception, he comes to expression. and from 
there to meaning. Heidegger, on the other hand, considers the world as 
------------------
(31) Cf. Don Ihde, Hermeneutic Phenomenology. p. 170. 
(32) Cf. M. Heidegger, Introducci6n a la Metaffsica, pp. 20 ff. 
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a cultural product, inhabited by subjects who create and are created by 
language (a similar statemement to that already mentioned by Vico, in the 
XVII Century). The main point of departure from Husserl is in the fact that 
for Heidegger the phenomenon is the being, and being is revealed only 
through what man says. In his studies about the German poet of the XVIII 
Century, Friedrich H8lderlin, Heidegger quotes the following words from one 
of his poetic works: "We are an undeciphered sign ... " (33). Ricoeur, who has 
considered Heidegger's hermeneutics in his work The Conflict of 
Interpretations, notices here that being and meaning ("signification") are 
the two key aspects of his thought. The ego, so important in Husserl's last 
work, where perception was limited by the "I", as the only source of 
knowledge, has been now displaced. Dasein and language (as parole) are in a 
dialectical perspective: Dasein is in the core of a philosophy of language, 
and as such is equivalent to the Lebenswelt, the "life-world" of Husserl. 
About the Dasein, Ricoeur says: "Authentic Dasein is born from the response 
to Being and, in responding, preserves the strength of Being by the 
strength of the word" (34-). One of the main contributions of Heidegger to a 
phenomenological hermeneutics is related to his concept of Dasein which 
advances beyond the impasse of subject-object inherited by phenomenology. 
The Cogito as "absolute subject" disappears, and from now on its 
authenticity remains in "the gift. of the poetic life". Ricoeur takes from 
(33) H. Heidegger, "Was Heisst Denken7", in VortrKge und AufsKtze, TeU II, 
p. 11. 
(34-) P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 234. 
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both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger that their different options, ("experience 
and language", "immediacy and history") are related to different linguistic 
aspects, but that they are also complementary, and we need a phenomenology 
of speech and a phenomenology of language if we want to understand the 
human discourse as an unity. This is the difference between "the short way" 
-as in Heidegger- and "the long way" of Ricoeur, to the meaning of being 
via linguistics. 
Part 2. 
1.6 The Hermeneutical Circle of Paul Ricoeur. 
"My purpose here is to explore the paths opened to contemporary philosophy 
by what could be called the graft of the hermeneutic problem onto the 
phenomenol ogi cal method". 
P. Ricoeur (35). 
1.6.1 General Characteristics. 
The characteristics of a Phenomenological Hermeneutics, developed after the 
works of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur, can be organised according to 
questions concerning the text, its nature and status, the relationship 
between ~iter and reader, and the main purpose of the literary work. The 
following definitions will give us a clear, although very brief summary of 
-------,-----------
(35) P. Ricoeur, OF. cit., p. 3. 
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the main characteristics of Phenomenological Hermeneutics (36): 
a) A literary text is a written discourse with an unity. Although the 
product of a writer, the text becomes "itself" only through the work. of 
actualisation by the reader, in a process called "immersion". But the text 
is also immersed in its own historic reality. At the end, the identity of 
the text is shaped according to its relation with the interests of the 
reader. The experience of the reader is as important here, as was the 
"mind" of the author for Schl eiermacher. Ricoeur considers that 1 anguage is 
rooted in human action, and a text finally remits us to praxis. 
b) The model of communication is built upon a parallel pattern of 
writer/text and reader/text. The author/text belongs to the historical 
event of the creation of the text. The model is not a dialectical one, 
because there are no common experiences bet~en reader and writer; 
phenomenological hermeneutics searches tor the state of consciousness, the 
type of Dasein that the text has. 
c) The re-reading is an event which replaces the event of the author. 
Ricoeur elaborated the idea of Aneignung (appropriation) as the moment of 
re-creation of the text by the reader. This appropriation is mediated by 
the formal structure in which the text has been objectivised; Ricoeur, in 
his "long way" (detour), has taken the road of semiology and modern 
(36) Cf. M. J. Vald~s, Phenomenological Hermeneutics and the Study of 
Literature, pp. 60 ff. 
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linguistics (the linguistics elaborated after Saussure) in order to 
elaborate a phenomenology without the short comings of Merleau-Ponty. The 
literary text is used by the reader to re-shape reality, not as an 
individual, but from a community since the text comes from one and the 
reader belongs to another. Appropriation of the text is related to the 
challenge of the text towards a concrete praxis of redescription of the 
world. 
d) The tension bet~en the planning of a textual explanation and an 
understanding, as a provisory hermeneutical conclusion. is resolved 
dialecticaly, based on the following principles: 
1) The acceptance of the role of presuppositions in order to acquire 
knowledge. 
2) The rejection of an absolutist. idealist conclusion. 
3) The intentional nature of the structure of the text, determined by 
the historical context of the author. 
From these general aspects concerning phenomenological hermeneutics, we are 
now able to say that the formal structure of the text. its history, the 
experience of the reader and his own reflection in the moment of 
appropriation are key aspects concerning the meaning of a text. These 
elements, organised in a relationship of mutual dependency and interaction. 
constitute the four basic moments of the hermeneutical circle of Ricoeur. 
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1.6.2 The Hermeneutical Circle. Its structure. 
The close nature of the dialectic explanation and understanding. and 
appropriation and understanding, and the aspect of "circularity", which 
opposes the dialogical to the hierarchical. makes it difficult to explain 
the hermeneutical circle in a linear fashion. Following Ricoeur's schema in 
Interpretation Theory, and for the sake of clarity, I have organised here a 
methodical step by step description of moments, which in reality are not 
sharply divided as this presentation may suggest. These moments of 
interpretation. according to Ricoeur and the general principles of 
Phenomenological Hermeneutics already studied. are the following: 
1) Guess i ng. 
2) Expl anat ion. 
3) Understanding. 
4) Appropriation. 
This can also be seen in the following diagram: 
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Guessinr 
Formal dimension of the text 
Dialectic: Text/meaning 
(How does the text work?) 
A new proposal of being-in-the-
world; praxis 
Appropriation 
Text as "Self-knowledge" 
Dialectic: Author's event/reader's event 
Explanation 
Text as Hi story 
Dialectic: 
(How have I read this text?) 
Text/reference 
(What does the 
text speak about?) 
" Hermeneutical 
Understanding 




( What does the text say to me?) (37) 
(37) Cf. M. J. Vald~s. Phenomenological Herme!l_~t,Jtics and the Study or 
Literature p. 67. 
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1. 6. 3 Guessing 
Schleiermacher, who is considered the precursor of Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, gave a special place in his interpretation theory to what he 
called the divinatory aspect of reading. This divinatory aspect was related 
to the process of guessing the original intention, the mind of the author. 
However, as we have already seen phenomenological hermeneutics has replaced 
the "genius of the author" stressed by Romanticism, by the experience of 
the reader. and the collective aspect of interpretation has taken the place 
of the old individualistic approach. Guessing, for Ricoeur, is something 
that happens in the semantical and not in the psychological field, which he 
considers inaccesible to our experience. 
According to Ricoeur guessing is related to the phenomenological principle 
of the hermeneutical circle itself, the idea that the parts cannot be 
understood without a previous insight of the whole, and vice versa (38). 
The reader is confronted with, basically, two kind of texts, defined by 
formal aspects of the discourse: a) descriptive texts, which only require a 
knowledge of grammar for their interpretation, because in these texts there 
is not an outside reference, and b) literary or poetic texts, which involve 
a more complex process of understanding, due to their creative potentiality 
of meanings. But to be able to make a distinction between these two 
different kinds of texts, already involves a guessing, in the sense of a 
"Judgement" upon many works. This is the process Ricoeur calls the 
(38) For this point cf. P. Ricoeur Interpretation Theory, pp. 74 ff. 
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"individualization of the unique text", which involves a first act of 
discernment about what sort of text it is that we are reading. This 
includes aspects of understanding the construction of a text, as related to 
its style (the key to finding the potential meanings of a text), class and 
genre, and the particular types of codes, that give the reader the first 
clues about the meaning of a discourse. Here, guessing involves the process 
of seeing the text as an unity. as belonging to a certain literary genre, 
but it also presupposes the task of looking at its parts or components; 
Ricoeur establishes in this moment the questions related to the topics of 
the text, and the structure of "hierarchy of topics". In the same way that 
the study of the codes establishes the text In its individuality, the 
hierarchy of topics focus on the text as a totality, as a whole. 
Ricoeur compares the moment of guessing with the contemplation of an 
object; it is possible for the reader in this particular moment, to see one 
side of the text, but not the text in its complete constitution, from all 
the available perspectives at the same time. It implies that there is 
always an "onesideness (that) grounds the guess character of 
Interpretation" (39), an acceptance of a non idealist pOSition, and a clear 
option of significance. The originality of Ricoeur on this point, consists 
in seeing the nature of our cultural engagement with the world since the 
beginning of our task. This is an acknowledgement of our cultural roots, 
our particular way of belonging to the world of human actions, and will be 
the key element for the proposed re-elaboration of the world during the 
(39) P. Ricoeur, l~terpretation Theory, p. 78. 
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moment of appropriation. The circle of interpretation begins with the 
reader situated in a certain level of consciousness, and finishes with the 
the same reader. but after having passed through a qualitative leap of the 
level of being-in-the-world. But guessing, as a moment of interpretation. 
is not an individualistic act. In Phenomenological Hermeneutics, to start 
our process with the form of a text, means also to provide a space in 
common for a community of readers. the common base from where the critical 
analysis will begin. It means to begin with a project which belongs to a 
community, in what we would like to call a "Hermeneutics of Solidarity", 
amomgst interpreters, authors and their worlds (~O). 
Guessing presupposes the attitude of the reader who is confronted with the 
text from a formal point of view. The dialectic that Ricoeur uses here is 
(40) For the collective aspect of interpretation, Cf. M. J. Vald~s, ~ 
cit., pp. 24, 65 ff. Vald6s relates this aspect ~th the Relational Theory 
of Vico in the XVII Century, which tries to explain how it is possible to 
obtain a "shared meaning" from a reading done in different historical 
times. Although the readers as individuals change, there are common 
elements in the interpretative dynamiC, such as the tradition of a 
community of interpretation, the participation in certain praxis of change, 
and the fact that every text is the product of a community. To re-read a 
text is to re-WTite it. Vald6s sees these points in relationship with the 
moment of "guess i ng", but al so wi th the whol e dynami c of the hermeneut i cal 
circl e. 
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the one of meaning/text. The basic question which appears is, "How does 
this text ~rk, how is this text organised (the Zusammenharg, or inner 
organisation of a ~rk) to produce a certain meaning?" The answer lies in 
a theory of the text which can provide us with access to a deep semantic 
level, and at the same time, with the obJectivation of the text necessary 
to avoid a psychoanalytic hermeneutics. Ricoeur finds here that the 
structural conception of language from Ferdinand de Saussure 
(Gestalinguistik) and the narrative analysis from Algirdas Julien Greimas 
(Structural Semantic Analysis) gives him a scientific. rigorous method of 
study. In addition, Ricoeur considers the ~rk of the Russian Formalist 
Vladimir Propp and other French Structuralists such as Roland Barthes, 
Claude Br~mont and the Structural Anthropologist Claude L~vi-Strauss. 
1.6.3.1 Structural Analysis. Ferdinand de Saussure. 
At the beginning of the century, Saussure produced a revolutionary approach 
to linguistics, based on a systemic conception of language. He did not 
began his studies from the point of view of the origin of language, but 
from the notion of system. Later on his followers changed the word "system" 
to "structure", and his analysis was called "structural" (41), 
He considers language as a system independent of its task of communication, 
and makes a distinction between Language (Langue) and utterance (Parole). 
Language is defined as "the body of conventions adopted by the society in 
(41) Cf. A. Alonso, "Pr610go a la Edici6n Espaftola" in F. de Saussure. 
turso de Lingu1stica General, pp. 7 ff. 
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order to allow communications amongst individuals" «(,2), while utterance 
refers to the use of the codes. Ricoeur sees three important principles in 
Structuralism (43): 
1) The idea of language as an objective system, independent of the observer 
subject. 
2) The notions of the Diachronic and Synchronic levels of understanding 
3) The work of the linguistic laws. 
1) The language as a system of signs, is organised around lexical 
oppositions. Saussure says "In Language, we only have oppositions" «(,4->' A 
sign is an arbitrary, unconnected combination of an acoustic image (called 
"signifier") and a concept (or "signified"). Both signifier and signified 
constitute a first, inner level of differentiation; a second 
differentiation process happens at the same level as the lexeme (for 
instance, the oppositions produced by phonemes, morphemes etc.). Sign and 
sense are linked to each other since sense is the resultant of the relation 
between signifier and signified. 
2) The synchronic level is the one where we can see the simultaneous 
elements of a system in a particular moment. Diachrony is interested in the 
evolution in time of such elements. Structuralism privileges the Synchrony, 
-------------------------
(4-2) Saussure, 0,. cit., p. 103. 
(4-3) Cf. P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 80 ff. Also 
Saussure, op. cft., pp. 46 ff. 
(44) Saussure, Ope cit., p. 139. 
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the present moment of the language, but Ricoeur considers that it is in the 
"diachronic residue" where ~ find the deep structure of a text. For 
Ricoeur, Synchrony is subordinated to diachrony, because it is necessary to 
respect the unity of significance, regulated by temporality. This means 
that the original event of the text needs to be taken into account in our 
analysis, and even be privileged over the system, or ~ would not be able 
to advance from a surface meaning. This primacy of Diachrony has profound 
consequences for Biblical Hermeneutics in the context of Liberation 
Theology. 
3) The linguistic laws refer to an unconscious, pre-reflexive level of the 
spirit, where history is excluded. Ricoeur considers it a "Kantian 
Unconciousness", as opposed to a Freudian one. The difference is 
basically, that Structuralism defines the unconscious level as a system of 
categories, as an organisation without a reference to a subject. 
To conclude, we can say that the idea of language as an organism. composed 
of units related at different levels, the privileging of synchrony as 
opposed to the historical development of the structure, and the concept of 
language as a finite system of unities in permanent combination, are the 
key elements of Structuralism as conceived by Saussure. 
1.6.3.2 Structural Semantic Analysis: Greimas. 
After having considered the text as a whole, Ricoeur analyses the discourse 
from two aspects, the word (or lexeme, as Greimas and Pottier call it) and 
the structures behind the lexemes. 
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In the first case Ricoeur uses a semantic lexical analysis, e.g. he 
analyses the lexical units of the discourse, and finds their meaning. 
In the second case, Ricoeur follows Greimas and his Structural Semantic 
Analysis, also called "Semic" or "Componential Analysis" (Componentielle). 
We will consider now the structural analysis, which seems particularly 
relevant for Ricoeur (45). 
Greimas does not start his analysis from the perspective of lexemes, but 
that of s~mes (46). S~mes (or semantemes) are the minimum units of 
significance, or structures of meaning organised in relations of 
conjunction and disjuction. By relation of conjuction, Greimas means that 
the semantemes are organised around a common aspect, e.g. genre; on the 
other hand, disjunction is the case of s~mes which do not have any aspect 
in common, but are binarily opposed to each other, e. g. black/white or 
male/female. (The structural analysis that privileges this aspect is 
called, precisely, "Binary Opposition Analysis".) The semantemes acquire 
their value in the diachronic level, by means of a chronological process, 
and obtain a modern significance in a new system, at the synchronic moment. 
1.6.3.3 Levels of Signification. 
Greimas divides the text into two levels of signification: a) The level of 
(45) Cf. G. Mounin. Clefs pour la Linguistique, pp. 140 ff. 
(46) Cf. A.-I. Greimas, Semantica Estructural. 
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Manifestation and b) The level of Immanence. Ricoeur considers that this is 
a very important aspect of the componential analysis of Greimas, and as 
such deserves to be seen in detail (t7). The level of manifestation is the 
one of the "surface" of the written discourse; it "manifests" something 
that is happening at a deeper level, showing us the organisation of the 
"actants" or characters of the story ("character" is here defined by 
function, as roles. By actant Greimas means abstract figurae, opposite 
values, objects or actors.) The lexemes belong to this level. But it is at 
the level of immanence where we find the fundamental oppositions in which 
the text rests. On this level Greimas considers the narrative (or 
syntactic) structure, concerned with the deeper organisation of the 
actants, and the discursive (or semantic) structure, where the fundamental 
oppositions of the story are located. Ricoeur finds that the most important 
level is the surface, the level of manifestation, because in it the 
semantemes -through relations of conJuction and disJuntion- produce the 
"meaningful effect" (effet de sens) of the text, depending on their context 
(which is called classeme by Greimas). 
The action-sentences are decisive for the treatement of the plot, and 
homogeneous levels of signification can be distinguished in the narrative, 
by means of the isotopies of discourse (t8). Ricoeur is interested in this 
(47) For the analysis ot Ricoeur on Greimas' narrative semiotics, cf. P. 
Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. II. pp. 44 ff. 
(48) The isotopies (there is a principal one and many secondaries in every 
text), are refered to by U. Eco as an "umbrella term for coherence" (Cf. U. 
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aspect, because it is related to the multiplicity of meaning and the study 
of symbolism. From the synchronic concept of polysemy, which he mentions as 
"the axis of semantics" (4-9), to the plurivocity of the text due to the 
role of context, Ricoeur finds that Greimas provides him with a scientific, 
stable structural model, and a dialectic of openness and closure of the 
text. Greimas, as a Structuralist, considers that there is no salvation 
outside the text (50). But tor Ricoeur, the analysis of the discourse also 
requires the understanding of the problem of the reference of the text. As 
a hermeneutician, Ricoeur goes beyond the semantic field to find the 
historical context, which is related to the reference of the discourse, in 
order to interpret the text as a mediation bet~en human beings and their 
world. This is precisely the point of the second moment of the 
hermeneutical circle, the dialectic of the historical context of the text 
and the reader. 
Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, p. 190). They guide the 
reader to identify the text through the phenomenon which Greimas calls the 
"plurilineal character of manifestation". 
(4-9) Cf. P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 71. 
(50) Quoted by M.-C. Escal1e in Equipo Cahiers Evangile (eds.), Iniciaci6n 
al Analfsis Estructural, p. 14-. 
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1.7 Explanation. 
If in his first approach to the text Ricoeur questioned the formal 
dimensions of composition, and found that Structuralism and the Semiotic 
Structural Analysis of Greimas provided him with a solid base, his pursuit 
of the reference of the text moves our author into another dialectic. The 
main question of this second hermeneutical moment is concerned with the 
text as history, and the tension produced by the historicity both of the 
text and the reader. Ricoeur, who has already asked "How does the text 
work?", will now ask "What does the text say 7". But before considering his 
answer to that question, we need to mention some aspects of the path from 
guessing to explanation. 
Ricoeur in his book Interpretation Theory, quotes E. D. Hirsch about the 
need to validate our guessin~ 
"The act of understanding is at first a genial (or a mistaken) guess, 
and there are no methods for making guesses, no rules for generating 
insights. The methodological activity of interpretation commences 
when we begin to test and criticize our guesses." (51). 
In the moment of guessing, of "naive understanding", the phenomenologist 
hermeneutician uses the epoch~, bracketing off or suspending of any 
Judgement upon the text. But because the discourse is the fixed expression 
(51) P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 99 (2). 
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of an event (and as such, opposite to language as a code or system), 
meaning becomes the paradox between what can be identified and what needs 
to be construed and therefore, guessing can only be validated by a 
dialectic between understanding (VerstKndnis) and explanation (Erkl!rung> 
(52). This is the field where the conflict of interpretations happen, and 
where Ricoeur argues for the need for arbitration. It is obvious then. that 
Ricoeur privileges the dialectic Explanation-Understanding, because in its 
relationship the reader is able to pass from a level of critical 
description of the text to another of interpretation. 
Returning to our question, "What does the text say?" we find ourselves 
struggling in the tension created by the text and its references, which is 
closely related to the process of understanding. For Ricoeur, to understand 
a discourse, means to follow a movement produced from sense to reference, 
from what the text says to apprehend a sense which is beyond the intention 
of the author and the reader's situation. Ricoeur distinguishes between two 
kinds of references, the ostensive one, which refers to the author's or 
reader's situation (the U~lt), and the non-ostensive one, which is the 
world opened to our eyes by the text, the revelation of new ways of being-
in-the-world (Welt). From the intersection between the ostensive and non-
ostensive references, produced by the tension confronting language and 
expression, the metaphor is born. 
(52) The dialectic Explanation-Interpretation constitutes what Ricoeur 
calls the hermeneutical arc. Both moments can be compared with "pillars" 
which support. the "bridge" or "arch" of hermeneutics. Cf. P. Ricoeur, "\Jhat 
is a text?" in "From Text to Act.ion", pp. 105 ff. For this point. concerning 
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1.7.1 Theory of the reference 
The balance which Ricoeur establishes between understanding and 
explanation. is the same when he considers the relation between the 
Naturwissenschaften and the Geistewissenschaften (Empirical and Human 
Sciences). It also implies that Ricoeur does not differentiate between 
different languages (scientific or common); on the contrary, Ricoeur has a 
wider, less parcelled concept of language than many of his predecesors. 
To study the dialectic sense-reference, (understanding "sense" as the 
"what" of the text, and "reference" as the "about what") Ricoeur uses the 
distinction between language and discourse of Emile Benveniste (53). 
Saussure, as we have already seen, privileged the place of Langue, as a 
system the unit of which is the sign. But Benveniste finds that farole also 
has a structure, and to express it he decides to use the term Discours 
(discourse). The unit of the discours is the sentence, and while in 
language we only find relations of difference, in the discourse we only 
distinguish references. The sign. as a form, is opposed to the synthetic 
value of the sentence; meaning is no longer the signified of a sign 
defined by opposition, but is related to the discourse through the 
the mediation of- explanation and understanding in the process of text 
interpretation cf. K. Vanhoozer, "Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of 
Paul Ricoeur", pp. 86-8. 
(53) For the present point cf. P. Ricoeur, "New Developments in 
Phenomenology in France: The Phenomenology of Language". in Social 
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sentence. Ricoeur is interested in the development of these ideas, and for 
that purpose he considers the work of Gottlob Frege and Husserl. 
Ricoeur follows Frege in the difference that the latter makes between sense 
(Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). In The Conflict of Interpretations 
Ricoeur writes: "It is in the instance of discourse that language has a 
reference. To speak is to say something about somethin~'. Quoting Frege's 
article Uber Sinn und Bedeutung, Ricoeur considers that the aim of language 
is constituted by "an ideal sense of meanin~' and by "the aim of 
reference", but it is the reference which takes us from the ideal meaning 
to reality. Frege says that every proper name is related to a sense which 
it expresses, although there is not always a correspondence between them, 
since sometimes we can find sense without reference. However, Frege sees a 
movement <drang) from the ideal sense to the real reference, and this is 
what Ricoeur considers our "exigency for truth" (das Streben nach 
Wahrheit), which can be compared with Husserl's Bedeutung and Erffillung 
(Reference and Fulfilment) of the Logical Investigations. According to 
Husserl, the relation between sense and reference is resolved through a 
fulfilment of the linguistic expressions, in an act which confers them 
sense. This is the act that goes from "the ideal ity of meaning to the 
reality of reference (or Erffillung)"; Ricoeur finds here an ontological 
proposition, because Husserl speaks about the role of language in reference 
to a pre-experiential level (a Lebenswelt or Life-World), which is previous 
t.o any experience of the relation subject-object. 
Research. 34, pp. 1-30. Also cf. P. Ricoeur, "The Question of the Subject". 
in The Conflict of Interpretations, pp. 326-66. 
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1.7.2 Theory Of Descriptions 
Ricoeur also mentions other philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and P. J. Strawson, in relation to a referential theory. 
Russell, in his article On Denoting (54), considers the question of 
existence in his Theory of Descriptions. The point of his theory is to show 
how an imperfect use of language has produced erroneous philosophical 
thoughts, which do not perform What, in his understanding, is the aim of 
Philosophy; this aim is to inform about the structure of the world. 
Russell makes a distinction between definite and non-definite descriptive 
propositions. In the first case, the descriptions do not have ambiguity, 
e.g. they start with the article "the"; in the second, they have indefinite 
pronouns and articles. The definite descriptions are, according to this 
theory, the ones which describe existence and nominate entities in a 
significative way. Russell's Ontology is concerned about the world's 
reality (sense-data) and the reality of other existences such as names, 
chimeras, etc. As a result of this theory, he establishes the dual 
character of the relation between "facts" (real descriptions) and "objects" 
(things) . 
Ricoeur finds that in Russell the facts belong to the objective world, and 
the distinction between facts and things (in the sphere of existence) is 
parallel to the dist.inction between sent.ences (in the s'Phere of language). 
-----
(54) Cf. B. Russell, "On Denoting", in Logic and Knowledge: Essays_J~Ql-
1950, pp. 39-56 
47 
Ricoeur finds here a lack of distinction between reference and 
signification, and a failure to understand the difference between the aims 
of ordinary and scientific language, which are those of communication and 
argumentation. He quotes Strawson's response to Russell's article, On 
Denoting', saying that "Language has a reference only when it is used" (55). 
Strawson considers that the sense of a sentence depends upon its context, 
and the reference has the power to make it false or true. Ricoeur says: "To 
refer is what the sentence does in a certain situation and according to 
certain use" (56), The act of refering is in itself. a "speech-event". 
Ricoeur also takes into account the ideas of Wittgenstein, whose ontology 
he considers of a "crystalline beauty" (57). Ricoeur considers that "to 
name", and "the word", are entities with an independent existence from the 
sentence. Proof of that, is the existence of dictionaries. But If the word 
(55) P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 20. 
(56) Ibid., p. 21. 
(57) Wittgenstein, using Plato's mimesis, finds a coincidence of structures 
between discourse and reality, as a kind of mirror-relation where the 
structure of the discourse "reflects" the structure of reality; this is 
basically, a relationship concerning true propositions and facts. In his 
Philosophical Investigations, Witt.genstein finds that in language the 
important thing is not signification in it.self, but rather the way we use 
terms, because it is not possible to understand the world outside the 
structure of language. Cf. P. Ricoeur. "Ontologie". in Encyclopaedia 
UniversaliSt XII, pp. 94-102. 
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has a meaning in itself, it is only a potential one, while the sentence 
carries out an actualised meaning of the word, thanks to the contextual 
frame provided by the sentence. This is what Ricoeur calls "the Semantic 
Capital" defined by the context. 
StHI, Ricoeur finds that the question "What does it means to refer to 
something,?" has not been resolved, and in order to do that he needs to 
study the structure of the discourse beyond names and descriptions. The 
theory of propositions of analytic philosophy, represented by Frege, 
Russell and Wi ttgenst. e in, is complemented by Ricoeur with the theory of the 
"Speech-Act" of I. L.Austin and I. Searle, and the "Theory of Intention" of 
P. Grice. These theories represent the fusion between pragmatism and 
semantics (58). 
(58) Ricoeur has considered the two functions upon which the the discourse 
is based. These functions are identification and predication. 
Identification has the aim of identifying singularities, for instance, the 
subject of a proposition. The second function, predication, links the 
subject with universals or classes; in this sense, it fulfills the purposes 
of classification. It is very important to distinguish here between the two 
functions in order to understand that universals can only be revealed 
through the subject, and in the singularity of identification. 
Identification is a logical and not a grammatical function, and as such it 
creates a problem which requires, apart from Linguistics, the work of the 
phenomenological reduction proposed by Husserl. What is identified exists 
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1.7.3 The Speech-Act Theory. 
Austin divided language into two categories: the constative and the 
performative. Constative expressions are descriptions, affirmations, while 
performatives are "utterances which themselves describe the speech-act 
which they perform" (59), The difference between constat i ve and performat i ve 
sentences is parallel to the difference between to say and to do. The acts 
of discourse do things with words, and Austin divides them into three 
categories or levels: the locutionary, the illocutionary and the 
perlocutionary acts. 
The Locutionary Act is the basic act of the discourse. It is equivalent to 
a sentence with signification. The Illocutionary Act, expresses an order, a 
wish, a promise, and the force of a proposition in general. The 
Perlocutionary Act, is what we produce with our speech, e.g. to convince or 
to threaten. Ricoeur says that this aspect is the least linguistic of the 
three mentioned. 
(the "potential existents" of Strawson), but Ricoeur wants to discover now 
which is the "linguistic place" of the ontological question; he already 
suspects that it is not in the "name", but in the sentence, and to 
investigate this point further, he turns t.o the Speech-Act theory of Austin 
and Searl e. 
(59) G. Leech, Semantics, p. 323. 
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Ricoeur finds in Austin's Speech-Act Theory the following implications for 
his own analysis: 
1) The illocutionary force is related to an ontological engagement. Both 
the constative and perforrnative make things with words, and the conclusion 
is that the illocutionary force is present in the discourse as a whole. 
Austin finds that "our being human lies in doing things with words." (60) 
2) There are two ontologies in the discourse: an ontology of facts and 
another of individuals or things. There are two theses then, a linguistic 
and an "extra-linguistic" one, which Ricoeur relates with the problem of 
sense and reference. 
3) Ricoeur finds in Austin and Searle's theory, that there is a reality in 
the same act of discourse, and that language, more than a mediator between 
human beings and the world, is a way of being in itself. 
Ricoeur considers that language is more than a mediator, it is an ~chanreur 
(shifter) "between two exigencies, an exigency of logicity which gives it a 
telos, and an exigency or foundation in the prepredicative which gives it 
an arch@." (61) This "pre-predicative" stage is Husserl's concept of 
Lebenswelt, a level of experience previous to the relationship subJect-
--------------------
(60) Cf. W. Cert, "Critical Review of How to Do Things with Words", in K. 
T. Fann <ed.) Symposium on J. L. Austin, p. 372. 
(61) M. J. Vald~s, Phenomenological Hermeneutics, p. 55. 
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object, and close to the horizon of the world, or the operative life (62). 
Merleau-Ponty, in his work The Visible and the Invisible, already foresaw 
language as an articulation of the Lebenswelt, as a pre-logical and pre-
verbal stage. Only through a retrospective enquiry (RUckfrage), would ~ be 
able to understand this field of meaning previous to the subject of the 
Theory of Knowledge, and previous to the objectivity represented by the 
constitution of the mathematical nature since Galileo. 
It is in this search for the kind of language which will help us to reveal 
the Lebens~lt., that Ricoeur goes to the study of the poetic text. finding 
as Heidegger did, that it is the onl y I anguage with the po~r "to say" our 
being. It is in this context that Ricoeur dedicated himself to the 
investigation of the metaphor, "the poetic text in miniature", which will 
guide us to discover the richness and deepness hidden in the symbol. 
1.7.~ The theory of the metaphor. The Living Metaphor. 
Merleau-Ponty, in his study entitled Ph~nom~nologie de la Perception. 
presents a linguistic position which can be considered an early challenge 
to Structuralism. Basically, Merleau-Ponty locates language in a central 
(62) In relation to Ricoeur's reflections on Merleau-Ponty, see for 
instance P. Ricoeur "Language (Philosophy)" in Encyclopaedia Universal is, 
pp. 771-78. Also cf. P. Ricoeur. Husserl. an analysis of His Phenomenolo~. 
pp. 209 ff. 
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position, and finds that the discourse is the place where the Lebenswelt, 
or the stage of the "pre-reflexive" is manifested in a "reflexive" moment. 
Although Merleau-Ponty died before developing a further criticism on 
Structuralism, which advocated the closure of the text to any pre-
theoretical sphere, Ricoeur continues this challenge, through his Semantics 
of the Metaphor (63). 
For Ricoeur the task then is to find the appropriate language, a language 
which can convey enough freedom in order to allow the expression of the 
Lebens~lt. This language, according to Heidegger, is poetry, the only one 
(63) Cf. P. Ricoeur, The Rule of the Metaphor. Ricoeur starts considering 
the metaphor as part of the "Art of Rhetoric", and he discuss Aristotle's 
"Poetics". where the philosopher defines metaphors first of all in terms of 
transferences of meaning in words, and second, by the use of comparative 
images. Here the metaphor is the "trope" (from Latin tropus, or figurative 
use of a word and the Greek tropos/trepe in, "styl e/to turn" >. But Ri coeur 
finds that here the metaphor is located in the field of words, of "the 
connotative". which in his opinion does not give place to any semantic 
innovation and therefore, does not convey any new information concerning 
reality; this aspect of "innovation of meanin~' is, precisely, what Ricoeur 
wants to explore. and for this purpose he considers the work of modern 
Semantics, starting with Richards, whom he considers a pioneer in the 
development of the modern theory of metaphor. See also S. Meitinger 
"Between plot and metaphor: Ricoeur's poetics applied on t.he specificity of 
the poem", in Philosophy and Social Criticism, 14: 2, p. 161. 
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which can give us a glimpse of being. Ricoeur quotes Monroe Beardley's 
definition ot metaphor as "A text in miniature", and dedicates himself to 
the study of the history of the theory of metaphor, considering the works 
of Beardley, Max Black, I. A. Richards, Colin Turbayne, Philip Wheelright 
and Nelson Goodman and others. 
1. 7.5 I. A. Richards' "Theory of the Discourse" 
In his essay Creativity in language (64), Ricoeur writes that Richards has 
characterized the rhetoric metaphor theory as a "substitution theory". 
This theory consists in restoring to the reader a word already substituted 
by the author, and therefore the metaphor fulfills only a decorative role, 
because the information carried by the word used, and the word restored is 
the same. Metaphor is then a way to relate two ideas concerned with 
different objects, in a word or sentence; it is interesting to notice that 
such a relationship keeps the different ideas in a sort of dialectical 
tension, but preserving and respecting both of them. Richards considers 
that in a met.aphor, there are two aspects present at the same time: the 
"tenor" (the underlying subject of the metaphorical word) and the "vehicle" 
(the metaphorical word itself), Ricoeur considers that the tension of the 
metaphor does not happen at the level of t.he terms of the utterance, but 
(64) P. Ricoeur, "Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor"" in The 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. An Anthology of His Work, pp. 120-33. 
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between the "opposed interpret.ation of the utterance". He put.s the 
following examples of metaphors to analysis: "Blue Angelus" and "Mantle of 
Sorrows", and finds that in a literal interpretation. there is an element 
of absurdity present. Ricoeur says: 
"The angelus is not blue, if blue is a color; sorrow is not a mantle 
if the mantle is a garment made of cloth. Thus a metaphor does not 
exist in itself, but in and through an interpretation." (65) 
In this interpretation, Ricoeur finds an extension of meaning which help us 
to understand what, if considered in a literal way, may be seen as absurd. 
Ricoeur sees the metaphor in the semantics of the sentence and not in the 
word, as in the "substitution theory" which'Ne have already considered. He 
finally finds in Black other useful perspectives about the tenor/vehicle 
concept from Richards (66) . 
. -----------------
(65) P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 50. 
(66) Max Black Black's System of Implication considers the literal 
interpretation of the metaphor as a "contradiction". Black points out two 
aspects of the metaphorical sentence: the metaphorical word and its 
contrasting context. As an epistemologist and as a logician. Black works 
over the concept tenor/vehicle, which he replaces by the focus/frame 
relationship. According to this model, the metaphor is considered in the 
sentence; there is a specific word which makes a metaphorical statement, 
which "focalises", e.g. brings to the mind the meanings organised in "a 
system of associated commonplaces" (M. Black, Models and Metaphor, p. (2). 
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1.7.6 Monroe Beardsley: The role of Logical Absurdity. 
Beardsley's literary criticism of the metaphor contains two basic points. 
which Ricoeur considers important in order to resolve the problem of the 
metaphorical process. 
These points are the role of logical absurdity and the metaphorical twist. 
1) The role of logical absurdity: 
This is a basic, pivotal concept, and refers to the "clash between meanings 
within the same context" (67). Black's model of tenor/vehicle is replaced 
The sentence, to which this metaphorical word -focus- belongs, is the 
frame, the place for contrasts and filtering of some meanings at the 
expense of others. It is important to recall that the focus also works as a 
filter, organising and selecting our perception of the frame. Ricoeur, in 
his essay Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics, finds that Black's 
theory can reduce the metaphorical process to the "system of associated 
conunonpl aces" and therefore, curtail s the freedom and creativity which 
Ricoeur is looking for. He then tries to explore what Black has called the 
"specially constructed system of implications" (Cf. M. Black., op. cit., 
pp. 4-8 ff.), emphasising the "constructed aspect" of the model, since it 
implies interaction, creation, and leads us to the novelty of meaning, 
beyond the limitations of a system based on the psychological association 
of commonplaces. Cf. P. Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the Main Problems of 
Hermeneutics" in The Philosophy of P. Ricoeur, p. 134.-48. 
(67) P. Ricoeur. op. cit., p. 140. 
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by the notion of modifier/subject. The primary meaning of the modifier, 
e.g. what is predicated of the subJect, is in a contradictory tension -or 
"logical emptiness"- with the primary meaning of the subject. Beardsley, in 
his book Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism says that "in 
poetry the chief tactic for obtaining this resul t is that of logical 
absurdity" (68). The reader then needs to produce a new, secondary meaning 
in order to make meaningful the absurdity of the contradiction. 
2) The "Metaphorical Twist": 
The reader is then confronted by the event of a new meaning, which is 
independent of the intention of the author, but dependent of the 
interaction betweeen subject/modifier. Ricoeur finds that the "Metaphorical 
Twist" of Beardsley is related to the reader's construction of a novel 
meaning through the confrontation of two interpretations of the same 
statement. The hidden kinship of the word's connotations are established in 
a process of selection and discrimination. 
1. 7.7 II Image and Resembl ance": 
Ricoeur finds that Beardley's theory does not use any reference to the 
image function in the metaphorical process. In fact, he observes that the 
Anglo-Saxon interaction theory does not consider the place of an image or 
figure at all. Both image and resemblance have been associated with the 
-----------._-------
(68) M. Beardley, Aesthetics; Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, p. 
138. 
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substitution theory already mentioned, but Ricoeur still considers that 
they are central elements of the metaphorical process, and that it is 
necessary to reconcile and to investigate their dialectical relationship. 
In The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur organises his thesis upon the work of 
resemblance in four main points, which we will briefly mention here: 
1) Resemblance is a necessary notion for a tension theory, even more 
necessary than in a sUbstitution theory. The concept of "logical 
contradiction" requires that what is distanced must be drawn near, showing 
a relation of kinship through the work of the predicate. 
2) Although resemblance is shown through the work of the predicate, it also 
constitutes the predicate. Ricoeur uses here the work of Phillip 
Wheelwright (69), to show two elements which are part of a metaphor: 
Epiphora and Diaphora. The first, following Aristotle's idea, is related to 
an intuitive process in which alien ideas are assimilated and transferred; 
the second, is the constructive or discursive moment of the metaphor. 
3) According to this, Ricoeur sees that the metaphor is a semantic fact, 
instead of a psychological one. The originality of Ricoeur's thought lies 
in the aspect that he sees the production of resemblance as coming from the 
core of every genre, in the origin of every semantic process. There is 
(69) cr. P. Wheelwright, Metaphor and Reality. 
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something in the metaphorical process which produces changes. and this is 
also closely related with the way language in general works. In this sense 
he agrees with Gadamer, who sees the metaphor as the origin of logical 
thought. Thus Ricoeur says: "(the metaphor is) the genetic phenomenon 
par excellence in the realm of the instance of discourse." (70) 
t) If the metaphor is the union of the epiphoric and the diaphoric. 
intuition and discourse, then it is also image and verb. Mentioning Paul 
Henle's "iconic theory" and Michel Le Guern's "associated image", Ricoeur 
considers the tension between a "bad psychology", and a semantic analysis. 
His dialectical approach once more produces a new synthesis, finding the 
role of a creative imagination in the process of the metaphor. In this way 
he incorporates the image into the semantic theory, because resemblance is 
in fact an image, "depicting abstract relationships." (71) 
Ricoeur agrees with Beardsley saying that not only sentences, but the text 
itself has a sense and a reference, a connotation and a denotation which 
somehow are outside language. There are multiple meanings, and the metaphor 
is a text of an ambiguous discourse. This ambiguity of the text, is the 
equivalent to the plurivocity of the sentence and the polysemy of the word. 
The "cumulative" characteristic of the polysemy constitutes for Ricoeur an 
important aspect of the theory of the metaphor, in relation with the 
production of novel meanings. 
(70) P. Ricoeur. The Rule of Metaphor, p. 198. 
(71) Ibid., pp. 198 ff. 
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Ricoeur considers what he calls "the case against reference" and finds the 
two basic positions in relation with sense and reference. First of all, 
there is a suspension of reference in relation to literature; for some 
people tor instance, "poetry" is the "Counter-example of the referencial 
relationship of language" (72). Others see the suspension of the reference 
in all literary genres, and not only in poetry. Ricoeur considers the 
relation between sense/reference and sense/reality (or truth), and says 
that without a reference, poetry becomes subJective, a fact which he 
criticises as originating in Positivism. He needs then to find more about 
the referential role in the metaphor, and for that purpose he studies 
Goodman's theory. 
1.7.8 Nelson Goodman: Reverse Reference. 
Goodman, in his work Languages of Art, starts considering all verbal and 
non verbal-operations (pictures or statues, for example) from a referential 
perspective (73). Basically, he considers that a piece of music, a dance, 
or a written discourse, refer us to the organisation of the world, and that 
there is a re-creative aspect in such reference. Goodman establishes a 
relation between the symbolic operation of the metaphor- the re-creative 
aspect- and the symbolic operation of the denotation. "Denotation" is in 
this context a concept similar to "reference", or a "first label" as 
(72) P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 221. 
(73) For this point cf. P. Ricoeur "Metaphor and Reference" in The Rule of 
Metaphor, pp. 216 ft. 
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Goodman calls it. This labellng or denotation is produced through the 
transference of predicates or "properties". from one field to another. An 
example of this. can be found in relation with colours: if we say "blue", 
and we see "blue". we are passing from the symbol (the word) to the object 
(the colour). This is to label, or to denote something. Object are not the 
only ones capable of denotation but "events" are denoted too. The 
denotation of nature is related to the re-creation of reality. 
When the predicate goes in an opposite direction from the example which we 
have seen, starting with the object. in this case the colour blue, and 
passing to the symbol (the word "blue"), we are presenting an example 01 a 
property that something or someone possesses. Goodman calls this process 
"sampling". and establishes that in this case. the predicate does not 
denote but exemplifies. What happens then with the reference in this 
process of exemplification? According to Goodman, reference and property 
coincide. A grey picture exemplifies. or possesses "greyness". but at the 
same time is denoted by the property of "greyness" to express sadness. 
Goodman calls this type of reference, a "reverse reference", and Ricoeur 
comments that the theory of the metaphor can be bound "solidly to the 
theory of reference, I inked by transference of a relation ... " (7,(,), The 
transference is one of possession. which is exemplification. For Ricoeur 
then, a metaphor is a kind of exemplification, e.g. the sadness expressed 
by the painting is a metaphor. 
---------
(7,(,) P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 23,(,. 
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From his analysis on Goodman's theory, Ricoeur takes the following points: 
a) Poetry has a referential function. Ricoeur says that "Metaphorical 
reference ... consists in the effacement of descriptive reference." (75) 
b) Sounds. ill\ages and feelings (called "sensa") are not descriptions but 
representations. They do not denote. but exemplify. In this sense, the 
poetic reference is as real as the reference of a scientific discourse. 
c) The metaphoric language "make and remake" the world. 
d) Poetic language is concerned with truth, and Ricoeur thinks that there 
is an "interweaving" action between historic and poetic references. This 
happens through the temporality of human actions. 
In this second moment of the hermeneutical circle, we have seen how Ricoeur 
investigates a dialectic of meaning in the past and in the present, through 
the study of the problem of the reference of the text. But the historicity 
of the text is in a conflictive relation with the historicity of the 
reader. For this reason, Ricoeur wants to ask about the nature of the text 
as experienced. in a dialectic text/reader and text/author. The main 
question for the following moment of the hermeneutical circle will be "What 
is the text saying to me, in relation with the experience of the 
, communi ty' of readers?" 
(75) For this point cf. P. Rlcoeur, op. cit, p. 238 ff. Also Time and 
Narrative, I, pp. 80-6. 
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1.8 Understanding. 
The two main principles of a phenomenological hermeneutics are concerned 
with the meaning of the text and with a different model of textual 
communication. The first means that any question to the text must be, 
basically, a question about its meaning, taking into account the history, 
the formal aspects of the text, and the reader's own reflections (76). The 
second, changes the traditional model which relates writer, text and reader 
in the mentioned order, to a model of "parallel relations" between 
writer/text and text/reader. This is the model which Ricoeur uses to 
analyse the relation established between the reader, the text and the 
community of readers in "Narrated Time", the fourth part of the volume 
three of Time and Narrative. 
1.8.1 The World of the Text and the World of the Reader. 
In his work The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur studies Aristotle's definitions 
of the concepts of mimesis and muthos, as presented in his Poetics. 
Aristotle defined mirn@sis as "an imitation of human actions" and finds 
that poetry, especially in the superior form of tragedy, fulfils this role 
of imitation of human life. It is important to recall here that for 
Arist.otle "imitation" is a concept of product.ion, as for instance, in the 
work of "resemblance". But every tragedy, according to the Poetics, is 
(76) Cf. J. M. Vald~s. Phenomenological Hermen_~_t)tics and the St~4y of 
Literature, p. 60. 
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composed of six different parts which Ricoeur mentions as ..... Fable or Plot 
(muthos), Characters (@th@), Diction (lexis), Thought (dianoia), Spectacle 
(opsis) and Melody (melopoia)". Of all these parts. muthos is the central 
one; its functions are the organisation of the poem and the work of 
coherence necessary for the arrangement of characters. Muthos (or myth) is 
in a way, mimesis, and it is also a pOi@sis (a making), because of its 
creative function. As mimesis is a re-description of reality (77). Ricoeur 
finds that in the relation muthos/mim@sis of the poi@sis. lies a tension 
between imitation of reality and creativity or between heuristic fiction 
and re-description of models. These concepts enrich Ricoeur's investigation 
about metaphors; there is a parallelism between the "elevation of meaning" 
in the myth, at the level of the poem, and the "elevation of meaning in the 
metaphor at the I evel of the word [I exis]" (78). 
In the first volume of Time and Narrative, Ricoeur returns to the concept 
of mimesis, in an elaboration of what he calls "Mimesis 3'" He tells us 
that "Mimesis 1" is an elaboration made from a pre-figured structure of 
human experience, and "Mimesis a", is the creation of a text by an author. 
"Mimesis ;," then, is the re-configuration of what the author has created in 
the text (Mimesis .>. 
Ricoeur now wants to study how the narrative configuration could be related 
to the reconfiguratlon of temporal experience. Following our author's 
(77) P. Rlcoeur. op. cit., p. 35. 
(78) Ibid., p. 41. 
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elaboration in Part IV of Time and Narrative (Vol. III), we find this 
definition of time: "(Historical Time> is a reinscription of lived time on 
cosmic time" (79); this means for Ricoeur that history constructs 
reconfigurations which "stand for" or "take the place of" the events of the 
past. Speaking about what he considers "the interweaving of history and 
fiction", Ricoeur proposes the overlapping of the "quasi-historical 
character of fiction" and the "quasi-fictive character of the historical 
past" (80), and shows how this work of re-configuration (Mimesis ~) is 
perceived through the interrelation between the world of the text and the 
world 01 the reader. 
1. 8. 2 The "Reader-Response Theory." 
Ricoeur looks now for a theory which emphasises the role of the reader, an 
"aesthetic theory" in contrast with a "rhetoric of persuasion" where the, 
reader is a more passive element. The text affects the reader, and to 
analyse this process, Rfcoeur investigates the Reader-Response Theory of 
the German Aesthetics 01 the University of Constance, represented mainly by 
the work of Woltang Iser and Hans Robert Jauss. 
Iser, in his book. The Act of Reading~ A Theory of Aesthetic Res~n~~. 
------------------
(79) P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. III, p. 99. 
(60) Ibid., p. 191. 
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establishes that every literary text represent.s a perspect.ive 01 the world 
organised by its author; t.he text is a construction and not a copy (or 
imitation, in a Platonic sense) of the world, and it does not. need to 
convey an original perspective from the author. Usually what the t.ext 
carries is a recompilation of the perspective of the author's historical 
time. The role of the reader is one of participation in the production and 
understanding of a text because the written discourse has an element of 
indeterminacy, which forces the reader to communicate with it, and to 
complete the text. Such indeterminacy is the consequence of the text's lack 
of a concrete referent, and Iser compares the written discourse with an 
"iconic sign", which designates "the conditions of conception and 
perception", and facilitates t.he reader's construction of the text -and 
referents- in his/her own mind. It. is because of such a lack of concrete 
referents, that Iser sees the work in the interrelation between the 
language of the text and the reader's consciousness. This consciousness 
actualises the potential of the linguistic signs. Iser says that a novel 
has the power to represent "thought systems" due t.o this characteristic of 
"suspended reference", which do not anull a mimetic function, e.g. a 
relation of resemblance, similarity and difference in the text. 
Ricoeur considers that the most important concept of Iser is that of 
"wandering Viewpoint". By wandering viewpoint, Iser means the changes of 
perspectives or broken "threads of the plots" (81), which are the new 
introductions offered by the narrative to the reader. According to Ricoeur, 
------------------
(81) P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 112. 
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this concept "expresses the t~fold fact that the whole of a text can never 
be perceived at once and that, placing ourselves in the literary text, we 
travel with it as our own reading progresses" (82). It means that the 
reading process involves a play between expectations, anticipations, and 
modification of memories, something that Ricoeur finds very similar to 
Husserl's description of the two main phenomena of Phenomenology of Time: 
the relation between "retention" (primary memory) and "protention" 
(expectation) . 
Iser has based his investigations on the ~rk of Roman Ingarden, a Polish 
philosopher who studied with Husserl, and who tried to use the 
phenomenological method to overcome the distinctions between object and 
subj ect (e. g. the mat er i al and the mental worl d), through a careful 
examination of consciousness and the object of consciousness at the same 
time. Ingarden defines the text as "one object presented to consciousness". 
Ricoeur mentions Ingarden's understanding about the "incompleteness" of a 
literary text as follows (83): 
1> The text is incomplete because it only offers schematic views that the 
reader must complete or "concretize". Ingarden uses the term "places of 
i ndetermi nacy" whi ch the reader must "f ill out". 
(82) P. Ricoeur. Time and Narrative, vol. III, p. 168. 
(83) Cf. P. Ricoeur, "A Phenomenology and a Aesthetic of Reading" in ~ 
cit., pp. 166 ff. 
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2) The incompleteness of the text is also related to the "ordered sequence 
of sentences" (intentionale Satzltorrelate) , which gives to the text "a 
quasi-temporal 'extension' from heginning to end". Ricoeur finds here 
another relationship between the concept of a "chain of sentences" and the 
Husserlian idea of protention/retention. Protention is the equivalent to 
quasi-temporal 'extension' from beginning to end". Ricoeur finds here 
another relationship between the concept of a "chain of sentences" and the 
Husserlian idea of protention/retention. Protention is the equivalent to 
the function of anticipation of the sentence, while the function of 
retention is fulfilled by the primary memory of the mentioned chain; in 
terms of reading, hoth terms refer to the process of modification of 
expectations and transformation of memories in the sentence. 
1. 8. 2.1 The dialectics of the "vital experience." 
Ricoeur considers three main dialectics which are the characteristics of a 
reader-response theory, and those responsible for a "vital experience" 
(exp6rience vive) on the reader's side. These dialectics are: 
1) Dialectic of "Discordance-Concordance": Reading becomes a "drama of 
discordant concordance", because the places of indeterminacy are the result 
of a strategy of frustration of the text. meaning by that the reader's 
necessity to provide the configuration of the world, while the text 
"frustrates" his/her expectations of obtaining an immediate one. 
2) Dialectic of "Determinacy-Indeterminacy": Apart from its indeterminacy, 
the text has an excess of meaning, which makes it inexhaustible from the 
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reader's point of view. There is a permanent tension in every text between 
a lack of determinacy and an excesive richness which is provided by the 
work of the reader. 
3) Dialectic of "Famll iarity-Discovering": The reader, in his/her search 
for the coherence of the text, could find him/herself becoming "famil iar" 
with the work, or as Ricoeur says "on an equal footing with the work" 
("believing" in it). This makes an illusion of the act of concretizing 
(Konk.retisation - realisation), but on the other hand, if the reader cannot 
find coherence in the WTitten discourse, s/he will never became familiar 
with the work. "The right reading" then, is according to Ricoeur "The one 
that admits a certain degree of 111 usion" but al so accepts the excess of 
meaning (or polysemanticism) of the text (84), key for a creative 
i nterpretat ion. 
1.8.3 Hans Robert Jauss: The Collective Horizon. 
Iser has studied the relationship of the text with the individual reader, 
who is considerd by him as the co-creator of a text, because slhe needs to 
supply the implied -not written- meaning of the work. Jauss, in his work 
Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, organises his theory in a hermeneutic of 
a more collective horizon. Yet, Ricoeur does not find contradictions 
between them, but a complementary role of an individual/public approach to 
the process of reading. According to him, the individual reading manifests 
(84) P. Rtcoeur, Ope cit., p. 169. 
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the "structure of appeal" of the text, but the act of reading is always 
related to the historic expectations of past. readers and their own 
reception of the text. Ricoeur finds here the necessity of establishing a 
phenomenology of reading, to enlighten certain aspects such as the relation 
between the "hnplied reader" (the reader 1'01 e that the text in :t tsel f has 
established> and the "implied author" (the styl e of the work). 
To explore this relation, Ricoeur takes us now into the consideration of 
Sauss' theory. Jauss has rejected the idea of the fixed meaning of the 
text, and he has searched for an explanation to the question of different 
readings in history. Basically, he relates such differences to two notions, 
the paradigm and the horizon of expectations. The "paradigm" refers to the 
fact that writers and readers belong to certain historical periods, in 
which certain assumptions about literature and literary conventions existed 
and were shared by the authors and the readers. These assumptions were also 
part of a context, where some expectations prevailed over others, although 
there are writers and readers who work outside such horizons. They are 
usually the ones who contribute to future expectations, although their 
ideas are not necessarily understood in their own historical time. Jauss 
explains the changes in literary history through the concepts of a "shared 
set of assumptions" and by the rejection of an horizonal framework. 
1.8.3.1 Basic thesis of the Response Theory. 
Ricoeur mentions what he considers the basic thesis of the response theory 
in Jauss' Aesthetics, in the following way: 
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1> Basically, the production of meaning in a text rests upon the dialogical 
(dialogisch) relation created by the public who read the text in their own 
different historical moments. 
2) There is a "trans-subjective horizon of comprehension" (85), which acts 
by conditioning the "effect" produced by the t.ext. (Wirkung). To put it in 
other words, all the references of a text, as they were thought by the 
public in the past., need to be recognised in order to be able to understand 
the sense of the work. To take such references into account is what lauss 
calls the restoring of the horizon of expectations. It is interesting to 
remember here that Husserl defined temporal experience by the word 
"horizon", and Jauss is using the aforementioned concept in the primary 
sense of "the experience of the first readers of a work". (86) 
:n The concepts of "effects" of a text, and "history of effect" (Gadamer), 
together with the idea of "horizons of expectations", are compl emented with 
a logic of question and answer, in which Jauss follows Gadamer and R. G. 
Collingwood, in his book. The Idea of History. Jauss considers that every 
text replies to a question, and understanding depends on the way the answer 
Is articulated by the reader. Ricoeur adds here that this response 
"mediated between the past and the present" (87), or in other words, that 
there is an historical mediation in the reception of a work.. 
(85) cr. H. R. Jauss, pour une Estetiqtle de la Reception, p. 14. 
(86) (87) P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 172. 
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!) Jauss opposes Gadamer's concept of Classicism in Truth and Method. This 
is related to the "consciousness of the perennial, of the inalienable 
sense, which Is independent of all temporal circumstances." (88) 
According to Jauss, in the classical works there is only a "temporary" but 
not permanent hold up of the dialogical relation public/text. The contrary 
is, in his own words, "an abusive interpretation" (89; my translation) 
where the characteristics of openness of history are denied, in the same 
way that the creative aspects of the logic of questions and answers are 
suppressed (e.g. the answers of an early work should produce more 
questioning, and new responses too). Still, Ricoeur remarks that in 
Literary History we need to consider the classical works as "references", 
temporarily estabilised (on a diachronic level) but producing integration 
in the synchroniC moment of reception. 
Ricoeur finds in Jauss' thesis a certain creativity, which makes him 
criticise the structural ist position (the "narrow" text without reference) 
and the dogmatic Marxist position which moves everything into the social 
plane. The creative function of the text is done only on the public level, 
through the aesthetic distance existing between the horizon of expectations 
of literature and everyday life to which it is confronted. Ricoeur 
discovers here the "efficacy" of literature: to put the reader in a 
situation where s/he can find his/her own answers, to the questions opened 
by the text. A Literary Hermeneutics needs to work in the three stages of 
(88) H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 272. 
(89) H. R. Jauss, Ope cit., p. 105. 
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understanding. explanation and application; these aspects are related to 
each other and application cannot be privileged above the others, otherwise 
our approach becomes superficial. Finally, Ricoeur presents us with a 
synthesis of the process of reading and its reception, according to what we 
have already considered, in the form of a structure of inmediate 
understanding. 
1.8.3.2 Structure of immediate understanding. 
First Reading: The first reading is a nafve one (although Ricoeur doubts 
about its "innocence"); it is governed by the epochal tendencies of the 
text. 
Second Reading: A distance with the text is established; the reader has new 
expectations, and the work of the logic Question/Answer begins. The reader 
needs to choose an interpretation, excluding others, and doing that s/he 
gives place to a "certain partiality" in the interpretation. 
Elucidation. 
The "certain partiality" produced requires a work of elucidation. This is 
done through a third re-reading. 
Third Reading: This is a moment of verification. The limits and conditions 
derived from the historical horizon of the text need to be questioned. The 
difference of horizons is then clarified, and this process generates more 




Although the expectations from the first and second readings still 
continue, the historical reading, which answers the question "What did the 
text say?", is now under the frame of a more hermeneutical question. "What 
does the text say to me and what do I say to the text?" (90), The following 
question is, according to Ricoeur, the one concerning the applicability of 
this schema, and this will lead us to the last part of the Hermeneutical 
Circle, the moment of Appropriation (Aneignung). 
1.9 Appropriation. 
1.9.1 Ricoeur's shift of emphasis in the Hermeneutical Circle. 
The idea of the hermeneutical circle in Ricoeur comes from Heidegger's 
ideas, as expressed in Part II of Being and Time. Heidegger considers here 
the movement of an ontology of understanding, where we are able to perceive 
the being only in the moment of interpretation. There is a sense of 
circularity, concerning the understanding of the text and the understanding 
of oneself, and this is basically where the image "hermeneutical circle" 
comes from. There are common aspects in all the definitions of 
hermeneutical circles, from the ones conceived by the Romantics to Ricoeur. 
but there are differences too. For instance, when Schleiermacher uses the 
circle, he refers to the relation established between two subjectivities, 
the author and the reader; to understand the text is to understand the mind 
(90) P. Ricoeur, op. cit .. p. 175. 
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of the author, the other, by means of the projection of the reader's 
subjectivity into the reading. But Ricoeur, although not ruling out the 
hermeneutical circle as such, reformulates its concept, in accordance with 
his own shift of emphasis in understanding. 
Ricoeur does not consider the understanding of the other, but of the world. 
The circle then does not belong anymore to the psychological level of 
intersubJectivities, but to the semantical process of textual 
interpretation. The hermeneutical project of Ricoeur relates to two 
discourses: the discourse of the text and the discourse of interpretation. 
considering here the moment of appropriation. not as a proJection of the 
reader but as a fusion of different horizons. 
1.9.2 The Hermeneutical Arc. 
Ricoeur, in his essay entitled What is a text?, says that the moment of 
appropriation should be "postponed until the end of the process" (91). 
Appropriation is then the "last pillar" of a process of interpretation, 
which Ricoeur calls "the hermeneutical arc" (arc hermeneutique); in this 
"arc" (or "arch"), explanation and understanding are two pillars, 
integrated in the reading of a text (92). This is part of the process of 
(91) The French word "arc" can be transl ated as arch or as arc. Cf. P. 
Ricoeur, "What is a Text?" in D. Rasmussen Mythic-sylnbolic Language and 
Philosophical Antrhopology, p. 150. 
(92) The dialectic explanation-understanding of Ricoeur has a deep 
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"making one's own" the sense and meaning of the work. Both expl anation and 
understanding are the pillars where the hermeneutical arc rests. 
Understanding is non-methodical, it is a "guessing" concerned with the 
semantics of the text, because through them the work becomes truly alive; 
explanation, on the other hand, involves a methodology, an analysis seeking 
to explain what is being understood, and to understand what is explained in 
a dialectical way. As Ricoeur himself says " ... explanation (erkIKren) 
requires understanding (verstehen) and ( ... ) understanding brings forth in 
a new way the inner dialectic, which constitutes interpretation as a 
whole." (93) 
1.9.3 The Mechanism of Distanciation 
We will consider now how Gadamer's thought has had an influence on Ricoeur, 
studying their coincidences and divergences in relationship with 
influence from Gadamer, although there are also many points of divergence 
between both thinkers. Gadamer developed a hermeneutics based in the 
dialectic of distance and participation. By "participation" Gadamer means 
an ontological participation (Zugeh6rigkeit), which implies the relation 
between things and their being (the object/subject relation of distance). 
He returns to the discussion of Dilthey about the status of Epistemology in 
Natural Science, and finds that scientific objectivity is based in a 
distanciation between Being and participation; in Gadamer the ontology of 
Heidegger and the epistemological quest of the Romantics seem to be 
combined. 
(93) P. Ricoeur. Interpretation Theory, p. 86. 
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appropriation of meaning in interpretation. Ricoeur divides the function of 
distanciation in t~ parts, a cultural and a methodological one. The 
cultural (or temporal) aspect of distanciation, is related to the fact that 
the text has lost its immediate authority; all the ~rk developed by 
Ricoeur around the Judeo-Christian symbology and the function 01 the myth 
in the Christian tradition comes from his confrontation with this problem. 
The second aspect, method, has received the influence of Gadamer's thought 
in Truth and Method. Basically, the thesis of Gadamer's masterpiece is that 
methods destroy the reality of life; one should opt for one or the ot.her, 
method or truth, because understanding can never be reduced to a technique. 
Methods, according to Gadamer, produce an al ienating distance wit.h t.he 
t.ext, objectifying it. 
Ricoeur disagrees with Gadamer on this point, because he wants to rethink 
the hermeneutical problem created by distanciation. Doing so, Ricoeur finds 
that far from alienating, the aforementioned function performs a very 
necessary aspect such as the preservation of the text.. The mechanism of 
distanciation then, according to Ricoeur, happens in the following way 
(94) : 
First Distanciation: 
The first distanciation is t.he one produced in the act of taking dist.ance 
---------
(94) cr. P. Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation" in From 
Text to Action, p. 75 fl. Ricoeur wants to leave behind what he understand 
is the Gadamerian antinomy between distanciation-belonging, which is also 
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from the event: it happens in the speech-act (event of the discourse) and 
it Is manifested in the ambiguity of the text, which requires 
i nterpretat ion. 
Second Distanciation: 
The second moment of distanciation, is related to langtlage; the text has 
been preserved by langl1age, but at the same time it has become de-
contextualised. Such de-contextualisation requires a hermeneutic process, 
in order to understand the work; at the same time, it perforns the function 
of keeping the "openess" of the text. This "opene-ss" is the key to new 
interpretations, and to the creative aspect of re-readlng in general. 
Third Distanciation: 
Distanciation is, according to Ricoeur, the element which helps the text in 
it.s function of re-descrihing reality, the "world of the text" (remembering 
that "text" is an extended concept in Ricoeur). It Is in this world of the 
text where a third distanciation movement appears: "a distanciation of the 
an antimony between truth and method. Gadamer thinks that we should opt tor 
a method (thus losing ontological density in interpretation) or tor truth 
(rennouncing to the claim of objectivity made by human sciences). Against 
this antinomy, Ricoeur considers that truth is no longer relate to the 
dicotomy I obJ ect--subJ ect'. but can be found instead in the text and in the 
interpreter appropriation of its meaning. Cf. also P. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics 
and the Human Sciences. pp. 162 ff. 
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real from itself" (95). In this new distanciation Ricoeur sees the 
importance of fictional narrative. which supresses the famll iar or "first 
reference", and gives place to a different sort of reference. The new 
reference is related to the resurgence of the Lebenswelt mentioned by 
Husserl or the "being-in-the-world", using Heidegger's terms. 
1.9.( Fusion of Horizons. 
Gadamer sees human beings in their location in History. The historical 
consciousness is the "consciousness of the history of effects" 
(wirKungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein) and this implies the awareness of 
knowing how our interpretations are conditioned by our historical setting. 
This historicity of interpretation means that no observation can be 
neutral, since it is closely related t.o a previous understanding on the 
side of the interpreter. According to Gadamer, we are never free of the 
past and although he does not consider the past as an object of 
observation, he sees how it affects us; the consequence of this argument is 
that historical existence has priority over reflection. Ricoeur disagrees 
with Gadamer in this aspect, becauses he sees Gadamer as following Dilthey 
in an opposition between explanation (related to the human sciences) and 
understanding (concerned with the physical sciences). 
Gadamer uses the term "horizon" to describe the contextuality of 
(95) P. Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutical Function of the Human Sciences", in 
From Text to Action", p. 86. 
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Interpretation. The interpreter cannot be separated from his/her own 
horizon (von-sich-absehen). but the text itself has Its own horizon too. In 
order to understand the past, the horizon of the present must include the 
one of the past: this is the "fusion of horizons" (Horizontwerschmeltzung, 
literally "a wiping away of horizons"), a broadening and focusing function 
which results in the creation of a new horizon, where "the world horizon of 
the reader is fused with the world horizon of the writer" (96). 
The relation between the past and present horizons is in a dialectical 
tension, and it is the key for understanding our history and our present. 
1.9.5 Appropriation and the fusion of horizons. 
However, the fusion of horizons is not appropriation, neither is the 
concept of application (or Anwendun~). Anwendung, according to Gadamer. is 
not the final aspect of interpretation (as in Ricoeur) but an implicit 
aspect of the whole hermeneutical process, related to "the conscious act" 
of the fusion produced when "the historical horizon is projected (and) 
s i mul taneousl y removed" (97). 
Appropriation (Aneignun~) as defined by Ricoeur, is the understanding of 
the distance which is mediated by the text, and not by the author, who is 
here considered as an "illusion". This concept of understanding obviously 
(96) P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 93. 
(97) H.-G. Gadamer, Trut.h and Me t. hod , p. 273. 
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is opposed to the Cartesian apodigma Corito ergo sum and the idea of the 
subject as capable of knowing by intuition. To interpret is to appropriate 
the meaning of the horizon of the text, and the term has an individual and 
a collective connotation, difficult to understand in the English and French 
translation of the word. Aneignung, which in a literal translation means 
"making one's own" (98), also implies the idea of "to incorporate" the 
thought of a certain author. But although it appears to be an act of 
individualistic possession, it also implies the notion that the reader 
needs to be "open" to the text, emptying him/herself in order to be in 
contact with the world offered by the text. Ricoeur says that " ... it 
implies a moment of dispossession of the egoistic and narcissistic ego" 
(99), and presupposes the contact between the individual and the community, 
expressed in the communitarian aspect of the Welt (World of the text). This 
is the ontological aspect of the act of appropriation, the engagemenent of 
the interpreter in the re-description of the world, and his/her response to 
that. Ricoeur sees some misconception in the use of the idea of 
appropriation, basically in relation with the following aspects concerning 
the author, the addressee, and the actual reader. 
1) Concerning the author: Appropriation is not incorporation of the 
intention of the author, neither of his/her historical circumstances, 
(98) P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 94. 
(99) Ibid. 
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expectations or understanding of the cultural/historical phenomena of the 
past. Appropriation is related instead, to the meaning of the text as 
"open", in a certain ateJftporality where the text reveals the world which 
constitutes its reference. 
2) Concerning the addressee: The process of appropriation must not be 
regulated "by the understanding of the original addresee of the text" 
(100). The historicity of the text is in tension with the "omnitemporality 
of the meanin~' which has left the original author. his/her circumstances 
and the original reader or addresee. 
3) Concerning the actual reader: To regulate the moment of appropriation by 
the actual reader is also a mistake, since interpretation could become 
merely a proJection of individual prejudices, pre-understandings etc. 
Ricoeur reminds us here that this is a criticism made to Existential 
Hermeneutics. Aneinung is appropriation of a certain proJect of the world, 
a "pro-position of a mode of being in the world that the text opens up in 
front of itself by means of its non-ostensive references" (101). 
1.9.6 Conclusions. 
To conclude, Ricoeur does not acknowledge Gadamer's separation between 
truth and method, and reaffirms instead the dialectic 
(100) Ibid., p. 93. 
(101) P. RicoeuT, op. cit., p. 97. 
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distance/participation which is related to explanation/understanding. The 
appropriation of meaning, as part of this dialectics, reveals to us a new 
interpretation of the text, and new ways of being in the world. This last 
moment of the hermeneutical circle presents to us the text as a medium for 
"sel f understanding", and through thi s to a new understanding of the worl d, 
manifested in the challenge to the moral. philosophical and aesthetical 
problems confronting our exist.ence. 
We started this long way of Ricoeur's hermeneutical circle of 
interpretation providing the space and common base for a community of 
readers, throughout the study of the formal aspects of a text. We continue 
asking questions about the text as history and as experience, and we finish 
acknowledging the interpreter's new "level of being", acquired in a process 
of self knowledge which is also a new knowledge of his/her world. It is in 
this moment called "Appropriation" by Ricoeur, where meaning is found in 
praxis, through a dialectic process which has challenged the interpreter, 
and produces in him/her a "challenging attitude" to his/her own world. 
Through this long way which in Ricoeur implies a "return" (Kehre) of 
language, we perceive the interpreter's discovering of a more authentic 
being, closely related to a praxis of change of structures of power and 
dominion. It is in this context that Ricoeur sees the amplitude of the task 
of liberation, the key for our study of Theology of Liberation, in the 
following words: 
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"The problem of liberation [is concerned with] the I iberation of 
exploitation of work but also of the word which is falsified by the 
fact of being at the service of certain relations of po~r." (102) 
The suspicion of interpretation as merely a projection of the individual's 
pre-understandings, gives space to the ideological suspicion. 
This words from Ricoeur introduce us now to the second part of our study. 
where ~ will consider Ricoeur's analysis on the problems confronting 
Biblical Hermeneutics, and his debate with Bultmann and the "New 
Hermeneutics" on myth, symbol and exegesis. 




Hermeneutics can be defined as "the theory or philosophy of interpretation 
of meaning." Ricoeur considers three main aspects of hermeneut.ics: as a 
technique, as an intrinsic element of language, and as interpretation. The 
first two aspects are subsumed under the third, as part of a hermeneutical 
synthesis developed through many centuries. 
In the area of Philosophical Hermeneutics ~ have considered the work of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey in the XIX Century. Schleiermacher tried to 
reconcile philosophy and exegesis, putting together Kantian criticism and 
Romantic creativity. He established a "Divinatory Met.hod" to understand the 
text by the search for the mind of the author. Diithey had a similar but 
less mechanicist psychological approach, developing a descriptive and 
analytical model concerned with the structure of mental activities. Ricoeur 
admires Schleiermacher's departure from the Physical Sciences, but 
criticises the subjectivity of his approach, which tends to produce a 
partial understanding, and the same criticism is applied to Dilthey. 
Ricoeur is concerned with the meaning of the text, and not with the life of 
its author. 
Ricoeur studied the development of Heiddeger's hermeneutic in relation to 
three main points: a) the contestation of the cogito, b) the question of 
the self and c) the emergence of the word. He considers that Heidegger has 
displaced the position of the cogito in his philosophy, and he takes from 
him the reading of experience through a philosophy of language. Ho~ver. 
Ricoeur keeps the analytical method from Husserl, approaching the phenomena 
by the discourse, in which he considers "the long way of hermeneutics": to 
being, through the understanding of signs. 
Ricoeur uses a Phenomenological Hermeneutics based on the following key 
points from Husserl: The process of phenomenological description, as 
studied from the category of meaningj the subject as the conveyor of 
meaning, and the act of phenomenological reduction. From t.hls last point we 
emphasised the role of the epoch~, or suspension of immediate beliefs and 
understandings prior to the process. 
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Part two 
The hermeneutical circle of Ricoeur takes four elements from 
phenomenological hermeneutics: 1) a literary text as a written discourse 
with an unity, 2) the model of communication built upon a parallel pattern 
writer/text and reader/text, 3) the re-reading as an event which replaces 
the event of the author, and 4) the dialectic explanation-understanding. 
The main moments of the hermeneutical process are: Guessing, explanation, 
understanding and appropriation of meaning. They are related to the 
following aspects. 
Guessin~ How does the text work? Formal dimension of the text. 
Explanation: What does the text speak about? Text as history. 
Understanding: What does the text say to me? Text as experience. 
Appropriation: How have I read this text? Text as self-knowledge. 
Ricoeur considers the formal dimension of the text studying Saussurian 
Structuralism. He sees here three important principles: The idea of 
language as an objective system, the notions of diachronic and synchronic 
levels of understanding. and the work of linguistic laws. Basically. what 
Ricoeur rejects is the lack of reference in Structuralism, and the 
exclusion of historical context. 
The text as history is relat.ed t.o the theory of reference. Ricoeur 
considers two types of references: The ostensive one (referred to the 
author's situation), and the non-ostensive which is the world opened to our 
eyes by the text.. From t.he int.ersection of both references, the metaphor is 
born. Ricoeur's t.heory of the metaphor is elaborated upon the work of many 
thinkers such as Bearsdley, Black and Goodman amongst others. From Goodman, 
he takes these important points: a) poetry has a referential function. b) 
poet.ical references are real, and c) Metaphors qualities contribute to the 
shaping of the world. 
Explanation and understanding form t.he "hermeneut.ical arc", and both 
elements are necessary for the process of interpretation. Ricoeur studies 
the Reader Response Theory, where he finds the creative function of the 
text, and the efficacy of literature: the reader can find his/her own 
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answers to the questions opened by the text; this confronts Ricoeur ~th 
the problem of distanciation, which can briefly be described as this: The 
first reading is a naYve one, and takes account of the epochal tendencies 
of the text, while in the second, a distance is established and the reader 
chooses an interpretation. A third reading requires a verification, from 
the historical context of the text, and after that, a new moment of 
distanciation moment arrives, with the act.ual isation of meaning. 
Distanciation is, according to Ricoeur, the element which helps the text in 
its function of re-describing reality, "the world of the text." In 
relationship with Gadamer, Ricoeur disagrees in what he considers an 
opposition between explanation and understanding, or t.rut.h and method. 
Ricoeur reintroduces a dialectic of dist.anciation and participatory 
belonging, in the text. 
Finally, the hermeneutical circle reaches its end, in the moment of 
appropriation of a certain project of the world that the text. opens up to 
the reader by means of its non-ostensive reference. This is, in a nutshell, 
the long way of interpretation proposed by Ricoeur: a return t.o language to 
discover a more authentic being, related to a praxis of change in the 
world. It is a hermeneutic of solidarity, since it values the community of 
interpreters and the practice of a new way of liberation from oppressive 




BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF SYMBOLS 
"At times, interpretation matters. On the whole, such times are times of 
cultural crisis." 
David Tracy. (103) 
"Theology may be defined as a new act of interpretation of the Christ 
Event." 
CI aude Geffr~. (104) 
Part One. 
2. 1 Christian Hermeneutics during critical times. 
The first chapter of this thesis has introduced us to issues concerning 
general hermeneutics and the development of the circle of interpretation of 
Paul Ricoeur, which, as ~ have seen, is related to phenomenological 
hermeneutics. In the present chapter, we will consider Ricoeur's theory of 
interpretation in its specific relation to Biblical Hermeneutics, and his 
formulations on symbols, myths, and on the problems which lie at the core 
of Christian hermeneutics. The second part of the chapter will be dedicated 
to studying Rudolph Bultmann's concepts of myth, symbol and exegesis. His 
(103) D. Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity, p. 7 
(104) C. Geffr~, EI Cristianismo ante el riesgo de Interpretaci6n, p. 74. 
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hermeneutical circle of demythologizing will then be compared with 
Ricoeur's theory and at the end with one of Bultmann's students, Ernst 
Fuchs, a representative theologian of the "New Hermeneutics". Our purpose 
here will be to create a dialogue between Ricoeur, Bultmann and Fuchs, 
ending the chapter with a synthesis of Ricoeur's exegetical and 
hermeneutical proposal. 
We started quoting Tracy on the role of interpretation during critical 
times. Such crises could be in the lives of individuals or nations; it 
could ~ll be, as Tracy says, Luther challenged by the crisis of the German 
society of the XVI Century, or Schleiermacher confronted with the crisis of 
the process of interpretation in itself. In any case, the history of 
Christian theology is built upon the interpretation of dogmatic crisis, 
requiring the re-creation of a meaning which seems to become at times, 
either lost or inefficacious. This is the reason why Geffr~ considers that 
Christian Theology has always been a hermeneutical theology, in constant 
dialogue between tradition and history, and the horizon of the Revelation 
which lies in the past but also waits in the future. 
Ricoeur has said that hermeneutics is the art of interpretation which 
always maintains a distance with the object of explanation. In the same 
way, theology had maintained a distance with the tradition of the event of 
Christ (as experienced by the apostles), and added new elements in its 
search for understanding the Christian message of the Scriptures. Such 
investigation has been enriched in our time by the experience of a more 
plural dialogue with culture and ideology, resulting in a contextual 
hermeneutical approach from the Third World. 
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As a result of this hermeneutical dialogue with culture. Christian theology 
has found new Challenges which have given origin to a new model of 
interpretation, where many anthropological assumptions have been 
questioned. Language has taken a decisive role in relation to these 
questionings, and biblical hermeneutics has moved from a tradition of 
translation to a more critical relationship between understanding and 
explanation, the hermeneutical arc or "pillars" of the process of 
i nterpretat ion. 
One can ask, however, if the strong role of linguistics in biblical 
hermeneutics is a modern product or if it is the natural consequence of a 
process that has been carried throughout history, as part of the 
hermeneutical theology mentioned by Geffre. Ricoeur, in his analysis of 
the core of the hermeneutical problem in the history of Christianity, 
considers the problem of interpretation and language as inherent to 
biblical reading in history. He denies that the actual conflict of 
Scriptural interpretation is original to modern times, and sho~ us instead 
its development through history. We will proceed to consider Ricoeur's 
outline of the dialectics of biblical hermeneutics, in relation with the 
text, the Kerygma and the existential question of humanity. 
2.1.2 A mirror of explanations: The text as interpretation of a text. 
The fact that today we perceive biblical hermeneutics as so challenging, 
especially in relation to previous methods of interpretation is. according 
to Ricoeur, a paradox. Such a paradox is built upon the historical 
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development of a Christian hermeneutic, which has always been grounded in 
the interrelation of the Writings (Scriptura), the Word, the event, and its 
meani ng (105)' Ri coeur thinks that many aspects worth cons Ider i ng In thi s 
dialectic, have not been clearly perceived until recently. 
The hermeneutical problem of Christianity is organised by Rlcoeur in three 
main moments: 
1) The moment of questioning the relationship between the Old and New 
Testament. 
2) The moment of Interpreting Christ's mystery in relation to human 
existence. 
3) The moment of the questioning of the hermeneutical situation in itself, 
or the correlation Kerygma-Text. These moments are not arranged by Ricoeur 
In a chronological but in a systematic order. 
2.1.2.1 First Moment: The questioning of the relationship between the Old 
and New Testament. 
The hermeneutical problem was considered by the primitive Christian 
Community and later on by the Reformation. In recent times It has been the 
object of consideration of Liberation Theology and other contextual 
(105) P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations. p. 362. 
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theologies. Ricoeur reminds us that the New Testament is already an 
interpretation of the only text t.he first Christians had, the Torah. This 
event of interpretation gives the Hebrew Scriptures the adjective of "old", 
although the new interpretation remains related to the interpreted text, 
the Torah. Ricoeur finds this relationship ambiguous, and established upon 
an inner mechanism of processing of meaning. Such is the mutation of 
meaning which lies at the core of the Scripture, from the Letter to the 
Hebrews to the whole spirit of the Gospel, the novelty of the "Good News." 
This novelty of meaning has been expressed in the use of Christian 
allegories, which Ricoeur distinguishes carefully from the hermeneutical 
use of allegories by pagan sources. The basic difference between them lies 
in the fact that the Stoics, and Philo of Alexandria in particular, use ... 
a, 
r 
allegory as a way of mythical appropriation of a philosophical discourse, I" t 
while Saint Paul, based in the historical event of Christ, uses allegory to 
interpret the whole of the Scriptures. Ricoeur says that Jesus is the 
Logos of Scripture, and himself "Exegesis and Exegete" (106) of the 
biblical text, whose richness is increased by the tense relation of the 
Torah and the Gospel, since the categories of promise and fulfillment act 
as a bonding element between the texts; the ambiguity of the dialogue 
between Old and New Testament is then resolved creatively by the use of 
allegorical tools. 
(106) P. Ricoeur, Of. cit., p. 384. 
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2.1.2.2 Second Moment: Interpreting Christ's mystery in relation to human 
existence. 
Ricoeur finds that the hermeneutical circle used by St. Paul, is based 
primarily upon the events of the Cross and Resurrection. The reader is then 
encouraged by St. Paul to appropriate these event.s in relation to his/her 
own existence; as such. the act of appropriation is explained in Paul's 
metaphor of becoming a new creature in Christ (107). The death and 
resurrection of Christ are hermeneutically related to the mystery of human 
existence, and to humanit.y's own experiences of dying and living again 
(eternal life). 
This hermeneutical dialectic has been developed during the Scholastic 
interpretation of the Middle Ages, and by Rudolph Bultmann in our own 
century. The Scriptures are interpreted here in a cultural relation. with 
the aim of producing an understanding not only of the text. but of the 
whole world. Medieval hermeneuticians were concerned with reality, both 
from the human and divine perspective. The emphasis put on the moral 
meaning of the Script.ures made hermeneut.ics "The deciphering (of) our 
existence according to its comformity with Christ" <l08); from that. 
Ricoeur finds that our own understanding of ourselves is mirrored in the 
written word. The moral meaning of the text depends on the allegorical 
---------
(107) P. Ricoeur, op. cit., pp. 409-11. 









process, but at the root of it. we always find the relationship betW1een 
word and reality, text and life, liber et speculum. 
2.1.2.3 Third Moment: Kerygma and Text. 
According to Ricoeur, The paradox of biblical interpretation is that the 
Kerygma is not a text, but a person (109). The announcement of Jesus Christ 
implies then that the Word of God is God himself, as in the mystery of 
incarnation, and not in the Scriptures as such. But to express this Kerygma 
the written word has been needed, and the communication took the form of 
the witnesses' stories of the Gospel; afterwards, it also became the 
community confession of faith. 
The Kerygma became the text and rule (canon) of interpretation of the 
Hebrew Scriptures, and this happened because the literal meaning prevailed 
over other meanings such as the moral, analogical and methodological (110). 
The point is that according to Ricoeur, this literal meaning also needs 
interpretation. although this is certainly a modern discovery, indebted to 
Philology and Historical Criticism. The desacralisation of the Scriptures 
which ~ have already studied in Chapter One, forces us to consider not 
(109) Ibid., p. 386. 
(110) Ct. M. Lubac, Ex~gese M~di~vale: Les Quatre sens de l'Ecriture. Also 
P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretation. p. 38(. 
only the relation between Old and New Testament, or text and existence, but 
the discernment between Word of God and human word located at the core of 
the New Testament itself. The whole Scripture is mediated by a process of 
distanciation, from the first community of witnesses to ourselves. The task 
of modernity is, according to Ricoeur, to understand this distance of time, 
space and meaning; in this hermeneutical moment in which we are now. 
Bultmann's genius was the re-discovering of a demythologization programme, 
which was later challenged and continued by the New Hermeneutic movement.. 
Ricoeur has then contributed new insights from Phenomenologyi and the 
dialogue, far from being finished, is still growing in the actual 
hermeneutics of Liberation TheOlOgy. This adds new questions concerning the 
degree of dependence/independence bet.ween both types of hermeneutics, and 
the specific problems of the biblical text, which we will proceed to 
consider in the light of the thought of Ricoeur. 
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2.2 The place of Biblical Interpret.ation. 
"Biblical hermeneutics is at the same time a particular instance of the 
sort of general hermeneutics described ... and a unique affair." 
Paul Ricoeur. (111) 
In a short article entitled Biblical Hermeneutics and Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, Ricoeur analyses the relation between these two 
interpretative tasks, which he defines as being complex and inclusive. The 
first, obvious question he confronts us with, concerns the degree of 
dependency of biblical hermeneutics on a philosophical structure of 
interpretation. The second question which is indirectly framed, is about 
the integrity of a theological reflection which can be subordinated to a 
philosophical hermeneutical process of understanding. 
Ricoeur starts his argument considering philosophical hermeneutics in a 
category of "general hermeneutics", from which biblical hermeneutics can be 
seen as a derivation or "region". Faithful t.o his dialogical methodology 
which we have already presented in chapter one, he proceeds to try to 
reconcile and differentiate at the same time, the categories of general and 
regional herm.eneutics. Ricoeur considers the many different uses or 
applications of philosophical categories of interpretation in biblical 
(111) P. Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneut.ics" in 
Exegesis, p. 334. 
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hermeneutics, but also stresses the unique characteristics of the 
theological discourse; for instance, the Word of God as privileged 
referent, and the uniqueness of its textual world. 
To follow Ricoeur's analysis, and to understand his bird's eye view of the 
core of the problem of biblical hermeneutics throughout history, we will 
proceed first of all to present his idea of the uses of philosophical 
hermeneutics in a biblical one. There are four principal areas of 
application of general hermeneutics in theology which we are concerned with 
1) the structural forms of discourse, 2) the oral and written word, 3) the 
problem of reference and 4) the category of comprehension. 
2.2.1 The Use of Structural Categories. 
Ricoeur defines the character of theology as "eccentric" (112)' This 
concept refers to the fact that theological hermeneutics is not centered 
exclusively on the notion of the text. For instance, biblical hermeneutics 
uses elements outside the scriptural narrative, such as a confession of the 
Christian faith. In this case, the meaning derived from the reading of the 
Bible is produced in the closed relationship between the narrative 
structure and the confession of faith, which also has a particular 
structure or form of discourse. Ricoeur considers that the confession of 
faith is full of theological contrasts, which are a consequence of inner 
(12) P. Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics". 
in Exegesis, p. 322. 
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tensions produced in this particular text by different forms of discourse. 
He uses the example of the necessity to distinguish between narration and 
prophecy as prior to any understanding of the Old Testament's message. But 
another dimension concerning the structure of the biblical text, according 
to Ricoeur, is the closure of the canon, which adds elements of 
signification to the narrative forms, by means of stressing and shaping 
them. 
Analysing what he considers the problems of biblical discourse, Ricoeur 
uses methodological elements from the work of Gerhard Von Rad. In an 
article published in the book Exegese et Hermeneutique, Ricoeur makes an 
interesting re-reading of Von Rad's Old Testament Theology, using Roland 
Barthes structuralist levels, e.g. level of functions, of actions and 
actants and the narrative level (113). In the first level, he puts the 
confession of faith from Deuteronomy 26:5 ("My father was a wandering 
! Aramaean ..... ) as the originator of a long sequence, whithin which many 
sub-units of the Hexateuch are organised. But there is a narrative "law of 
expansion". and many non-narrative elements are also incorporated in the 
stories; for instance equivalent elements, such as short stories made by 
short sequences, or long stories made by long sequences as in Exodus 14 
(The departure from Egypt). Ricoeur also sees in Von Rad the element of 
extension due to recurrence, and he quotes again the Creed tram Deuteronomy 
26:5, which incorporates mythical accounts and epics. 
-------------------
(113) Ct. R. Barthesj P. Ricoeur; A. Vergote et al., Ex~~se et 
Hermeneutique, pp. 4~-6. 
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Following then Von Had's exegetical analysis in this way, Ricoeur derives 
the three basic problems of the biblical discourse. The first one is 
concerned with the relation between biblical narrative and confession of 
faith; the second considers the same point but with reference to the 
theological method, and the third looks at the relation between the whole 
of the corpus of the text and the changes produced in the interpretation of 
individual forms of discourse when they are a unit. Rhetoric and narrative 
are connected in a close relation of mutual dependence, and narrative and 
confession of faith make of Christian theology "A theology in the form of 
Heilsgeschichte." (114-). In order to interpret the signification of the 
discourse, Ricoeur once again takes the long way of language. in the study 
of the structures of forms. 
2.2.2 From the spoken word to the written text. 
This is Ricoeur's second application of categories from philosophical 
hermeneutics to biblical interpretation. Here he is concerned with the 
process of distane.iation, from the moment of oral utt.erance to the fixing 
of the word in the text (115). 
The aspect to be stressed here is the relationship between the Word and the 
event. The word precedes the writing, and the Word goes before the 
(114) P. Ricoeur. "Philosophical Hermeneutics and Bibl ical Hermeneutics" in 
ExegesiS, p. 325. 
(115) This point has been already studied in Chapter one. The process of 
distanciation is synthesised in Chapter one. 1.9.3. 
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Scriptures. The writing process, as we have seen before, is the first 
closure of signification, and the beginning of the process of distanciation 
which consist.s in distanciation from the author, from the situation of the 
discourse and from the original addressee. Ricoeur considers the importance 
of the study of such a moment of transition for a theology of the Word, 
where the origin, the object and the expression of Christian faith come 
together as the Event. 
At this point Ricoeur presents us with his panorama of the core of the 
hermeneutical problem in Christian theology, which could be summed up as 
follows. Christianity works as an exegetical religion; the word as such has 
always been related to the event.. to the writing, in a fashion that allows 
Ricoeur to consider whether "writing should precede the word" (116)' The 
Event of Christ needs to be transmitted by the interpretation of t.he 
written word, but the preaching act in itself is a new writing; the process 
of distanciation is always present, giving origin to tradition, which works 
basically as a link between the word and the Scripture. The import.ance of 
the study of the function of distanciation for a theology of the Word lies 
in the fact that the Scripture becomes free of the "voice" of the writer, 
and its significance comes to us by the characteristics of the world (or 
"thing") of the text. which in itsel f constitutes the true object of the 
hermeneutical process. 
(116) Ibid., p. 327. 
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2.2.3 The ~rld of the text. 
The world of the text is a basic category of the hermeneutical circle of 
Ricoeur. and as such it has been considered in relation to the problem of 
reference in chapter one. In the hermeneutic.al moment of "Explanation", our 
author considers two methodologies which could help us to answer the 
question of the reference of the text. The first is the Structuralist 
Method and the second is Historical Criticism. Ricoeur finds in both 
theories advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the work on 
the world -or "thing"- of the text, and he ends proposing a convergence of 
methods <I'entrecoupemente des m~thodes) to help with the problem (117). 
Structuralism provides the hermeneutic.ian with an objective method, which 
helps to avoid a psychological interpretation, or subjective insights into 
the 'NOrld of the text. The charac.teristics of the work at the levels of 
surface and deep structure of understandimg, provide us with the 
organisation of the textual codes, which are the key to "open up" the 
specific insight of the text, or the "thing" we are searching for. On the 
other hand, Ricoeur is critical of the semiotic model in itself, since 
there is a lack of understanding of the concept of discourse and the role 
of the phrase in the process of interpretation. Unless we take into account 
what is beyond the structure of a text, we will not be abl e to reach the 
deeper meaning 01 the discourse, where the ultimate reference of the text 
(117) Cf. R. Barthes; P. Ricoeur: A. Vergote et al. ~x~~se et 
Herm~neut~u~, p. 285. 
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can be found. It is in this sense that. Ricoeur considers the Structural 
method valid only as a first step, which would take us from a surface level 
to a deeper analysis of the work. 
Structuralism needs then to be complemented by Historical Criticism, which 
according to Ricoeur, is a method requiring not so much replacement but 
correction. The basic point here is that the text is a living testimony of 
an event and a tradition, to which the readers also belong. Biblical 
exegesis will always need to use historical criticism; the proposed 
correction of the method is related to what Ricoeur calls the three 
"illusions", regarding the source of the text, its author and its 
addressee. Basically Ricoeur sees here the difficulties in an understanding 
of the text, based only on its origins. the author(s) or the original -or 
modern- meaning elaborated by the readers. The interpretation should always 
be liberated from these flagrant psychological or ideological projections. 
The convergence of those two methods brings us the real world of the 
biblical text, the thing which gives the uniqueness of the script.ural 
discourse, which is revelation. Ricoeur calls revelation "the mark of the 
biblical world" (118), and he arrives at this conclusion after having used 
structural analysis (which enables him to call YHWH "t.he great Actant of 
action"), and his studies in the narrative forms. The following two 
(118) P. Ricoeur. "PhilosophIcal Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics", 
in Exegesis, p. 331. 
102 
applications of general hermeneutics into biblical hermeneutics are also 
related with the world of the text. 
2.2.~. The communitarian dimension of the text. 
Ricoeur deduces the "cosmic dimensions" of the signification of the 
biblical text, from the reference to the world or wholeness of the 
Scripture. The world of the Bible comprises people in both a historical and 
cultural frame of reference. In the Scriptures. a person is considered in a 
broad dimension of existence, which is cosmological. personal, 
anthropological and ethical. It is in this point that we find that the 
communitarian aspects of what we have called a "hermeneutic of solidarity" 
are revealed as the base of Ricoeur's hermeneutical circle. and are also 
present in his reconciliatory dialogue between different met.hodologies. 
2.2.5. The power of proJection of the biblical text. 
Ricoeur stresses the poetic dimension of the text. The literary aspect is 
important because the text is "poetically removed from daily reality", and 
in consequence, it opens a space of creativity at the moment of 
appropriation of the text. The inference he makes from here is of a degree 
of importance that cannot be overestimated. Ricoeur sees the opening of the 
text as a precursor to the opening of reality, the dimension of the 
hermeneutically "possible". The foundation for this concept comes from 
Heidegger's basic structure of finite transcendence, consisting in 
understanding as comprehension (Verstehen) and the mood or component 
through which the non-Being Is disclosed (Befinqlichkelt). Verstehen speaks 
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about how the Dasein is projected into the world, and is directed to the 
possibilities of the proJect of Dasein. Ricoeur finds the Christian 
statement "The Kingdom of God is here" has the theological appeal to the 
possibll ities of Being, which do not come from oursel ves. "The real ity of 
the possible" is then the final conclusion that Ricoeur presents to us, as 
the principles of general hermeneutics are applied to biblical 
interpretation. 
Ricoeur claims that far from submiting itself to a philosophical theory, 
biblical hermeneutics makes of philosophy its "organon"; this happens due 
to the specificity of the world of the Bible, and the uniqueness of its 
main referent, God. The word God is the centre around which all the 
biblical stories and the different forms of discourses are organised. 
Understanding the word God, we understand the meaning of the religious 
symbolism and at the same time we open the horizon of the text. The word 
Christ serves the same function but it adds a new dimension expressed in 
the symbol of the sacrificial love of Jesus who conquers death. Ricoeur 
finds that the preaching of the event of the cross and the resurrection 
gives "density" of meaning to the word God. God, and the event-meaning of 
Resurrection makes of the biblical discourse something unique due to the 
continuous reference to one Name, but this would obviously require from us 
some considerations concerning the role of faith in this process. 
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2.2.6 The hermeneutical constitution of faith. 
Ricoeur considers that the concept of "new being" in the Scriptures should 
be found in the "thing" of the text itself. It is in this sense that faith 
is defined as related to this new being, to the world of the text and to a 
hermeneutical understanding. To claim that faith is an issue of 
interpretation as such, means also to underline its independence from a 
psychologically constructed faith, but Ricoeur also recognises that faith. 
as an act, goes beyond the linguistic dimension and cannot be reduced to 
that. Faith then. is defined as hermeneutical because it cannot be 
considered outside the interpretative process of the Word. which always 
refers us to language but remembering also the non-hermeneutical origin of 
interpretation; this is what Ricoeur calls "The feeling of the Absolute". 
Ricoeur is refering here to the feeling that comes to us, and becomes 
closely related to aspects of Christian hope. It could be described as a 
process of openess that goes beyond our experiences and, as Ricoeur says, 
sometimes even contradicts them. 
But Christian hope needs to be re-read constantly in a renewed 
interpretation of the "sign-events" of liberation in the Scriptures. 
especially in the Old Testament Exodus and the New Testament story of 
Resurrection. In these stories, we are able to appropriate the possibility 
of personal deliverance, and our faith is constituted in close relation 
with the world of the text. Our understanding of ourselves is linked with 
our work in the hermeneutical circle, and it results in what Ricoeur calls 
"sel f-understandi ng before the text". where the ill usions we brought into 
the process are confronted by a hermeneutics of suspicion. 
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This hermeneutics of suspicion has a creative, positive task, which goes 
beyond the destructive process of illusions. Ricoeur resorts here to the 
notion of "pI ay" <.1eu) in Gadamer's Truth and Method: pI ay as the road to a 
metamorphosis, as the way to allow imagination to open the poetic dimension 
of the text (119). To the distance bet~en the world of the text and 
reality, we should add the distance produced by the creative imagination. 
Rlcoeur concludes his analysis by saying that our imagination is the first 
addressee of the text, because it is the one which carries the power to 
interpret "the symbol ics of my liberation" t which in turn will become the 
word of God (120). This point will take us into the second part of our 
study, which is concerned with the relationship bet~en biblical 
interpretation and symbolism. 
2.3 Biblical Interpretation and Phenomenological Analysis: 
2.3.1 Interpretation and Symbol. 
According to Ricoeur, a symbolic word has a po~r to reveal dimensions of 
human existence which cannot be reached by any other way, except through 
the deciphering of symbols and signs. The relation bet~en symbols and 
hermeneutics is a closed one, and it is part of the task of understanding 
ourselves and the world in which we live (121). 
--------
<t 19) P. Ricoeur, "Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics", 
in Exegesis, p. 338. 
(120) Ibid., p. 339. 
(121) Cf. P. Ricoeur, Finitud y Culpabilidad, pp. 712 ff. 
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Ricoeur has defined interpretation as "the work of thought which consists 
in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the 
I evels of meaning impl ied in the literal meaning" (122). These "hidden 
meanings". which are the task of exegesis in general, and biblical exegesis 
in particular. are discovered through the power of expressions with "double 
meaning", ego structures of signification which can tell us more about 
ourselves and about the world. Such structures are what Ricoeur calls 
"symbols", and they playa key role in his long route to discover the "I" 
of the Cogito, which is Ricoeur's ontological task. Interpretation and 
symbols are concepts closely related to each other in Ricoeur's thought, 
and are part of the challenge of a reflective approach to Hermeneutics, 
where the study of signs and symbols opens the way to a transcendental 
understanding of existence. 
Ricoeur's phenomenological method, initiated in his unfinished project "The 
Phil osophy of the Will", changes from the approach used in The Vol untary 
and the Involuntary to the hermeneutics of The Symbolism of Evil, Freud and 
Philosophy and The Conflict of Interpretations. In The Volunt~and the 
Involuntary, Ricoeur wanted to demonstrate the mistakes of the dualistic 
tradition after Descartes. The voluntary and the involuntary are shown as 
interrelated aspects. interdependent on each other. in the way that 
transcendence is related to finitude. In this analysis Ricoeur uses a 
heuristic device called "The diagnostic method" (Diagnostique), which 
(122) P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 13. 
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consists in the use of another objective point of view. exterior to the 
analysis carried out. whenever the phenomenological method reaches a limit. 
It Is a correlative I\ethod with the task of helping to understand the 
nature of human beings; an example of this Diagnostique, is how Ricoeur has 
used disciplines such as Psychoanalysis or Sociology. Following elements 
from Marcel (especially the notion of "Mystery" which is close to the one 
of "limits") and Husserl, Ricoeur seems to work in search of a descriptive 
unity in his investigation. 
In The Symbolism of Evil. Ricoeur's phenomenological approach gives rise to 
a hermeneutic of the symbols in religion, in relation to evil. His task is 
to understand experiences as interpreted in religious texts; he then 
develops a theory of the symbol. At the end of this investigation and 
owing to the lrreducibl e c.haracter of the syllhol, Ricoeur weI comes a more 
plural dialogue than the one established in The Voluntary and the 
Invol untarl' or FallJl>lJL Man. In subsequent works on Freud and in The 
Con.f lJ_Q.L_9f Inte'tlIT~Jat l.9nli Ri coeur's i nterpretat ion is directed towards 
texts. the oral ones froln dreams and the religious discourse that precedes 
theology. where the latter may recover a more primitive dimension. Faith 
and hermeneutics, syllhols and myths, are part of Ricoeur's dialogue with 
belief and suspicion. This is a dialogue which needs a reconciliatory 
hermeneut:fc. 
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2.3.1.1 The Privileging of the Symbol. 
For Ricoeur a reflection on the symbolic is a starting point for a 
philosophy of Language. David Rasmussen (123) finds this as part of an 
anthropological Ricoeurian project. where hermeneutics plays a key role in 
the restoration of the human's being. The exegesis of the symbolism of 
evil, especially in the Judaeo-Christian traditions which have deeply 
influenced our western culture, is then the touchstone of the 
interpretation of texts (defined here as any cultural production) and life. 
Semiology, the analysis of the signs in a system, and Semantics, the 
science which reflects on the signs but in reference to the discourse and 
the sentence, are both part of the Philosophy of Language where event and 
structure are no longer differentiated. 
For Ricoeur, a symbol is an indicator of reality, an instrument born from a 
confrontation with life, which points outward to another meaning. Western 
civilization seems to have lost its ability to relate to the symbol, and in 
this process it has lost the possibility of finding this "other meaning" of 
its existence. The lack of sensibility to the Scriptural Word is in reality 
a fear of confronting something different which could challenge our 
Cartesian (dualistic) construction of the ~rld in which we live. Ricoeur 
affirms that this fear of the disclosing power of the symbolic -manifested 
through the re-discovery of biblical literalism, for instance- is a major 
(123) Cf. D. Rasmussen. Mythi c-Symbol i c Lan--K11age and Ph:l) osophi ~ ~J 
Anthropology, p. 90. 
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problem for the understanding of biblical texts; it is also part of a 
bigger and more complex situation, which creates an obstacle far 
superior to the cultural distance ~ have with an ancient text. It is in 
this sense that Ricoeur finds it necessary to use an Hermeneutics of 
Suspicion, because it has the po~r to take from the religious discourse 
that whi ch has been kept apart. from it, and whi ch -i n general- we do not 
want to confront. Ricoeur is talking here about the narcissistic 
interpretative elements which pervade our understanding of the Scriptures, 
helping us to avoid any challenge from our reality. 
Ricoeur's analysis of the symbol is then complemented by a study on 
Structuralism, Psychoanalisis, and Structural Anthropology (L~vi-Strauss). 
2.3.1.2 Defining the symbol. 
How does Ricoeur define a symbol? In The Conflict of Interpretations we 
find the following concept: 
"I define symbol as any structure of signification in which a direct, 
primary, literal meaning designates. in addit.ion, another meaning 
which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and which can be 
apprehended only through the first." <124-) 
This definition is closely relat.ed by our aut.hor t.o his own concept. of 
interpret.at.ion as "a deciphering". Ricoeur think.s that. both symbol and 
interpretation are in fact correlative c.oncept.s, due basically to these key 
aspects of "hidden meani ng" and "pI urali ty of meaning" (doubl e 
(124) P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 12. 
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intentionality> which function as their hermeneutical loci. 
The function of the literal meaning of the symbol, which consists in the 
showing of an extra secondary meaning, could be understood in the context 
of Ricoeur's discussion on the Cogito. We have already seen in chapter one 
the opposition of our author to the illusion of the Cartesian ego, which 
Ricoeur calls a "false consciousness". Now we will see another aspect of 
this discussion, ego the consequences of Cartesian thought in relation to 
the symbol. Both in The Voluntary and the Involuntary and in The Symbolism 
of Evil, Ricoeur speaks about the Cogito Bris~ <broken> or Bless~ (hurt), 
which carries with it the suspicion of a false conciousness. 
The narcissistic ego wants to control, to manipulate the world <which it 
considers to be of its authorship>, and more than anything, to control 
language. The Corito Blesse instead, has a kind of humbleness, which 
Dobilises it in search of its own self-understanding (125). To achieve its 
task, the Co,ito Blesse looks for clues to hidden meanings, such as the 
ones the signs, symbols and cultural institutions (eg. significative 
construction) can provide. From a phenomenological point of view, Ricoeur 
is working with the pre-objective world, the world of the pre-reflective, 
where the symbols belong before we organise them into logical categories. 
Ricoeur uses here the epoche, to bracket out the natural attitude of the 
philosopher and to allow him to find -through phenomenological reduction-
the world before the control of the narcissistic ego. The problem of the 
(125) Cf. P. Ric.oeur, Le Volontaire et l'Involontalre, pp. 17 ff. 
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human w111, the mystery of evil, the question of human freedom, lies in the 
interpretation of the symbols. Ricoeur's Hermeneutic of Suspicion is 
counter-balanced by an Hermeneutics of Hope and Faith, in his attempt to 
find the mystery of interpretation which is finally related to the mystery 
of being, and the being of the interpreter. 
2.3.1.3 Symbols and Metaphors. 
The symbolic production of meaning in Ricoeur, should be understood in 
relation to Ricoeur's theory of metaphor (126). The living metaphor has the 
power to disclose reality due to the process of "the metaphorical twist" 
where the reader is able to construct a "novel" meaning. According to Alan 
Olson, it is in the analysis of metaphor that Ricoeur enables us to 
understand the dymamic structure of the symbol, and its characteristic 
"non-linguistic roots of experience" (127). The metaphor is always situated 
at a more visible level than the symbolic universe. and it is in its image 
that the symbol becomes "a giver". Basically, it gives new meanings by a 
phenomenon of transgression of the limitations imposed by the false 
fixation of discourse; it gives the possibility of the possible through its 
exploratory function, and in the famous words of Ricoeur "The symbol gives 
rise to thought" or "Gives us something to think. about" (Le symbole donne Ii 
penseI') . 
(126) For Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. cf. Chapter 1, 1.7.4. 
(127) A. Olson, "Myth Structure and Metaphorical Truth". in A. M. Olson 
(ed.). Myth. Symbol and Reality, p. 108. 
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Ricoeur proceeds to analyse the symbol phenomenologically, and he starts by 
bracketing out everything except the symbol itself. He wants to understand 
the symbol by itself, working sometimes from the multiple meanings of the 
same symbol, or explaining a symbol by another one, in any of the 
manifestations of the sacred, such as myths and rites. Ricoeur then tries 
to rescue the symbolic system by becoming involved within it, in order to 
appropriate the deepness of its meaning. As part of his phenomenological 
procedure, the question of symbol and truth is suspended here and replaced 
by a dymamic implication with the symbol. However, it is at this moment 
that Ricoeur formulates the following hermeneutical circle: "You must 
understand in order to believe, but you must believe in order to 
understand." (128) 
To interpret, the interpreter must already have a participation in the 
meaning which is hidden; and this is in a way, belief. Yet, without an 
hermeneutical understanding we remain in a first narvet~, in a pre-critical 
moment. The challenge here is to understand the symbol without resort to 
allegorical methods or gnostic interpretations which are a kind of dogmatic 
rationalisation. 
(128) P. Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols", in C. Reagan (ed.), 
Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p. 45. 
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2.3.1.4 The Dynamic of Symbols. 
Ricoeur classifies symbols In two categories: Primary symbols and secondary 
symbolism (129). Primary symbols have the characteristic of showing their 
own structure; they build upon their literal meaning (first 
intentionality), a second meaning which discloses the participation of 
humanity in the sacred. Symbols can be also organised into technical and 
symbolic signs. The first are "transparent": they say what they mean 
through their signified; the second are "opaque", and they are richer than 
the first; their second meaning is not given, but is hidden. The secondary 
symbolism has the characteristic of being organised in a system, and 
articulated as we find them in myths. 
2.3.1.4.0 Primary Symbols. 
Ricoeur finds that the dynamic of symbols is related to three "symbolic 
constellations", which are stain. sin and guilt. Every symbol seems to 
destroy a previous one, and only t.he archaic symbols remain at the end of 
this process. The example our author puts here is the one of stain. and he 
follows its dynamics in the Old Testament in the following way: 
a) Evil. considered as a thing, is symbolised by "stain". 
b) Evil, leavingt.he category of thing, becames the opposite, a "nothing", 
expressed as a broken relationship with God and Humanity, absence of God, 
(129) Cf. P. RicoeuT, The Symbolism of Evil, pp. 17 ff. 
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and emptiness. 
c) Due to the historical circumstances of the capt.ivities of Israel (first. 
the Egyptian and second the Babylonian), stain returns to its "schema of 
exteriority" but at an ethical level. Later on. stain becomes related to 
the symbol of guilt. Ricoeur concludes that t.he persistence of stain, is a 
proof of its archaisa 
This example belongs to the category of cosmic symbols. the ones where the 
sacred can be seen in the world. There are another two modalities of 
symbols, the oneiric or dream images and the poetic imagination. In The 
Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur worked basically upon cosmic symbols while in 
Freud and Philosophy he studied the nature of oneiric ones. The poetical 
imagination is investigated in several works apart from those already 
mentioned, especially in The Conflict. of Int.erpretations and The Rule of 
Metaphor. We will proceed now to describe briefly Ricoeur's understanding 
of each category of symbol, making it clear that these different levels of 
symbolism are very closely int.errelated in t.he whole of Ricoeur's thought. 
2.3.1.4.1 Cosmic Symbols. 
As we have already seen, these symbols are related to humanity's tendency 
to see the cosmic as symbolic of the "sacred" (a term t.hat comes from 
Rudolph Otto). Ricoeur follows here Mircea Eliade's phenomenological 
concept of myth: " ... Myths describe the various and sometimes dramatic 
breakthroughs of the sacred (or the 'supernat.ural') into the Worl d. 1/ (130) 
(130) Cf. M. Eliade. Myth and Reality, pp. 5-6. 
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The sun, the stars, elements such as fire or water, are things and signs of 
something else, something that cannot be reached unless we proceed to 
interpret the doubleness of their meaning. Ricoeur comments on the 
linguistic function of the symbolic process of imagination, since this 
second meaning cannot be reached unless we designate it with words. Quoting 
Psalm 19, Ricoeur stresses the fact that the heavens cannot "tell" about 
the glory of God, because they do not speak, but it is the prophet, the 
psalmist or the liturgy, the voice which makes the heavens speak to us 
about the glory of their creator. The hierophany needs the word to 
communicate its sacredness. 
2.3.1.4.2 Oneiric Symbols. 
Ricoeur works here in a dialogue with Psychoanalysis, re-reading the basic 
thoughts of Freud and Jung and adding to the cosmic function of the 
imagination the psychological one. The hermeneutical task of this moment is 
to recover the nexus between the symbolic of the subJect's unconscious and 
the cultural symbols of humanity. The point is that the meaning of the 
symbols released by consciousness into dream images needs to be 
interpreted, and communi cated with words, in the same way that the cosmi c 
symbols require a linguistic dimension. 
Ricoeur's works on Freud are related to two areas: the inquiry about the 
nature of the cogito, and the economy of desire. In the first area, he 
reviews the topography of psychoanalysis, organising consciO\.lsness into 
three areas: unconscious, preconscious and conscious. Consciousness then 




is its own "dispersion". The phenomenological task of reduction to 
consciousness, is inverted in a process of reduct.ion of consciousness. 
Reflecting on Freud in this way, Ricoeur comes t.o the conclusion that 
Psychoanalysis has the task of searching for the subject. the one who, 
obscured by the narcissistic (false) ego, is usually identified with 
consciousness. 
The second aspect that Ricoeur develops is in relation to the inquiry of 
the subject in an "Economy of Desire." Desire is defined as archaic, 
preceding consciousness and timeless; although originated in the 
unconscious, desires can only be manifested in the pre-conscious and 
conscious levels. The point is that because the desire is anterior to the 
cogito, the latter is defined more by the "I am" rather than the "I think". 
The analysis of the question of the cogito, gives Ricoeur another ontic 
dimension to his theory of symbols, because in order to apprehend the 
meaning of the immediate consciousness it is necessary to interpret a 
material that is not evident but rather hidden in dream images and 
fantasies. The arche, is then the object of a reflective philosophy, but it 
is necessary to counterbalance this search or archeology of the subjec.t 
with a teleology of the "cultural aim." of the subject. The dialectical 
method that Ricoeur uses here relates a Freudian archaeology of desire with 
a teleology of the spirit by Hegel, where the initial instinct is kept in 
the progressive movement. of the individual. Or to say it in other words, 
humanity's destiny is in dialogue with its history. 
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When Ricoeur analyses Sophocles' Oedipus Rex (131), his ~rk on the symbol 
becomes clearer and is organised in what he calls "two types of 
hermeneutics": The first type. considers the archaism of the symbols as 
contained in the tragedy, such as vanity, power and truth: the second 
hermeneutics find new symbols, such as the cultural ~rld of ~rks, 
monuments and institutions, which still symbolise the same drama of power 
and truth. This is what Ricoeur calls the "projective" power of symbols 
into the past and future. but there is another aspect to consider, the 
"formative" or educational side. The symbol becomes paidea, or Blldung, the 
forming basic element of the building of culture. 
2.3.1.4.3 Poetic Symbols. 
Ricoeur uses the term "poetic imagination". making an important 
distinction between imagination and image. The concept of image sometimes 
used, as representation or "portrait" is rejected in favour of Gaston 
Bachelard's definition: (The poetic image) "puts us at the origin of t.he 
speaking being' (132). This happens because an image is basically close to 
the emergence ot language in itself. Here we are confronted by the symbolic 
function of poetry in its nascent stat.e, with the dynamism that cosmic and 
oneiric symbols are deprived of, since they are free of the stability that 
the history of religions, myths and rites provides for hierophanies and 
(31) Ct. P. Ricoeur, The Conflict. of Interpretations, p. 115. 
(132) P. Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p. 13. 
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dream images. In Ricoeur. poetic imagination is a key theme of his theory 
of metaphor. as has been seen in chapter one. 
2.4 Secondary Symbolism: Myths. 
We have already noticed how Ricoeur gives a first definition of myths as an 
organised system of primitive symbols. Apart from the structural aspect 
there are other basic differences between myths and symbols, as seen in 
the study of the narrative time of the myth, the narrative order in itself 
and the dialectic between myth and ritual. 
2.4. 1 The time of myth. 
Ricoeur calls it the "fundamental time" (133). This is the kind of time 
referred to in stories of origins and endings (myths of creation, 
apocalypse) and which is recognisable because of the inclusion of formulas 
such as "In those times ... ", or "Once upon the time ... " It is interesting 
to notice here that the first book of the Old Testament is called "In the 
beginning" (Sefer Maaseh Bereshith, "Book. of the Beginning"). The Bible 
itself then, starts with an account of events in the fundamental time. and 
this adds a historical dimension t.o the narrative of myths, which primitive 
symbols do not have. Ricoeur's task here is to try to recover this 
fundamental time of existence through interpretation. 
(133) P. Ricoeur, The Confl iet of Int_erpretations, p. 28. 
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2.4.1.1 The narrative order of myth. 
The writing of myths implies a first distanciation, and as such the 
beginning of a process of rationalisation. Here we are confronted with a 
closure, manifested in the fixation of the symbolic discourse through the 
function of rhetorical rules and speculation. This is a necessity, because 
myths cannot be expressed without a narrative which also serves to expose 
the dynamic of myths: their "struggles" with each other, where only the 
strongest are able to survive, and their processes of deep inter-
communication. The difficulties arise when the lundamental time of myth is 
"exhausted" due to the work of dogmatism of the great narratives <called by 
Ricoeur "mythol ogisation" >. The development of traditions Is close to 
mythologisation, as in the stories of fall and exile in the Bible, and both 
the Gnostic and anti-Gnostic elaborations. The only way to renew and 
recover the richness of the myth is to interpret them starting by the study 
of the primary symbols which are organised in them as an explanation 
already. To "demythologise" is important for Ricoeur, although it could 
produce the risk of a "de-symbologising" process too. 
2.4.1.2 The dialectic between myth and ritual. 
This is an elaboration that comes from phenomenological roots. Ricoeur is 
influenced here by Eliade, Marcel Mauss and the work of the anthropologist 
Bronislaw Malinowski who, through his functionalist theory, considered the 
wholeness of culture. An example of this is Malinowski's Coral Gard~JtL~Il~ 
their Magic, where he proves that the Melanesian gardens as aesthetic value 
are intimately related to agricultural labour and magic amongst 
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Trobianders. For Malinowski myth is "a hard-W'Orked active force" <134.) and 
a reality with social functions, such as the legitimisation of institutions 
(135). Myth is then manifested in a sociological sphere, but its richness 
is not exhausted neither in rites nor institutional life; it remains alive 
although obscured by temporality. 
After having studied those characteristics, Ricoeur concludes t.hat myths 
are no longer at the same level as symbols, but are rather subordinate to 
them. The richness of meaning of a primary symbol diminishes when it 
becomes a myth due to the closure produced by the main factors already 
mentioned. Ricoeur's insistence on the dist.ortion produced in myths by 
rationalisation, indicates his ideas concerning the autonomy of myths. He 
has taken in this position, some elements from Ernst Cassirer's idea of the 
unity in myths (136), and Claude L~vi-Strauss' anthropological 
structural ism. 
Cassirer's theory preserves the autonomy of the myth in a sense of unity or 
wholeness of the mythical thought. Myths have an internal and an emotional 
(not rational) coherence manifested individually but showing, through a 
common "tonal ity" an universality of mythical apriori (137). Myth cannot be 
reduced, but Cassirer considers a difference between the thought of the 
(134-) B. Malinowsky, Ma~ic Science ~Jl~LR.~li~ion, p. 101. 
(135) Ibid .. p. 106. 
(136) Cf. E. Cassirer. The Philosophy of Symbolic For~ lIi-Mythical 
Thought. 
(137) Iblq., p. 88. 
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primitive human and the scientific, modern view. The mythopoeic thought is 
a form of thought in itself, autonomous, and not related with scientific 
thought; it has it own rules and provides the foundations of the symbolic 
religious base of our civilisation. 
L~vi-Strauss does not differentiate between a primitive and a scientific 
mind, because "between societies which are called 'complex' and those which 
are wrongly termed 'primitive' or 'archaic'. the distance is less great 
than one might think" (138). The function of the myth is then to show us 
the structure of the human mind. From Cassirer, Ricoeur takes the 
differentiation between primitive and scient.ific thought, but he also finds 
with him and with L~vi-Strauss that there is a point of reunion between 
both kinds of t.hought. manifested in the symbolic language. which is a 
basic point for Ricoeur's ont.ological quest, or long route. 
2.4.1.3 The pursuit. of the fundamental time: The Cri ticism to the 
Structural Ant.hropological Model. 
Reflecting about both the "time of tradition and interpretation" (139) in 
myths, Ricoeur addresses t.wo structuralist concepts, diachrony and 
synchrony. As we have already seen in Chapter one, Structuralism favours 
synchronicity (a moment of the language> over diachronicity (language in 
relation to its hist.ory>. In order to carryon this investigation, Rlcoeur 
-----------
(138) ct. C. L.-Strauss. "Conference paper". in Annales. Nov./Dec. 1983. 
(139) P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretat.ions. p. 29. 
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decides to study L~vi-Strauss' work. especially The Savage Mind, which in 
his opinion constitutes a systematisation of the structural system in an 
anthropological model. 
Structural anthropology has been inspired by the work of Saussure. the 
Prague school 01 linguistics and the phonological method of Trubetzkoy and 
Jakobson. Phonology has looked into the unconscious structure 01 linguistic 
phenomena, as structuralism has reflected on the non-reflexive, ahistorical 
level of linguistic rules. In this system the general rules are deduced by 
a logical process inherent to the syst.em, which is objectively independent 
of the subject. 
L~vi-Strauss applies these concepts of language as a closed system or 
organism, where meaning is established in the interrelation of terms of 
opposition and correlation, at synchronic and diachronic levels, but in 
kinship relations. He finds that clan systems function in an analogous way 
to language: first, they work at an unconscious level; second, 
communication is produced by circulation of women amongst clans, in the 
same way as words are interchanged in language (140). The third level. 
shows that the kinship structure has a diachronic perspective, manifested 
through the connection of different generations in a family. The synchronic 
or historical dimension also seems present here, but Ricoeur found that it 
(140) Cl. C. L~vi-Strauss, Structural Analysis in Lin8\dstic~ a~<l 
Anthropology, p. 58. 
123 
is subordinate to the diachronic level, since history is not regarded in 
the construction of kinship systems. 
Structural anthropology analyses a society in a way similar to Saussure's 
analysis of a text. L~vi-Strauss opposes fathers to sons, husbands and 
wifes, as characters who can only be understood by their binary relations, 
in a very similar style to Vladimir Propp's work on Russian folktales. 
Propp established that in folk tales, there are characters who always 
perform the same "functions" or actions, which are the ones responsible for 
the coherence and stability of the tale. These functions are limited to 31, 
and always follow the same order; for instance, first the story presents 
its hero, who is in a situation of deficiency and needs to pass through 
different tests, in order to overcome his deficiency (eg., a task to do 
such as to rescue someone, or find an object, or marry a princess etc. ). 
Propp also establishes a number of seven characters as the maximum for a 
f 01 k tal e (14- 1 ). 
L~vi-Strauss goes a step beyond Propp, concentrating less on t.he narrative 
I evel of myths but more on the deep level, ego systems of reI at i onshi ps and 
their logical- symbolic meaning. A myth, as a kinship relation works for 
L~vi-Strauss in a similar way to Propp's analysis: the difference is that 
L~vi-Strauss advances over the initial situation of deficiency and finds 
(14-1) ct. P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, II, p. 33. 
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that myths manifest something else, an excess of meaning which he explains 
in an algebraic formula. Mythical language is then a language in itself, 
which cannot be considered pre-logical nor primitive. Its function is 
different from scientific language, because it basically expresses the 
structure of unconscious mental processes, as they can be discerned by 
reflection on social institutions, rites or stories. The process of thought 
is the same in both the mythical and scientific model, but the object 
differs. Here we need to be aware that Levi-Strauss is not using a Freudian 
theory of the unconscious, but rather a Kantian one: the unconscious is 
considered as structured in a categorical way, without the subject as 
thinker. 
Ricoeur's criticism of the use of a linguistic model in struct.ural 
anthropology, is concerned with the hermeneutical circle of interpretation, 
which can be divided in two levels: a) level of description and b) level of 
i nterpretat ion. 
2.4.2 Level of description 
This comprises the text as form, the literary theory and the dialectic 
text-reference. At this level the interpreter takes distance from the text, 
and obJectivises it in order to explain it; this is a moment of critical 
description and analysis. Levi-Strauss' analysis of the kinship system 
seems to work primarily at this level, de-codifying and describing the 
aforementioned by its structure. The structural law of myth is located at 
the level of its logical relationships, as organised in the text; here 
Levi-Strauss can say with Greimas that "there is not salvation otltside the 
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text" and the my themes or units which constitute the myth. Ricoeur 
recognises the value of structuralism at this level, but he asks if there 
are not other existential meanings to be found beyond this "surface 
analysis" ot myths. The symbol does not exhaust its meaning in the myth, 
and L~vi-Strauss himselt recognises it in the mediator function of the 
mythical thought between life and death. Then, the structural analysis 
needs to be complemented with a hermeneutical level, or moment of 
i nterpretat ion. 
2.4.3 Level of Interpretation 
Here we consider the reflective task of hermeneutics, the understanding of 
experience and the appropriation of the text as the interpreter's self-
understanding. It is at this I evel that the fundamental time of myths as 
narrative can be rescued, through what Ricoeur calls a "semantic analysis" 
or study of the meaning of the sign. The description process carried out by 
L~vi-Strauss works basically at syntax, ego the meaningful combination of 
words, which explains the myth but does not understand it. L~vi-Strauss has 
argued against Ricoeur on this point, saying that it is not a question to 
choose between syntax and semantics, because meaning is produced by the 
combination of elements which are significatives in themselves <142>' This 
is a definition of meaning in L~vi-Strauss which comes from Phonology, 
---------
(142) Cfr. P. Ricoeur, "Structure et HerB\~neutique" (partial text), in 
Sprit, 31, 1963, pp. 596-627. 
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while Ricoeur favours meaning in relation to the hidden time, or time of 
meaning, that st.ructurallsm cannot discover. Another criticism of L~vi­
Strauss by Ricoeur is concerned ~th the lack of unity in mythical thought 
according to anthropological structuralism, and the difficulties involved 
in working with a highly heterogeneous geographical material, such as in 
the case of the non-european myths. Both in the Israelite and Mesopotamian 
mythologies, as in the Grecian stories. there seems to be an underlying 
unity expressed beyond the fragmentation of myths, which -according to 
Ricoeur- is the unity that our fragmented universe's perception is 
searching for. This is the reason why different myths repeat certain 
elements and yet they appeal' to be so diverse. The second point of 
criticism, is related to the characteristics of totemic thought itself. 
This type of thought lends itself to the kind of analysis that L~vi-Strauss 
uses, for instance, in "The Savage Mind", but the Semitic. pre-Hellenic or 
Indo-European myths which do not belong to that cuI tural area cannot be 
organised so easily in the same structure. But the main doubt of Ricoeur is 
about the use of structuralism to understand cultural phenomena. because 
the principles of phonology are not broad enough to understand the work of 
the human spirit in historical events. 
2.4.4. Kerygma and Tote_ism 
Ricoeur takes us bac.k into bibllcal interpretation. reflecting upon the 
difference bet~en these two models of analysis. Kerygma and Totemisn. 
Totemism is characterised by the privileging of order and structure. or 
synchrony over diachrony. As such. it seems to be the ideal field for the 
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structural method, but the Bible requires another type of analysis, such as 
the one provided by the kerygrnatic model. Ricoeur follows here Von Rad's 
work in his book Theolon of the Historical Traditions of Israel, where the 
author examines the Hexateuch in relation to its kerygma, ego the signs of 
actions of YHWH as constituted by events. These events, presented as the 
crossing of the Red Sea, entering the Promised Land, the Davidic mission 
and the destruction of Israel are made part of Israel through its 
historical confession of faith. Every new generation reappropriates this 
confession, which then becomes a meaningful unit, and part of a tradition 
which is constantly being re-interpreted in a historical way. Here Ricoeur 
discovers the historicity of hermeneutics, which cannot be confined to a 
system: 1) there is the fundamental time of myths and sagas which is 
hidden, the time of the founding events; 2) the time of the interpretation 
made by the biblical writers and 3) the time of re-discovering and renewing 
of meaning by hermeneutics. The kerygmatic model is organised in a 
structure of word-event, a semantic model where diachronic time ~revails 
over the synchronic dimension. 
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The following diagramm illustrates Ricoeur's position in relation to the 
interpretation of myths and his criticism of anthropological structuralism. 
Ricoeur' 8 K~v.R1ftati<:. _ Mo el L~vi-Straugs' T~~mic Mode 
x Appropriation 
x Appropriation 
Kerygmatic model: work in solidarity 
with previous cOfimunity of interpretation 
(diachronic level). 
Totemic Model : Fragmented. 
Kerygmatic model: Dialectic 
Sign/Event; the hidden meaning 





(unity of myths). 
eve S 0 e ' 
Levels of Description 
x tTnde rstanding 
x U?tt~'PIs«t a'actn~ y 
understood.e-cod 
Kerygmatic model: The "time" of myths and the 
"time" of the reader. 
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The following diagramm illustrates Ricoeur's position in relation to the 
interpretation of .yths and his criticism of anthropological structuralism. 
x Appropriation 
Rlcoeur's Kerygmatic Model 
x Guessing 
Kerygmatic model: work in solidarity 
with previous cOJl\JJ\unity of interpretation 
(diachronic level). 
x Explanation 
Kerygmatic model: Dialectic 





(unity of myths). 
Levels of 
Interpretation Levels of Description 
x Understanding 
Kerygmatic model: The "time" of myths and the 
"time" of the reader. 
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2.5 Ricoeur's analysis of Myths in the Old Testament 
In "The Symbol ism of Evil", Ricoeur considers the myths of Israel, Greece 
and Mesopotamia as the language which expresses the human experience of 
fault in relationship with God. He divides myths into four categories: 
1) Myths of the drama of creation. 
2) Myths of the fall of humans. 
3) The myth of the tragic hero (in Greece). 
4-) The myth of the exiled soul. 
To study a particular category of myth, Ricoeur starts his phenomenological 
analysis by work.ing with primary symbols, as in the investigation of the 
trilogy stain-sin-guilt in the Old Testament context which we have already 
briefly addressed <14-3). His investigation will force him to try to 
understand symbols by symbols, and sometimes by myths or rituals, which 
Ricoeur considers -taking a term from Rudolph Otto- "manifestations of the 
Sacred" ( 144 ) . 
Ricoeur studies the myth of creation in relation to the origin of evil. He 
distinguishes myths where evil is created at the same time as the 
divinities are born (eg., the Enuma EI ish), from others such as the myth of 
Enki and Ninhursag. where evil "falls" into the world. The story of the 
Flood in different myths also shows a disparity in the treatment of human 
(14-3) Cf. P. Ricoeur, The Symb9Ji~Jll o(_[vil. pp. 172-4. 
(144) Cf. C. Reagan (ed.) Thefl}!19S9_rlu-9~auJ_Ricoe\lt:., p. 45. 
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fault and God's reaction to it. In the myths of Atra-hasis and Gilgamesh, 
there is no offence done to God while in the Old Testament's Genesis, 
divine offence is provoked by human fault. One of the characteristics of 
the Old Testament myths that Ricoeur points out, is the transforming action 
of the irruption of history in Israel. It is manifested through the lack of 
theogony or theomachy in the account of creation, or stories about the 
birth and wars amongst Gods, and their irruption into the world. The 
theogony always has a clear intentionality, which is to make reality 
meaningful: this is the reason why their divinities come from the Apsu-
Tiamat, the primordial Nun of the Egyptians, but never from "nothingness" 
(145). Instead of these mythological schemes, the Old Testament defines 
evil as a historical fact, where enemies are human protagonists of the 
struggle of the God of Israel and his people against pagan nations. 
The type of myth required to express Israel's historical experience of evil 
is exemplified by Ricoeur in his analysis of the Adamic myth. This myth is 
classified as a creational myth, and "strictly anthropological" (146). 
Ricoeur interprets it around the work of the primary symbols of stain-sin-
guilt, which are already present in the narrative. These symbols represent 
the experience of humanity, in the historical tension and dramatisation of 
the movement from innocence to fault. The myth works to resolve the 
threefolded dialectic ot human sin, rooted first in a situation of 
(145) ct. J. S. Croatto, EI Hombre en el MundQ, I, p. 96. 
(146) ct. P. Ricoeur, The Symholism_9f Evil, p. 240. 
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estrangement from God, and as a consequence of it, of estrangement from 
fellow human beings. 
2.5.1 Stain, Sin and Guilt. 
The situation is described by Ricoeur in the following terms: The sinner 
confesses its sin as a bad action but also as a product of the situation of 
estrangement; this estrangement is not entirely the fault of the sinner 
(eg. the human race), because it was in the world already and yet, it fell 
(by a human decision) into the world. The character of the serpent 
symbolises the evil which is outside Adam and at the same time is part of 
humanity (the" Adamah"), al though it belongs to an unknown, "dark" aspect 
of human nature. The holiness of God condenms sin, which at this level of 
the narrative of the Old Testament presents a scheme of exteriority, almost 
equating evil w1th something material, although there is also an element of 
sin as 1nternal reality. It is 1n this context that Eve becomes a deeply 
symbolic character of the triple al1enation of humanity from humanity, from 
the vis1ble Sacred represented by YHWH, and from the desacralised nature 
which is his creation. 
Sta1n is the most external symbol of evll, and as such 1s manifested 
through cui tic ceremonies of purification, or cleansing rituals; sin is the 
symbol that comes aft.er stain, and carries t.he t.ension of both exterior and 
interior manifestations. Ricoeur looks at the meaning of the word sin, not 
with the intention of underst.anding the symbol by its et.ymological root.s 
(which could close its ontological openness to meaning) but. to see its work 
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in the context of Israel's Covennant with God <1,(,7). "Sin" appears here as 
the translation of hatta't, "to miss the mark", and 'awon, "deviation". 
Another root, pa§a', "rebellion" (in a political sense) shows the int.ention 
in itself to commit an evil action in a communitarian sense. 
The drama of the fall reminds us of the paradox of human nature and its 
relationship with God; here Ricoeur quotes Kant, about the human destiny of 
doing good, and its inclination to do evil (1,(,8) This is also the 
historical experience of Israel with God, and as such grounded in Psalms 
and prophecies of the Old Testament. The third symbol of the trilogy. 
guilt, appears already in the Adamic myth as a further st.ep of a process of 
internalisation started with stain; guilt does not supersede stain, but. 
rather brings back all its archeological po~r. There is already a 
mechanis:m of inner demythologization set in the core of primary symbols, 
from the desacralization of stain, as a material thing which needs to be 
washed, to the guilt of the Adamic myth which can only be cleaned by a 
surrender of human hubris. The demythologization process, started in the 
desacralization of cos:mos and nature in Genesis, explains why Ricoeur sees 
the myth as an explanation of a structure of pri:mary symbols, intimately 
connected. 
To continue then this line of thought, Ricoeur needs to go to a second step 
of explaining myths by myths. The tragedy of human hubris in the Adamic 
-------
(1,(,7) Cf. P. Ricoeur, ~. cit., p. 72. 
(148) Ibid., p. 252. 
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myth, could be bet.ter expl ained by ot.her myt.hs of' falling, as found in 
Plat.o's Phaedo, in Plot.inus and the Neo-Plat.onism, t.he Orphic Myst.eries and 
in t.he Gnost.lcs. St.udying them Ricoeur comes to t.he conclusion t.hat t.he 
symbol of the fall is not. original of t.he Adamic myt.h; the originallity 
lies, in any case, in the fact that Genesis is a unique attempt to separate 
evil from good in its origins, and it tries t.o do that from a human 
centered perspective. To int.erpret t.he Adamic Myth, Ricoeur is aware of the 
dangers of gnostic (rat.ional) int.erpretations, or apologetic att.lt.udes 
inspired by works such as St.. Augustine's explanat.ion of the nature of 
evil. Both of t.hem reduce and exhaust. t.he living movement. of meaning in the 
symbol, and the ana-travail or work of int.errelations between human beings 
and fundamental time, lire-united" by the action of primary symbol ism (149), 
2.5.2 Myths and Mystifications 
We have seen how Ricoeur has investigated the nature of symbOlism, myths, 
and the characteristics of the biblical narrative in relation to western 
thought. His interpretative tools have allowed us to gain a new insight 
Into the historical process of Christian hermeneutics, with its particular 
inter-textual (Old/New testament) relationship. Through all this process, 
Ricoeur has been establishing a fundamental difference between what we 
could call myths and mystifications; to understand those terlRS will help us 
<1(9) Cf. P. Ricoeur, "Langage ReI igieux" in "Actes de Xlle Congres des 
Soci~t~s de philosophie de langue fran~aise", Le Langage. II. Lang~~, pp. 
130-1. 
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to study Ricoeur's position in relation to Boltmann's de1l\ythologising 
project. in the second part of the present chapter. 
Ricoeur considers that myth is a language in itself. with its own inner 
dialectic compressing aspects of time and life. with its "symbolic 
alliances", facing death or a more or less uncompromissed survival. Ricoeur 
has shown us these dynamics in the Old Testament myths of creation. in the 
symbolism of fatherhood. or through the follow up of the tril ogy stal n-s I n-
guilt in the Bible. Myths are not associated with falsehood. but with the 
communication of inexpressible truths, concerning the relation between 
human existence and the Sacred. But when Ricoeur speaks about 
Mystifications. he implies something different. Mystifications are kinds of 
false constructions which do not participate of the dynamic structure of 
the symbolic-mythic language, and which do not require interpretation but a 
de-structioD (de-construction) of literal meanings (150). Perhaps we could 
say that mystifications do not share with myths the centuries long 
communitarian process of their creation. and the enrichment and deep 
characteristic of a language which transcends human reality. In 
mystifications. language expresses the divine in human terms; in mythical 
language, the divine itself communicate its Truth through the imperfect 
human word. The difference can be summarised by saying that in myths "God 
created man and woman in His own image", but in mystification "Humanity 
(150) Cf. P. RicoeuT, "Preface to Bul tmann", in L. Mudge (ed.) Essays on 
~iblic~L1J]Je.r~retatlo1J.. p. 58. 
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created the sacred in its own image". This could also be part of the Old 
Testament contrast between God and an idol. 
To demythologise does not partake of this negative enterprise of de-
struction of literal meaning, (although in some sense it needs to be done 
too) but tries to reach a comprehension of the text. We must remember here 
that myths have a mystifying wrapping which has been produced by the 
cultural/conceptual distance we have with the text. Bultmann has 
demystified the New Testament taking apart what Ricoeur calls the 
"mythological wrappings" (151), and this has freed a primary meaning of the 
Gospel, through the separation of the Kerygma from elements of the original 
cuI tural/conceptual frame (Bul tmann call s them "myths"). But in the 
process, Ricoeur adduces that Bultmann has de-symbolised the narrative, 
perverting the real meaning of myth and reducing it to a nafve surface 
level of understanding. We will proceed now to study how Bultmann 
understood the demythologising project, and how Ricoeur has challenged this 
position from a methodological perspective. 
(151) Cf. P. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 59. 
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Part T~. The hermeneutical circle of Rudolph Bultmann. 
2.6 Demythologization or demystification? 
" ... De-mythologizing is an hermeneutic method, that is. a method of 
interpretation, of exegesis". 
Rudolph Bultmann. (152) 
"The first problem is demythologization; the second is what is called the 
hermeneutical circle." 
Paul Ricoeur. (153) 
Bultmann wrote in an essay entitled On the Problem of Demytholo~izing 
(154), that he had no wish to impose his concept of myth on any person, who 
could find his own notion as questionable, and that more to the point the 
concept of myth could not be important for the understanding of 
demythologizing. In spite of that, we consider it relevant to start the 
second part of this study with an investigation into Bultmann's own 
conceptualization of myth. Myth is the basic presupposition, at the 
"guessing stage". of both Ricoeur and Bultmann's hermeneutical circle. and 
functions as the key concept upon which their processes of interpretation 
(152) J. Bultmann. Jesus Christ and Mythology. p. 45. 
(153) P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 388. 
(154) S. Ogden <ed.), New Testament. Mythology and other Basic writi~. p. 
95. 
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are built. For Bultmann, as we will see. demythologizing is a whole method 
of interpretation; for Ricoeur, it is only a part of the process. 
Bultmann's understanding of myth has proved to be polemic. not only because 
of the criticisms his position has generated, but also due to disagreements 
amongst theologians concerned with the ambiguities of Bultmann's own 
concept of myth; this is related to the fact. that Bultmann produced 
different definitions at different stages of his work. However. the truth 
seems to be related to Bultmann's lack of concern with a definition of 
something he did not question; he simply claimed to understand myth "in the 
sense in which it is customarily used in the science of history and 
religion" (155), For the present purposes of the study of Bul tmann' s 
hermeneutical circle we will consider now the background of the concept of 
myth in Bultmann, according to different parts of his work. 
2.6.1 The sources of Bultmann's concept of myth. 
Roger Johnson, in his study about the philosophy and historiography in 
Bul tmann' s t.heology, rec.ognises three moments in t.he construction of t.he 
concept of myt.h, all of them relevant for our understanding of 
demyt.hologisation (156), 
--------------------
(155) S. Ogden (ed.), op. cit., p. 95. 
(156) R. Johnson, The Origins of Demyt.hologizing, pp. 30 ff. 
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These moments are: 
1) The forJBul ation of myth according to the ReI igiongeschichte. 
2) The Enlightenment concept of myth. 
3) The existentialist definition of myth 
2.6.1.2 The Religiongeschichtliche approach to myth 
Bultmann received the influence of the School of Religion, mainly through 
the work of Richard Reitzenstein and Wilhelm Bousset; this happened 
especially during the early period of Bultmann's work, between the years 
1933 and 1941. The Religiongeschichtliche Schule uses a descriptive and 
phenomenological approach to t.he religion of Israel from the point. of view 
of its historical development, although their definition of myth varies 
amongst diverse theologians, from Gunkel to Eissfeldt. Reitzenstein, in 
some of his works such as Poirnandres and Die Hellenisten Mysterien-
Religionen, stressed the influence of the early mystery worships in the Old 
Testament, ego the myths of Cybele and Attis in Phrygia, Serapis and Isis 
in Egypt and the MIthras worship In Persia. Bousset also considered 
Christianity as a part of a major historical phenomenon. but he gave 
considerable Importance to the influence of the Old Testament and Jewish 
background, in Christian thought. From Reitzenstein's ideas, Bultmann 
elaborated a concept of myth, as a special kind of narrative concerned with 
the story of the "Primal Man". or "Heavenly Redeemer": this motif was 
considered to have originated in Iranian religious beliefs. Zoroastrianism 
was based on dualistic principles of Asha (Truth) and Druj (Lie). This 
dualism was later incorporated in the Hellenistic narratives which 
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influenced Christianity (157). 
Reitzenstein considered the myth as a soteriological narrative. stressing 
the assimilation of the story of the Primal Man, from its Persian origins 
to the rich Mandean, Manichean and Gnostic traditions which had an impact 
on the primitive Christian community, and in St. Paul (156). Bultmann 
summarised these ideas from Reitzenstein (159), drawing the following 
outl ine on the myth of the "Heavenly Redeemer": 
a) There is a dualistic principle in the world (weltbild) manifested as 
Light/Darkness, Order/Disorder. 
b) In the beginning, part of the Light fell into the darkness. due to a 
"cosmic conflict", giving origin to the "Primal Man". 
c) The Primal Man was divided up into pieces. and as a consequence of 
that, some particles of light remained in the Darkness. These are the 
soul s. 
d) An ambassador from the Light. is then sent to the Darkness. He taught 
the souls about their origins. and showed them a way to return to their 
real "home". or place of procedence (Light). This way is related to the 
Christian use of Sacraments. 
e) The ambassador dies, but his death prepares the way for the souls to 
return to their home of Light. 
(157) Cf. R. C. Zaehner (ed.), The Concise Encyclopedia of_ LivU!g Fai.th~. 
pp. 200 ff. 
(158) Cf. R. Davidson. A. Leaney (eds.), Biblical Criticism, p. 288. 
(159) Cf. R. Bultmann, "Urchristliche Religion". in Archiv fHr 
~eligionswissenschaft, pp. 83-164. 
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The emphasis of the Hellenistic influences in the Christian mythology 
was stressed by Bousset in his book Kyrios-Christos_. publ ished in 1913. 
Bultmann took from Bousset the idea that the life of Jesus, and the passion 
narrative. are both informed by Hellenistic myths. During all this period 
of his work, Bultmann related myths to soteriological narratives. in close 
contact with the Hellenistic religions; he also kept a temporal-spacial 
definition of myth, within the boundaries of the Hellenistic world. 
Bultmann sees myths as heuristic devices, as a particular literary 
phenomenon which help us to understand the historical origins of the New 
Testament. 
2.6.1.3 The Enlightenment conception of myth. 
Bultmann worked with the Enlightenment definition of myth at the time he 
developed an existentialist understanding of the New Testament Mythology. 
From the Enlightenment Movement, he understood myths as false conceptions 
of the world, and a product of primitive men unable to rationalise or use 
logical thought as we do now. The scientific paradigm, with its 
understanding of reality as a mere product of causal laws, was linked in 
this way to the "primitive man mental ity" theory. This gave way to a 
developmentalist conception of history, where myths occuppied the space of 
the childhood of humanity. Bul tmann' s books New Testament and Mythol~ 
<1941> and On the problem of Demythologizing (1961) reflect this moment of 
his thought, and his similarity to formulations from J. G. Eichorn and 
D. F. Strauss. These theologians were in agreement with the opposition 
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between mythical and scientific thinking (160). But it is also true that 
the Enlightenment tradition also recognised the scientific intentionality 
of myths, <in the sense that their intentionality is informed by a desire to 
explain natural phenomena), as a "primitive sort of science" (161) or a 
"Mythical Weltbild". Demythologizing then, was Bultmann's programme, 
created to set free the Scriptures not only from this primitive Weltbild, 
but from a scientific paradigm too. 
In this way, Bultmann seemed to have criticised the Enlightenment 
formulation of myth, and this in spite of his acknowlegement of a basic 
definition of myth, from a Neo-Kantian position (and its concept of 
reason). Bultmann, as a Neo-Kantian, worked from a dualistic core of 
"reason-individuality", but he never felt compelled to accept the ultimate 
truth ot modern science; instead of that, he recognised the importance of 
Greek thought (as the origin of modern science), and the Scriptural view of 
reality which is related to it. The individual, in a historical process 
which manifests the unity ot reason, needs to objectify the surrounding 
world. Such "objectivation" is science in itself, although it has a 
mythological nature. 
2.6.1.4 Myth and Existentialism 
Bultmann incorporated an exist.ential hermeneutic of myth into his works 
(160) ct. R. Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, II, pp. 180 ff. 
(161) Cf. R. Bultmann, Jes~~ Christ and Mythology. p. 15. 
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between the years 1925-1933. He developed his thought about myth and self-
understanding under the influence of Heidegger's Being and Time, and the 
dialectical work of Hans Jonas on Heidegger and Hegel. Jonas studied 
Augustine and Gnosticism between the years 1930-1934, and later on 
formulated the concept of "objectifying", which Bultmann used after him. 
But the existential understanding of myth in Bultmann does not always 
coincide with Heiddeger's categories, as he has already departed from the 
Enlightenment concept of myth, to formulate his original proposition. 
In general, myth is defined here in relation to the existential human quest 
for self-comprehension, but acknowledging the "Objectivation" of the 
understanding expressed in mythical terms. Jonas spoke of "Objectivation" 
(ObJektivation, a reifying of Dasein), in relation to the movement of the 
Spirit (Geist) in history, showing how the Spirit changes form during the 
different levels of the dynamic of history. Reason becomes objectified as 
part of its own activity, and as a necessary condition of Existence; 
ObJectivation is then an ontological concept referring to the actualisation 
of beIng. HermeneutIcally speaking, Jonas found that this history of the 
Geist, provIdes us with a community of interpretation, with whom we are 
related through the text, and by our special position in the movement of 
the Spirit in history. Every obJectivised self-understanding is then 
superseded by a new one, which enriches the first with available knowledge 
of the history of the Spirit, and thus gives to the new interpreter 
possibilities of understanding and self understanding denied to the 
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original addressees (162). In this way, the spiral of interpretation 
cout.inues as the true hermeneutics of Being. 
2.6.1.5 Concept of Objectification. 
Bul tmann' s concept of obJ ecti f ication (Ob.1ekti vierunr), departs from Jonas 
position. Bultmann does not agree with Jonas in the structuring of 
knowledge formulation, and his idea of human beings as part of a continuum. 
Bultmann works with a dualistic understanding of world/existence, in a way 
which is more an existentiell rather than an existential analysis. The term 
"existential" refers to the activity of interpretation, but "exlstelltiell_" 
Is used to describe the every day understanding of existence. Themes such 
as "anxiety" or "authentic being", are appertaining to the concret.e reality 
of a personal existence, thus "existentiell". Bultmann sees a human being 
as a "potentiality to be", whose reality can only be expressed in his/her 
own acts (actualization of being). The being in the continuum with the 
world, as defined by Jonas, threatens the real being because its 
perpetuates insecurity and splits the real self. 
Objectification is an exlstent.ial stance charact.erised by inact.ion, 
Insecurity and lack of decision. Bultmann sees two kinds of knowledge, an 
objectivlsed, "worldly" one, composed of general trut.hs (descriptive 
propositions, imperatives) which are baslcallv "counter-existential" and 
expressed in ob.1ectifylng language referred t.o past events of history and 
nature, and secondly, an authentic knowledge. This authent.ic understanding 
(162) Cf. J. Jonas, Augustin und das Pauljnishe Freiheltproblem, II, p. 13. 
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Is expressed in an existential language which is concerned with freedom 
from worldly existence, and authenticity. Thus both the theological and 
kerygrnatic languages are related with a dimension which goes beyond the 
descriptive levels of objectified truths. 
Objectifying, mundane thought is connected with the idea of work, and from 
BultBlann's Lutheran perspective, with the doct.rine of "Justification by 
Faith", opposed to a Justification by human work (163). The historicity of 
Christ is opposed to a Kerygmatic Christ who is the real source of our 
salvation in terms of the restoration of our authentic being. 
Demythologizing is the method that Bultmann conceives to allow the Gospels 
to bestow our being by the free gift of the kerygma. which delivers us from 
the vicious circle of our false (mundane) self. 
2.7 Demythologizing. 
Demythologizing is the process of understanding which consists in the 
systematic elimination of the worldly, historical (objectified) identity of 
Jesus and his teaching. as given by the Gospel narrative. According to 
Bultl\ann the mythical language, which is scientific in int.ention and 
counter-transcendental by nature. needs to be dismantled to give way to 
authentic understanding. This objective is achieved by a hermeneutic of 
translation from a mythic mode of discourse (which has become meaningless 
to modern humanity), to an existential language with the power to disclose 
(163) cr. R. Bultmann. Faith and Understanding. I. 
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the true meaning of the text. These two aspects reI ated to an inauthentic 
understanding of human existence, and at the same time to the bearer of 
Dasein's self-understanding, make the complex structure of a myth. 
2.7.1 The Hermeneutics of Demythologisation 
In order to describe and understand Bultmann's project of demythologizing, 
we will organise it in various moments of interpretation, according to the 
hermeneutical scheme presented in chapter one. In each of these moments, we 
would like to describe the movement of Bultmann's interpretative process, 
and the differences between this theory and Ricoeur's own position. 
Hopefully. as a result of this, we will achieve a clearer understanding of 
Bultmann's and Ricoeur's methodology, concerning both biblical hermeneutics 
and exegesis. 
2.7.1.1 Moment of Guessing. 
Presuppositions. 
Bultmann's first approach to the text comes from his understanding of myth. 
as a language with an existential intentionality, obscured by a pre-
scientilic interpretation of the world. He receives the biblical text in 
its second moment of distanciation (the first distanciation was produced 
when it became the written word). adding to this process another distance. 
the one produced by objectification. The structure of the text produces a 
concealment of the transc.endental element.s of its discourse, and there is 
an inadequacy of c.ommunication of meaning at formal levels. The "first 
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narvete" or fascination with the text is, in Bultmann, a negative 
experience. 
The first encounter between text and reader, apart from an acknowledgement 
of the objectivisation of textual meaning, also presupposes the presence of 
a community of readers and critics (which includes the new reader). 
Following Bultmann, this community has the charact.eristics of the same 
ambivalent elements featured in his formulation of myth. As a reader, he 
shares with the community the ontological quest for human destiny, and at 
the same time, the frustration produced by the concealment of the 
signification of existence, in the present discourse. But, how does 
Bultmann know that this community of Bible readers in the past, perceived 
an answer to existential questions hidden in mythological language? The 
answer lies in another of Bultmann presuppositions: the commonality of the 
Christian faith. Faith is a requisite to understand, and understanding is 
the requisite to believe wit.hout the need to mak.e a "sacrificium 
intellectum". This is what Ricoeur has called "the hermeneutical circle of 
Bultmann". or "the primacy of the object of faith over faith." <164-) 
Bultmann places the meaning of the biblical text in the text. and not in 
the intention of the authors; in this way he departs from Dilthey's 
psychological position, although Ricoeur finds that the circle of 
believing/understanding is a psychological formulation in itself. But the 
(164-) Cf. P. Ricoeur, "Preface to Bultmann", in 1. Mudge (ed.), Essay~_ on 
BfblJ~J!L Int~r-P-Tetation, p. 58. 
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point here is that the intention of the text requires a ~rk of 
inteTpretation; in this, the interrelationship between demythologisation 
and hermeneutical circle becomes more evident. But the basic presupposition 
of Bultmann's hermeneutical process, is the expectancy of obtaining self-
understanding, resulting in a particular selt-transformation of the reader 
as interpreter of the biblical text. In this sense, we find in Bultmann an 
attitude of "openness" to the text, or desire of dialogue, but there is 
also a strong pre-determination of the interpretative process at the very 
start of his hermeneutical circle. Self-understanding ~rks here both as 
pre-understanding and the ultimate objective of the inteTpreter. 
2.7.1.2 Moment of Explanation. 
The hermeneutical principle. 
Bultmann's approach to the biblical text has the characteristics of 
scientific realism; the text is an object independent of the reader who 
perceives and interprets it. The movement of interpretation has only one 
accepted way, from the reader to the text and not vice-versa. With this 
investigative spirit, Bultmann fixed the task of interpretation: "Our task, 
therefore, is to discover the hermeneutical principle by which we can 
understand what is said in the Bible" (165). Part of this hermeneutical 
principle is the presupposition of faith. as we have seen already. or the 
belief that the .word of the Seriptures is addressed personally to the 
believer-reader. But fro~ a methodological point of view. the heTmeneutical 
(165) R. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 54. 
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principle is a philosophical option, defined by Bultmann as his 
existentialist position, whose object is to try to analyse and understand 
human existence in relation to God (166). If in the New Testament such 
existence has been intuited and expressed according to a pre-scientific. 
mythical world view, the modern interpreter's task is the translation of 
the central message of Christianity into scientific, logically minded 
language. The method of interpretation becomes translation, the meaning is 
pre-assumed to be existential, and the dialectic used is the dialectic of 
the Kerygma (as proclamation; the central message of Christianity) and 
history. 
The project of demythologizing uses a translation method, whose roots are 
to be found in the same Kerygma (or proclamation of the Christian church), 
concerning the act of God in Jesus Christ for the salvation of humanity. 
Bultmann proceeds to separate Kerygma and history through the questioning 
of the mythical language of the New Testament, and the use of analogy. 
Bultmann's interpretation of history is informed by Existentialism, and as 
such is composed of two levels of interpret.ation called Historie and 
Geschichte. Bultmann regards the first. as science, a free and obJective 
account of facts of the past., and the second, as the subjective 
interpretation of the meaning of such events. Demythologizing works at the 
level of Geschichte, which is where the power of God calls us to live an 
authentic existence, and where our faith Is manifested as decision and 
acceptance of the free gift of self-disclosure of God in our lives, or 
(166) Cf. R. Bul tmann, QJh_~ ... tt., p. 58. 
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"revelation". Historie can be discarded because as a science, it will never 
be able to perceive the higher levels of historical interpretation, present 
in a Holy Geschlchte or Heilsgeschichte. To highlight the historical 
aspects of the life of Jesus, from this point of view, is exegetically 
misleading because they are not historical but uncertain, mythical 
constructions which, according to Bultmann, cannot express the revelatory 
act of God in Christ. 
The translation method uses an analogical style of work, Juxtaposing 
mythical-symbolic expressions with an existentialist model of language. For 
instance, Bultmann sees the conception of God the Father, seated in Heaven 
with Jesus at his right hand, as a secondary term, adequate only for a 
mythological framework in need of making God observable, and located in 
time and space. But through an analogy, what can be rescued here, are the 
existential characteristics of the concept of divine fatherhood (167), as 
an experience of human finitude which needs to be submitted to the divine. 
This is as relevant today for the modern person, as it was in the past for 
the disciples. Here Bultmann received an influence from Martin Buber's "1-
Thou" analysis, where visible features need to be considered only in a 
correlation with deeper. existential phenomena. God as a father is not a 
myth but a symbol, and through analogy we rescue a God who is the same for 
the modern person as He was in the times of Jesus, because the kerygma Is 
the loci of a deeper meaning, only reflected partially in the symbols used. 
The literalism of the interpretation of New Testament myths is the 
(167) Cf. R. Bultmann, Ope cit., p. 69. 
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stone -or "skandalon"- which Bultmann wanted to remove, to allow a way to 
the confrontation with the "real scandal" of the cross of Jesus. Humanity 
needs to face the challenge presented by the Word of God. through the word 
of the Bible; mythical creeds and cosmological statements. openly false, 
should then be discarded. 
2.7.1.3 Moments of Understanding and Appropriation. 
Event and Meani ng. 
The first two moments of the hermeneutical circle, Guessing and 
Explanation, work at descriptive levels, although some methodological 
aspects are usually specified during the Explanation. Understanding is a 
non-methodological moment which, together with the appropriation of the 
text. works at more interpretative levels. The relation between Explanation 
and Understanding is similar to language (as system> and word (as event); 
Bultmann has considered the first, Langue, but neglected the second. 
Parole. He has interpreted the mythical language through a negative 
hermeneutic, based in analogical translation, but he did not work at a 
level of understanding. The appropriation of the textual meaning comes, 
somehow, by a shorter way than in Ricoeur's work. 
Bultmann's concept of meaning is rooted in Husserl. The text acquires its 
meaning only through the personal appropriation made by the reader: this is 
what Btlltmann calls the moment of "personal decision", when -through the 
acceptance of a gift from the Transc.endental-, the being is bestowed to the 
reader by the Kerygma. The text acquires its meaning only when the reader 
is "changed" into a Blore authentic being by his/her act of interpretation. 
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It implies an act of self-renunciation, and an acceptance of a lack of 
authenticity, together with the impossibility to live out of transcendence, 
and by human resources (168). Through the use of analogies, Bultmann has 
identified these experiences with the New Testament calls to "humility", 
and "renunciation of the world", and St. Paul's arguments concerning living 
by Grace and living by Law. 
Bultmann's hermeneutical circle starts and finishes with faith. Without 
faith, such a process of interpretation of the Bible could not happen, but 
the question is that the appropriation of the existential call, towards an 
authentic life, is also done by faith. Faith is defined here as an act, not 
a belief; it implies previous moments of decision or appropriation of the 
word (169). Faith is the human possibility to actualise the individual's 
true being, and thus transform him/herself; self-understanding is then, an 
understanding of a new self which is different from the one known before 
this existential encounter with God. 
2.8 Ricoeur's criticism of Bultmann's circle of interpretation. 
Ricoeur bases his analysis of the demythologizing method, on two of the 
main works of Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament and The Gospel of 
John: A Commentary. He focusses on several points of criticism, which can 
(168) Cf. R. Bul tmann, Faith and Understanding. 
(169) Cf. P. Ricoeur, in L. Mudge <ed.) f;ssays on Bibl ieal Interpretation. 
p. 162. 
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be organised into the hermeneutical circle in the following way: 
1) Moment of Guessin~ A criticism of Bultmann's appropriation of 
Heidegger. 
2) Moment of Explanation: A summary of points showing lack of reflection 
about language in the process of demythologizing. 
3) Moments of Understanding/Appropriation: A criticism to Bultmann's 
formulation of the relation meaning-event. 
2.8.1 Moment of Guessing. Dasein and Language. 
Ricoeur accepts Bultmann's position of confronting the Scriptural Texts 
with presuppositions; in this case, Bultmann uses an appropriation of 
Heidegger's anthropologyi a human being is an unique creature who attains 
his being through the possibilities of his existence. Ricoeur has ~rked in 
his interpretative circle with a principle of pre-understanding, which in 
any case, he tries to discover before the hermeneutical proc.ess starts. The 
difference with Bultmann is in relation to a Heideggerian methodology which 
Ri coeur cons i del's i ncompl ete, or a II short cut II (170). 
According to Ricoeur, Bultmann concentrated his analysis on being, in 
Heidegger's existentlals (care, being-in-the-world, fallenness, etc.) These 
are constitutives of Dasein's structure, since Heidegger claims that 
------_. 
(170) Cf. P. Ricoeul', The Confl ict of Interpretations, p. 399. 
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tlDa-sein (to be there) is Mit-Sein (Being-with)" and also because there is 
an openness to "life in community" in the Being (171). But Ricoeur 
criticises Bultmann for stopping his analysis here, at this "surface 
level", while in Heidegger the question of being is broader than that. To 
take a "long way" (as opposed to a "short cut") in this ontological 
project, could only mean then to question the being from the spaciality of 
Dasein, the "there" of being-in-the-world. To question the "there" (the 
concrete world) can only be done through language; Da-Sein and Sprache 
determine each other in a dialectic of meaning. Ricoeur finds that Bultmann 
has not questioned the being, and instead of following the long process 
proposed by Heidegger, he has started interpretation in the middle of the 
analytical road; Bultmann has not worked enough with those existentials he 
took as presuppositions. As a result of that, Bultmann's concepts on human 
beings and God do not come from a conceptual process. but are appropriated 
by him at the start of his process of investigation. 
The Bultmannian hermeneutical circle is then psychologically framed, with 
the object of faith influencing faith, and an exegetical method behind the 
reading of the text (172). God as a concept is not. "discovered". but 
presupposed. which in Ricoeur's opinion, invalidates the process. No doubt. 
Bultmann's subject-object approach also has influence at this point. 
However, we need t.o stress that Ricoeur does not consider the use of 
Heidegger's philosophy as a necessity for interpretation. but rather as an 
(171) Cf. M. Heidegger. Being and Time, p. 156. 
(172) Ct. P. Ricoeur in L. Mudge (ed.), op. cit., p. 58. 
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option. The point which is the object of his criticism of Bultmann, is the 
misuse of Heidegger's conception. 
2.8.2 Myth and Language 
As we have seen in the first part of this chapter, Ricoeur's concept of 
mythical-symbolic language is opposed to Bultmann's. Ricoeur understands 
myth as the language which is capable of objectively representing the 
relation between human beings, and the limit and foundation of existence. 
Myth is neither opposed to science nor the product of primitive 
civil isationsj it is a projection and reduction of something transcendental 
which humanity tries to grasp. In Bultmann, the movement is inverse. and 
I' implies a projection of human power into a ficticious universe, explaining 
the world in terms of a pre-scientific language. (173) 
This understanding of myth in Bultmann, is linked by Ricoeur to a general 
lack of reflection about language. For instance, Bultmann never questioned 
the language of faith, in the use of expressions such as "act of God", 
"future of God" or "Word of God". These become non-mythological statements 
because Bultmann considers that the Transcendental is not mythological. 
Ricoeur explains this position in relation to the Kantian influences that 
he perceives in Bultmann. "Myth holds in the first thinker (Bultmann) the 
(173) These points have already been considered in point 2.5.2, under the 
title "Myths and MystifIcations". 
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same place that' transcendental illusion' holds in the second (Kant>. 1/ 
(174). The transcendental illusion is not the thought concerned with the 
Absolute, but rather with the intention to explain the Absolute as a 
phenomenon, or as an object of phenomenological knowledge. Bultmann has 
criticised the New Testament myths, but has never questioned these non-
mythological elements, which are part of his theological presuppositions. 
influenced by Luther's doctrine of Justification by faith. Bultmann cannot 
explain the act of God, he can only receive it by faith. Ricoeur finds here 
a fideistic position, which produces a psychological exegesis, since the 
act of God is explained only from a human, psychological experience, 
instead of analysing the text from the word. The ontology of language is 
then missed in Bultmann. 
Without this type of reflection, Bultmann gives the language of faith 
characteristics of personalism and analogy. Whenever Bultmann says that 
God relates to us as a father, on a personal level. he is using analogies 
of a I anguage he no longer considers mythical but symbolic. The I ack of 
reflection at this level (on analogy and symbolism) produces, according to 
Ricoeur, a sacrificium intellectus in the language of faith; the same kind 
of sacrifice which Bultmann tried to avoid in his demythologising 
programme. But according to Ricoeur, exegesis and demythologising become 
unnecessary tools, when the language of faith apparently has no need of 
being deciphered. 
(174) Ct. P. Ricoeur. Essays on Biblical Interpretal1on , p. 64. 
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2.8.3 Meaning and Event. 
According to Ricoeur, the relation between "the word and the event and its 
neaning is the crux of the hermeneutical problem" (175). The historical 
interpretations of the Scriptures show the centrality of this problem in 
Christianity. as we have already seen at the beginning of this chapter. 
under the title "A mirror of explanations: The text as interpretation of 
the text". Bultmann's position concerning the process of objectivisation 
produced his lack of questioning about language: the mythological language, 
the language of faith and even the philosophical language. Ricoeur finds in 
Bultmann a psychological. Diltheyan approach to the text, where the act of 
understanding is an emotional empathy with the text. As a result of that. 
Bultmann explains a myth, but he does not understand it, because his de-
nythologising project only succeds in pre-empting the meaning of the 
symbolic language 
Ricoeur's own hermeneutical circle considers two important moments of 
interpretation: the e~~lanation of the text -but not of the author- and the 
appropriation of meaning by the reader. The second depends on the first. 
which, as we have seen in chapter one, is a semantic moment presupposing 
the use of a theory of language. Textual criticism needs these two aspects, 
the objective and the existential, but Bultmann neglects the first; his 
hermeneutical circle is a "half circle". where understanding (Verstehen) is 
empathy with the author(s) of the text, instead of an appropriation of 
(175) Cf. P. Ricoeur, in L. Mudge (ed.). 9.lL- cit., p. 49. 
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meaning (Aneignung). The hermeneutical circle should always be 
methodological, rather than psychological. Ricoeur also finds a kind of 
anthropological reductionism, in some of Bultmann's formulations; one of 
them, "the act of God" becomes related to the existential relation between 
God and human beings, and to a preaching centered in the message of 
personal decision (or conversion). The historical dimension of the biblical 
text, which consists in the manifestation of the greatness of the creation, 
and of the People of God (Laos theou), is lost. The individualist approach 
to the text seems to forget the cornmunitarian cont.ext of salvation: for 
instance, in the Old Testament., salvation is for t.he People of God, and in 
the New Testament the Holy Spirit Is manifested in the community. 
Another aspect. that c,oncerns Ric.oeur, is t.hat Bultmann centers his work in 
the "speaking" experience (event) rather than in the "language" side, or 
system (176), Exegesis requires the two moments of int.erpretation in order 
to understand both the system and the event; in this sense, Bultmann's work 
is opposed to Structuralism which stresses the language, as a system of 
signs. Ricoeur sees that this forgetfulness of language has produced in 
Bultmann a neglect of the non verbal language of faith. represented by the 
world of sacraments, rituals and meaningful gestures without which the 
preached \VOrd suffers a further reduction of its meaning. 
(176) Cf. P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of InterpretatJ9n~. p. 398. 
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2.9 Post-Bultmannian hermeneutical criticism. 
What does language do? It justifies being. How does it do this? ... It 
makes being into an event." 
Ernst Fuchs. (177) 
2.9.1 The New Hermeneutics. 
Bultmann's interest in finding a way to convey the meaning of biblical 
language to 1I\0dern readers, was cont.inued by other existentialist 
theologians who were his disciples. The problem of language, to an extent 
unknown in Bultmann's programme of demythologising, became the core of the 
thinking of the movement called "New Hermeneut.ic". The main hermeneutician 
we are going to consider here was a student of Bultmann: Ernst Fuchs, who 
become Bultmann's successor in the University of Marburg in 1961. He is one 
of the principal exponents of the New Hermeneutics amongst continental 
schol ars. 
Fuchs shares with Bul tmann the basic ground of a quest for the 
communication of the biblical message. through the distance of centuries: 
both of them agree that distanciation puts modern readers in a tradition of 
interpretatIon alien to t.hemselves. Fuchs and Bultmann discard the use of 
(177) E. Fuchs, Studies of t.he Historical Jesus, p. 207. 
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literalism, because it could lead the int.erpreter to a mere repet.ition of 
traditions; this styl e neither honours the real meaning of the text. nor is 
able to communicate truth. in a modern, scientifically informed society 
(178). However. Fuchs departs from Bultmann's proposal in some aspects 
concerning language formulation, t.ext definition. fait.h and history; from 
the interrelat.ionship of these concepts. t.he New Hermeneutics developed a 
hermeneutical circle which seems t.o come closer to Ricoeur's interpretation 
theory, alt.hough there are still important differences for us to consider. 
We will proceed to highlight t.he dialectical moments of t.he New 
Hermeneutic, following Fuchs theory in his work Hermeneutik, and Studies on 
the !{istorical Jesus. Our main int.erest here is t.o contrast Ricoeur, 
Bult.mann and t.he New Hermeneut.ics, in order t.o arrive at a conclusion 
concerning what we can call Ricoeur's biblical interpretation proposition; 
such formulation will then take us into the next point of our 
investigation, which will be centered on the influence of Ricoeur's 
biblical interpretation on the hermeneutical c.ircle in liberation theology. 
2.9.2 The dialectic of the New Hermeneutic. Key concepts. 
2.9.2.1 Language 
Fuchs' definit:fon of language includes two basic aspects: a) the concept. 
(178) Cf. A. Thiselt.on, "The New Hermeneutics" in D. McKim <cd. l. A Gllt~~ 
to ConteB\por~I'y'_HeTmeneutics, p. 78. 
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of "letting". and b) the relation between language and event. The essence 
of language is constituted by an act of "letting" or "showing". as if the 
core of language could be described as a certain movement that directs us 
into perception (179), This concept is related to Fuchs' I inguistical ity of 
existence, where human beings only exist in language. and specifically in a 
point located between the call (Anruf) and the answer (Zuruf) of language. 
Toward this m.ovem.ent or "grant" of language, a being becomes an event. 
because it lets being exist and to exist in certain time; the concrete 
word, as a linguistic event (Sprachereignis) makes possible the existence 
of being (160). 
From this formulation we understand that. in Fuchs. language precedes the 
spoken reality and the speaker him/herself. Language is not the second 
mom.ent of thought but the contrary is true; language. in this definition. 
is the home of existence. It is important to recall that Fuchs makes a 
distinction between "language" and "words", because he does not define 
language from. the conceptualised meaning of words; this transference from 
content (concepts through words) to language. does not concern him. Fuchs' 
main definition of language is related instead to existence, and to the 
communication of the personal nature of existence. 
Human beings inherit a language tradition which Involves a self-
understanding of their being; communication amongst individuals relates 
(179) cr. E. Fuchs, Hermeneutik, p. 141. 
(l60) cr. E. Fuchs, $_tudies In the Historicat Jesus, p. 79. 
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then to a sort of "agreement" of corrunon understanding (181). This self-
understanding suffers crises concerning its adjustment to reality. which 
are generally minor shifts produced by the experience of life. But there is 
also what Fuchs calls "major crisis" (182), where the individual 
experiences a radical challenge to his/her own self-understanding of the 
world and of hiln/herself. This is the essence of Fuchs' concept of "speech-
event", where the real content of our speech is the situation (event) of 
our being (183). 
It is in these situations of major crisis where Fuchs likes to stress our 
dependency upon language and specifically, upon a new, authentic language 
which is the one conveyed by the Word of God. Since human beings exist 
between a call and an answer of language. the Word of God is what Fuchs 
considers the Anruf of the linguisticality of existence (184). 
The difference between Fuchs' position and Bultmann becomes clear in this 
last pOint. Although both theologians focus on language in relation to 
human existence, Fuchs goes beyond Bultmann in the prioritising of the 
I anguage-event. The I anguage of t.he biblical text cOJneS first for Fuchs. 
while for Bultmann the priority belongs to the interpreter's own thoughts. 
At the same time the proclamation of the word, which in Bultmann was 
(181) Cf. R. Funk, Language. Hermeneutic and the Word of God, p. 51. 
(182) cr. E. Fuchs, Hermeneutik. p. 137. 
(183) I~id .• p. 349. 
(184) Ibid .• p. 70. 
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assoc I ated onl y wi th speech. in Fuchs I s reI ated with the event of the 
presence of Christ. who calls us to an authentic existence and gives us the 
answer we require at the same time. This is the language of the parables of 
Jesus. 
The new hermeneutic understanding of language takes distance from Bultmann 
but comes closer to Ricoeur. because it allows the text to "say" the being 
of the reader, and to challenge him/her beyond his/her own conceptions. 
Fuchs agrees with Bultmann in the necessity of a demythologising programme. 
al though the subject of this process is not the text, but the interpreter. 
Here we are closer to the transcendence of the Cartesian subject-object 
approach, from which Bultmann takes a position as interpreter-subject, 
directed towards a text-object; this is the characteristic movement of 
scientific thought, opposed to Ricoeur's phenomenological position. where 
the text "questions" the reader. Instead of being a mere object of 
Investigation, the text is here the "subject-matter" of hermeneutics. 
2.9.2.2 Text. 
The text as "subject-matter" transcends Bultmann's demythologtsing pro.ject. 
because the text not only works as an instrument of communication of the 
Kerygma, but as the "grant.er" which direc.ts us int.o a new perception of our 
existence. Fuchs considers that the hermeneutical task is a continuation of 
a similar process already present in the text. The Gospels are a linguistic 
phenomenon, and the same could be said about the pri~itlve Christian 
church, which existence was grounded in this "new' -allthentic- language. As 
we have seen already, Bultmann shares Fuchs opinion about the continuation 
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of the hermeneutical process; ~ can recall here how in Bultmann the 
demythologisation process is evident in the New Testament, for instance in 
St. Paul's letters. Ricoeur would also agree with t.his posit.ion, since he 
has affirmed t.hat. the biblical text is interpretat.ion of interpret.ations. 
Ho~ver. Fuchs stresses that the t.ask. of interpret.at.ion goes beyond the 
text, because he is t.hinking in a hermeneut.ic of the present moment. (185). 
It is in this present. moment where our human existence is confronted with 
the Word of God, and this is the reason why, in Fuchs opinion. the 
hermeneutical task is a continuing process. 
Fuchs uses a method of self-understanding in his exegesis of the parables 
of Jesus which represent for him the most genuine instances of aut.hentic 
language. Three basic aspect.s of Fuchs' understanding of the parables need 
to be mentioned here: (186) 
1) Jesus does not use the circumstances of the normal, everyday life of 
Palestine in the first Century CE, as a device for picturesqueness. He uses 
them as a contact point with the world of the reader. The commonality 
between the worl d of J eStls' parabl es and hi s hearers own circumstances, 
allows a greater existent.ial understanding in the parables, than in another 
form of discourse. 
2) Through t.he use of a conventional. common, daily language. Jesus 
challenges his audience with the unexpected reactions of the characters 
from the parables. This is a creative language event. where through the 
(185) Cf. E. Fuchs. StudiesiRthe HistoTical Jesus~ p. 211. 
(186) Ibid., pp. 97 ff. 
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commonality with the world of the text, we find ourselves challenged to 
take a decision, as a result of a new observation. Here we need to consider 
tor instance, the "upside down" elements of the parables, which contradict 
what Paulo Freire calls "NaYve Consciousness", and produces a new awareness 
in the reader. Perhaps liberation theology could say that Jesus' parables 
are, somehow, m.ini-m.odels of conscientization programmes, since they share 
the life of the listeners (students/base communities members>, allowing 
them to face a challenge, and to make a decision which would involve a 
transformation at both personal and community levels. 
3) Fuchs' Christology st.resses the unity bet.ween Jesu9 and his word. To 
hear Jesus then, is t.o part.icipat.e wit.h Him, to share his world and to 
respond to God's challenge together with t.he Son of God. This is the "Jesus 
as a model for faIth" that. is found not in history. but in the language-
event. This aspect of the part.icipation of the community \vith Jesus, has an 
interesting parallel in the characteristics of a Freirean teacher as a 
concientizador popular. or the leader of Base Christian Communities in 
liberation theology. In both cases the subject-object approach of 
Scientific ism has been superseded by a non-banking understanding of the 
dialectic of community transformation (187). 
Fuchs works exeget.ically with the Pauline Gospel and what Jesus said; he 
contrasts and conflrl\S both messages as the same, especially in that which 
is concerned with Jesus (and our own) relation with God. Fuchs believes he 
(187) Ct. P. Freire, Pedagogfa del _Oprimido, pp. 71 ff. 
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can know the mind of Jesus, and the real meaning of his sayings, which 
takes us back to the psychological approach criticised by Ricoeur. However, 
this seems to be characteristic of an old liberal. individualistic approach 
to the interpretation of the Scriptures. An example of Fuchs approach to 
the New Testament can be found in his exegesis of 1 Corinthians 9: 1 and the 
Parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15: 11-32). 
In this example Fuchs comments on St. Paul's vision of the risen Christ. 
and his acceptance of the Lordship of Jesus. St. Paul shows here a joy of 
communion with Jesus, which takes away the existential anxiety of humanity 
separated from God. The fear of divine judgel\ent has been replaced with the 
acknowlegement of God's graciousness, affirmed through t.he vision of Jesus 
sitting at the right. side of God the Father. This theme is repeated in the 
parable of the Prodigal Son: the father (who represents Jesus himself) does 
not reject the sinner, acting in accordance with the will of God. The story 
implies then that God (represented by Jesus/the earthly father) is gracious 
and merciful, and this is the same message we receive from St. Paul. 
According to Fuchs, this is the reason why the enemies of Jesl1s 
(represented in the story perhaps by the "self-righteous" brother), 
condemned him to die. They "could not tolerate (Jesus) claim to assert that 
God's will was a gracious w11l." (188) 
In another exegesis. Fuchs works with a similar method (189). For instance, 
,-----
(188) E. Fuchs, Studies in the Historical Jesus. p. 20. 
(189) Ibi4 .• pp. 23. 94, 122-3. 
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in the Parable of the Hidden Treasllre (Matthew 13:44-46). Fuchs starts with 
a granunatical question, concerning the phrase "op.o{a EO'ltv 1'1 ~aO'tAE{a 'tUN 
oupavttN". The lise here of a dative case creates, in his opinion. a 
confusion about the real purpose of the parable, and the meaning of 
~a<"AE'la. Fuchs considers that the Ki ngdom is "the miracl e of faith". The 
~aO\AE'la is not the treasure, but the abundant result of a very little 
amount of faith, which could only come through the preaching of Jesus 
Christ. Fuchs confirms t.his exegesis comparing other texts of the Gospel. 
The results of these exegeses highlight Fuchs' psychological approach to 
the text. In all the cases, the method of self-understanding seems to be 
related with an at.tempt t.o know "the mind of Jesus", and the security of 
reconstructing the real meaning of his teaching, in an individualistic 
style. Fuchs interest in History is relat.ed to this search for the 
reconstruction of the authentic voice of Jesus. 
2.9.2.2.1 Trans-Iatlon Method. 
In some ways Fuchs still uses a similar translation method to Bultmann; he 
calls it "trans-Iation" (Uber-setzen) of the language of the text, to the 
modern language (190). He has a frame of questions, an existentialist pre-
understanding, and his interpret.ation replies to it. There are other 
criteria which Fuchs does not take into account, as for inst.ance, the 
interpretatton that the New Testament. makes of the Old Testament teachings. 
------------------
(190) Cf. E. Fuchs, Hermeneut.ik, p. 109. 
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This is particulary evident in the narrative of the passion a.nd 
resurrection. Fuchs limits himself to linking the confession of Jesus' 
resurrection to our experience of a faith which experiences final victory 
in the Lord's Word (191). No matter how much Fuchs st.ruggles to render free 
the truth of the text, he pre-empts the results; perhaps Ricoeur would see 
in Fuchs the same hermeneutical "short cut" which Bultmann has taken. 
The New Hermeneutic wants to move from the every day, objective language, 
to the language of being, but still lacks a reflection translated to the 
deeper level of a semantic analysis. It seems that Fuchs relies on the 
transl at i on of the text t.hrough the concept of empathy (Ei nverstllndn is), 
which happens in the int.erpreter at a pre-conscious level, by an 
imaginative re-creation of the world of the text. Ricoeur would disagree 
with both the psychological approach and the lack of reflection which we 
have located at the moment of explanation of the hermeneutical circle. 
2.9.2.3 Language and History. 
The New Hermeneutics does not. relate its reflection t.o 8.n historical event .. 
Historical event.s do not exist as such, but. only through the reflection of 
the prophets concerned with certain events. The words of the prophets are 
not to be taken literally. as faithful records of God's revelation; rather 
these words are historical events in t.hemselves. Historical Criticism is 
used as a tool to liberate the hermeneutical function of the text (192) 
(191) Cf. E. Fuchs, op. cit .. p. 229. 
(192) ct. J. M. Robinson, The New Hermeneutic, p. 66. 
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from the distortion produced by mechanical causes, inappropriate 
interpretations, ideological prejudices or the confusion produced by the 
linguistic medium of the Scriptures. In this way Fuchs avoids perhaps the a 
historical existentialist interpretation of Bultmann, which seems to lose 
contact with the world. However the New Hermeneutics does not consider the 
objectivity of the external world, and emphasises the subjective individual 
experience in the present. The reconstruction of an historical past is 
outside the limits of this position, but the same can be said of Bultmann. 
Ricoeur spoke about "the world of the text", ego the meaning of historical 
events as left in the work of documents and signs. Thus Ricoeur defined 
history as "a quasi-' thing' on which human action leaves its mark." (193). 
This historicity of the text produces a tension in its relationship with 
the reader's own historicIty. There is a dialectic of meaning between the 
past and the present through the text, which allows us to explain what the 
text is saying to us, and avoid the perils of a too subjective 
interpretation as in Fuchs' case. Concerning the validity of the historical 
criticism, Ricoeur makes clear the importance of this method, especially to 
counter act the Hegelian totalization of History in the Absolute Spirit 
(194) . 
2.9.2.4 Language and Faith 
The reflection on faith in the new hermeneutics is closely related to the 
(193) Ct. P. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and_tll._f;_H_\Iffi£ln ~_~J~llceg. p. 208. 
(194) Ct. P. Ricoeur, The Con(lict .Qf_Int~rpret~lJons_. pp. 109-12. 
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dialectical relation "language-event" and Christology. Fuchs. like 
Bultmann, considers that the proclamation of the Kerygma radicalises human 
existence, demanding us to take a responsible decision concerning our 
present. This decision relieves us from the burden of the past, and puts us 
in the "future of God" <195>' Faith therefore is the act of acceptance of 
our present as a gift of God, and a giving up of the past for this ftlture. 
This is the "end of history, which is not as the end of man ... (but) 
identical with the' beginning' of (new) life." (196), But faith then needs 
to remain in a "present continuous", renewing itself, and this can only be 
done by the power of the preached word. Fuchs says that, "The preaching of 
the faith Is the preaching of the Gospels" (197), which in St Paul is the 
proclamation of the message of grace, as we have seen in Fuchs' exegesis of 
the Parable of the Prodigal Son. Jesus brought God into language, through 
the language-event (or "concept of the situation") of his proclamation 
(196) . 
2.9.2.4.1 Word and Faith. 
Word and faith are correlate terms in Fuchs' Christology; they are 
witnesses of the incarnation of Christ. Thus Fuchs says: 
"The relation between faith and word in the process of understanding 
------------
(195 ) Cf. E. Fuchs, Studi es on the Hi stot_t~al_ J eStlS, p. 218. 
(196 ) Ibid .. p. 40. 
(197 ) lh id. , p. Z19. 
(196 ) Ihid .• p. 221. 
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and interpretation is not a relation that moves from the subject to 
the word, but rather from the word to the understanding subject." 
(199 ) 
From this text we infer that the word of God creates faith. although it 
does not take it for granted; it is not necessary to presuppose faith in 
the addressee. The difference with Bultmann is then that the criteria of 
understanding of the Kerygma in the proclamation. is the non-believer 
instead of the believer (200). Nevertheless, Ricoeur finds that the lack of 
reflection on the language of faith, is still "at the center of post-
Bul tmannian hermeneutics." (201). In the new hermeneutics. the t.1Uderstanding 
of the biblical text (Verstehen) suffers a reduction of meaning. due to an 
excessive stress on the existential decision of the addressee. "The moment 
of exegesis" -according to Ricoeur- "is not that of existential moment. but 
that of meaning ... " (202). 
Ricoeur agrees with Bultmann and the new hermeneutics, on the place of the 
subj ect in the proposed phil osophi cal discourse. He can accept. that mean i ng 
--------._---------
(199) Quoted by .. T. M. Robinson, The New Hermeneutics, p. 64. Also cf. 
Evangelishe Evangelienauslegllng. 1st ed., pp. 382 ff. 
(200) Cf. A. Thiselton, "The New Hermeneutics" in D. McKim <ed.) A Gt1Jq~.-to 
Contemporary Hermeneutics, p. 101. 
(201) P. Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 396. 
(202) Ibid., p. 397. 
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comes from a personal appropriation of the text, but providing that this 
Aneignung CODes only as the last. stage of the moment of interpretation. 
"Meaning" is In Rlcoeur an objective or "ideal moment." (203). 
However, "Signification" is the moment of meaning act.ualised in existence; 
Ricoeur criticises that the pre-supposition of "the moment of 
decision"short.ens the circle of interpretation, leaping over the moment of 
I\eaning. a.nd making t.he ta.sk of interpretation very difficult. The main 
problem could be what Ricoeur calls "an objec,tivat.ion" of faith. or a 
I\ystification of the transcendental. Only through keeping the horizon of 
t.he Christian eschatology <ie. the transcendental or "beyond" history 
irrupting" in our history), can religion escape the risk of the totalization 
of the "Whole Other" (204.). The real danger then, is to make an "idol" or 
"relic" of the Christian religion. by a lack of relevant criticism in the 
biblical interpretation process (205). 
2.10 Ricoeur's Biblical Hermeneutic 
2. 10. 1 The Ricoeurian "Quadril ateral Model" 
Our investigation of Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics, with its 
--------....-------
(203) Ricoeur uses the concept of meaning in the sense of Husser} and 
Frege. Ct, I. Miller, Husserl, Perception and Temporal Awareness, p. 17. 
(204.) Ct, P. Ricoeur, Freud and Psychology, pp. 250 ff. 
(205) Ct. P. Ricoeur, "Task of the Ecclesial Community in the Modern 
Worl d". in L. K. Shook (ed.) Theololl' of Renewal, I I. 
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particular application in the field of biblical hermeneutics, has brought 
to the surface many characteristics of Ricoeur's project of interpretation. 
These elements can be organised into what Beatriz Melano Couch has called 
the "Ricoeurian Quadrilateral Model" (CuadrilAtero Rlcoeuriano), which 
scheme we are going to follow in this last part of our present chapter 
(206). This Cuadrilatero is composed of the four basic dimensions of 
Ricoeur works: 1) The linguistic, 2) the phil osophical, 3) the ontological 
and 4-) the sacramental dimension. All these aspects, which are present in 
Ricoeur's hermeneutics, seem to be absent or incomplete in Bultmann's 
demythologising programme, and in the new hermeneutic school. As a resum~ 
of our previous investigation on Ricoeur, we will mention briefly the 
following aspects of the Quadrilateral Model: 
2.10.1.1 The Linguistic Dimension 
Ri coeur has taken the long way of the I nterpretat i ve process. through the 
investigation of mythical-symbolic language. For that purpose, he uses the 
Linguistic Sciences and the study of Semiology; his task is the deciphering 
of the text, which is characterised by the multiplicity of meaning. But 
this textual plurivocity can only be approached by an inter-disciplinary 
model, e.g. through the psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams, study of 
myths, historical understanding, exegesis etc. 
Ricoeur works in a dialogical fashion, relating the philosophy of language 
-----
(206) Cf. B. Melano Couch, Hermen~utlca Met6dica, pp. 231 ff. 
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(the Speech-act of Austin and Searle, Black's theory of metaphor etc.) ~ith 
Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger's ontology and the semantic analysis 
used by exegetes. This is the Ricoeurian project in a nutshell. the 
organisation of a general hermeneutic which could include a reflection on 
anthropology. psychoanalysis, symbolic logic and exegetical science (207). 
Ricoeur considers here three tasks to be taken into account for this 
project: the catalogue of symbolic expressions (cosmic symbols, oneiric 
expressions, etc), the elaboration of a "criteriology". fixing the criteria 
of the structures of relat.ed forms, such as metaphors, allegory and simile 
(208), and consequently, a promotion of an inter-disciplinary dialogue. In 
this way. the multivocity of the symbols would not be reduced by one 
interpretation from metapsychology or phenomeneology of religion. but it 
would be enriched by a diversity of hermeneutical methods. A crfteriology 
will provide the base for such a fruitful dialogue, arbitrating between 
dream mec.hanisms and rhetorical forms. for instance. Rfcoeur's task is to 
liberate human discourse, from the absolutist claims of different .ethods 
of i nterpretat ion. (209) 
2.10.1.2 The Philosophical Dimension 
Ricoeur criticises Bultmann for his lack of reflection at this level. 
Bultmann's search for the meaning of the text does not provide us with a 
(207) Ct. P. Ricoeur, D~~ytholo,lsation et Herrnen~uti~. p. 36. 
(208) Cf. P. Ricoeur. The Conflict ot Interpretations. pp. H· ff. 
(209) Ibid., p. 15. 
careful analysis of the different moments of t.he production of 
meaning/signification. The two main points Rlcoeur considers here are a) 
the problem of existential understanding. and b) t.he quest.ion of the 
Cogito. In the first case, we cannot appropriate the meaning of t.he t.ext, 
in an existential way, if we do not take into account literary criticism. 
The interpretation of the text, at semantic levels, is c.losely related to 
the self-understanding of the reader. In t.he second point, Ricoeur works 
with a philosophy of the subject, in order to ask who is the "I" who 
appropriates the text. 
Bultmann has considered that the big obstacle for the moment of the 
appropriation of the text, is the cultural distance between the primitive 
addressee and the modern reader. He has tried to overcome this problem 
through his demythologisation method. But Ricoeur argues here that Bultmann 
does not ask who is the reader who appropriates the meaning of the text, 
without thinking that it could well be a "narcissistic ego" or a "false 
consciousness" characterised -according to Heidegger- by inauthenticity. 
AI though Bul tmann spoke of the need for a special attitude towards the 
text, or a kind of "disposition" on the part of the reader, he never asked 
about the nature of the "I" who needs to be "disposed" in front of the 
text. 
An important point to remember here is that for Ricoeur, the distanclation 
of the text is a positive aspect which contributes to the interpretation 
process. The distanciation, as a hermeneutical function, produces three 
disappearanc.es: that of the original writer, that of the original addressee 
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and that of the original horizon of the discourse <cultural and historical 
context). All these factors contribute, in Ricoeur's opinion. to an 
enrichment of the meaningful possibll ities of the text. This happens 
because, although we do not have the "author", we have instead an 
autonomous text, with a new reader (addressee) and an "infinit.e" text.ual 
horizon, which replaces the original, limited horizon of the written 
discourse. 
Finally, what differentiates Ricoeur from Bultmann, is his interest in 
developing a philosophy of the subject, with help from other sciences such 
as psychoanalysis and structuralism. Using both approaches, Ricoeur aims to 
produce an unmasking of the false Co&"ito. In Ricoeur's own ~rds. "The 
self <Ie moi) must be lost in order to find the 'I' <Ie je)" (210). But 
this project can only be developed through the exegesis of the texts of 
human cui ture. (211) 
2.10.1.3 The Ontological Dimension 
Ricoeur says t.ha.t "Ontology is t.he promised I and for a phil osophy that 
begins with language and with reflection" (212), The ontology that Ricoeur 
proposes is intimately linked with interpretation. and following Heidegger. 
he starts with being, instead of knowledge. For Ricoeur. "understanding is 
(210) P. Ricoeur. The Confl ict _of Interpretations, p. 20. 
(211) P. Ricoeur. Del\ytholo&,isation et H~rmenelltique, p. 30. 
(212) P. Ri coeur. The Conti I ct of Interpretati on~_. p. 24. 
176 
thus no longer a mode of knowledge but a mode of being." (213). This is 
part of his major project of leaving aside the circle of the ob.ject-subject 
problem, in order to question the being, and that being which is "there" 
(Dasein), in the understanding mode; this can only be achieved by the 
hermeneutical process. (214) 
Ricoeur recognises the value of different hermeneutics; this is also part 
of his "Criteriology". Every hermeneutic discovers something about the 
being who interprets. For instance, psychoanalysis has show the relation 
between language and human desire, and phenomenology work.s at descriptive 
levels related to language and the sacred. All these approaches are useful 
to unmask the narcissistic Ego, which considers itself the origin and 
fundament of every meaning: at the same time, these methods constitute the 
ontological implications of an interpretative process. This process is 
composed of different "ontological roots of comprehension" (215), which 
Ricoeur organises as psychoanal ysls (with its archeology of the subject). 
phenomenology of the spirit (with its teleology of figures). and 
phenomenology of religion (the signs and the sacred). 
The task. proposed by Ricoeur is of a fundamental ontology. Language needs 
to be considered not as an object, neither as a mediator between meanings. 
but as a way to "name the Being." Bultmann also tried to find the being 
------------------
(213) Ibid., p. 7. 
(214) Ibid., pp. 7 ff. 
(215) Ibid. p. 22. 
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through an existential encounter with the kerygma, as the proel aimed word, 
but in Ricoeur's opinion, the problem is that Bultmann's ontological 
project does not use the interdisciplinary approach; and this is necessary 
to rescue the many dimensions of the Dasein who interprets. 
2.10.1.4 The Sacramental Dimension 
Ricoeur has criticised Bultmann for his excessive concentration on the 
spoken language, forgetting the important dimension of the non-verbal 
language; symbols, action, rituals and gestures are a rich language to be 
considered. Rlcoeur studies d1fferent discursive models such as the 
religious, the discourses of Jesus, the poetic, the iconoclastic and a type 
of discourse he calls "of a second hearing" (de la seconde ~coute). (216) 
His conclusions are the followln~ 
a) There is a dialectic of proclamation and manifestation expressed 
through the interrelation of hermeneutics and a phenomenology of the 
sacred. 
b) It is not possible to conceive a faith without symbols; the symbols 
allow us to continue the process of interpretation. 
c) The kerygmatic discourse is communicated through symbols. 
Ricoeur sees a subtle equilibrium between proclamation and sacraments 
(manifestations of the sacred) during all the history of the Christian 
Church. This dialectic Is manifested by the fact that in the preaching of 
(216) Ct. B. Melano Couch, Hermen~utica Met6dica, p. 238. Also cf. P. 
Ricoeur, "Manifestation et Proclamation" in L' HeIJJ~1}_~utique du Sacr~. 
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the kerygma, the Church wants to actualise the symbol (this is a praxis), 
but in t.he sae.ramental acts, the praxis becomes symbol again. Ricoeur 
stresses this mutual interdependence, saying that the sacrament allows the 
word to become concrete, and vice versa, t.he proclamation returns the 
charismatic dimension to the sacrament. 
Melano Couch adds to this analysis that something similar happens in 
relation to other symbols of the Christian Church. For instance the 
Koinonia <communion of the Church), as a sign of the power of the word, 
"speaks" to us about the action of the Holy Spirit; the kiss in the 
"sharing of peace" of our congregations, and even the silence kept in the 
presence of God, are full of meaning. "The symbols give flesh (encarna) to 
the word; they speak, and sometimes they do it louder and more powerfully 
than the words which are said and heard." (217) 
The CuadrtlAtero Rtcoeuriano of Melano Couch's model organises the foul' 
dimensions of the Long \Jay of Ricoeur, which provide us with an exegetical 
methodology. a fundament to understand history. and a mediator amongst 
contradict.ory interpretations. The sac.ramental dimension is of particul ar 
relevance for the hermeneutic of religious language. from the perspective 
of a non-verbal language. Ricoeur has crit.icised Bultmann for having 
emphasised the preached word, without paying attention to the language of 
gestures. actions, and any form of human conununication without words. It is 
(211) ct. B. Melano Couch, Ope cit .. p. 238. 
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in t.his perspect.ive that Ricoeur asks: 
"Does an hermeneut.ic of Procla1l\ation detach itself of a phenomenology 
of the Sacred? Does the Kerygma annihil ate the Sacred'l" (218). 
This point seems to be of particular relevance for the Latin American 
liberation theology. since our challenge is to reflect theologically 
with peo~le who belong to traditional non-Hispanic speaking, agraphic 
cultures. We need to be able to incorporate to our theology, elements such 
as dances and community celebrations, which have the role of communicating 
the religious experience of our people. In this sense we can say that the 
Long Way of Rtcoeur cannot be completed in Latin America, until the 
sacramental non-verbal language of the poor can be rediscovered, and 
incorporated to the linguistic, ontological and reflexive dimensions. 
2.10.2 Exegetical Rules for Biblical Int.erpretation 
We have studied Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory, and we will concl ude now 
reviewing his work concerning exegetical rtlles (219). There are three main 
rules he mentions as important for the biblical exegete. The first is 
concerned with the non-neutrality of the text, the second with the 
(218) Ct. P. Ricoeur, "Manifestation et Proclamation" in L' Hec!'m~lleutlque dtl 
Sacre. 
(219) Ct. R. Barthesj P. Ricoeur; A. Vergote and others, Exesese et 
Hermeneuttque, pp. 13 ff. 
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postponement of a final interpretation. and the third, with the work of a 
criteriology (220). 
The first rule 01 exegesis is to be aware of the non-neutrality of the 
methods of interpretation. Behind any chosen method there is always a 
theory of the product.ion of meaning; to know the method we have selected 
helps us to realise the intermediaries between the text and ourselves. For 
instance, questions concerning the nature of language, or the text. 
function as a-priorist.ic. determinants for our understanding of the 
discourse. Every method carries with it it.s own I imitations, which should 
be known by the exegete hefore hand. 
The second rule Is related t.o the first, in the following sense: t.he 
exegete, being aware of t.he limitations of his/her chosen methodology, 
should not precipitate the final moment of interpretation. The paradox with 
which Ricoeur confront. us here, is t.hat we need to choose a method (thus 
limiting our possibilities), but at. t.he same time be aware of the risk of 
an ecclectic combination of different theories. As a result of that, the 
final interpretation should be post.poned, in the sense that it would need 
to al ways be open to new possihilit ies of interpretat ion. of further 
enrichment of previous exegesis. In this way, the task of the exegete is 
------
(220) By "criteriology" Ricoeur understands the combined work. of different 
models of transference of meaning. as key to the development of the 
interpretative task. He considers that due to the Platonic influence, we 
tend to use most} y an analogical model. whil e fail ing to incorporate the 
181 
never finished, because it Is the task of the search for the being who 
interprets. In Ricoeur's own words, the interpreter "like Moses ... can only 
glimpse this (promised) land (of ontology) before dying." (221). 
The third rule combines the first two. Recognising the limitations of our 
J 
chosen method, and being aware of the risks both of ecelecticism and of 
j 
fanaticism, it is required to develop a way of working with different 
methods. This should be done in order to keep enriching our interpretation. 
Ricoeur uses here a criteriology. a recognition of the "borders" or limits 
of different methods, and the points where they can connect with each 
other. Acquiring awareness about the finitude of the theoretical models. 
the exegete woul d be abl e to empathi se wi t.h other epi sternol ogical 
proposals. knowing when and how to introduce a different met.hod of 
analysis. Ricoeur wants to produce a convergence of methods 
<!'ent.recoupemente des m~thodes), as t.he only solution to the existing 
conflict of interpretations. 
analysis of dreams from Freud, or the critique of illusion from Nietzsche. 
A criteriology then, fulfils the role of incorporating different and even 
contradict.ory models of transference of meaning into the interpretation 
theory. Ricoeur points out. that every interpretation is partial, and to 
avoid narrowness and fanat.icism Is necessary to rediscover the richne~s of 
different. hermeneutics. In t.his way, the conflict of interpretat ion will 
give way to a deeper, richer hermeneutical circle. cr. P. Ricoeur. T~e 
Conflict of Interpretations. pp. 26 ff. 
(221) Cf. P. Ricoeur. op. cit., p. 2t. 
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Melano Couch adds two extra rules which she infers from Ricoeur's work: The 
relation between written and spoken word, and the place of the exegete in 
the biblical tradition. Ricoeur has clearly established his belief in the 
dialectic of the written/oral discourse. In the written word, the unit.y is 
the phrase, and in the oral discourse, the sign. The exegete needs to pay 
attention to both dimension.s, through the use of an adequate knowledge of 
the theory of di scourse. Ricoeur has c.overed these exeget ical di mens ions 
with his studies on structuralism (concerned with the written text), and 
his research on Wittgenstein. Benveniste, Austin, Strawson and Searle (the 
spoken word). 
But the exegete should also remember that his/her interpretation is 
situated in a chain of biblical interpretation; this means that the exegete 
belongs to the same tradition as the biblical text. Ricoeur has said that 
there Is a chain of tradltlon-text-interpretatlon, which can be read in a 
different order. For instance. text-interpretation-tradition or 
Interpretation (of an event)-text-traditlon. In order to keep the integrity 
of the text, the exegete must acknowledge the fact that s/he is part of 
this community of interpreters who preceded him/her. This. as we have seen 
in chapter one, is one of the presuppositions from the moment of guessing 
in the hermeneutical circle, and a key aspect of what we have called "an 
hermeneutics of solidarity". It is this cOllllRunitarian, mutually binding 
aspect of Rlcoeur's proposal, which has proved to be an important influence 
on the Latin American theology of liberation. This and other relevant 
points from the hermeneutical circle developed by J. Severino Croatto, Juan 




The Conflict of Interpretation of the Scriptures. 
Ricoeur, in his analysis of the core of the problem of interpretation in 
the history of Christianity, sees the conflict of interpretation of 
Scriptures as something inherent to biblical interpretation itself. He 
considers three main moments of its development: 
a) The moment of questioning the relationship between the Old and New 
Testament. 
b) The moment of interpreting Christ's mystery in relation to human 
existence. 
c) The moment of questioning of the hermeneutical situation in itself. 
Bibl ical hermenel,tlcs. 
Biblical hermeneutics Is, according to Ricoeur, a paradox. It is part of a 
chapter of a General Hermeneutics, but at the same time it has unique 
characteristics. One of these, is the "eccentric" character of biblical 
interpretation, that is, the use of elements outside the text as essential 
to interpretation, such as the use of the confession of faith, and the 
closure of the narrativity produced by the canon. Ricoeur uses Von Rad's 
analysis and takes from it the three basic problems of the biblical 
discourse: the relation between biblical narrative and the confession of 
faith; the reI at ion between these two el ements and the theological method, 
and the relation between the whole of the corpus of the text, and the 
changes produced in the interpretation of individual forms of discourse 
when they are a unit. 
Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur works with phil osophical hermeneutics to study the rei at ion between 
Word-event (from the spoken Word of God to the text), and to anal yse the 
world of the text (which has a referential function>. He understands the 
world of the text by the c.onvergence of two methods: Structural ism and 
Historical Criticism. Ricoeur wants to rescue the poetic dimension of the 
biblical text, and to give value to the interpreter's creativity. To 
understand the word of God is to understand its symbolism. 
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Phenomenological Hermeneutic and Theology. 
Ricoeur has defined interpretation as "the work of thought which consists 
in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding th~ 
levels 01 meaning implied in the literal meaning." Through the study of the 
symbolism of the Bible, Ricoeur privileges the humbleness of the Corito 
Bless6 <which looks for hidden meanings), against the manipulation of the 
word by the narcissistic Ego. In the study of the dynamic of symbol s. 
Ricoeur considers three symbolic constellations found in the Bible: stain, 
sin and guil t. 
Myths. 
The analysis of myths is considered by Ricoeur in The Symbolism of Evil. He 
organises them into four categories: 1) Myths 01 the drama of creation; 2) 
Myths of the fall of humanity; 3) The myth of the tragic hero (in Greece) t 
and the myth of the exU ed soul. But the important thing to remark is 
Ricoeur's own conception of myth as a language in itself, with its own 
inner dialectic compressing aspects of time and life. 
The hermeneutical circle of Bultmann and the New Hermeneutics. 
At the base of Ricoeur's criticism of Bultmann lies a different conception 
of myth. Bultmann has been influenced by the Enlightenment conception of 
myth, and works from the idea 01 myth as falsehood, and as a product of 
primitive minds. Ricoeur opposes these concepts, but also criticises t.he 
lack of a theory of language and the centering of the Bultmannian exegeses 
in the "speaking" exper i ence. He sees that this forgetful I ness of 1 anguage 
has produced in Bul tmann a negl ect of the non-verbal language 01 fai th, 
such as the world of sacraments and rituals. without which the preached 
word suffers from a reduction of meaning. 
Ricoeur agrees with Bul tmann and the New Hermeneutics, in the pI ace of the 
subject in the philosophical discourse. He can accept that meaning comes 
from the appropriation of the text. but providing that this Aneignung C01l\eS 
onl y as the I ast stage of the moment of i nterpretat i on. Ho~ver, the 
Bultmannian pre-supposition of the "moment of decision" shortens the circle 
of interpretation, I eaping over the I\oment of meaning, and making the task 
of interpretation very difficult. 
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Ricoeur's biblical hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur has recovered the four main dimensions of biblical hermeneutics: 
the linguistic, the phil osophical, the ontological and the sacraJl\ental. As 
a result of the work of the Argentinian theologian Melano Couch, this is 
known in Latin America as the Ricoeurian "Quadrilateral Model". The 
exegetical rul es that are reI ated to this are the following: 
1) The exegete must be aware of the non-neutrality of the methods of 
interpretation. 
2) The exegete must also be aware of the limitations of his/her chosen 
methodology . 
3) Recognising the limitations of our chosen method, and being aware of the 
risks of both eclecticism and fanaticism, it is required to develop a way 
of working wi th different methods. 
Two extra rules that can be added are concerned with the relation between 
written/spoken word, and t.he place of the exegete in biblical tradition. 
This last point seems to be particularly relevant for liberation theology 
in Latin America, since the exegete must acknowledge the fact that slhe is 
part of this community of interpreters who preceded him/her. Is this 
communitarian and mutually binding aspect of Ricoeur's proposal, which has 




HERMENEUTICS OF LIBER~TION 
"We 1I\ust rea) ize that there are different phllosophical categories that the 
Latin Americans are working with. such as the question of phenomenology and 
the category of mystery that is very present in many of the Catholic 
(theol og1 ans). " 
Orlando Costas (222). 
"The hermeneutical studies and the philosophy of language of Paul Ricoeur 
(from his philosophical interpretation on Freud to The Conflict of 
Interpretations and other more recent essays) have given us very useful 
tools for reflection. These ideas, together with the illuminating work of 
Paulo Freire ... have been and st ill are a sonrce of inspiration." 
J. Severino Croat to (223). 
Introduction 
3. O. 1 "The Question of Phenomenology" 
The quotation from Croatto, one of the earliest and Blost influential Latin 
American bibl ieal hermeneuticians, c.onfirms the \Itr'Ords of Costas. The 
Theology of Liberation has been deeply influenced by phenomenology, 
specifically through the works of Ricoeur and Freire, whose Pedagogy 
(222) Cf. M. Branson; C. R. Padilla (eds. >. C_onfl iet and Context, p. 109. 
(223) J. S. Croatto, Liberaci6n y Libertad, p. 10. 
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of the Oppressed has roots in the work of Husserl and other existentialist 
phenomenologists. There is a curious coincidence too. in the fact that 
Latin American theology is usually described in similar terms to 
phenomenology, at least in the first attempts towards a definition: It is a 
methodology, a way of walking through certain path ot knowledge. a MetA-
6dos. This methodology can be traced from the early documents where t.he 
theological thought of Latin Americans started to be organised, although 
sometimes it may look incomplete, contradictory or even dispersed. Nearly 
twenty years after the first works of liberat.ion theology became known, 
there is still a need to organise the early influences and further 
elaboration of Latin American hermeneutics. 
In the second chapter of the present research we have seen Ricoeur's 
biblical hermeneutical proposal in deta:ll, and considered his work in 
relationship to Bultllann's hermeneut.ical circle and the "New Hermeneutic" 
represented by Fuchs. We have considered especially Ricoeur's syJnbolic 
theory, the dynamics of myths and the Ricoeurian model for bibl ical 
interpretation and exegesiS (the "Quadr:llateral Model"). 
In the present chapter we will continue our investigation related into 
Ricoeur's hermeneutical proposals, specifically in relation to their 
influence in key aspects of the methodology of liberation theology from 
Latin America. We will continue analysing the four moment.s of the 
hermeneutical circle and evaluating the use ll\ade of Ricoeurian theory by 
the theology of I iberat i on, not onl yin the aspects where both 
interpretative methodologies are similar, but also in the ones where the\' 
are different. 
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The Latin American theologians who have been selected for this chapter are. 
from many points of view (including the chronological one) the most 
relevant in the hermeneutic debate of the continent. They belong to 
different geographical areas of Latin America, and although they represent 
the same church (Roman Cathol ic). we need to acknowl edge here that the 
differences of work and style of the church from one country to another are 
very noticeable. These diversities have enriched the methodology of 
liberation; different patterns of interpretation are mainly due to the fact 
that Latin America is a vast continent, where cultures and languages are 
bound together as in a tapestry of different textures and colours, although 
in a similar design of poverty and violence. 
The hermeneuticians whose theory we will study are Jos~ Severino Croatto, 
luan Luis Segundo and Clodovis Boff. Segundo and Croatto belong to the 
River Plate area of South America, which was very much influenced bv the 
European immigration movement of the beginning of the century. Uruguay and 
Argentina are considered the "white countries" of Latin America, with 
little identification with the rest of the continent where the native 
population is more numerous. The Roman Cathol ic churches in the River Plate 
tend to be very conservative. with a history of long alliances with the 
state. 
Segundo is a Jesuit priest in Montevideo, and Croatto, having been 
excollUllunicated from the Roman Catholic Church, works actively amongst both 
Protestants and Catholics in Argent. ina. He occupies the Chair of Professor 
of Old Test.ament in I.S.E.D.E.T .• which is the Union Theological Seminary 
of Buenos Aires, having worked during many vears as a member of S.A.P.S.E. 
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(Argentinian Society of Sacred Scripture Professors), which is well known 
for its extensive contribution to the research of hermeneutics in Latin 
America. Clodovis Boff is a Servite priest from Brazil. which is the 
biggest country in South America, and a place where Christianity mixes with 
the spirituality of the old African religions hrought to the continent by 
the people submitted to slavery by the Portuguese Empire in the XV Century. 
He usually divides his time between working in Basic Ecclesial Communities 
and teaching in the Catholic University of S~o Paulo, Brazil. 
3.0.2 Liberation Theology as a Methodology. 
In 1968, the Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAN) gathered in 
Medellin. Colombia, and produced a very important document for the Catholic 
Church. whic.h deeply inll uenced the thought and work of the mainstream 
protestant churches. In this document, with its studies of the "structures 
of sin" In Latin America, and words of encouragement for the promotion of 
Comunidades Eclesiales de Base (CEBs: basic ecclesial communities), it is 
interesting to notice the methodological background provided by Paulo 
Freire. This is especially so in the section about "Liberating Education", 
but also in the discussion concerning church and Latin American realfdad 
(real ity; In Spanish it is a term that incl udes a concept of history and 
contextuality>. Many hermeneutical keys derive from Medellin, such as the 
option for the poor as a presupposition for interpretation, and a 
dem.ythologizing process in relation to socio-ecclesiastical symbols leading 
to what Freire calls an integral transformation of the Latin American 
realldad. 
Nearly ten years later, CELAM gathered again in Puebla de los Angeles, 
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M~xico, producing a second document, this time concentrating on issues of 
culture. The hermeneutical clues from the Puebla document were also 
present, and to the idea of the "educational community", as a tool for 
transformation, other elements ~re added such as the role of ideology in 
evangelfsation, and the clarification of the pastoral task in the socio-
economic context. The preferential option for the poor of the continent was 
stressed again. The Puebla ,gathering was informed by a substantial 
preparation document. analysing the conditions of extreme poverty and 
violence in which the people were living. The best known Latin American 
theologians, such as SegundO. Guti~rrez, Dussel, Sobrino, Comblin, Boff, 
Gal 11 ea and Assman amongst others were, curiousl y, not invited to Puebl a, 
but working from a parallel meeting, they contributed to the Conferenc.e 
discussing the papers produced by CELAN, and circulating their commentaries 
through the Conference. 
These two Conferences synthesised a current discussion about the mission of 
the church in Latin America, and provided, as Guti~rrez has written, a 
challenge in relation to the suffering believers of a deeply Christian 
Continent. They also opened the way for the organization of the CEBs (224). 
What Medellin and Puebla did, was to bring to the surface a much needed 
dialogue which had al ways been there, since the times when Las Casas and 
Montesinos spoke from their pulpits to the Church to ask: 
(224) Cf. G. Guti~rrez. "Entre las Calandrias", PArinas, 100, Pl>· 112 ff. 
The CEBs are small Christian communities, constituted by poor people who 
live together with a minimun of co-ordination from their local diocesis. 
They are mainly Catholics, but Protestant and ecumenical conununities can 
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"By what right do you keep these Indians (sic) in such cruel 
servitude? .. Are these not men? .. Are you not bound to love them as 
you love yourselves?" (225). 
The "Right Questioning" that Segundo advocates as a hermeneutical key in 
his circle of int.erpretation, has been practiced since the arrival of 
Christianity to the continent. 
We have said that liberation theology refers to a met.hodology, a way to 
interpret the Latin American reality which is a Christ.ian reality. The 
first questioning, the product of an on going dialogue bet~en theologians 
from different. countries, came t.o the surface in the years 1964-1975; the 
key works of liberation theology ~re published almost simultaneously, all 
of them being the product of parish courses, workshops or conferences. A 
Conference given by Ivan Illich in 1964. inspired Gustavo Guti~rrez to work 
on a series of papers that were roughly gathered as A Theology of 
Liberation in 1968, and finally published in 1971. In 1976 Clodovis Boff 
finished his doctoral thesis on theology and praxis for the University of 
Louvain, Belgium, which was partially published in the same year by the 
Revist.a Eclesiastica Brasileira. Meanwhile Segundo, who has been publIshing 
works in existentialism and philosophy since 1948, and a doctoral thesis on 
Christianity as Utopia in 1964, produced between 1968 and 1972 two volumes 
of Open Theology for the Adult. Lay Person, From Society to Theol..2.gy and in 
1975, a proposal regarding a hermeneutical circle in his famous book th~ 
Liberation of Theology. 
also be found. Cf. J. Marins et al., The Church from the Roots. 
(225) Cf. H. Herring, A History of Latin America, p. 174. 
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All the works produced by Latin .4merican theologians have a methodological 
interest and contain a search for a new hermeneutical path but the three 
theologians we have selected for our study are the ones who produced 
specific research in the field of theories of interpretation. Segundo has 
worked on The Liberation of Theol.2n. organiSing many methodological 
elements into an hermeneutical circle, which bears the influence both of 
Ricoeur and Freire. In previous works, especially in the first. volumes of 
his Open Theology ... , Segundo also used a phenomenological methodology and 
produced some structuralist analysis on dogmatic issues and Scriptures. 
Boff's research on Theology and Praxis had been informed by the 
hermeneut.ical theory of Ricoeur. together with Gadamer and DB they. 
Finally. Croatto was a pioneer in relation t.o the development of a biblical 
hermeneutics in Latin America. having published his first book on the 
subject in 1973. This book called Freedom and l.iberation: HeTmen.eut.ical 
Clues. set a pattern in the interpretat.ion circle in Latin America, because 
it was the first work on interpretation to be organised around a Ricoeurian 
background, where the creativity of the Frenc.h philoso-pher' s theory is 
tested in relation to important issues of liberation theology. It became a 
very influential text. and will be discussed in the first part of our 
study. 
3.0.3 The Phenomenological Hermeneutical Circle in Latin America. 
I h t ne under t .he title "The Hermeneut.ical Circle of Paul Ricoeur" neap er 0 • 
we studied four characterist.ics of the phenomenological ap-proach to 
193 
literary interpretation. We will summarise them briefly to remind us of 
their characteristics, as follows: 
1) The text becomes "alive", or "itself". only in relation with the 
interest of the reader. The historical experience of the reader shapes the 
text, which remits the reader to action. 
2) Phenomenological hermeneutics is not interested in the possibilities of 
any shared experiences between the writer and his/her reader. but the type 
of being--in-the-world that is unfolded in the text. The term "author" is 
reserved for use only as a value-concept, in relation to the historical 
process of composition of the text. 
3) The experience called lire-reading" re'Places the author's intention, as 
in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. Re-reading produces a re-creation of the 
text, in the moment of Appropriation. This moment is related to a specific 
praxis. 
"-) The role of presuppositions is accepted, and the "final hermeneutical 
conclusion" is postponed, because the text is inexhaustible. Although the 
"mind of the writer" Is rejected, the text needs to be organised for its 
study by its form, and historical origins. but remembering that the reader 
is the onl y agent of meaningful ness. 
The first point has been developed in liberation theology in relation to 
the interests of Latin American people; their concrete experience of 
poverty, destitution, ill iteracy etc. has been used to shape the reading of 
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the Bible. The second point has been practised in an ambiguous way; in some 
hermeneutical works there is a clear correlation model used, and therefore 
the historical experiences reader-~iter/text are stressed. In other recent 
approaches, there is a tendency to emphasize the type of being-in-the-world 
that is unfolded through the text. This point is then related to a more 
critical reading of the biblical text, as we will see later. The other 
elements concerning the "re-reading" of the text and "re-creation" of 
meaning have been extensively developed, in the style of wort presented in 
Cardenal's The Gospel in Solentiname, for instance. <226a) 
Finally, the stress on the "openness" of the text, has created the Latin 
American hermeneutical premise of "allowing the reader to say his/her own 
word" <que cada un.o dig:a Stl palabra), which reminds us of the Ricoeurian 
task. of allowing language "to name the being". Obviously, this point has 
ontol ogi cal impli cat ions whi ch we will study espec 1 all y In reI at ion to the 
moment of appropriation of the text by the reader. 
All these principles, including the particular words used, such as "re-
reading", have been present since the very beginning of the "popular 
Biblical studies" In the CEBs <Basic Ecclesial Communities), although some 
of them were fully developed only in more recent times. An early document 
such as Pope John Paul II's opening address at the Puebla Conference, mates 
the following comment: 
"Now today we find in many places a phenomenon that is not new. We find 
're-readings' of the Gospel that are products of theoretical 
speculations rather than of authentic meditation on the word of God 
(226a) cr. Ernesto Cardenal. The Gospel of Solentiname. 
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and a genuine evangelical commitment. They ~ause confusion insofar as 
they depart from the central criteria of the Church's faith. and 
people have the temerity to pass them on as catechisms to Christian 
communities ... They (the Bible study leaders) indulge in types of 
interpretat ion that are at variance with the Church's faith." (!26b) 
The "theoretical speculations" are related to the four basi~ statements 
already described. concerned respectively with the text. the author, the 
reader and the meaning of the text. We will 'Proceed now to find some of the 
answers to these questions. researching Croatto's early hermeneutical 
circle as 'Presented in Exodus. a Hermeneutic of Freedom. and its 
complementary text Biblical Hermeneutics. 
Part I 
3. 1 J. Severino Croatto. Freedom and Liberation. 
Hermeneutical Clues. 
Croatto published this book in 1973, as the result of a course given by him 
on "Bible and Liberation" in the early seventies, in the "Casa Nazareth", 
better known later as "The Institute for Justice and Peace" in Buenos 
Aires, Argent ina. The English edition was publ ished rather I ate (in 1983). 
under the title -f:xo~hlS. A Hermen.!'utJ_~ __ of Freed,QJ.n. This English title is 
perhaps misleading. since Croatto dedicated only one chapter to the 
--------
(226b) cr. John Paul II. "Discl1rso Inaugural" I. 4. in Documento de Puebla. 
p. 559. Also in Enrique Laje. "El Ateisllo Larvado en Cierta Teologfa de la 
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study of Exodus. froll the six which form the book. The original subtitle 
gives us instead a more fai.thful idea of its contents: "Hermeneutical 
Clues". elements for the construction of a hermeneutical circle presented 
through concrete examples. It is true that the event of Exodus Is presented 
in this particular \¥Ork as an interpretative key. together with \rords such 
as "Freedom" and "Liberation". but the presentation of a hermeneutical 
circle seems to have been the real object of the book. It Is interesting to 
notice that in the English edition of this book. Croatto has written a 
comment conc.erned with the misunderstanding of his \¥Ork as an exegesis on 
the Exodus, instead of a presentation of a method of interpretation. Thus 
he says that Segundo, in a brief comment about Exodus written in Th~ 
Liberation of Theology, has missed the point of the hermeneutical circle 
proposal and stressed the exegetical aspects of the book. 
Ten years after Exodus. Croatto published a second volume, called Biblical 
Hermeneutics. which is the theoretical complement of the first. Both books 
should be read together. as an unity; the practical examples of Exodus ...• 
used as hermeneutical clues, are the product of a series of \rorkshops for 
lay peopl e. and for that reason the theoretical el ements are not stressed. 
Biblical Hermeneutics provides the reader with the appropriate 
philosophical bac.kground whi c.h the first book 1 acks, be I ng the compil at ion 
of many years work of hermeneutical courses given by Croatto at 
I.S.E.D.E.T., Buenos Aires. 
Llberacl6n" in Tierra Nueva. 71, 1989, p. 35. 
(227) Cf. J. S. Croatto, Exodus. A Hermeneut i c of Freedom. p. 83. AI so J. 
L. Segundo, The Liberation of Theol~. p. 112. 
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Other books written by Croatto on hermeneutics, which we are going to 
consider are Nito y Hermen~utica, ("Myth and Hermeneutics", published in 
1974; no English translation), the two volumes of £1 Hombre en el Mundo 
("Man in the World"; vol. I "Creation- and Design" (1973); vol II "To Create 
and Love in Freedom", (1986); no English translations); Los Pobres ("The 
Poor" (1978), no English transl ation); some of his many articl es published 
in different journals. together with notes taken during his classes at 
I.S.E.D.E.T., and his latest book, "Isaias 1-39", from the series of "Latin 
American Ecumenical Biblical Commentaries" <1990; no English translation). 
3.1.1 The Hermeneutical Vocation of the Latin American People 
"Lord, take away from me this chalice." 
(from a popular Brazilian song). 
The genesis of the elaboration of the circle of interpretation in Croatto 
provides us with many interesting clues. First of all, he starts searching 
for a "Generative Word", following Paulo Freire's methodology. The words 
that he finds (Freedom, Liberation> presuppose a previous investigation 
process at "grassroots" levels (a nivel de base>. This work has been done 
personally by Croatto in his involvement with CEBs, through his teaching, 
and also through the reading of other works on Latin America and theology, 
such as the writtngs of Gut.i~rrez, Assman, and Dussel amongst. others. The 
words Freedom and Liberat.ion are generative, because they "generate" the 
dialogue and discussion amongst. Latin American people at an every day 
level, showing that somehow they were related t.o some key aspect of their 
reality. 
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The words Freedom and Liberation were also closely associated with language 
and interpretation. Confronted with censorship, including the banning of 
certain words for public use and a persistent lack of information, Latin 
America beca1l\e a continent of incipient hermeneut.icians; one of the DOSt 
popular every day phrases of the seventies was: "Do you know what is 
happening?". as 'People made their effort to understand their reality which 
was becoming silenced and meaningless (228). Freire recalled how a popular 
song in Brasil t the chorus of which goes! "Lord, tak.e away from me this 
chalice", become a symbol of freedom, because in Portuguese the word 
"chalice" (calic~_) sounds very s imil ar to the im'Perat i ve mode of the verb 
"to shut up" (calar-se). What 'People were actually singing in the streets 
was "Lord, take away from me this [order to] shut up." (229), This is a 
perfect example of what Ricoeur considers the positive role of double 
meaning. In Ricoeur's own words: 
"There is something to unfold, to dis-implicate in symbols [chalice 
became here a theological symbol of the identification between the 
suffering of people and Jesus's crucifixion] ... That which arouses 
understanding is precisely the double-meaning, the intending of the 
second meaning through the first." (230) 
---------
(228) For this point, cf. D. Balderston, Narrativa Ar~ntina d~ran~~ 
Proceso Mili tar. 
(229) From a private conversation with Freire, 1989 
(230) Cf. P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosop~, p. 18. 
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However, the censors did not discover the "doubl e meaning" of the song, 
probably due to the fact that authoritarian language only works with non-
equivocal utterances (231). In certain countries common names and verbal 
expression have heen banned, under the suspiCion of having undeslrable-
connotations; for instance. political opposition prisoners were referred 
to by certain governm.ent media as "parcels" (paquetes), in order to 
dehumanise them, and relativise their persecution. Even the teaching of the 
language of binary mathematics was forbidden, because like Marxism, It is 
built upon relations of opposition (the same can be said about Saussurean 
structural ism). 
The poor people in Latin America. have a traditional orally oriented 
cuI ture, which means that if the i l' freedom of speech is curtail ed, a very 
serious damage is produced in people's I ife, especially since ill iteracY 
and poverty does not. allow another sort of "dialogue" with texts, for 
instance, or with images such as cinema or television. Croatto then rescued 
through the use of a Freirean conscientisation process, two words that 
conveyed the Latin America reality at that time: Liberation and freedom. 
This is, hermeneutically speaking, his starting pOint, and there are two 
key elements in it which will introduce us to the first step of the 
hermeneutical circle of liberation theology: the starting point of the 
questions and of the questioner. 
(23]) For a commentary abo\'lt "doubl e-mean i ng" in Ri coeur's hermeneut I ca I 
circle, cf. Chapter two, 2.1. 
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3.1.2 The Hermeneutical Circle of Liberation Theology. 
"We are not going to devise anything new. Bibl ical hermeneutic is simply a 
nethod to read the Bible which needs to be clarified and organised." 
I. S. Croatto (232) 
Croatto defines the theology of liberation in terms of hermeneutics. In his 
introductory words to "Exodus", he writes: "We prefer to speak of 
hermeneutics of liberation rather than liberation theology." (233). The 
reasons for this are related to the theology of liberation's need to remain 
a "theology of the possibl e", in the same way that Ricoeur's hermeneutics 
has been characterised by a "passion for the possible." (234). Ricoeur has 
tried to preserve the opening of his Poetics. in order to keep in the 
process the category of hope. In the same way. Croatto defines theology of 
liberation as an unfinished (inacabadQ) project, open to the plurivocity of 
the text of the Scriptures and the Latin America situation. The experience 
of re-readlng the Bible keeps the dynamic opening of the text, and the 
Kerygma of "man's (sic) vocation for freedom" (235). Croatto considers that 
every reading Is a hermeneutical reading in Itself, and as such the 
(232) J. S. Croatto. Herl\en~utica Bfblic.a, p. 8. 
(233) Cf. J. S. -Croatto. LJb~I:.ac i6n--LJ.ibertad, Introduct ion; my own 
transl at ion. 
(234) Ct. Don Ihde, The COllUJct_-.!?f In1.~.J'..rret~j;jons. xxiv. 
(235) J, S. Croatto. LlberJ~.~j6n y Llbertad, p. 144, 
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hermeneutical circle has presuppositions but no neutral positions. The task 
of interpretation then requires the organisation of methodological elements 
which are necessary to renew theology itself (236). 
There is another purpose in Croatto's task of organising a methodology ot 
liberation. related to the category of suspicion, which has been taken trom 
Ricoeur's interpretation theory. Hermeneutical suspicion is an important 
factor in biblical re-readings: it shows that acc.ording to contextual 
Interests. theological readings emphasise one element to the detriment of 
another. advocating a model of being Christian which could be at odds with 
movements of liberation. The "hermeneutics ot Apartheid", which read God 
and God's children in terms of a dial ectic "black servants and white 
masters" is a clear example of that (237). In Latin America, Jos~ Miguez 
Bonino's studies on images of Christ since the Spanish Conquista (as a 
child, as a king and as a crucified dying man) are another example of how a 
specific Christology can result in the submissive apathy of a continent 
(238). The methodology of liberation which Croatto wants to organise has an 
awareness of undesirable ideological biases (anthropological, political, 
cultural, religious etc. >. critically accepting Its own options at the same 
time. Exegesis depends on hermeneutics. and hermeneutics needs to be 
(236) J. S. Croatto, lIermen~utica Bfblic~. p. 8. 
(237) Ct. G. S. Wilmore and J. Cone (eds.), Bla~t_T~~~~, p. 277. 
(238) Cf. J. Miguez Bonino. Jesus: Ni Vencldo..Jl1j4_QJ)~rca Celestial. 
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aware of its presuppositions. In this relationship between methodology and 
partiCl.1lars of interpretation 1 fes the intimate connection between 
hermeneutics and the renewal of the Lat in American churches. 
3.1.3 Biblical Hermeneutics and Philosophy. 
Croatto follows Ricoeur's position in relation to the place of biblical 
hermeneut i cs in the context of a "general hermeneut i cs" (239), e,ons i der:l ng 
the "regional" pI ace - and at the same time the uniqueness- of bibl :leal 
hermeneutics in the philosophical field. The methodology and the phenomenon 
of its study (the textual event) is basically the same, no matter if there 
is a sociological. literary or philosophical hermeneutic. More to the 
point, Croatto considers that the indifference shown by biblical 
hermeneutics towards a theory of interpretation of signs is a scandalous 
situation. He claims that "in no other literary work has anybody committed 
such elementary mistakes", as for instance. the interpretation of texts 
using only a historical perspective. Yet, it has happened with the Bible 
(240) . 
Croatto considers briefly the history of hermeneutics in three moments of 
its development, from 20th Century theories to Rabbinic interpretation 
during inter-testamental times. Coherent with his hermeneut ical cirel e 
which starts in the present, Croatto starts analysing Heidegger' s ontology', 
-------------
(239) Cf. Chapter two, 2.2. 
(240) J. S. Croatto. Hermen~utica Bibl ica, p. 21. 
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and ends with the work of the Targum (241). 
Firstly, Croatto mentions the philosophical hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, 
Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur, and its relation wit.h the 
theological work of Bult.ann. Fuchs and Ebeling. One important aspect to be 
considered in this moment is, according to Croatto, t.he Heideggerian return 
to the foundation of hermeneutics (Kehre), which is the Dasein act.ing as a 
pre-comprehension for the int.erpretation. It is interesting to notice that 
Croatto translates Dasein in Spanish as Estar, making very accessible the 
concept of Dasein to his readers, especially in CEBs. The Dasein 
interrogates the Cartesian Ego, because the essence of being is put in 
relation to the world. From Gadamer, Croat.to considers the position of 
human beings as inserted in a hist.orical tradition. and two hermeneutical 
elements: the function of distanciation and the fusion of horizons (242). 
Finally. he considers the proposal of the "long way" (detour) from Ricoeur, 
and his return to a linguistic theory. 
Secondly. Croatto considers the medieval hermeneutic, and mentions the 
controversy upon t.he four Scriptural senses: Literal, allegorical. moral 
(or tropological) and scatological. He does not analyse them. but reDUlrks 
that this variety of models of interpretat.ion shows t.he fact that 
hermeneutics is a never finished process, and the Scriptures always have 
"something else" to say. Curiously, Croatto does not mention the Lutheran 
-----------
(241) Ibid., pp. 10 ff. 
(242) For this point, cf. Chapter one, 1.9.3. 
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"Perspicuity principle" (243), which has influenced all biblical 
hermeneutics in general and Latin American interpretation in particular. 
C. Ren~ PadUla, the Argentinian Baptist theologian, during the "Context 
and Hermeneutics in the Arnerie.as Conference", (Mexico, 1983), argued 
passionately with an hermene'l1tician from the U.S.A. about the role of the 
Lutheran infl uence in Lat in America. Padill a has repl led to the charge that 
no theology can work outside the Church's traditions with the following 
statement: 
"In Lat i n Arneri ca we have a struggl e with the church that says 
'Scripture and tradition', and we have always said: No, Scripture. 
Scripture, Scripture and Scripture." (244.). 
Croatto represents the "Churc.h and tradition" position; we will consider if 
such a position can be maintained or not in t.he context of the 
"hermeneutics of possibility" he advocates, in the final discussion of 
chapter 4.. 
The last moment of Croatto's consideration, is the hermeneutics of the 
First Century, especially t.he work of Philo of Alexandria which is related 
to a concern with language. Finally, he mentions the biblical reading made 
by the Rabbinic Tradit.ion of the inter-testamental times. Croatto sees in 
them an attempt to find a second meaning, or "deep sense" of the Scripture. 
(24.3) Cf. Chapter one, 1.3.1 
(244) C. R. PadUla, in C. Padilla; M. Branson <eds.) Conflict. and Context. 
p. 106. 
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in the deras and pesat (surface and deep level) of the biblical words. 
3. 1. 4- Privil eged el ements of interpretat ion. 
These three main moments of hermeneutics, are related to specific 
methodological approaches, which Croatto organises according to the element 
which occupies the privileged place of interpretation. We will ment.ion 
them briefly. studying Croatto's comments on these points later on in this 
chapter. These priv:lleged elements of interpretat.ion are: 
1> The reality: The hermeneutical circle \.YOrks only with the text of t.he 
present situation: the Bible Is rejected. The main problem with this 
position is that it denies the possibil tty of other readings of t.he 
Scripture and seems to accept the closure of the text; but the question is 
that if hermeneutics cannot recreate meaning in texts, how can it be done 
in the "text" of societies which have not introduced elements of change 
during centuries? This position. in Croatto's opinion. Is in contradiction 
with the theology of liberation's own objective of liberating the text. The 
theological reflection should have priority over a social-historical 
praxis. 
2) The 1 iteral sense of the text: There are t\o}() aspects to consider here. 
the literal readi ng as sl.1ch or "fundamentali sm" (where the or igi nal 
addressee coincides with the modern reader), and the reading which docs not 
discriminate between the event and its meaning. Croatto calls both these 
positions a Conc.9rdtsmo (a concordance-style of interpretation), because it 
tends to reduce the biblical message to an equivalent situation between 
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Israel in biblical times, and other cultures in ot.her times. such as the 
African, Asian or Latin American; obviously, t.here are not always 
coincidences amongst them. The criticism presented to this position lies in 
the fact that every fundamentalist reading confuses the Kerygma with 
certain cultural contextualisatlon in which it is expressed. 
3) The "pre-text" (history of the construction of t.he t.ext): Croatto 
condemns here t.he exclusive use of historical criticism or history of 
redaction. wit.hout. adding ot.her elements of interpret.atlon in t.he 
hermeneutical circle. The risk is to produce a reductionism of the text. 
Croatto quotes Ricoe\lr'S analysis of the emphasis on the "historical sense" 
of the texts, characteristic of western culture, without acknowledging what 
the text has to say by i tsel f (24-5>' But Croatto al so considers t.hat 
literary criticism needs to include other pers-pectives of interpretation to 
avoid the risk of a superficial reading. 
4-) The "surFace structure" of' the te'xt: The reference here is t.o the use of 
structuralist approaches. Croat.to, following Ricoeur. considers the 
benefits brought by this type of analysis, mainly the independence of the 
textual meaning from the author's original intention. His criticism of this 
met.hod is, again. the possibil it.y of fall lng' into a reductionist position. 
due t.o the denial of st.ructuralism of ext.ernal (historical> references, 
which canst it.ute the "Ii fe" of the text (24-6). 
(24-5) Cf. J. S. Croatto, Hermen~utica Bibl ica, p. 15. Also P. RicoeuT, "The 
Task of Hermeneutics", in Exegesis, pp. 265 ff. 
(24-6) Cf. Chapter one, 1.6.3.1/2. 
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5) The New Hermeneutics: Croat.to criticises the Bultmannian and post-
Bultmannian hermeneut.ics, from t.he same perspective as Ricoeur. As we have 
seen in chapter two, t.he ontological appropriations in these hermeneutical 
circles, are done via the "short way", ignoring the "long way" of the use 
of the linguistic science. Croatto considers t.hat the hermeneutical task of 
interpretation must always have its foundation in the science of signs 
(Semiot i cs). 
As we can see, acc.ording to Croatt.o. each one of t.hese approaches seems to 
be I acking some el ements present in the ot.hers; t.he risk is to produce a 
narrow-minded, or reductionist approach to the Scripture. Croatto finds the 
solution t.o this problem in Ricoeur's convergence of methods 
(~entre~oupemente des met.hodes). "The conflict of int.erpretat.ions". Sf:\ys 
Croatt.o, is related to the fact that "each one (of the int.erpretations) 
claims t.o be the 'real' interpret.ation, (and) does not accept a different 
one." (24-7), Croat.t.o's hermeneutical circle tries to reconcil e diverse 
methods of interpretation, as t.he onl y possibility to interpret the text 
from different. angles and perspectives. producing a JOOre integral process 
of interpretation. (24-8) 
To summarise. the basic elements of the hermeneutical circle of Croatto 
show a marked influenc.e from Ricoetlr in the following points: a) the place 
of bi bli cal hermeneut i cs in t.he context of phil osophi cal hermeneut i cs. 
(24-7) J. S. Croatt.o. l:I.r-rJnen~uti~3LJHblica, p. 37. 
(24-8) Ibid., p. 18. 
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b) t.he acceptance of the Ricoeurian "long way" of interpretation (via 
Linguistics) c) the category of suspicion. d) the understanding of the 
plurivocity of the text and e) the proposal of a convergence of 
methodologies as the only possibility to produce a more integral 
interpretation. These are the basic points from which other elements, 
related to these first ones, will appear as related to our present study. 
3.2 First Moment of the Hermeneutical Circle: 
Guessing "in community." 
Croatto makes cl ear that his chosen hermeneut ical cat.egories come from the 
common people's life, from a community. The generative power of "freedom" 
and "liberation" is immense because they transc.end natural ethnic frontiers 
In Latin American, and appeal both to the peasant and to t.he urban 
population. The hermeneutician who belongs to the poor cOlIIDunity. such as 
Croatto, tries to give voice to the voiceless. This means that the 
hermeneutician starts with his/her own reality, the social context. that 
gives a word like "liberation" such high value and with the questioning of 
himself/herself, where the first elements of "suspicion" fell. \Jhen the 
hermeneutician asks about his/her own standing in relation to such a social 
context, s/he is quest.ioning the "I" of the Cartesian cogito too. His/her 
existence hecomes part of the community to which s/he belongs. As Ricoeur 
has said: "My birth ... speaks to me in another way of my exist.ence as 
rece i ved: not onI y found here but gi ven through others ... " (249). 
(249) P. Ricoeur, Fallible Man, p. 97. 
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3.2. 1 The text. 
The phenomenological circle of interpretation starts with the text as the 
reunion of the interpretative community, in what we have called a 
"hermeneutics of sol idarity" I but Croatto adds to this the dimension of the 
Christian Latin American conununity, which happens to be constituted by the 
poor, the native people and the marginalised. In this way, they are 
included in the starting point of the interpretation process. Working with 
the categories of freedom and liberation <which implies the opposites of 
bondage/oppression), Croatto declares his presupposition: "First of all, we 
must discover the presence of God in the historical event (acontecimi~I!t9.)" 
(250 >. 
Events are also texts which require interpretation, and at this point 
Croatto expresses what he considers a different position from Ricoeur who, 
in his opinion, only understands hermeneutics in relation to written texts. 
"Text and event (or praxis) are mutually conditioned ... " And he adds that 
although writt.en texts require another type of interpretation, he will not 
"make such a distinction between both terms (written t.ext and event) in the 
present work." (251). 
However, this does not seems to be Ricoeur's position. since the French 
philosopher in his discussion on the dynamic of symbols makes clear what he 
(250) J. S. Croatto, LU~eIaei6J:t_tiJl>eTtad, p. 19. 
(251) J. S. Croatto, tlermen~utica BfbL~~, p. 9. 
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calls the "two types of hermeneutics." (252). This second type of 
hermeneutics is the one which. according to Ricoeur. works with the symbols 
which became buildings, monuments and institutions, interpreting them as 
"written texts". (253) 
Another important point to consider is that Ricoeur has always considered 
language as rooted in human experience, and the function of the text 
related then to a praxis (254). Ricoeur's insistence on the grounding of 
the text in social action is a quite distinctive element in his analysis. 
and one of the reasons for his opposition to Structuralism, which 
obliterates the reference of the text. It seems that Croatto has been 
misguided by a definition of hermeneutics made by Ricoeur in ExeresiS. 
where he says "(hermeneutics) is the theory concerned with transactions of 
comprehension. in reI at i on to the understandi ng of texts." (255). However, 
in other texts Ricoeur has worked extensively on the question of the text 
and the text-event, and his position on this is clear. (256) 
(252) Cf. Chapter two, 2.1.3.2 
(253) For a more detailed discussion on this point, cf. P. Ricoeur The 
Conflict of ID"t~_rpretations, pp. 121 ff. Also P. Ricoeur. Interpr~tatiQIl_ 
Theory, p. 40. 
(254) Cf. Chapter one. 1.7. 
(255) P. Ricoeur, "The Task of Hermeneutics", in F. Bovon, G. Roullier 
(eds.) Exegesis, p. 265. 
(256) Perhaps one of the most relevant texts on this issue is Ricoeur's 
"The Model of the Text: Meani ngful Act ion Considered as a Text", pl1bl ished 
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We w111 proceed now to study briefly the main hermeneutical elements of 
this moment of .. guessing", concerned with text and truth, the category of 
suspicion and the problem of distanciation. 
3.2.2 Text and Truth. 
The relation between text and truth is concerned with determining a 
criteria of veracity for the written discourse. Croatto addresses this 
problem through the study of an important presupposition of his 
hermeneutical circle: Hacer-para-hablar (action as a foundation of speech). 
(257). He goes beyond the concept of honesty or authenticfty 
(autenticidad), which is considered an important value in Latin America, 
and one of the ~rds most frequently used in theological circles. To remain 
in a criterion of authenticity, for instance, "acting as we preach", does 
not imply that our action is correct, since it could be invalidated by a 
false argument. The point is that, for Croatto, action as a foundation of 
speech opens the discussion on the veracity of the text, because it makes 
us consider "right actions" as the ultimate criteria for truth. The written 
discourse (and the Biblical text) then, is seen as part of a process which 
started in a particular action or experience, and the veracity of the text 
refers us to certain right actions of God (which in Croatto are always 
actions of liberation) and wrong action from idols and people (understood 
in this context-as oppression). 
--------------------
in 1971; cf. Fro~Text to Actio_n· Essays on Hermeneutics II, p. 149. 
(257) Cf. J. S. Croatto, ktberaci6n y Libertad, Introduction. 
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It is the "veracity" of the text in terms of its basis in action which 
seems to be t.he criterion of authority of the text for Croatto; the modern 
Latin American reader confronts hhnlherself with the Bible in terms of 
action, which starts and ends the hermeneutical circle, as ~ will see 
later on in our study of the moment of appropriation of the text ). In this 
discussion Croatto uses Ricoeur's idea (already in Heidegger), that what we 
understand from a discourse is a project. or a model of being-in-the-world. 
"Human ac.tion", says Ricoeur "is opened to anybody who can read." (258). 
But Ricoeur has also made clear that the text is free from the ostensive 
type of reference present in t.he oral discourse, that is t.he situation of 
the people who lived in a certain time and culture (the U~lt). Ricoeur 
does not split the text from its referent, but he considers that the world 
of the text (Welt) is related t.o possible modes of being; this is the 
element which liberates the text from the limitations of certain past 
situations. Croatto instead seems to be reverting to a position nearer to 
Schleiermacher than to Ricoeur in this point. substituting for the "mind of 
the author" (as a reference), "the situation (or actions) of the author." 
We will consider the discussion about the veracity of action as 
hermeneutical presupposition in Croatto, in relation to Ricoeur, in chapter 
four. 
The other aspect to consider here is the hermeneutical dimension of the 
text-event, which works as an important interpretative key in liberation 
theology. In an article entitled "Dios en el Acontec.imiento" ("God in the 
(258) P. RicoeuT, "The Model of the Text", in From Text to Action, p. t~. 
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Event">, Croatto considers the importance of the event of salvation .:\5 a 
hermeneutical clue for Christian theology (259), The discussion is now on 
theology "as a text", which Croatto considers has been closed (or "fixed") 
in a rationalist system, and the challeng-e, according to our author. is to 
open it towards a new meaning. Croatto sees theology as a logos. a Greek 
word which means "word" but in the dynamic relation implied in a speech 
act (260). This logos. in Croatto's opinion. is related to a specific 
historical event in which God has been manifested. 
Now a new problem seems to arise, related to the function of distanciation 
of the text. The question is, which events need to be considered in our 
reading? The events of the Umwelt of the text, or the modern events of the 
life of Latin American people? Croatto wants to start grounding his 
hermeneutical process in the events of Latin American history. He says: 
"There Is no other primary source (for the \VOrk of liberation theology) 
than the events-or-liberation of Latin America." (261), These events of 
liberation "dis-cover" (des-ocul tan) the meaning of the text of real i ty. 
but they should be taken into a dialogue with the actions of liberation 
which Croatto considers the basis or the biblical discourse. Croatto uses 
(259) Cf. J. S. Croatto. "Dios en el Acontecimiento", in Jtevista Bibl ica, 
I 4- 7. pp. 56 f f . 
(260) The word lQ..gQs. has been transl ated in the Spanish version of the 
Bible as "verb"; cf. Reina-Valera (trad. >, La_Sa]l!a~~Jllia, revlsi6n 1960. 
(261) Ct. J. S. Croatto, Llberaci6u.y-LtJ>e-r:tad" Introduction. 
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here an expression taken from radio communication: to tune in 
(sintonizar). The present events need to be put in tune with the biblical 
ones. 
It seems here that Croatto is advocating the use of a "concordance of 
actions" between Latin America and the Bible, but, on the contrary, he 
reiterates his position against concordismos. He explains that his stvle of 
"tuning" is related to re-dfscovering of meaning and high! ighting of events 
of liberation. The distinction between a concordismo and a sintonia seems 
at this moment to be far from clear, in terms of the actual procedure in 
the establishing of a dialogue text-Latin American history. We will 
clarify this concept further later on, when we study Croatto's use of 
history in interpretation. 
3.2.3 The probl em of Distanc.iation. 
In his work in "Bibl ieal Hermeneutic.s". Croatto considers the problem 
created by a biblical text which has a large cultural and linguistic 
distance from the modern reader. The problem, which has been a matter of 
Interest to Bultmann amongst. other existentialist theologians. is resolved 
by Croatto in a different. way from the New Hermeneutics, following 
Ricoeur's syl\bol ie. theory. as we will see in the subsequent poi nt on 
"Explanation" (3.". 
Croatto considers here Ricoeur's works: Ev~n~ment_~_~~ns and "The 
Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation." He starts pointing out the 
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dynamics of distanciation (262) in relation to the Bible. He considers the 
oral texts which precede the biblical ones. and the phenomena of closure in 
the writing and editing of each text. Rut the paradox is that everv 
"closure" produc.ed by distanciation. also opens up new meanings which are 
now presented to us as codifications of a message (263), Croatto considers 
the following three characteristics produced in the text by the function of 
distanciation: 
a) The original author disappears-. It is interesting to note here that 
Croatto uses the word "transmitter" (emisor; again terminology from radio) 
as equivalent to "original author". Perhaps it is a clue for us to 
understand Croatto's preoc,cupat:lon with the oral discourse rather than with 
the written text. Croatto uses here a principle from Structuralist 
analysis: "the author is dead". The author "dies" in the codification of 
his/her message; Croatto rejects the psychoanalytic approach from 
Schleiermaeher and the procedures of historical criticism. We will come 
back to these points in the next chapter. 
b) The orisinal interlocutor also dlsappeBrs~ Croatto finds that this 
continuous change of addressees seems to be less evident in the religious 
texts because they tend to keep their meaning through many generations of 
addressees. 
------------------
(262) Cf. J. S. Croatto, HerB\en~utica Bfblica, p. 22. 
(263) Cf. Chapter one, 1.8.4.4. 
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c) The original horizon or the text is DO longer present: The cuI turaI. 
social. political and religious original context of the text has changed. 
and the modern addressees have a different world in which they live. 
As a result of these three moments, produced by distanciation. Croatto 
considers the autonomy of the text: the narrator is a linguistic 
supposition, the author does not live outside the text and the addressee 
relates him/herself with the written discourse. independently of the 
original reader. The finite horizon of the text is supplanted by the 
"textual infInite" (264.). Far from cloSing the meaning of the text. these 
elements open the text to a new polysemy. 
3.2.4. Distance and accumulation of meaning. 
Croatto considers two distanciations produced by 1) the distance from 
~J1B1!~ to parol e. <I anguage and speech) I that is. the \lsage of I angua.ge as a 
system and the individual speech act, which implies a choice; and 2) the 
distance froln a text (words, phrases. literary units etc.) to "scripture" 
(writing), where the text is fixed. These elements come from Saussurean 
Structuralism, but now Croatto adds a third moment of distanciation: the 
one which Is produced by the re-readl ng of the text. At this point we need 
to come back to Ricoeur, since this new dimension mentioned by Croatto is 
studied in Rlc.oeur' s "The Hermeneutical Func.tion of Distanciation". Ricocur 
considers that the counterpart of the appropriation of the text bv the 
(264) Cf. J. S. Croatto. 9~ cit., p. 24. 
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reader is the distance from the original author produced by \tlI"iting. 
Appropriation is then not linked to the primitive intention of the \tlI"iter, 
but with the re-reading of the modern reader. "Appropriation ... 1s 
understanding at and through distance." (265). We will come back to this 
point later on in this present chapter. 
Croatto finds that there is a relationship of elements here, which can be 
expressed In the forl\ul a: the greater the dist.ance in the text. the greater 
the accumulation of meaning or reserva-de-sent.idQ. (reservoir-of-meaning) we 
find in the text. He also recognises that such creative re-reading can be 
accused of a lack of accuracy, for instance by Historical Criticism. 
However, as Croatt.o advocates a sort of Ricoeurian "dIagnosis", that is, 
the use of different sciences which can help to understand the phenomenon 
of study, he wil I introduce elements of historical accuracv in the re-
reading. We will see more about this point further on, in the moment of 
Explanation. 
The following resum~ synthesises Croat.to's position in relation to 
distanciation. which has strong influences of Ricoeur: 
(265) Cf. P. Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutical Funct.ion of Distanciation", in 
From Text to Action. pp. 67 ff. 
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First Dlstanciat,ion: From Language <characterised by polysemy> 
To Speech (which closes the 1 it po ysemy. e. g. 
chooses an usage of language) 
(From possible meaning 
t.o a "fixed" meaning,) 
Second Distanciation: From Speech <plurivoclty) 
To Text./Writing (a new closure of multiple meanings) 
(From t.he first "fixed meaning" of the speech act 
to a "reservoir-of-meaning" of the writing) 
Third Distanciation: From Text/Writing (a new polysemy) 
To Re-reading (a new closure of meaning) 
(From the "reservoi r-of-meaning" 
to an "expl orat ion-of-meani ng" ) 
3.3 Hermeneutics and Suspicion 
The element of suspicion is introduc.ed by Croatto in relation to the 
function of distanciatton. Ricoeur has also considered that his own work in 
a hermeneutics of suspicion belongs "in its own right to the work of 
distanciation that all sel f understanding in the light of the text 
requires." (266)' The function of distanciation in the text, and the 
(266) P. Ricoeur, "Philosophical and Biblical Hermeneutics". in fr_QY!LJext 
to_ ActlQn. p. 100. 
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moment of praxis (appropriation) are intimately linked with a hermeneutic 
of disbelief. 
As we have seen in the previous diagram, distanclation always implies 
choice and closure or fixation of the discourse. Although this does not 
reduce the meaning, (far froll that, it seems to increase its creative 
property), the question now is: who makes the choices? The suspicion is 
related to two elements: to the text (as a construct) and to the reader who 
re-constructs the text. Croatto discusses both aspects. 
3.3. t The suspicion of the text 
As we have seen before, Croatto establishes the close relation action-text; 
every text starts with a praxis or an event (any human act ion>. The 
biblical text then. Is an interpretation of events, and not an "objective" 
account; Croatto explains this point by saying that although the text has 
certain objectivity (the historicity of the event that it interprets>, the 
writing has produced a new text, or new interpretation. "Objectivity" here 
should not be used in opposition to "subJectivity". but both concepts need 
to be seen in relation to the process of construction of the text (267). 
The question to ask at this moment is: who made the re-reading, and what 
were their interests at the time? For instance, according to Croatto, the 
exodus has been the I nterpretat i ve c1 ue for successi ve re-reading of 
(267) Cf. J. S. Croatto, Herl\en~t1tica Bibl ica, p. 4-7. 
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the Bible in the same Bible; here we have an example of "non-neutral tty" in 
the traditional r~-reading made by Israel. 
3.3.2 The suspicion about the addressee 
This point is linked with the first, in the sense that the modern reader 
re-interprets the texti but since the Bihle has not been read by people in 
Latin America, until relatively recently (with the coming of Protestantism 
In the XIX Century>, and it has always submitted to a heavy pre-
Interpretation by the Church, the "modern reader" has not had the 
opportunity to make the text "his/her own." Croatto speaks of the suspicion 
about who is the real addressee of the Bible, as if there is a Telation 
between the "liberation" clue that he finds in the text, almost as a key of 
its construction and a special sort of addressee: the people who can be "in 
tune" with I ibeTation (the poor, the humildes -humble ones). Croatto 
suspects that the Church in Latin America has changed this addressee for 
another one, who represent the established, generally non-native affluent 
cl ass. 
These two suspicions mak.e us reflect on the fact that the Roman Catholic 
ChuTch in Latin America is the Church which ca.me with the Conquistadores, 
and theTefore the real suspicion is to be set upon a fOTeign faith which 
was cruelly imposed to a whole continent. This implies the need for a 
serious reflection about the re-reading of the text by the church itself, 
in ordeT to be coherent with the liberationist circle of interpretation and 
its premise of veracity set in a pre-action. "A text comes from another 
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text" says Croatto (268'. and the history of the church in Latin America 
can enrich or iJlrpoverish t,he hermeneutical circle of I tberation theology. 
The pre-comprehension of the interpreter. and his/her c.ontext, needs to be 
broadened to include more elements of discussion. We will see later how 
Croatto attempts to resolve this adding a cultural dialogue to his 
hermeneutical proposal. 
3.3.3 The Poor as the Da of Dasein 
Ricoeur. in hi s book on Freud and later in The Confl i ct_..-9J_IJlt~rt're..t~tt QJ1!!J.. 
has organised the Hermeneutics of Suspicion using a process of doubt. as a 
way to find new, alternative styles of thought. but also to transform the 
process of interpretation in itself. Ricoeur has worked in a hermeneutics 
of disbelief, inspired by the "masters of suspicion" (269). Marx. Nietzsche 
and Freud. Ricoeur uses Freud and lately he has been working more with Marx 
in relation to ideological suspicion. The important aspect to highlight 
now. is the object of Ricoeur's suspicion: the discourse in itself (the 
text) and the "idols" of the non-equivocal interpretation. Behind this 
project of demystification. lies Ricoeur's intention to unmask the 
narcissistic ego, and to question the "I" who asks the questions and 
interprets. 
(268) J. S. Croatto, op. cit~. p. 35. 
(269) Ct. P. Ricoeur. Freud and Philosoph~, p. 32. We will study this potnt 
in more detail in our discussion about Segundo in Part II. 
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We have already said that the process of distanciation implies choices; 
through those choices the reader/interpreter closes the text and fixes a 
certain meaning. The hermeneutics of suspicion of Ricoeur, linked with his 
ontological project, introduces a doubt about the "I" who participates in 
the construction of the text. However, suspicion is an element that, 
according to Ricoeur, cannot be found outside the text, as an "outside 
adversary" of the discourse (270), On the contrary, "suspicion" I s an 
instrument of interpretation which can be found Inside the text: every new , 
I\oment of dlst.anciatlon from a previous text, shows its presence. 
Croatt.o also works with an ontological project related to his use of the 
element of suspicion; the unmasking of the narcissistic ego of the 
theologically assumed "Lat.in American man and woman". His hermeneutical 
circle tries t.o discover who is the Latin American person. the addressee of 
the Biblical text and Christian believer; when Croatto takes an "option for 
the poor", he is making ontological definitions concerned with the "Da of 
Daseln" , the being-there of the Latin Americans. However, he does not tal:~ 
the short rout.e of Bultmann, but the long way of Ricoeur. via Linguistics. 
We will see more about Croatto's ontological project in our discussion 
about the hermeneutical moment of praxis. 
----------------
(270) Cf. P. Ricoeur, "Philosophical and Biblical Hermeneutics", in From 
Text to Action, p. 100 
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3.4 Explanation 
"Understanding calls for an explanation when the dialogical situation 
ceases to exist, when the questions and ans~rs no longer permit us to 
verify our interpretations as the dialogue unfolds." 
P. Ricoeur (271) 
"Texts and human events are signs and they appeal to interpretation." 
J. S. Croatto (272) 
3.4.1 The Two Texts. 
Croatto has taken the long way proposed by Rlcoeur, as the methodological 
detour for a hermeneutic of liberation in Latin America. As we have already 
seen, the key element of Croatto's biblical interpretation theory is 
Sintonia, or the process by which he attempts to "be in tune" with the 
events of the text and the Latin American reality. This project requires 
then the interpretation of two texts: the text of society and the Bible. 
Reality as a text. is the starting point (el antes) of Croatto's 
hermeneut.ical process, which receives the name of "eisegetical", that is. 
(271) P. Ricoeur. "Explanation and Understanding", in From T~~xLt.9_Action, 
p. 129. 
(272) J. S. Croatto, tl~:I'm~n~utica B!lllic~, p. 19. 
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the movement of interpretation goes from the "outside" (society) to the 
"inside" (Bible), These two elements are in fact in a dialectical reI ation. 
which makes it very difficult to tell which is first (273). However, 
Croatto does not use sociological methods of interpretation in his 
hermeneutical circle, and he seldom mentions concrete details of socio-
historical relevance in relation to Latin America. It seell'L"S that Croatto 
has taken from Ricoeur the concept of "diagnosis". which refers to the use 
of auxiliary sciences in order to understand a phenomenon. This concept is 
very similar to the use of "mediation sciences" in liberation theology. 
This diagnosis is evident in Croatto's work, because his exegetical 
exrercises or biblical commentaries always produce an empathy with the 
Latin American reader; the text of reality is pre-supposed in his work. but 
not explicitl y. 
There are two reasons for the use of a diagnosis. and a refusal to engage 
himself in a sociological reading of the Bible. First of all. he criticises 
the use of a sociological praxis as a hermeneutical parameter. since it 
tends to neglect the work on biblical interpretation (274). The process of 
interpretation of the Bible has been denied by sociological approaches 
which do not need any other text than reality. Croatto criticises this 
position in certain liberation theologians. who cannot resolve 
methodologically the problems created by traditional interpretation. In 
Croatto's opinion, it Is the hermeneutics and not the Bible which needs to 
(273) Cf. J. S. Croat.to. Liberac i6_n y Libertad, p. 25. 
(274) Cf. J. S. Croatt.o, Her1nel)~utica B~~llca, p. 13. 
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be replaced. 
The second point, is in itself an hermeneutical concern. Croatto has stated 
In different books that his interpretation method attempts "to open the 
text" and allow the people to make t.heir re-reading from their different 
Latin American contexts (275). The use of historical criticism together 
with linguist.ic tools, makes the Bible "sensitive" t.o the reading from 
Latin America, but. it is the role of the reader to "be in tune with 
reality" or to start his/her own hermeneutical circle (276). Croatto does 
not want t.o "close" the reading of the Bible, but to invite the reader to 
say his/her own word from his/her particular reading of reality, avoiding 
at the same t.ime what he has defined as concordismo (concordance) betW'Cen 
the historical circumstances of the t.ext and modern society (277)-
Sometimes Croatto uses examples from the Latin American reality, which 
pervades his whole work; but he does not use a sociological reading of 
reality. His path, is the return to the hermeneutics of Ricoeur. to the 
project of being t.hrough language. Croatto works as a semiotician. not as a 
sociologist. However, in his book E..L.Jlomb_re ~n eL..M.un..<lQ. vol. II. Croatto 
makes a brief analysis of the social conditions of production in Genesis 2-
3, but stressing that his reading is more a discernment. in relation to 
(275) Cf. J. S. Croatto, LiberaciQILL_Libertad. Hermen~utica Bfbl i~J~, and 
Isaias 1~39. amomgst other relevant texts from this author. 
(276) ct. J. S. Croatt.o. Isaias 1:39, p. 30. 
(277) Ibid .• p. 31. 
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the text, and a complement to the work of historical criticism rather than 
a sociological analysis. (278) 
3.4.1.2 The sign appeals to interpretation. 
Croatto uses a verb from the judicial vocabul ary: to appeal (ape} ar). With 
Just one verb he conveys the image of the accused appealing for Justice, a 
very appropriate metaphor for the often "silenced" signs of texts and 
events. The route is then from semiotics to hermeneutics, and the work is 
to be done through a convergence of di fferent methods. We will proceed to 
study three main elements of Croatto's moment of explanation: a) his 
semiotic analysis of texts, b) the use of historical criticism and c) the 
use of Ricoeur's symbolic theory in relation to myth in the Bible. 
3.4.2 The use of semiotic anal ysis. 
Croatto's starting point is the reading process as a production of meaning 
(279)' He finds that the text, and not the meaning. is the first element to 
consider, since the fixation of meaning by s'llccessive re-readings are of a 
relatively transitory nature, while the text remains. Croatto criticises 
the Romantic hermeneuticians such as Schleiermacher who considered that 
text and meaning are coincidental, in an objective way; foT' instance, the 
meaning of the text 1A the intention of the author. To find the original 
(278) J. S. Croatto, ELJPombre en el Mundo, II, p. 205. 
(279) .L S. Croatto, tIerl\e~~uti{'~_JUblJ{'a, p. 26. 
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author's intent.ional ity (or "mind") will give the meaning of the text. 
which Is supposed to be unique and iJlUl\utable. Croatto rejects what he calls 
the "extra-textual authority" of this hermeneutical model. and introduces 
us to a discussion on text and meaning which follows the Strtlctural ist 
I\odel. (280), 
Croatto seems to favour the use of the structural method for textual 
analysis, at its two levels: the narrative or "surface analysis" and the 
discursive or "deep level". The structural analysis he uses ('omes from the 
Semiotic School of Paris (especially Greimas), and can be briefly described 
as follows: (281) 
3.4.2.1 The narrative level 
This considers the st.ory as a sequence of narrative states (~tats) and 
transformations. The semiotic characters (objects, human beings. feelings 
etc.) are called actants, and they describe their identities through 
functional differences. Briefly, this type of literary analysis has four 
stages: 
(280) Cf. Chapter one. 1.8. 1. 1. 
(281) For thi s point.. cf. A. -Gre imas, Mat~p-~ssallt~~ s~Jl\JoJ:~t~l!te dQ~xt&: 
exercice~ratlgues. Greimas explains his method through the analysis of a 
text from Maupassant. Also cf. G. Prince, "Act.antial Model", in Dictionary 
of Narratol..Qg):.. 
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a) Initial situation: We start. with a "Process Statement", where the 
analysis consists in finding relations of conjuct.ion and disJunction 
between a subject and an object (Dest.inateur/Destinataire). The subject is 
sometimes called "hero" (in Propp) or "protagonist." 
b) Competence~ The subject-hero goes through a process of transformation. 
"Competence" is, precisely, the necessary conditions for such 
transformations or operations to oceur, which can be defined in relation to 
three verbal el ements: Ito want I , Ito have power to dol and It.o k.now how to 
dol (1 e voul 0 I r..J. 1 e pouvo i r and_i!Ls~Y9_tr=-fai re). Every ehange produced ina 
narrative state is called a "performance." Performances are indicated 
through verbs of action (to do). 
c) Principal performance: There are different kinds of performances; the 
principal one is indicated by the passage of the subject-hero from a 
situation of disjunction wit.h the object, to a conjunction with it (to 
finally obtain something, or to complete a task, etc.) 
d) Final state: is the resolution of the story: in it. the subject-hero 
fulfils a situation of deficiency, and achieves the objective of the story. 
3.4.2.2 The discursive level 
Instead of working t.hrough transformat ions and enchafnements <linking) of 
functions, this analysis considers the logical articulations of themes, 
which are prior to the the narrative level of manifestation. The analysis 
here uses logical models such as the search for the semantic axis of the 
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discourse, and tools such as semiotic and verisimilitude squares (logical 
structures organised through visual representation). The characters are not 
defined by their actancial role, as in the narrative analysis, but by 
thematic role; this means that instead of considering what they d.o, the 
discursive analysis tries to find the meaning of their actions. 
3.4.2.3 Croatto's Narrative and Discursive Analysis. 
In his analysis in BiklicaL1l.erm~rn.eutic~, Croatto agrees with this 
structural model, and finds the meaning of the text in the level of 
competence. He gives t~ examples of biblical analysis, upon two different 
texts, giving some brief indications about a possible narrative and 
discursive analysis. In the text of John 1: 35-51, Croatto points out how 
an analysis of different codes tends to mark different themes 01 the story 
(282). At a narrati ve I evel. codes are considered important in terms of the 
referents of the story; for instance, they refer to cultural objects or 
bodies of knowledge (historical, literary, artistic etc.) The codes govern 
the production and reception of the message. Croatto finds four main codes 
in the text of John: ehronological. visual, onomastic and a code of 
I\ovement. 
Th hr I i I d i h t 1 sed by phrases S "lch as "t he day aft er" e c ono og ca co esc arac er, ~ 
or verbs sueh as "to find". From theil, the structure of the story organises 
(282) CI. J. S. Croat to, Herl\eJ~~l1tJc~_Iitblj~a, pp. 28 fl. 
230 
a. theology of the creation. which refers us to the first week of the story 
of the book of Genesis in relation to the beginning of Jesus' ministrv. The 
chronological codes stress the human dimension of the encounter between the 
disciples and their Master. The visual codes are marked by the verb "to 
see"; the code of "finding" Jesus, is 1 inked, according to Croatto with the 
visual one of "recognising" him. The onomastic codes (the use of propel' 
names), are linked with ldentificatory codes (titles); for instance, in the 
formula "Jesus. son of Joseph." The last code ment.ioned by Croat-to is that 
of movement, made evident by the use of verbs as "to go". "to come" a.nd "to 
follow" . 
Croatto thinks that from a study of these codes, a reader can find a 
deeper, more subtle 1I\eaning of the narrative, because codes are one of the 
more important const.ituents of any act of communication; the message of the 
text, "signifies" (eg. gives meaning) through the system of codes of a 
discourse. Here Croatt.o uses Greimas' analysis on narrative organisation: 
"codes" are the "nucleic figures" (fig!!res nucl~aires) of our cultural 
universe. These codes work at different levels of the story; Croatto puts 
the example of the visual codes of John 1: 35-51. which are expressed both 
at a body level ("Jesus saw Nathanael") and also at a theophanic one: "You 
will see heaven 1 aid open ... ". 
The combination of the different codes of the passage. are stressed as the 
key for the production of meaning, through the constant "opening and 
closing" dialectic of the text. The discourse produces its meaning by the 
work of the superficial codes (such as symbol s, I iterary genres, etc.) and 
deeper ones (actants. actors and functions). It is important to mentton 
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here that Croatto has never used the st1"uctural method as such in his 
exegetical work exce-pt for the few elements as the ones shown in this 
exam-ple of the use of codes in John. His opinion of structural analysis is 
simH ar to Ricoeur, in the sense that he does not consider such a method as 
"interpretation, but as a preparation (for the interpretative act)." (283)' 
Ricoeur considers Structural ism as a nec.essary step from a surface semant ic 
(for instance, the story of the myth) towards a deep semantic (the myth's 
referents). (284), Structural ism, accord i ng to Croatto then, is a val uabl e 
tool which needs to be compl emented with other methodologies. 
3.4.2.4 Other methods. 
Other methods considered by Croatto are the p'e~er and the midras. Both 
styles of biblical eommentary. although coming from rabbinic cireles, seem 
to be more open to new readings than other st.yles of interpretation. The 
Midra~im for instance, are a type of interpretation which admits a deeper 
Scriptural level (geras) of meaning, and which has many elements from a 
communitarian or "popul ar" (1 ess erudite) hermeneutical circl e. The use of 
Historical Criticism, and es-pecially the investigation of the etymology of 
words and grammatical constructions (both in semitic and greek languages) 
are very marked in the work of Croatto. who is a specialist in oriental 
languages. From his use of the historical referent of the text we can infer 
---------
(283) J. S. Croatto, Hermen~ut.ica Bfblict\. p. 28. 
(284) Cf. P. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, p. 17. 
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that his hermeneutical pTo-posal disagrees with Structuralism, which, as we 
have already seen, denies the ext.ernal referent. of the discourse in its 
analysiS. 
However, Croatto does not discuss the place of the referent in 
Structuralism as Ricoeur has done before, and more than that, he says that 
the external referent. does not give us the meaning of the text.. As we have 
seen in chapter one, Structuralism only works with t.he product.ion of 
meaning of elements present in the text. mainly by their relations of 
opposition; the author "is dead". and there is no historical referent to 
condition the new interpretation. RicoeuT rejects this position following 
Frege in his analysis of the relations between sense (~inn) and reference 
(Bedeutung). It is pTecisely t.he role of the reference to ground an ideal 
meaning in real ity, since "to speak is to say something about something." 
(285) . 
Croatto does not share Ricoeur's concepts on the role of the referent. and 
considers the structuralist denial of hist.ory as a positive element in the 
re-reading of the Scriptures. He expresses it very clearly, saying t.hat the 
historical referent is "a useless load <1astre) t.hat needs to be thrown 
away." (286). It Is difficult t.o see how a positive view of the non-
referential perspective of st.ruct.ural analysis can then be in agreement 
with the extensive use of historieal crit.icism which is found in all the 
(285) Cf. P. Ricoeur, 'I'he _~on.f.lJ~1; of Illterpretat_ioq~_, p. 87. 
(286) J. S. Croatto, tle!,Jnen~utica Bfblic{!, p. 33. 
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work done by Croatto. At first sight, it looks like a contradiction. This 
is the theme that ~ will consider no~ how this difficult dialectic 
referent/non-referent is organised by Croatto in his proposed hermeneutics 
of liberation. 
3.5. The use of Historical Criticism. 
3.5.1 History and Event. 
Croatto defines the text as a product of a process of interpretation (287). 
The numerous diagrams ot this book, the exegetical commentaries of Exodus, 
and the two volumes of II Hombre en el Mundo reter continuously to the 
processes of closure and opening of meaning during the history of redaction 
of the text. In other words, Croatto stresses that the re-reading of the 
Bible is, somehow, part of the process of construction of the text, which 
is related to the dialectic word-event. "Every word becomes an event, or 
appeal s to it" says Croatto, quoting Ric,oeur, "because every word is a 
creative word." (288) We will now analyse if history has a role to play in 
such construction, and particularly, in the Biblical texts. 
(287) Ct. J. S. Croatto, op. cit .• p. 56. 
(288) cr. J. S. Croatto, ID_ftQmhre en el Mundo, II, p. 120. Also P. 
Ricoeur, Ev~n~ment et Sens pp. 15 ff. 
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3.5.2 History as "The time when we were not yet born." 
Roland Barthes, in his book L~_Chambre Claire, asks the following question: 
"Isn't History simply that. time when we weren't yet born?" (289). 
These words introduce us into the structuralist dialectic of history-texts. 
Structuralist analysis does not deny the historical event but. stresses the 
fact that the only thing which we have from such an event is an 
interpretation, or a discourse. Any text is the 'Product of a certain 
culture; the Bible in itself refers us to a particular cultural context 
every time we read it. The key to understanding what. Structuralism says 
about history, Is to consider that. the culture which gave origin to the 
text Is dead, while the text is alive. The "culture" or "historical 
context" fulfils t.he same role as the author of the text: the author -or 
culture- is dead. Serge Doubrovsky has expressed this with the following 
words: "The author is dead in the instant when hi slher creat i on 'closes up' 
on itself; slhe has left." (290), Only the text has survived in a new 
culture, which is the reader's own historical context. The text only "dies" 
when it is not read. 
The value of the text in this position Is related to the reader's own 
culture. The historical facts are only a matter of interest when they 
(289) R. Barthes, Le Chambre Claire. Notes Sl1r __ ti\_Xltotographt~, p. 100. 
(290) "L' auteur 'meurt'_~es __ l' inst_ant-«ue sa cr~atioILJHL refergle ~lJr. elte-_ 
.erne et Ie quitte .. " cr. S. Doubrovsky. Les Chemins Actuels de la CritJ~_e. 
p. 14.7. 
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become appropriated by the reader, as a matter of interpretation. Ricoeur's 
position differs from this because the extra linguistic referent (history, 
context) Is still kept. Ricoeur calls the application of structural ist 
techniques a "dechronologizing-' of the narrative. which is reduced to a 
combination of a few "dramatic units" (actions such as "promising", 
"hel ping" etc.) which are then taken as paradigms (291). The narrator is in 
the text (designated by signs of narrativity> and nothing outside the text 
Is considered, because the only model used is the semiological one. Ricoeur 
sees here a risk of reductionism of the text, in a very similar way to 
Croatto' s criticisms, as we have already seen in 3.1.5. Ricoeur's main 
criticism of StTuct.uralisrn is in relation to the absolutisation of a 
semiological model, where even society belongs to this order. He says "It 
18 an apology for a system without a subject" (292). Language, deprived of 
a historical understanding, becomes an anonymous code, and humanity t:'. 
product of language; for Ricoeur, "humanity is language", but not a mere 
product: humanity also has a creative role. Another point Is that the 
semiological structures alone cannot totally explain a religious. 
political. social or cultural reality. 
At the same time, Ricoeur does not reduce the text to an archaeological 
I\eaning, related to an absolutisation 01 a historical perspective, but on 
the contrary. he stresses that the referential function of the text Is 
------------------
(291) Cf. P. Ricoeur, From-'fext to Ac.tioll. p. t 17. 
(292) Cf. P. RicoeuY', "Langage (Philosophie)", in f;ncyclopaedia 
Unlver~a,11s. vol. IX. 'P. 778. 
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"beyond" it, in a dimension of the possibll ity of the discourse. or its re-
creation. This is what Ricoeur calls "the world of t.he text". defined as 
"the kind of world the work unfolds. as it were. before the text." (293). 
This is an element Ricoeur has taken from Structuralism. due to the death 
of the material conditions of the text (author and historical production of 
meaning>. Croatto takes from Ricoeur' s t.heory the "beyond" (!lde~nte_) of 
the text, and Ricoeur's criticism of the emphasis on the original situation 
of the discourse, as if the original event can be repeated (294). Another 
Ricoeurian concept which plays a key role in Croatto's thought on history 
and text. Is the relation between tradition and innovation. especially as 
developed in Ric,oeur's Time and Narrative, vol. 1. 
3.5.3 The History of Effects in narrative. 
Croatto accepts the epistemology of St.ructuralism: the production of 
meaning from the text, through the process of interpretation which is 
essentially creative: the future of the text, comes from the polysemtc 
nature of the discourse. He re.jects "historicism", because it impl ies the 
closure of the meaning in the original event. However, there is a 
historical element which liberates the text from historicism but nurtures 
the reader's understanding of the text: the "history of effects" 
(Wlrkunpgeshichte), which Is an original concept from Gadamer, used by 
(293) P. Ricoeur. "Explanation and Understanding" in from T~xt.l'_<:LJ\('tlo~tl 
p. 131-
(294) Cf. P. Ricoeur, ~v~Jl~m~Jlt ___ ~t ~~~~, p. 23. 
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Croatto (295). Gadarner refers to the fact that the effect (Wi rRllllE) of a 
text is a very important part of its meaning'i this effect has a history and 
a tradition, and the interpreter's understanding is conditioned bv it. This 
reflection on the effects (or conditioning) of history calls for a self-
reflection on the part of the historian or interpreter. concerning the 
influence of traditions in present thinking. 
Ricoeur has said that reflection on the consciousness of the history of 
effects (Wlr'kungsgescb,ic:h:1:.J iches Be\VUsstseJn) is a category no longer 
pertaining to historical methodology but to the reflective consciousness of 
it. This is t.he consciousness of being "exposed to history and to its 
action" says Ricoeur, "in such a way that this action upon us cannot be 
objectified because it is part of the :historical phenomena itself.''(296). 
This is a form of hermeneutics which does not treat the past as an object 
of classification, but allows the tradition to say something relevant to 
the present moment. 
Croatto elaborates this concept in the following way: There are two worlds 
related to the ac.t of interpretation. the world of the text (as described 
by Ricoeur), and our present world. The first world belongs to the 
(295) Cf. J. S. Croatto, HerJllen~utica Btbttca, p. 44. Also ct. H.-G. 
Gadamer. Verdaq y M~todo, pp. 370 ff. 
(296) P. RlcoeuT, "The Task of Hermeneut ics" in From Text to Act ion. p. '7? , ~. 
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linguistic level, but the second is related to history or "a level of 
praxis" <nivel pt'axico) (297). This level of praxis is constituted by the 
event which has become "~rd" in a text; the point is that the event then 
has the ca~acity to generate other histot'ical events, through an act of 
"giving meaning" to othet' critical moments. This is not done through a 
relation of causality, but rather of meaning. As an example of this, 
Croatto points out that the crossing of the Rivet' Jordan (Joshua 1:5) is 
reI ated meani ns1Y..U..x with another event such as the crossing of the Red 
Sea. The element that relates one event to another. is the "effect of 
history" produced by each text. The production of historical events. linked 
by their own effect of histot'y. became part of the historical situation of 
the reader, and the interpreter relates to the text in the same way slhe 
does with his/her own situation. 
Croatto sees in this relation the resultant of the function of 
distanciation. which goes beyond the dynamics of the text. and reaches the 
comprehension of historical events (298), At this moment. Croatto Is trying 
to distinguish t~ different moments in the interpretative process: The 
epistemological moment and the moment of textual meaning. In the first, the 
interpreter, c,an work with structuralist models~ the adv~.ntages are (as 
Ricoeur has pointed out) the possibilities to work free from subJectivIsm, 
and from the a.rcheologlcal preoccupatIon with the author's IntentIon or the 
(297) Cf. J. S. Croatto "Liberal' a los pobres: Aproximac16n Hermen~uttca". 
(298) Cf J Ct Croatto Her-en~ut ica. __ B1 .. bl ica, p, 45. •• • 0. • _ •• -
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first production of meaning. But the second moment is different from the 
first. because it works at the level of meaning (or the message of the 
text). which is a kerygmatic moment. It is at this point that the 
interpreter requires a convergence of different criticisms. including 
historical criticism. 
The use of historical c.riticisrn in Croatto is then related to the work of 
the effect of history (the meaning of the significative events) and a 
dialectic tradition-innovation, which we find in Ricoeur's works History 
and Truth and Time an<t NarrJ!i.ive. We can synthesise this dialectic in 
Ricoeur's own words: 
"The labor of (hermeneutic) imagInation is not born from nothing. It is 
bound in one way or another to the tradition's paradigms. But the 
range of sol utions is vast." (299). 
The "vast range of solutions" that Ricoeur suggests. are characterised bv a 
polarisation of options, which Ricoeur calls "servile applications" (non-
critical) and "calculated deviations" (total suspension of tradition and 
history in the hermeneutical circle), According to Ricoeur, both extremes 
are detrimental to the real task of interpretation, because one depends on 
the other. Only when the hermeneutical imagination is able to create 
poetically from an existent reference (of history, or previous 
interpretative traditions) c.an the text project new horizons of 
(299) P. Ricoeul'. Time and NarratIve. I. p. 69. 
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possibilities. This Rlcoeurian dialec.tic tradition-innovation is affirmed 
by Croatto with the following ~rds: 
"The real hermeneutic assumes tradition. in the same way that tradition 
carries out meaning (~rtadora-de-sentid~) because it is open to the 
interpretation which extends its existence." (300) 
Croatto has found in Ricoeur's theory two key hermeneutical elements: a 
positive use of history and tradition, and a convergence of new methods of 
textual criticism. As we will see in chapter four. both aspects are very 
relevant in relation to the role of utopia as the "eschatological horizon" 
of the theology of Ii berat.ion. 
3.6 Myth and Symbol in the Hermeneutic Circle of Liberation Theology. 
The "servile applications" or "inert. transmission of some already dead 
deposit of material" are Ricoeur's description of the role that myths and 
folktales ha\'e played in traditional interpretation (301). As we have 
already seen in chapter 2, Bultmann approached myth as a language with 
existential intent.ionality, but obscured by pre-scientific interpretations 
of the world. Myth was opposed to history, and to truth, because it was 
thought to belong to an aethas mythica, superseded by the advancement of 
science. Croatto starts his reflection on myth from the perspective of 
(300) J. S. Croatto. EI Hombre en el Mundo. It p. 36; also cf. P. Ricoeur, 
"Symbolique et Temporalit~". in ArchiyJo di Filosofia. (1963) pp. 5-4.1. 
(301) P. RicoeuT. Time ~~d Narrative, T. Pl'. 81-2. 
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language. questioning the understanding of myths and their existential 
Interpretation; to understand the nature of myth, says Croatto, is "an 
hermeneutical 'Probl em." (302). Croatto's research on myth and sylftbol ism has 
been dee'Ply influenced by the extensive work by Ricoeur on this sub.ject, 
which we have briefly reviewed in chapter two. It is important to notice 
that this is a re-definition of myth which comes from Phenomenology of 
Religion; as such, it has been very innovative in Latin American theology 
and has produced interesting research in relation to the dialogue between 
Christianity and the ma.jor Latin American reI igions. such as the NAhuatl 
religion. It is not a coincidence tha.t the original design of the front 
cover of the first edition of Croatto's ~~heraci6n y Libertad, reproduces 
the figure of the NAhuatl god Xolotl .• who tradit ionally represents the 
triumph of dawn, carrying the symbols of victory (liberation) over the 
darkness of night. Our st,udy will concentrate on three main aspects of the 
work on myth by Croatto: myth, sign and symbol. myth and event and myth and 
ideology. Finally, we will briefly consider what Croatto calls the 
"decosmicization" 'Process of the Bible, in relation with demythologization. 
3.6.1 Myth, Sign and Symbol. 
Croatto defines the relation between myth and symbol, following Ricoeur's 
Th~.~mbolisl\ <>..1 Evil. He starts by considering how the symbol differs from 
the sign, in three aspects: 
(302) J. S. Croatto, ~tto~ermen~utica, p. 6. 
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a) The sign is semiotic, that is, it "indicates" something and Stlpposes a 
relat.ion of causality. The symbol is semantic, because it "orientates" 
towards sOJlething, and points out a reality not totally known but 
recognised by the symbol. 
b) The symbol is "obscure" by naturej when it loses this mystery, it 
becomes a sign. 
c) The symbol is polysemlc by nature; it has a plurivalence of meaning. The 
sign refers to only one meaning. 
The main characteristic of the symbol Is then its revelatory function, 
showing to the reader certain levels of reality which are not. immediately 
accessible to him/her. Croatto also mentions Eliade's concept about the 
"polarity of the symbol" (303), which refers to the fact. that reality is 
presented in a symbol in a c.ont.radictory way <coincidentia oppositorum). 
Only the plurivocity of the symbol is able to express these contradictions, 
the products of a richness of meaning, which makes of the symbol an 
essential component of religiol1s language. 
Myth is not a synonym of symbol, but a myth is always symbolic. The 
contrary is not necessarll y true; Croatto says, for example. that water is 
a symbolic. oh.1ec.t but. it is not a myth <al though it can be part of a 
(303) Cf. M. Eliade "Spirit. Light and Seed", in HistQ.!.Lof th~neJi,ions. 
11: I, 1971. pp. 1-30. 
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mythical story). The func.tion of the myth is the integration of symbols. 
which also suffer modifications in the mythical structure; it can be said 
that myth re-creates symbols, though the work of a religious community. 
Croatto says" (myths) are the inheritanc.e of a communit.y and they are born 
and are developed in t.he middle of the community experience of the sacred." 
(304). Myths work as an unificat.ion fact.or for t.he communit.y's 
participation in the universe of the sacred; they give a common language to 
people's experiences. and this is why they are anonymous, without an 
individual author. The symbol works hy "suggest.ion", but t.he myth is more 
explicit. it says something of a transcendental nature. of the symbolic 
universe, in relat.ion to a hierophany. These concepts are organised from 
Ricoeur's work on symbolic theory and myth. as we have seen in chapter two. 
3.6.2 Myt.h and event. 
The relation between myth and event, and myth and ideology, is perhaps the 
most original elaboration of Croat.to on this theme. Croat.to has defined 
myth as "an account of an act or event of t.he gods at the beginning of the 
physical world, or of history, which reveals the meaning of a 'Present 
reallty, instftution or customs." (305), This definition has two main 
elements that we would like to explore~ t.he role of the event, in the 
formation of myt.hs. and the "effect of hist.orv" in its production. 
(305) Cf. J. S. Croatto ~l_ltQmbre en el Mt.l11dQ., II, p. 24; also cf. J. ~. 
Croatto "The Gods of Oppression". in P. Richards (ed.) The_I~ol1L-9f_1)_e~t'tl 
I!rnt. the_ God~_f Life, p. 28. 
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Croatto refers to an "event". which does not relate to historv or to a 
scientific geography. The mythical event is explained here in the context 
of the deep experiences of humanity, and as having an ontological nature 
(an intuition of a being-in-the-world). Myth is a "paradigmatic event". 
with a profound "reservoi r of meaning", which is somehow captured and 
condensed in the structure of its language (306). From this perpectivf", the 
biblical myth of creation, is according to Croatto. the "coincidence" of 
the encounter between a real event and another of divine origin. As we have 
seen already. Croatto will not. turn to history for a verific.ation of the 
reality of a past event, because he works from the text, and its own 
production of meaning. God becomes the actant (or actor) of history: the 
events of the garden of Eden are real in the text, and in the memory of a 
communi ty whi ch re-creates them. 
With the word "account" of the definition, Croatto stresses the linguistic 
structure of the myth's narrati ve, which invol ves the characters of gods. 
and has "historic" elements. The history of the myth is not present in the 
narrative, but in the interpretation of the narrative. Although myths have 
suffered from an association with history. and Croatto following Ricoeur 
disagrees with such a relation, the second part of Croatto's definition 
seems to refer to the effect of history on myths. As we have seen this 
effect is produced by a text, and works linking different historical 
events, in such a way that. the int.erpreter relates to the historical 
situation of the t.ext in a similar way that s/he does with his/her present 
------------
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situation or context. When Croatto claims that a mythical narrative reveals 
to its reader an aspect of the reader's own reality. he Is using the same 
concept. The mythical event is connected through this effect of the 
conditioning of history in the text, with another modern mythical event of 
present times. As Ricoeur might say, it is the reflective consciousness 
which is present in the narrative. the one that makes the connection 
between the past and the present mythical event. 
3.6.3 Myth and Ideology 
Croatto analyses this aspect in some detail in his article The Gods ___ Qt 
~ession. He starts by organising the elements which make myth an 
archetypal thought: 
1. The gods who create are ontologically "perfect and insuperable" 
2. The traditions concerning the origins cannot suffer innovations. 
3. The reality which is shaped according to these traditions. cannot be re-
structured. 
4-. The tradit.ions are related to the deeds of the gods. their inventions. 
and their exempl ary actions. 
From that, Croatto establishes a link between social changes and a mvthical 
world view. according to the dynamic. of changes. For instance. in a societv 
buH t on an archetypal model as the one previous} y described. the ch(\n~es 
produced are related to "a return to the true sources" but not to 
innovations in the pattern. Another element that Croatto finds relevant in 
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this dialectic myt.h-human praxis, is Destiny. in relationship to the 
construction of social status (for instance. divinity and royalty.) 
Croatto analyses these elements in the Old Testament <Book of Kings, Son~ 
of Songs and some major prophets), by contrasting them wit.h Babylonian 
myths such as the myth of Atrahasis, the Enuma Elish and even the Bh~ga~ad­
Gita. His tacit presupposition is that the oppressive ideological el ements 
of myths which support social structures of injustice belong to non-
Christ.ian traditions. These are the examples of the "gods of oppression" 
against the Biblical God YHWH who is a God of liberation, supported by a 
different archetypal thought. The main areas where the implications of 
mythical thought appear are, In Croatto's opinion, in the eplphanization of 
culture, (eg. cult.ure as a divine product wh~re people do not intervene): 
social status (mythical Justificat.ion of marginalisation of groups 
according to race, gender, etc.) and celebrations (the cyclic holidays 
reveal a cosmic order, but c·an be regressive inst.ead of progressive). 
3.6.4 Demythologisation and "Decosmtcization." 
Croatt.o ends his analysis by observing that the Bible has its own 
demythologisat.lon programme, which he calls "Decosmicization". From a 
hermeneutical point of view, it means that the Scriptures have 
"marginalised" t.he divine (as the archetypal actions previously described), 
in favour of humanity's working creativity. It does not mean that the 
process "de-symbol ises", or ceases to ac'k.nowl edge the nature of mvthici\J 
1 angtlage, as Btl I t.mann has done, but, according to Croatt 0, the 
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decosmicizatlon pro.fect puts people's destiny in their O\o.1ll hands, because 
it presupposes an awareness of a historical event of liberation. 
Is this decosmicization related to Rlcoeur's de-mystification process? 
(307). It looks as if it is implied in the dialectic gods of oppression/God 
of liberation, but there Is a lack of reflection in Croatto concerning the 
mythical language of the Bibl e at this point. He has not studied the 
dynamic structure which allows us to differentiate myths from 
mystifications in the Old Testament. 
There is also a lack of reflection on Croatto's O\o.1ll pres\..1ppositions In 
general, especially about the mythical archetype of liberation in the 
Bible, which calls 01.11" attention. The confrontation between Baal and YHWH 
at the event of .Exod\..1s is not clearly related either to this 
"decosmicization" process or to the Latin American slt\..1ation. How can we 
reI ate the cJ aim that the Bible put h\..1JJlan destiny in humanity's own hands, 
wi th the struggl es bet\\o"een "oppresi ve gods vs. II berat i ve God?". Anot her 
question which is not answered by Croatto is: Who are the gods of 
oppression in Latin America? In some ways he seems to consider that they 
are part of the Synchretistic-Cathollcism of the continent (308); In others 
he seems to consider that the traditional gods of the great Latin American 
religions ~re oppresive. In any case, he ends suggesting that the 
(307) Ct. Chapter two, 2.5.2 
(308) Cf. --'. S. Croatto, "The Gods of Oppression" in P. Richards ({'d.) Th~ 
Idols 01 Death~nd :th~~od_~Life. p. 43. 
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continent needs to meet the true God of the liberation manifested in 
Exodus. 
The problem which ~ find now Is how to relate this statement with the 
drawing of the god Xolotl on the front cover of Llberaci6n y Libertad. This 
is one 01 the questions that many third world hermeneutfcians are 
confronted with, in relation to the traditional cultures of the continent. 
Apparently, these are hermeneutical contradictions. which imply a lack of 
questioning of presuppositions, and a difficult dialogue between the 
language of faith and the role of the people in the determination of their 
beliefs. A main issue to analyse here is who names (or defines) God in 
Latin American theology? We will reflect upon this point as part of the 
general conclusions of the next chapter. 
3.7 Understanding and Appropriation of the text. 
Croatto arrives at the moment of understanding of the text as the second 
pillar 01 the hermeneutical arch of explanation and understanding proposed 
by Ricoeur. Understanding Is mediated by a work of explanation of the text 
at the linguistic level of the bib} leal narrative, through which the reader 
arrives at the experienc.e of the "fusion of horizons." As we have seen in 
chapter one, this Is a concept from Gadamer which Ricoeur adopted and 
Croatto also considers in his hermeneutical circle. The fusion of horizons 
alludes to the fact that the situation (or "horizon") of the interpreter, 
which is inseparable from the individual, has a certain flexibility to 
include the horizon of the past. According to Croatto. this is a 
reconclliatory process which incl udes the phenomenon of the broadening of 
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our horizon, through a focussing and understanding of the past in relation 
to our context (309). The two elements of this fusion of horizons are the 
fundamental or significative events of the text, and our own "significative 
context" (or meaningful events of our present). The hermeneutical circle in 
this way maintains a permanent tension ot interpreti'ltion. between the 
consciousness of the past events and the present horizon of the reader. 
3.7.1 Fusion of Horizons 
Croatto considers that the fusion of horizons between the Latin American 
reader of the Bible. and the historical consciousness of the text, is 
produced by the expansion of the understanding of events of liberation. His 
I\ain thesis is that the Pentateuch, tor instance, has been "closed" as a 
text, from the perspective of the oppressed (310). Anv re-reading of the 
Torah needs to take into account that the story of Israel is left 
unconc.luded, and in Croatto' s ~"Ords as "a diminished nation (llliebio 
disminu1do), with its lands still occ.upied. and without self goverment." 
(311). The literary structure of the Pentateuch is focussed on the "not 
yet" (todavfa---1lQ.) of freedom and independence. 
The Latin American reader is also familiar with events of liberation, which 
are re-told every year in the rit.uals Etestas Patria,~ (national 
(309) Cf .. J. S. Croatto. tler .. en~t1tica Bfblica, p. 24-5. 
(310) Iltid., p. 68. 
(311) Ibt!l., p. 69. 
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celebrations) 01 the continent. Croatto cites an example from Argentina. 
such as the celebration of the events 01 the 25th ot May of 1810 as "Dfa de 
la Patria" (Day of the Nation); although the historical event did not bring 
any real independence from the Spanish Crown, people have always "read" the 
event from "the perspect i ve of the oppressed". with the hope of luture 
independence. It is interesting to notice that the "Independence Day", 
which happened six years later. does not. aroUse the same feel ing from the 
people. In Croatto's words. the first event is open tor a reading of 
freedom, but the second is closed. (312) 
Both horizons relate to events of liberation (Exodus in the Bible, and the 
specific circumstances of oppression of any Latin American nation) and 
produce a single l:Iorizont.verschmelzun~ (fusion of horizons) of 
understanding in the reader, al thOllgh a tension between past and present 
always tends to remain. Croatto stresses that the process of text.ual 
closure is in reality. double, that means it is produced both in the 
selection of the fundamental event rescued by t.he text, and in the event of 
interpretation which takes the torm of a text. Every text, acc.ording to 
Croatto, has its start in an experience, in an event. which could be a 
natural phenomenon, a world view, or a context of oppresion (313). Not all 
events have the same "meaning"; only the significative ones become texts. 
(312) Cf. J. S. Croatto, Liberaci6n y Libertad, p. 16. 
(313) Ct . . J. S. Croatto, Hermen~utica Biblica, p. 43. 
251 
3.7.2 The conflict of interpretations and the conflict of praxis. 
Quoting Ricoeur, Croatto pOints out the fact that the conflict of different 
interpretative methods (which intervene in these processes of closure of 
texts>, results in a conflict of the appropriation of the te~t by the 
readers. Croatto speaks about appropriation in two senses: the 
appropriation of the biblical texts made by th~ology in general and 
theology of liberation in part.icular, and the appropriative moment made by 
the individual reader. According to the presupposition of this 
hermeneutical circle, they shm.lld not be in conflict, but in a dynamic 
reI ation. 
Croatto. following Rfcoeur, says that the act of reading C\'3 a production of 
meaning implies an appropriation of the textual meaning. The reader seems 
to have a relation of dependency upon the text which a/he interprets (314.), 
and appropriation bec.omes a "violent" phenomena where the interpreter takes 
the textual meaning as self-understanding. Somehow, the appropriation of 
the text is also a c.losure of meaning. and this is particularly manifested 
through different (sometimes opposite) practices, whic.h arise from the 
reading of the same (pol itical or reI igiol1s> text. It is important to 
remember at this point, that in Ricoeur's opinion, the reader always 
produces a change in his/her own world, as a result of interpretation, 
basically at the level of a c.hange of attitude of the reader. Croatto works 
on two aspects of praxis as a result -and ultimate goal- of interpretation: 
(314.) Cf. J. S. Croatto. H~rR\~n~lttlc~lHlllic~, p. 37. 
the unmasking of the sub.fect, and the existential or "new world" 
proposition. 
3.7.3 The unmasking of the narcissistic "I" as a "We". 
Croatto seems to be working here with Ricoeur's underst.anding of the 
decolonizatfon process (315)' Ricoeur relates colonization to "a removal of 
personality" and decolonization as the project which wants to recover 
people's own identity. Some Latin American t.heologians would consider that 
the locus of the crisis of the Cartesian Cog-ito is the shift that needs to 
be made between the old "I" as subJect., and the "We" as the new starting 
point (316). In this case, the unmasking of the ego is related by the 
suspicion upon a "false social consciousness": the process of understanding 
Ricoeur's "illusions of the sub.1ect". is done by diagnost.ic work 
(diagnostlque) using social sciences. The de-ideologization of the Latin 
American communitarian "We", in opposit.ion to an individualistic "I". seems 
then to be Croatto's task of interpretation, and like Ricoeur, he sees 
appropriat.ion as the consequence of the explanation of the text. (317), But 
he also takes the position of Gadamer, :In the sense that this final moment 
(315) ct. P. R:lcoeur, 'From Nation t.o HUJnanit.y~ Task of the Christians', in 
pol iticJ~:L and Social Essays by P. Ricoeur, p. 141. 
(316) Cf, P. Andiftach, Am.6s: M~moria yP~.p.f~~:la. M.Phi!. thesis done under 
the supervision of Prof. Croatto, p. 272. 
(317) ct. J. S. Croatto. Liberaci6n y Libert.ad, p. 37. 
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of interpretation is done and produced throughout the whole process of the 
hermeneutical circle. 
Croatto tries to elaborate an "ontology of being more" versus an "ontology 
of having more" (318). He has elaborated an understanding of the 
existential dilemma of Genesis, in terms of a primordial vocation for 
freedom in humanity, denied by the manifested negat.ion of the "ot.her", made 
by the oppressor. At this point Croat.to uses Freire's own ontolo~. 
concerned with the c.all "to be more" (human) which the dehumanization 
processes of injustice have impeded, thus alienating humanity from God's 
designs. The praxis of liberation needs to start with a conscientizat.ion 
process, which is in intimate relation with solidarity. as the social 
responsibility of the "We" who interprets the text. Croatto's 
methodological guidelines. organised through the paradigmatic event of 
Exodus. have many sil\ilar characteristics to a Freirean conscientizat.ion 
process: the "internalization" of the oppressor (the memory of good food in 
Egypt) I and the exodus as a long and di ff leul t "awareness rai sing" 
programme. 
3.7.t The proposition of a "New World" 
This "New World" is. according to Croatto. the result of the fusion of 
horizons of freedom and liberation. Freedom is the ontological vocation of 
humanity. and liberation Is the process to achieve ft. It seems that at 
(318) cr. J. S. Croatto. p--R~J.l .• pp. 14--5; 18. 
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this point Croatto considers the uto~ia of liberation theology (freedom: 
the ontological ~roposal of "being more human"). as part of the prophetic 
role of Christianity in the continent. The Christians' responsibility is 
then to announce the new Kingdom of God. which is the biblical proposition 
he has taken in his biblical re-reading. Again, Croatto uses the dialectic 
"God/Idols" which comes from his studies in myths. and organises the praxis 
in these two areas: the ones in favour of the ap~lication of concrete 
practices of liberation are the followers of God. and the opponents or 
"passive" readers are worshipping idols. This dialectic is later used by 
Croatto in relation to the Pauline interpretation of the events of the 
death-resurrection of Christ. The "New Creation" is opposed here to the 
"Old Person": "God" is related with community and solidarity, and what 
Croatto calls "the baptism-vocation" of Christians to realize the praxis of 
Latin American liberation (319); here he speaks of the commitment to the 
paschal events. "Idols" is the category of individualism, lack of awareness 
and indifference toward the biblical programmes of liberation. 
The question to ask now is if Croatto has pre-empted the application of the 
text, or if the "We" who interprets is more than a group of church 
hermeneuttcians. It is natural to have a tension of pro.jects coming from 
different re-readings of the text, and even dlsagrements around the "final 
interpretation", and in this point Croatto also agrees with Ricoeur to 
postpone the final moment of interpretation <leaving it "open" to new 
1 nterpretations). However. the event of Exodus Is a strong closure of the 
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Bible in Croatto's hermeneutical circle, and we must ask if it is 
legitimate to do so. There seems to be a Latin American consensus 
surrounding the re-reading of events of lIberation. not only in the Bible. 
These events. expressed in popular theatre as the traditional Latin 
American natives' dramas of Conquista. always present the opposition 
"liberation/ oppression" (not "freedom", as such, but the project to 
achieve ft). For instance, in these popular dramatizations, the 
conquistadores and the priests "speak" moving their lips. but not producin~ 
any sounds. People surrounding the actors in the streets. have 
traditionally put words, implying hidden motives of their situation. and 
positioning themsel ves as the "oppressed" who interpret their s11 enced 
universe of injustice (320). 
3.7.5 A "consc i ousness-of-freedom" process. 
Croatto has not closed the re-reading of the Bible, but many centuries 
before liberation theology. the people had also kept the text. of their 
oppression open in myths and art. The process for developing a 
"consc.io'lJsness-of-freedom" which Croa.tto finds in the bibl ical events of 
liberation, is the main application of the appropriation of the circle of 
interpretation. As a hermeneutician he has repeatly refused to advise his 
readers about any specific application of a praxis for liberation. because 
it would be contradictory with his eisegetical proposals (320. Eisegesis 
(320) Cf. E. Galeano, Nosotros deGimos NO. Cr6n~as, p. 364. 
(321) Cf. J. S. Croatto. LiJt~Tac16~tJ __ kibertad,. p. 11. 
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works from facts prior to interpretations, which in every Latin American 
reader can be different. Apart from that. the surplus of meaning of human 
praxis. as shown in the text. ensures that every interpreter can relate to 
an archetypical event such as Exodus, with a richness of meaning applicable 
to the reader's situation in a dynamic way. 
Croatto then completes his hermeneutical circle by "looking at the promised 
land of freedom", as Ricoeur look.s for the "promised land of ontology". 
Both things relate to each other; freedom from structures of injustice is 
closely I inked to the I iheration of the "non-person" (llQmhr_e-:~actus) of 
Guti6rrez. Somehow. Croatto starts and ends his hermeneut.ical process 
privileging the element of "suspicion": the suspicion of the interpret.er 
taking control over the whole complex task of liberation. Even at that 
point, Croatto insists that the text of action, must always remain "open." 
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Part II 
3.8 Juan Luis Segundo. 
Liberating the Hermeneutical Circle. 
"We cannot bear any longer the burden of a philosophy which leaves us alone 
at eating time, or at prayer." 
J. L. Segundo. (322) 
"You see, my dear fellow, if you are a phenomenologist, you can talk about 
thi s coc kta 11 and make phil osophy out of it!" 
Raymond Aron to Jean Paul Sartre. (323) 
Segundo publ ished his book Existencial ismo, Fi! 050f1a ,y-.poesi~ 
("Existential ism, Philosophy and Poetry") in 1948. It was philosophy or 
theology from every day life that from the beginning made him consider 
first, the relation between poetry and truth, and second, the relation 
between exegesis and truth. Yet, in those early days of his thought, 
Segundo was questioning a truth which Is not verified by praxis, and a 
--------------
(322) Cf. J. L. Segundo, Existenciallsmo. FH oSQ.ffa y J>_oeM!!: En~i\Y9 Of' 
Siutes i s, Introduet ion. 
(323) Quoted in M. Hammond, J. Howard and R. Keat. ~~derstandlnK 
Ph~n9meR910gy, p. 1. 
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knowledge which is not nurtured by the experience of reality (324). The 
influence of a phenomenological analysis on Segundo starts with his 
questions about the meaning of 10 cotidiano_ (the everyday I ile) in the 
light 01 the Christian faith in Latin Amerie,a, through a process of 
bracketing off models of understanding of which he is ideologically 
suspiciotlS. This includes certain theological structures, explanatory 
theories of the underdevelopment of the c,ontinent, and the traditional 
Latin American understanding of history. 
Segundo wants to understand all the texts of Latin American's reality, from 
poverty to the Bibl e, through the use of the ~poche and hermeneutical 
suspicion, not only in the products of interpretation (exegesis) but in the 
circle of interpretation itself. 
In this second part of the present chapter, we will study the influence of 
phenomenology on Segundo via Ricoeur, in relation to the hermeneutics of 
suspicion and in various elements of analysis that the Uruguayan theologian 
uses, which have been of enormous influence for liberation theology. The 
material we will use for this research incl udes earl y works of Segundo 
(such as his doctoral thesis for the University of Paris, Is ChrjsteMom all 
Utopja?, under Rieoeur's supervision. in 1964-), a classic book such as Thee 
LiberatfQn~t_lh~91J~.nt the five vol urnes of T~QIQgiJLAltlert_~_-P~L~_eUaieo 
Adul to (transl ated as "Theology for Art isans of a New Humanity", but ..... ·hich 
literally should be "Open Theology for the Lay Adult"), tJidde-.!l_ 
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MotJves of Past_oral-Actio!l.. Jesus~_Na2areth. and many articles which can 
hel p us to understand and organise the extensive work of Segundo reI <.\_ted to 
the hermeneutics of liberation theology. 
3.8.0 The Circle of Suspicion. 
The hermeneutical circl e of Segundo has many el ements in common with the 
hermeneutical proposal of Croatto. and yet. as we are going to see, it is 
radically different. We believe that an over simplification of the 
hermeneutics of liberation, with an excessive importance attached to the 
category of exodus (without even acknowledging the differences in the 
treatment of exodus amongst Latin American theologians> has overlooked the 
fact that Segundo has worked very little on the hermeneutical circle as 
such. His work instead, is more related to the study of sllspicion as a 
I\ethodology. in what we can call "the circle of suspicion" of liberation 
theology. However. his interpretat.ive process and the uses of Ricoeurian 
elements of hermeneutics, are different, if not opposite to Croatto. 
The objective of their research in the first instance is basically the same 
ror Croatto and Segundo: an ut.opia of liberation which uses a strong 
mythical-symbolic key to understanding, (as self-understanding> and praxis. 
However, if the methods of int.erpretation are different, dissimilar 
presuppositions are also implied, which produce different final models of 
action. Our present obJect.ive now is to study the Ricoeurian influences in 
Segundo, and how he has elaborated a hermenetltical perspective different 
from that already seen in Croatto; a further reflection concerned \.dth 
praxis will be dev~loped in the last chapter. 
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3.8.0.1 The construction of a paradigmatic suspicion. 
The current description of the hermeneutical circle proposed by Segundo is 
usuall y taken from The Liberat i on of Theology, in its four methodol ogi cal 
steps (325): 
1) We need to consider "our manner of experiencing reality, which leads to 
ideological suspicion." 
2) We apply the ideological suspieion, obtained In the first step. "to the 
whole ideological superstructure in general and to theology in particular." 
3) The new way of experiencing reality, and theological reality. leads us 
"to exegetical suspicion ... and to the suspicion that current bibl ical 
interpretation does not take into account important data." 
t) the last step is then related to "our new hermeneutics, that Is, the new 
way of interpreting the sourc,e of our faith, which is Scripture, with the 
new elements at our disposal." 
As we can see from t.hese four moments, the key issue is suspicion; the 
circle st.arts with sus-picion as a pre-su-pposition and ends with it as an 
understanding. The "How have I read?" of Ric,oeur's circle of interpretatton 
becomes, in Segundo's methodology, "How did I doubt about (reality. the 
exegesis, the hermeneutics in general )?" (326). The first question for us 
to ask now is how a Latin American person can -perceive his/h~r r~ality in a 
(325) Cf. J. L. Segundo, ThL1.iberat iQIL 9J'_:rheolQC., p. 13. 
(326) Cf. Chapter one, 1.6.2. 
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different way. and what does he mean by "different" here. At this -point. 
apart from Ricoeur, we need to consider the influence of Freire in 
Segundo's work. 
Segundo's "different manner of experiencing reality" seems to refer to 
Freire's study on the mediation role of "prescript.ion" <prescripci6n.) which 
Is a basic element in the oppressor-oppressed dialectic of education for 
liberation. Freire says that "every 'prescription' is the imposition of the 
option made by one conscience upon another." (327). This imposition of 
options by one group on another, implies certain conformity and lack of 
critical questioning on the side of the oppressed, which the Freirean 
process of conscientizatlon t.ries to challenge. In this 'Point Freire is 
using Husserl' s cone.ept of "fundamental intuitions". or perceptions that 
were not recognised by the sub~fect. and once acknowledged. become obJeets 
of reflection (ad-miraci6n). from more than one perspeetive 
(A,bschauttupgen) (328). 
The "problem posing" methodology of Freire. Is then indebted to 
phenomenology. in the sense that the student re-discovers a reality that 
a/he al ready knew, through a proc.ess of quest ioni ng which chail enged the 
"prescribed" view about his/her life and circumstances. This is the core of 
the pedagogy of the op'Pressed. which can be synthesised in Freire's own 
words: 
(327) P. Fre i re, p-~_dagor1 a del __ 9..J>xlml_dQ. p. 37. 
(328) Cf. E. Husserl, I~~as, section 24. p. 92. 
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"Nobody educates anybody, and nobody educates hilllherselfj people 
educate themsel ves in communion [communi tyl t and the \\.lOrl d [reali tyJ is 
the only mediator (in the educational process)". (329) 
The first point of the "Circle of Suspicion" suggests the use of a 
conscientization proJect, which must question the imposition of options in 
Latin America made by the t\\.lO most powerful institutions: church and state. 
But the concientization process, also requires a critical model. and at 
this point Segundo mentions the work of the "three masters of suspicion", 
Marx, Ni etzsche and Freud, refer i ng to Ricoeur' s hermenetlt ics of susp! cion 
as developed in his book Freud and Philosophy. ~e will consider now at 
whattpoints Segundo has followed Ricoeur's theory. and where he has 
departed from it. 
In Ricoeur's analysis, suspicion is a hermeneutical category closely 
related to the unmasking of false consciousness. or demystiflcation (330). 
Suspicion is here part of a "purific,ation proc,ess" of hermeneutics, 8nd 
Ricoeur speaks in religious tcrms about it, as if the interpreter was a 
sort of monk who needed to ful f11 four vows: "will i ngness to suspect, 
wilingness to I istenj vow of r18'Ou1'. vow of obedience." It is interest ing 
to note that Ric,oeur speaks here of an iconoclastic attitude, which \\.lOuld 
"liquidate the idols". restoring -listening to- the syJDbol1c true meaning 
(329) P. Freire, Pedagogfa del ~imido, p. 86. 
(330) Cf. P. Ri coeur. Freu9_ alld _fJ:\Ji oS9L1\y. pp. 26-35. 
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of what is said. The dialectic God-Idols, which Croatto and Segundo use 
extensively, starts at the moment of suspicion. 
Ricoeur builds his interpretative theory on the "school of suspicion", on 
the work of Marx. Nietzsche and Freud; the doubt about things, gi ves pI ace 
also to the doubt about the subject, about consciousness. The three of them 
have a convergence of destructive interpretatIons of reality: Nietzsche, in 
rei ation to humanity's power, the rest.oration of w111 and man's force; 
Freud, in the elaboration of "the economy of inst.incts", via dreams which 
needs to be deciphered, and Marx, who uses a criticism based on economic 
alienation. The dialectic "hidden-shown" or "patent-latent" is 
characteristic of their hermeneutics of suspicion. However. it. is neeessarv 
to say that Ricoeur's "doubting" element does not mean skepticism, but 
restoration of a more authentic reality. 
Segundo arrives at the Ricoeurian concept of a hermeneutics of suspicion, 
through the study of various points, from a criticism on "Narve Realism" to 
Marx's historical materialism, with a careful considerat.ion of Freud and 
Nietszche. The first element. t.o t.ake into account. is Segundo's criticism 
of t.he scientific approach to understanding, which follows Ricoeur's 
questioning of a position of "Narve Realism". From that. we will be able to 
understand better Segundo's work on the "Masters of Suspicion". and the 
final analysis of the role of Historical Materialism in what we have called 
"Segundo's circle of suspicion." 
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3.8.0.2 The criticism of Nafve Realism. 
We refer here to Segundo's Exjste!lcial ismo. Filosoffa y Poe.~J~. The main 
thesis of this book is the need for a philosophical synthesis, which could 
give us an exist.ential answer to the question of humanity. Segundo claims 
that such a synthesis will be a return to common sense, and will integrate 
the dimension of the experience of the sacred in people's everyday life. 
The first argument of Segundo is concerned with the false opposition 
between poetry and truth <philosophy). The second, is the relation of 
knowledge and existence, and Segundo dedicates a whole chapter to 
Existentialism, from a methodological point of view. Two points need to be 
highlighted in this early analysis published in 1949: a) Segundo's 
definition of methodology, as "Not so much a logical tec.hnique. but a way 
to conceive and confront the fundamental philosophical question" and b> in 
relation to the questioning, Segundo claims that "Questions are more 
important than answers." (331). These two el ements are present in the 
definition of Segundo's hermeneutical circle, previously described, and 
denote Segundo's preoccupation with R\ethodological suspicion: the methods, 
and t.he right. questions, define a philosophical (or theological) proc.ess of 
understandi ng. 
Segundo objects to a Nafve Realist argument. which claims that subject and 
object can be split, following a scientific paradigm. Instead of that. 
Segundo, like Ricoeur in his criticism of the "natural attitude", is 
(331) J. L. SegundO, gp. cit., p. 63. 
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interested in a phenomenological argument. which is more integral and 
considers that objectivity does not exclude knowledge gained by experience 
(vivencia). but rather obtains a new depth with it. (332). The relation 
between human knowledge and existence. in Segundo comes through an early 
and tentative analysis of existentialist methodology. and the suspicion 
about questioning. From here, the road towards a new methodology requires 
the study of the "three great destroyers". as Ricoeur has called Marx. 
Nietzsche and Freud. 
3.8.1 Hermeneutical dis-alienation. 
From liberty to Freud. 
The discussion of Freud in Segundo comes as part of the dialectic of 
"liberty and nature", and follows Ricoeur's analysis in his unfinished 
project of a Phil osoph.x.-Q.f_Wlll. In the first vol ume of Ricoeur's research 
called The VoluntaT~nd the Involuntary, the French philosopher has tried 
to demonstrate the interdependence between the two terms, that is. between 
the free decision and the experienced necessity. Human transcendence 
requires the attraction that the involuntary (an element of human finitude) 
provides: there is a risk in exalting transcendence at the expense of human 
finitude, which is the displacement of the c.oncret.e. or human existence. 
Ricoeur reflects on t.hese point.s froIn the perspective of Marcel and 
Husserl. Marcel provides him with the analysis of' the involuntary. 
--------
(332) J. L. Segundo. op. cit., p. 63. 
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basically through the study of the objective and the affective elements , 
and Husserl with a phenomenology which pursues a unity amongst different 
points of view. 
In the second vol ume of Ricoeur's project, Finftud~ et Ctllpab1l1t~, 
especially in part one (L'homme fail1ible), the "et" of the title implies 
the contrast between the two terms. The main thesis of the book, which 
continues the first volume, is that finitude should not be confused \dth 
gullt~ finitude is related instead with human fragility, which works as a 
pre-condition for situations of moral evil. This theme is then developed by 
Ricoeur in the second part of the volume II, The Symbolism of Evil, and 
later in his Freud and P~i19~o~~. For methodological reasons, we will 
concentrate first on Segundo's treatment of the PhilosolW--Y-2-L_ the WilL, and 
then on the essays on Freud. 
3.8.1. t Suspic.ious liberty. Determinisms and possibilities. 
"The struggle for truth -and I iberty- is a strtlggle to Interpret ... " 
J. L. Segundo (333). 
The material we are going to use here comes from Segtlndo's thesis, El_ 
Cristianismo, upa Ht.Q.pJa.1, vol. 1., and vol. II of the series A_Th~_Ql Q.8'Y-
for Artisans ... , Qr~~_~ _aJJ..~t~h~J{..!)man CQJldltion. In order to understand 
human existence. SegtIDdo considers the division of a human being into what 
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st. Paul call s "the inmost sel til and "the law 01 our bodfl y members". and 
Sartre calls "existence and essence". Following Ricoeur's analvsis of the 
"non-coincidence of man with himself" (334-), Segundo agrees that these two 
concepts are not opposite but compI ementary, and that free will and 
determinisms coexist, in contrast with other positions which see liberty as 
illusory. These "determinisms" On plural), that he speaks about. are "pre-
conditions" of Otlr being, but not I imitations to our free will or 1 iberty 
(335) . 
Segundo considers that since our acts 01 free will need to struggle against 
these "natural dynamisms", both inside and outside human beings. it implies 
that liberty operates in a realm of truth. in a search for discernment 
against the opposition of determinisms. Then as a consequence of that. our 
free w1l1 needs to interpret its decisions, and the result of its acts, in 
our own cuI tural context. because human 1 iberty. according to Segundo. 
implies the conscious realization of unconscious determinisms (or 
"involuntary factors"), as for instance, structures of ideological 
alienation (336). 
To dis-alienate humanity in its search for liberty and truth, the process 
of interpretation needs to be challenged; in order to achieve a creative 
freedom, liberty must be "suspicious" of structures of alienation. Segundo 
(334) Ct. P. Ricoeur, f--.1nituA~~J .. C'!1p-I!l>JLt1t. I. L..~ .. Jt9 .. wmne Faiillbl~. p. 13. 
(335) Cf. J. L. Segundo. {!I'~c"e and tlte .J!v .. man Con<lttlon. p. 33. 
(336) Ct. P. Ricoeur. Freedom and Nature, p. 277. 
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quotes Ricoeur's vision of the hermeneutical ta~1t. as follows: 
"A desire to cast suspicion on things. and a desire to listen ... Today 
our situat.ion as human beings is such that we have not finished yet 
with our idols and have just begun to I ist.en to symbols." (337). 
This is then related with an alienation-free will dialectic. where the only 
way for the Christian is to live in a process of interpretation of his/her 
reality, in church and in society (338). Ricoeur also speaks about the need 
for an "iconoclastic procedure". in our discourse of interpretation, which 
somehow, has been adopted by Croatto in his "idols-God" frame of 
interpretation (339). The question to ask here is if this procedure of 
"eliminating idols" has been carried out by Segundo, in the methodological 
process of liberation theology in itself; at this point it seems that 
Segundo. like Croatto, is confronted with the same dilemma, although the 
resolution is different. 
We will proceed now to invest igate Segundo's hermeneutical path. where we 
will be able to find some answers to this question. although more detailed 
concl usions will be drawn in the final chapter. The "suspicious I iberty" of 
Segundo starts from an analysis of Freud, which has been particularly 
influenced by Ricoeur's book, Freud and Philosophy. 
(337) P. Ricoeur, t:r~u(t and Phil_oso-Plt..x.. p. 27. 
(338) Cf. J. L. Segundo. Grace and_~llL lluman_CQ_nditton. p. 35. 
(339) Other Latin American theologians have adopted the same procedur(': cf. 
P. Ri chards (ed.), The l~Q.l ~.of_J)eath a!1<l __ :Lh,e GQ.Q QL.J".if_~c!.... 
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3.8.1.2 The semantics of desire and the "Master-Slave" dialectic. 
Ricoeur's thesis is that psychoanalysis is an interpretative science, with 
as its field of work a semantics of desire (340), Segundo finds that 
Ricoeur's analysis provides him with richer and broader tools of 
interpretation. always from the point of view of the "1 iberty-determinisms" 
dialectic, and especially because Ricoeur writes as a Christian philosopher 
(341). Following Freud's famous first topography, composed of 
"unconscious", "subconscious" and the "conscious", Segundo. who has already 
Identified the unconscious with the determinisms which operate against 
human liberty, goes beyond that, saying that "everything unconscious 1JL~e 
and of its very nature must be set up in opposition to man's liberty" 
(342). Ricoeur has reflected on this theme, from the perspective of the 
"ego", which is one of the three roles of the subject, together with the 
"id" and "superego", although they do not coincide with Freud's topographv. 
The ego, according to Ricoeur's re-reading of Freud. is permanently 
threatened by external dangers. but basically by dangers "from within", 
which are more difficult to combat (343). Freud spoke of the ego as a "poor 
creature", menaced by three masters: reality, the libido and conscience 
(340) ct. P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy. p. 375. 
(341) ct. J. L. Segundo, Grac.e and the HumaILCo_ndittQ.D, p. 36. 
(342) Ibid., p. 35. 
(343) ct. P. Ricoeur, 9P, cit .• p. 182. 
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(344). The situation of the ego is then related to what Ricoeur calls the 
"phenomena of unmastery", where the alternative of the ego is to dominate 
or to be dominated. At. this point Ricoeur, as Segundo says. goes beyond the 
dialectic "to be loved-to be hated". t.o start to speak about t.he "master-
slave" relationship. 
This is the starting point for a hermeneutics of suspicion, with a doubt 
about things, but also about consciousness, that now needs to be 
deciphered, or interpreted in a new exegesis of meaning. According to 
Ri coeur, we are now in the presence of a c..9$U.9_ bl~ss~ <wounded), whi ch can 
only understand its primordial truth, through the "avowal of the illusion, 
the fakery of immediate consciousness." (34.5). Segundo follows this 
argument, which he tries to relate to St. Paul's "law of bodily members" 
and "the inner man" dialectic, to conclude that the social structures that 
perpetuate humani ty' s al i enat i on are meant to pI ay an important rol e in the 
reappropriation of the real subject. once the narcissistic ego has been 
unmasked. The suspicion of t.he sUb.ject incorporates the function of 
symbolism, through the interpretation of signs belonging to the public or 
private spheres, or from the psychic or cultural realm; in them the "desire 
to be, and the effort to be which constitutes us. are expressed and made 
explicit." (346) 
(344) Cf. P. Ricoeur, op. cit.; also S. Freud, I~~~~ and t.h~Lq, chapter 
5. 
(345) P. Ricoe\lT, The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 243. 
(34.6) Ibid .• p. 266. 
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Segundo finds that what he has cal I ed "deterl\inisms", which confront the 
human vocation of liberty, are embodied in institutions, and in a social 
system which perpetuates them (3~7). The master-slave dialectic, is 
translated in terms of economic transactions, and relationships amongst 
social classes, which generate the appropriate supportive ideOlogy. They 
Justify the relationship of domination, which needs to be transformed in 
order to liberate humanity. 
3. 8.1.3 Superstructures and ideologies 
In his book Th~~iberation of Theology, Segundo takes these reflections, 
and connects the role of ideologies with theology and pastoral practice. 
The deciphering of signs Is translated into the task of interpretation of 
exegesis, where the cogito needs to be unmasked, through a hermeneutic 
suspicious of the "I" who interprets. In order to do that, Segundo studies 
the work of four writers, Harvey Cox, Marx, Max Weber and Jal\es Cone, and 
finds that only the last of those thinkers can carry the element of 
suspicion to its ultimate conclusion. Cone is the only one who is able to 
doubt the ideological constructions of superstructures (interpretation 
methods), especially in relation to theology. 
Segundo's ana.lysis of Cox, presents some similarity with Ricoeur' s early 
article Urbanization and Secularization (348). Ricoeur reads The Secular 
(347) Cf. J. L. Segundo, Grace and the Human Cond1tion, pp. 38-9. 
(348) P. Ricoeur, Political and Social Essays, pp. 176 ff. 
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City reflectIng on the tasks of theology of culture, and finds that the 
most important work to be done. is the construction of a new ecclesiology. 
The church is to be defined in relation to God's people, and the task of 
theology, according to the French philosopher, is bound to their project of 
liberation. Ricoeur's criticism of Cox's analYSis is similar t.o Segundo's 
on Cox's failure to identify the many problems of urban populations. 
Ricoeur calls this at.titude a "nafve enthusiasm concerning our modernity", 
which is basically, uncritical 01 teChnology. (349). 
As we have said before, Segundo's work is not related to interpretation in 
itself, but to one element <ideological suspicion). However, in other 
work.s. Segundo presents an incipient. study of int.erpretation, inc.luding 
some comment on Bul tmann' s demythologising pro.iect. with whom he has many 
more things in eommon than with Croatto. Before analysing these elements, 
we will study the most. important elel\ent in Segundo's circle of suspic.ion. 
whieh is his coneept of ideology. 
3.8.2 Segundo's anthropologieal thesis: 
The emancipatory conseiouaness theory and the role of historieal 
material ism. 
Ricoeur has considered the relation between the "master-slave" dialectic of 
the Freudian ego, together with Marx's concept of alienation: he has also 
(349) P. Ricoeur, QJh._ cit., p. 190. 
taken various elements from Nieztche's main notion of the weakness of man 
?:3 
Segundo has taken into account the works of Freud and. although briefly, 
some ideas from Nietzsche. in the first volume of EI Cristianismo Una 
-----------~~---
Utopia? Basically, Segundo stresses the Nietzschean idea of the stTengh 
needed to oppose the status quo, and to Challenge "a false moralitv" which 
is based in a lack of ideological suspicion (350). In his thesis, written 
under the supervision of Ricoeur, Segundo quotes the following words from 
Nietzsche: "You will be called destroyers of moral ity, but you will be 
finding yoursel ves" (351). The fear that threatened the ego in Freud, 
according to Ric.oeur, is challenged by Nietzsche's anti-narcissistic 
project; Segundo relat.es these elements in his dialectic liberty-
determinisms. affirming that suspicion is the absolute pre-condition for 
(self) understanding of human existence. 
Ricoeur has seen Marx as the third el ement of the trilogy of masters of 
suspiCion, and the t.heory of ideologies as an important part of the 
demystificat,lon process (352)' Ricoeur's analysis has used the early work 
of Marx, c.oncerned with the relation of labour and alienation. showing that 
the liberation of praxis, done by the understanding of necessity, also 
implies an att.ack on the "myst.ification of false consciousness" (353). 
(350) Cf. J. L. Segundo, Et __ ~ristJa!lJ~_moL..JTJHLlf:tQPJa?_, pp. 78-9. 
(351) J. L. Segundo. ibid.; also Karl Jaspers. N.ietzsch~,- __ Intr~duc~Jo!L_~_~_~ 
Phil oso_p]lie, p. 160. 
(352) Cf. P. Ricoeur, freud and.J>J).i~'~ltY, p. 35. 
(353) Ibid. 
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It seems that the young Marx elaborated a theory of emancipatory 
consciousness, from a dialectic perspective <'354-). Marx studied the 
mystified consciousness from the point of view of the elements which 
perpetuate the "continuum of domination" O. e. religious bel iefs, val ues, 
attitudes etc.) According to his theory, the mystified consciousness 
includes a "prac.tic.e of sub.Jectivity" (355), which Freire described in his 
Pedagogy of the~ressed, as a process of internalisation of the oppressor 
(356). This last element has been deeply influential in the whole 
development of liberation theology in Latin America. and its hermeneutical 
movement. An exampl e of that. is Croatto's anal ysis of the "murmuring of 
the Hebrews" against. Moses. who is their I iberator. due to the 
internalisation of the Egyptian oppressoTs in their behaviour. The role of 
a conscientization process is related to liberation from the inner 
oppression (357). 
Segundo has taken from Marx the notion of the development of emancipatory 
consciousness. from the context of historical materialism. According to 
this theory. the social struct.ures are c.onsidered to be the resul t of an 
economic system; the final moment of social transformation would then come 
through class struggle. in a historical process which would culminate in a 
communist utopia. The anthropological thesis of Segundo has taken into 
(354-) Ct. E. Sherover-Marcuse. EJI\8.ncipation and Consciousness, pp. 3-7. 
(355) Ibid., p. 5. 
(356) Cf. P. Freire. Peq~gQ~_~~I_~rim19o.. chapter 1. 
(357) Cf. J. S. Croatto. LJb~J __ J~~16n_-y ____ I..lberlad. p. 24-. 
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account this sense of progression. in relation to the liberation of the 
oppressed consciollsness. The "continuum of domination" is perpetuated by 
traditional education and Christian theologyi the hermeneutics of 
suspicion's role is, amongst other things, an anthropological model 
constructed upon the base of a consciousness produced by a determined 
economic system, which needs to be liberated through a dialogue between 
faith and ideOlogy. 
3.8.2.1 Faith and Ideology. 
The anthropological thesis of Segundo is described in detail in his book 
Jesus of Nazareth. This pro.ject has the characteristic. of being the first 
serious attempt in liberation theology to introduce anthropology as a 
theological locus. Segundo takes the risk of leaving aside the individual, 
the real object of Latin American theology, and introduces us to what he 
calls "a phenomenOlogical analysis of man, in order to describe the 
universal charac,teristics of his anthropological dimensions" (358). His 
method is therefore. descriptive, and preceded by a "bracketing off" (an 
epoch~) of Christian elements which could interfere with his intention of 
producing a phenomenological analysis. 
Segundo starts his study quest.ioning the relation between faith and 
ideOlogy, which he finds constitutive of two basic human dimensions: the 
dimension of the "Values" or "Ends" (valoT_ or fin), and the dimension of 
--------------
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"Efficacy" or "Means" (eficacia or medios). These aspects have different 
characteristics, but are complementary. Segundo's argument seems to be 
centred in these two dimensions which he sees present in human existence~ 
the human being moves continuously between faith <value) and ideOlogy (the 
"means" to obtain satisfaction). Through an analysis of Camus' Cal igula, 
Segundo has decided that the search for happiness (or "satisfaction") is 
the hum.an being's last existential goal; at this point, he differentiates 
his thought from the mai n theologians of 1 iberat ion who have found another 
final goal or objective for human existence. For instance, Guti~rrez 
considers t.hat the Christian responsibll ity towards the "non-person" is the 
ultimate objective of human existence. and Freire relates this goal to the 
context of humanity's vocation of "being more (human)". or ser mas. 
The model of ideology as a means to obtain happiness, comes from Marx's 
concept expressed in The .!ier:!p..~!)_ Ideol..Q.C.. that is the reI ation between 
cl ass interest and its expression in an ideal form <ideology) for 'Purposes 
of validation and universality (359). Here we find a process of 
legitimation or Justification, that Ricoeur incorporates in his idea of 
ideOlogy as a constitutive part of the hermeneutics of suspiCion. According 
to Rieoeur, ldeology has a "generative charac.ter" (360), a dynamism that is 
manifested through Justification of a project, but that also acts as a 
mediator between founding thoughts and their social appl ieation. From this 
perspect i ve, that Ricoeur has el aborated froll\ ~Tac(rJes Ell ul' s Le r~l.~_ 
(359) Cf. It Marx, The JierJJlan.ldeolQKY. p. 66. 
(360) Cf. P. Ricoeur, from .I~~t . tQ . .Act i.QJ1.. p. 250. 
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!\~diateur de I' id~ologie, anything can be considered ideological: reI igion. 
ethics etc. (361). The interesting thing is that Ricoeur considers that one 
of the main characteristics of ideology is a "non-reflective" (or non-
transparent) status, which seems to work as a condition "for the production 
of social messages" (362). According to Ricoeur, this is the reason why 
Ideology is, by its own nature, uncritical. and carries with it a certi:\in 
inertia which Is transmitted to the process. 
3.8.2.2 Positive and negative aspects of ideology 
There is a function of closure in ideology, due to its non-critical nature, 
but it also has the positive effect of being itself a re~resentation of a 
founding event., as for inst.ance. a memory of an act of I iberation. In this 
distinction from Ricoeur, we find the basis of the movement of emancipation 
of consciousness, or as Freire says, from "intransitive consciousness" to 
"transitive consclousness"(363). Liberation theology has incorporated these 
elements in its analysis of popular religiosity. The people's religiosity 
is somet.imes oppressive. but can also be liberat.ive; Christianity can be 
oppressive when it. is treated as a "closed" paradigm, which cannot be 
confronted with new challenges. However, a Christianity opened to receive 
criticism. becomes creative, and thus able to be a liberative force. An 
example of this is Enrique Dussel's thesis on modes of production and 
(361) Cf. J. Ellul, D~mythisation et Id~91~i~. pp. 335-5(. 
(362) P. Ricoetlr, From Text to Action, p. 251. 
(363) Ct. P. Freire, Pedag9g1Aci~J~QprJJ1\ldQ. cha~ter 1. 
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consciousness (364). 
The relationship between ideology and liberation in Ricoeur. is connected 
to the hermenetlt t cal funct ion of di stanc i at i on, as "a consc i Otlsness exposed 
to the eff icac.y of hi story" (365). The confrontat ion of the memory of a 
founding act (as in Exodus) is then contrasted with the history of the 
effects transmitted through people's experienc.es. in a critical way. 
These concepts related to the nature of ideology (as basically "uncritical" 
and authoritarian) and the positive aspects of criticism which need to be 
introduced in the foundational acts of a nation, are continuously present 
in liberation theology, from its hermeneutical proposal to its re-writing 
of Latin American history. It is due to the presence of the element of 
Ideological suspicion in these analyses, that it has been assumed to be 
part of the "hermeneutical circle" of Segundo. However, a careful study of 
Segundo's concepts of faith and ideology seeRlS to distance his thought from 
the current understanding of Ii berat i on theology on these issues. 
3.8.2.3 Ideology and neutrality of means. 
As we have seen, Segundo has an anthropological thesis which considers the 
role of interpretation in the process of co't\cientizaci6_R. which is based on 
the lI\aster-slave, or the oppressor-oppressed dialectic. The difficulties 
(364) Cf. E. Dussel, FiLQsoffa de:..-.iJL11beraci6n. chapter 1. 
(365) Ct. P. Ricoeur. Etom Text To Actio~. p. 269. 
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arise when we try to specifY further his concept of ideology, which seems 
to contradict some of his previous statements. ~e will summarise the 
somewhat arid arguments of Jesus of Nazareth, into points of discussion in 
order to clarify the real meaning of the phrase "ideological suspicion" 
from Segundo. 
t. Faith and ideology are anthropological categories: Segundo claims that 
fai th does not impl y "reI igion", ne i ther does "ideology" necessarll y mean 
"politIcs", These are broad categories relat.ed to the objective of human 
existence, which he calls "happiness" and the means to achieve it. Faith 
has the category of "goal of hl.lmanity" and ideology Impl ies any means used 
to achieve it. Segundo claims that, from this point of view, everybody has 
faith, but people disagree wit.h the ideologies used for the purpose. Both 
elements are complementary. 
2. Faith and Ideology as universal categories: Every human phenomenon then, 
can be classified either as faith or as ideology. Ideology is then defined 
as "all the means. nat.ural or artificial. used with the purpose of 
obtaining a certain goal" (366). Segundo does not explain how a natural 
phenomenon such as the digestion process (his own example) can be 
classified as a faith. 
3. Ideology as a neutral concept: Segundo considers that the common use of 
language gives a meaning of neutrality to the term "ideology". He does not 
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see a value Judgement in the use of this word. The point is that the use of 
the terms ideology/ideologist and ideological, have always had an 
ambivalence of meaning. Engels has considered ideology as an illusion. and 
as such related to false consciousness, while Marx seems to use the term in 
a more neutral way, notably in his Contribution to the Critique of 
pol itical Philoso~ (1859). Here Marx stresses the fact that ideological 
forms are expressions of the economic context (367)' Both conceptions of 
the term ideology, as an illusion and as a set of ideas related to certain 
economic conditions, have been extensively used in history. 
However, the common understanding of "ideology", is related to Napoleon's 
derisory, and judgemental use of the term. This is particularly true in 
Latin America during times of dictatorial regimes, which associated 
"ideology" with unlawful political activity (366)' In any way, Segundo is 
wrong to advocate the popular neutral meaning of ideology in Latin America, 
to the point that it would be very difficult for people to relate to an\' 
discourse of "faith and ldeo1ol!Y". Fear of political persecution could have 
been a deterrent. 
Segundo, having implied in his arguments that ideology guides action, needs 
then to aeknowledge the oh.fective elements which eonstitute an ideologv. 
The fact that Segundo attempts to exc.l ude ideology from the real m of 
values, adds c.onfusion to his analysis. The exclusion of values from 
ideology also creates the situation where liberation theology cannot 
(367) Cl. "Ideology", in R. Williams. Keyword~_, pp. 126-30. 
(368) During mil itary dlcatorships in the Rio de la Plata, the use of the' 
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make ethical decisions upon the means and ends of processes. Apart from 
that, Segundo has made clear that the hermeneutics of liberation theology 
needs to be biased in fa.vour of the poor (or to be "non-neutral") (369). 
The principle of "non neutrality" has been carried on extensively in Latin 
American theology and philosophy. especially by Freire. However. Segtmdo's 
concept of the neutrality of ideology seems to be the opposite of a "bias 
towards the poor" principle. 
In The LIberation of Theology, Segundo has said that ideology is "the 
system of means and ends" (370). But in ~l Hombre de Ho): ante Jesus de 
Nazareth, he only considers the "systems of means" in his definition. 
Therefore, it seems that Segundo has two definitions of ideolOgy: one, 
I ncl tldes the concept of "ul t i mate" goal s. and the other, onl y the way or 
the means to achieve such goals. At this moment. in order to clarify these 
two definitions, we will need to consider the differences established by 
Segundo between a "faith" and an "ideology". 
term "foreign ideologies" was commonl y assoc.lated with diverse issues, from 
communism and human rights to Freirean literacy campaigns. Concerning the 
use of the term ideology in the Roman Catholic Church, the Document of 
Puebla says the following: "The temptation of certain groups ... is to 
identify the Christian message with an Ideology." Cf. Juan Pablo II. 
Inaugural Discourse I, in Do~umento de Puebla, p. 559. 
(369) Cf. J. L. Segundo, "Capitalism Versus Socialism. Crux Theolo,gica". in 
R. Gibeilini <ed.) Frontiers.of __ Th~QlJ!n,_ln ,Latl11 Amert~_~. pp. 24-0-60. 
(370) J. L. Segundo, Th~, Llberatj9.!L of Theolon, p. 116. 
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3.8.2.4 The nature of the act of fal th and ideolog)'. 
Segundo wrote about ideOlogy as a "means" to obtain happiness. in a rather 
technical and I hnlted way. He established that at the root of any hUB'\an 
act, there Is something that he calls "a radical difference", which he 
illustrates in the example of the act of nail ing down (371). The nature of 
the objective of the carpenter. lies in what Segundo calls "an absolute 
freedom", where the "value" of the act. depends entirely on the person who 
decides to hit. the nail. But the means. or the methods s/he uses to do 
that, does not. depend on the carpent.er in him/herself. but in the 
availability of cert.aln tools. Here, according to SegundO. freedom is 
conditioned by circumstances. 
Us i ng Segundo's termi nol ogy "Ne can infer then that an ideology hnpl i es a 
"conditioned freedom", whil e faith is reI ated to an act of "absol ute 
freedom". The point is that the theology of liberation has worked upon t.hc 
basis of t.he lack. of freedom that people have in choosing their objective 
in life, owing to many conditions arising from their socio-economic 
circ.umstances. The differences t.hat Segundo tries to est.abl ish between 
faith and ideology seem very relative, and entirely dependent on the point 
of view of t.he person who decides if nail ing is an end in itsel f or a way 
to build a piece of furniture. 
AnOthf:'T difficulty we find, is related to Segundo's use of the word 
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"efficacy" as a synonym of ideology: it tends to implv that the more 
efficacious the means used. the better is the ideology. It does not always 
seem to be the case, and Latin American theology's criticism of 
developmental ism and the use of technology has put an argument against the 
lack of reflection on the methods used to help poor countries, which 
al though they can achieve their goa.l (for instance. to provide water to a 
village), do not consider the cultural implIcation of their actions. In our 
own example. the village can be provided with water but at t.he cost of 
changing basic cultural patterns. depending on t.he technology used. and 
damaging future possibilitIes of people's involvement in the resolution of 
their own problems. Apart from that. there is the fact that the t.erm 
"efficacious" somehow implies a value, and Segundo has already said that 
ideology does not have values. This is another example which shows that 
the division bet"'''een Ideology and faith. as explained by Segundo. is very 
relat.ive. 
3.8.2.5 Ideological suspicion. 
Our next step is to consider what Segundo really means by "ideologic(lj 
suspi cion". According to hi s anal ys i sin .. T esus of Nazareth. everybody has 
"failed" ideologic.ally speaking. including Jesus himself. in their own 
actions. The concept of faU ure used here is reI ated to the fact that 
nobody has ben a.ble to fulfil the criteria of the two dimensions of faith 
(goal/value) and ideology (means/methodology to reach the goal). 
Segundo's main ob,Ject of suspicion is the Roman Catholic social doctrine; 
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he considers it as "inefficacious" (372). The accusation lies in what the 
Uruguayan theologian eall s the desire to "create a model of what ought to 
be", wit.hout making an adequate proposal concerning the methodology to use 
for t.hat. purpose. In this case, the Roman Cathol ic ChuTc.h is encouraging a 
faith (as an "end") which cannot. be achieved, due to the presence of an 
obsolete methodology; Segundo does not hesita.te to c.a.ll Sl1ch a faith "a 
dead faith". since it is a model of "a faith without ideology". or means to 
realise it (373), 
Segundo's preoccupation with the right methodology (as "ideology") is the 
core of his hermeneutical circle. As we can see now, it is related to a 
specific criticism of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church in Latin 
America, which is inefficacious, and requires the use of Marxian analysis. 
Historical Mat.erialism is the right ideology, according to Segundo, upon 
which the circle of suspicion can be built. For this purpose, he quotes 
Marx from the Communist Manifesto, saying that "The dominating ideas of {.'tny 
period of hist.ory, have always been the ideas of t.he ruling class" (374), 
Thus the hermeneut ical eategory of ideological suspicion in Segundo, 
at though el aborated from Ricoenr's theory, does not follow the broad 
spectrum of questioning that. we find in the French philosopher. Mainl y it 
lacks the analysis of the non-critic.al nature of ideology, and its 
generative c.ha.racter in the field of actions. 
(372) Cf. J. L. Segundo. op. cit .. p. 158. 
(373) Ibid., pp. 156-8. 
(374) J. L. Segundo, The Liberation of Theology, p~. 20-t. 
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The elaboration upon Ricoeurian thought is then partial and even 
contradictory; however, the category of ideological suspicion has proved to 
be a rich component in the dynamic of hermeneutic.s of liberation in other 
authors, who claim to have taken this element from Segundo. The only 
explanation for this. is perhaps related to the fact that Segundo's readers 
have been developing the hermeneutics of suspicion from Ricoeur (or 
informed by him), and thus superseding the Uruguayan theologian's 
definition. However, in another part of his work. Segundo produces a more 
creative way of using ideological suspicion than in the specific 
discussions on faith and ideology in Jesus of Nazareth; an example of this 
can be seen in hi s Theology for Art i sans of a New Human:l.1y.. as we will 
demonstrate in our outline of Segundo's methodological proposal. 
The real value of Segundo's hermeneutics of suspicion in any case, is that. 
it was the first introduction of the Ricoeurian concept of suspicion in the 
methodology of liberation theology ~er se, which led to a rich variety of 
thought concerning dominat.ing ideas in class divisions, culture. and the 
role of the church and the primitive religions of the Amerindians by other 
theologians. The difficulties arise when we try to understand the frame of 
conceptions of Segundo, which are complex. diverse and even contradictory. 
3.8.3. An outline of the methodological proposal of Segundo. 
Apart from t.he circle of Sllspicion. Segundo presents us with an ot1tline of 
a circle of int.erpretation. which includes a demythologization process. We 
will base t.he present analysis on the five volumes of his TheoloD' for 
Artisans of a New HUlnan~. in order to consider elements such as c.;egundo's 
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use of history, the locus of interpretation. his concept of myth and 
language, and finally his points in common with Bultmannian hermeneutics. 
3.8.3.1 The inner suspicion In the methodological circle. 
Two elements call our attention in Segundo's suspicion about the 
traditional circle of theological interpretation. Both elements seem 
closely associated with the discussion of the narcissistic ego by Ricoeur, 
from an individualistic and social perspective. The idea of being 
suspicious of our Cartesian cog-ito, comes to Segundo in relation to our 
concept of God. 
The falsification (or "idolization") of the eoncept of God in our western 
society is, according to Segundo, an exist.ential act of protection of our 
egotism. Our conce-pt of God is intimately related to our existential 
experience in such a way. that what we can call the intransitive 
consciousness ot the oppressed results in a perverted idea of God. From 
another perspective. both the falsifications of God and society's 
definitions. are the product of the illusion of the western narcissistic 
ego, which has determined a certain socio-economic order. In this way. 
Segundo relates the criticism of the cog-it.o with social action. in the 
theological framework of the concept of God. (375) 
(375) Cf. J. L. Segundo, Our Idea of God, pp. 6 ff. 
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As a consequence of this the traditional theological locus is also 
challenged. Segundo sees the western milieu of Christianity as the origin 
of a type of historical consc.iousness which ident i fies certai n hi storical 
acts with a determinate meaning. The self-criticism of the western ego 
should be the process of separating both elements, and recognising what 
Segundo calls "the subtle and inhumane" character of the structures of 
domination which has permeated the constructed meaning of history (376). 
The suspicion regarding the theological locus of our discourse, highl ights 
the periphery of Latin America as an exploited continent. or space of 
"otherness", as Dussel refers to it (377), A theol ogi cal method from thi s 
periphery of the traditionally recognised western centre of established 
knowledge, is the challenge of Segundo's suspicion on the Cartesian cogito. 
3.8.3.2 History and interpretation. 
Segundo env i sa.ges hi story as a process which begi ns with God' 5 creat ion, 
and is prolonged by humanity's own acts. The main constitutive element of 
history is the c.ont:lnuity of "God-in-us" (378). The reI ation of 
collaboration between God and the human community is so close, that Segundo 
------------
(376) Ct. J. L. Segundo. Ope cit., pp. 35 ff. 
(377) Cf. E. Dussel, Filosofia de Liberaci6n, chapter t. 
(378) Ct. J. L. Segundo, ~~ cit., p. 39. 
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speaks in terms of U(;od who is a society" (379), This categorv seems to be 
crucial for the development of a hermeneutics of solidarity, as we will see 
with further detail in the next chapter. 
Traditionally, the history of salvation has been reduced to a 
"privatisation" or an individualistic understanding, in the same way that 
history in general, and particularly in Latin America, has become a mere 
list of events disconnected from the reality of the oppressed nations. 
Segundo proposes here to reappropriate the act of interpretation of 
historical events, as the first political act of liberation; the 
traditional events of Latin America's "Fathers of the Nation", also need to 
be re-interpreted, for instance, in terms of the idolisation of military 
cultures. 
Segundo claims that God convokes his people to a process of on going 
interpretation. as part of a project of "divine education" (380), This Is a 
concept that has recently been elaborated in liberation theology as 
constitutive of a Biblical pedagogy of the oppressed (381). According to 
this Freirean perspective. God wants his people to be active subjects of 
their own history, in their role as creators and not slaves of history 
(379) Cf. J. L. Segundo, op. cit., p. 39 
(380) Ibid., pp. 40-l. 
(381) Cf. L. E. Wanderley, "Comunidades eelesiais de base e edt1ca~ao 
popular". in R.~~!. __ EG1J:t~. Bras. (Dec. 198P. 4-1. pp. 686-707. Also cr. L. A. 
G611ez de Souza, CIJ1s~~~~_n().p-l!l.!ires e I gru a nos caml nos Q.~_1l.1 stQr.ll. Part 3. 
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(once again. we have here the two confronting dialectics of ('onsciolJsness, 
the narve or intransitive vs. the transitive or critical). Segundo 
considers that. a certain insecurity, or crisis of interpretation is 
unavoidable here, due to the nature of a collective creative process of 
interpretation as such, but the "presence of Christ in his church should act 
as a guarantee against an unfruitful relativism. 
Instead of relativism, Segundo sees what he calls a "coefficient of 
relativity". which he associates with Christian maturity. However, he does 
" 
not develop thi s cone.ept enough for us to understand its meaning. He seeftL'5 
to be alluding to the liturgical role of the "signs" of salvation in the 
Ilass (382)' He even suggests we should not qtlestion the validity of the 
rite, but reinterpret it. The point is that inasmuch as the rite of the 
Ilass is an interpretation of history, it should have the same "textual" 
category as the Bible, a social doctrine of the church or the ritual of 
celebration of the "Fathers of the Nation" in Latin America. It seems that 
Segundo's suspicion about history has its I im.itations, which contradict the 
work. of a "divine pedagogy of the oppressed", as he tries to k.eep a balance 
between the church's aut.hority and people's quest.ioning of t.he structures 
of power. 
3.8.3.3 Demythol ogi sat Ion. 
Segundo defines this term in relation to the "coefficient of relativity" in 
(382) Ct. J. L. Segundo, op. cit., p. 55. 
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interpretation. He agrees with Bultmann on the potnt concerning the 
existential meaning of the message of Christ, and the necessity for an 
interpretation beyond the limits of biblic.al literalism. Demythologistng 
is, according to Segundo, an attempt to avoid a ftxed, closed 
interpretation of the Scriptures, but not a denial of the history of 
biblical narrative in itself. 
It is important to notice here that Segundo uses the term "myth" as 
Hultmann does (as a pre-scient.tfic understanding of the world>, and not as 
Ricoeur (myth as a language in itself). To demythologize is for Segundo, 
the search for what is left in the Bible related to God's revelation beyond 
its popular legends and sagas. Int.erpretation needs to rule the narrative, 
because God's revelation is JM.de of historical act.s that we interpret. In 
this point, Segundo agrees with Bult~ann's criticism of literalist 
interpretation, and also, with the German theologian, he believes that 
demythologising will lead us to a new self-understanding of human 
existence. 
However, Segundo criticises Bultmann on various points, basically in his 
concept of "modern man" and in the language of transcendence. The criticism 
of the "modern man" paradigm. is based on the discussion about the ego who 
interprets. and he refers us again to the Ricoeurian doubting of the 
Cartesian cogito: The suspicion about the category of "modern man". seems 
at odds with Segundo's traditional conception of myth, underlined by 
an anthropological universe divided in primitive-scientific humanity. 
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The point is that when Segundo criticises the concept of "modern man" in 
Bultmann, he refers to the "western milieu" which has produced it. without 
considering. as Ricoeur does. that the basic dialectics of "modernity 
versus primitivism" also need some revision (383). 
The second aspect, concerned with the representation of the transcendental. 
seems to put Segundo in the preamble of a discussion on the concepts of 
myth as language, but the Uruguayan turns hi s argument around the theme of 
"attitudes", instead of language. Segundo critices Bultmann for not 
providing an alternative model to represent the transcendental language of 
the Bibl e; he then bec.omes suspicious, as we have seen, of this att itude 
which seems reI ated to the c,oncept of "modern man." Segundo accuses the 
paradigm of modernism of depriving revelation of its meaning. and replacing 
the traditional language of transcendence with elements of the 
industrialized, capitalist world (384-), This produces an enormous contrast 
with Latin America, which is trying to rediscover the "God who is a 
soc j ety" from t he per i phery of an oppressed cont I nent. 
Following thi s argument, Segundo says that when Bul tmann uses the term 
"God", in reality he Is refering to what he "desires his existence to be" 
(385). In consequence, "God" is the "idol" of the modern person. generated 
(383) For details on this discussion. ct. Chapter two, 2.8.2. 
(384) ct. J. L. Segundo. Our Idea_ of _G04, p. 49. 
(385) Ibid. Al so cf. P. Van BUTen. Th~L~~cul.~r Jle~llt1!&'-.Qf tlte. Go!!p_~l, from 
which Segundo takes the original idea. 
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by a particular life-style which has created structures of oppression. It 
is this conteKt that Segundo claims that Latin America is concerned with 
the death of Idols, but not of God. 
3.8.3.4 Language and Interpretation. 
Apart from the comments he makes on Bultmann, Segundo mentions Bishop 
Robinson's book Honest to God, from the perspective of the use of language. 
The following elements will give us a clear Idea of Segundo's position of 
the use of biblical language about God. 
a) The facts of the Bible are not important in themselves, but the 
interpretation of the events represented in it is crucial. Quoting John 
Macquarrie, Segundo finds that Bishop Robinson conunitted the mistake of not 
understanding the symbolic language of the New Testament, which seems to be 
full of analogies. 
b) As a consequence of that, the risk is to produce a reductionist model of 
biblical language, where the Christian message will suffer from a narrow 
approach to interpretation. Somehow, this model of interpretation seems to 
be connected with fundamentalism, which at first glance seems its opposite. 
because both styles deny the role of interpretation; in one case, by a 
literalist approach and in the other, by a positivist attitude. 
c) Human cODlllunication requires that historical events need to be fashioned 
in a symbolic language. The language of faith needs the "I-Thou" relation 
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experienced in human communication, or it hecomes impersonal and loses 
meaning. 
In synthesis, Segundo opposes the paradigm of modern man in hermeneutics, 
as a product of an Anglo-saxon culture (386). This is his main criticism 
concerning Bultmann's project. of demythologising, and from that he objects 
to the negat.ive attitude of modern man towards the language of 
transcendence. We do not find in his work a reflection upon language as for 
instance in Croatt.o, and it seems that. al though he has used some forms of 
literary criticism, Segundo follows what we have called the "half circle" 
of interpretation of Bultmann (387), Once again, as Ricoeur could say, the 
hermeneutical circle has come to the final moment of praxis and 
appropriation, without a propel' explanation of the text from the linguistic 
point of view. 
However, there are some el ements of strue.tural anal ysis in Segundo's 
approach to the New Testament, which we would like to comment on. For 
instance, the use of a visual code -the verb 'to see'- in the gospel of 
lohn (388), and the study of Jesus in relation to God the Father, also in 
the gospel of John (389). In this example, Segundo organises the story of 
the New Testament in terms of "functions", such as creation. election. 
(386) Cf. J. L. Segundo, Our Idea of God, p. 124. 
(387) Ct. Chapter two, 2.8.3. 
(338) Ct. J. L. Segundo. op. cit., p. 109. 
(389) Ibid., p. 60. 
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protective guardianship and love, and "operations" (between sUb.ject and 
object; in this case, represented by the Son and the Father>. These 
operations are manifested through relations of conjunction (between Father-
Son) and disjunction (between Son-Holy Spirit>. Segundo also considers the 
onomastic codes of the story from tTohn. sllch as the titles of Father. Son 
and Spirit, but concludes that the identity of the story's characters 
relates to their transformation of what we will call the narrative 
programme, and not to the apparent differentiation of names (for instance. 
the Father and Son are one, but the Son is different from the Spirit>. 
Apart from this and other examples of a sporadic use of structuralist 
elements of analysis, Segundo has not developed a reflection upon 
linguistic criticism in relation to the hermeneutical circle he wanted to 
build. His main concern is the use of ideological suspicion; and 
specifically from the base of historical materialism. This is the reason 
why we find Segundo's hermeneutics closer to Bultmann than to Croatto. from 
the point of view of the construction of the circle of interpretation in 
itself, although obviously, from the perspective of his pre-understanding 
of the text and reality, he seems part of the Latin American movement and 
not of the Bllitmannian demythologisation process. Therefore, the work of 
Segundo should be called "the circle of suspicion" since he tries to apply 
his ideological suspicion to reality, to textual interpretation and to a 
certain extent, to the interpreter himlhersel f. However, as we will see in 
the next chapter, his ontological proposal suffers owing to what Ricoel1r 
calls the short way of his hermeneutical circle. which has not t~ken into 
full account the extension of the suspicion procedures into the broad realm 




3.9 The Dialectics of Interpretation: Anarchic Reading and the Authority 
of Tradlt ions. 
"What does it means to take up pen and paper in the midst of persons who 
can't write?" 
C. Boff (390) 
3.9.0 Interpretation and illiteracy: The challenges. 
The question that Boff asks himself in his Brazilian Journey. is perhaps 
the most important question that biblical interpretation can ask today in 
Latin America. The challenge of a Christian continent, composed of a 
significant number of people who are illiterate in the broadest sense of 
the word. by their inabil ity to read and write, and by their lack of 
understanding of their particular circumstances, gives another meaning to 
the hermeneutical circle. To interpret seems, somehow, more vital and 
related to the existence of the Latin American people than anything else. 
(390) C. Boff. Ee~t~O~-The-Grou~g-Theology. A Brazilian Journey. p. 63. 
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Freire spoke about illiteracy in terms of dependence: this dependen:e upon 
the ones who read and therefore "interpret", has always been present in the 
life of the church in Latin America; in this process, people have tended to 
be passive recipients of meanings elaborated by others, but not 
participants. The Basic Ecclesial Commonities (eEBs) have challenged this 
relation, trying to enable people to read for themselves "the signs of the 
times", but they have also created a tension in the balance of power 
between theologians and the laity. The elements of solidarity amongst the 
interpreters of the text, as stressed by the hermeneutical circle of 
Ricoeur, Croatto and Segundo, can onl y be pract ic.ed through a process of 
empowerment, in the difficult dialogue between "new readings" of the Bible, 
and the authority of church traditions. 
Croatto has answered this problematic from the point of view of the 
meaningful event, and the "history of the effects"j the people who cannot 
write a text, nevertheless write the "historical text" of an organised 
community. People relate to meaningful acts resc.tted by the Scriptures, and 
repeated by liturgies and dramatic re-creations; the hermeneutical clue of 
the sintonia ("tuning in" of the Scriptures with their real ity>, has put 
together a hermeneutic circle of suspicion and hope, and a practice of 
social commitment. 
Segundo has elaborated a circle of suspicion, which suggests a 
conscientlzation process amongst the poor, including adult education wort.. 
His proposal reminds tlS of a "YHWH. Pedagogue of the Oppressed" model of 
Interpretation. Both in Croatto and in Segundo the community participates 
in the hermenetltical process with the guidance of an "animator" or leader 
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who gives them a "clue of interpretation": the event of liberation, or the 
art of suspicion. 
The quest I on that we are go I ng to ask in this I ast part of the present 
chapter is how does Boff reply, hermeneutically speaking, to this concern 
about a circ] e of interpretation amongst the illiterate. For this purpose, 
we will work with two of his bOOKS, Theology and Praxis, which Is deeply 
engaged in a dialogue about empowerment of the community and Its limits, 
and Feet-On-The-Ground-Theology, where examples from his work with CEBs can 
enlighten some points 01 his hermeneutical circle. 
Theology and Praxis is a doctoral thesis presented by Boff at the Catholic 
University of Louvaln, Belgium, in 1976. In this book he elaborates a 
hermeneutical model that he calls the "Correspondence of Relationships", 
which is presented as a healthy alternative to the other models used in 
Latin America, where simpl istlc. comparisons of the Gospel and modern 
politics are reproduced without further analysis. 
Boff has been informed by Rlcoeur's hermeneutical circle, from which his 
own model seems to c.ome. But Boff's hermeneut Ics, al though Inspired by 
Rlcoeur's theory, departs from It to the point of becoming contradictory at 
some moments of the Interpretation. The tension between a creative 
community reading and the authority of the church to determine the meaning 
of such a reading. forces Boff to take some options outside the 
phenomenological circle of Interpretation. We will analyse Boff's general 
ideas about the task of interpretation. and the work of his hermeneutical 
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circle, both in the noments of coincidence with Ricoeur. and also in its 
opposition to the French philosopher's theory. 
3.9.0.1 The Via longa (long way) of theology. 
Boff starts his analysis by considering the necessity of taking the long 
way suggested by Ricoeur, for a better understanding of the theol ogl cal 
discourse. He distinguishes between two different kinds of language: the 
religious and the theological. According to Boff, the differences between 
these can be established by the degree of scientific methodology that each 
of them requires. For instance, the religious disc.ourse works with what 
Boff c.alls "raw material", or supernatural factors. to which all kind of 
approaches are 1 egitimate; but theology instead, needs to use more 
scientific c,ategories, in order to describe properly the ob.1ect of its 
discourse (391). 
The conflict between theol ogi c,al and reli giotls di scourse lies then in the 
use of either a sc.ientific or a "mythical" paradigm. To produc.e a 
sc i ent i f i c theological understanding. Boff adv i ses the use of the v i~_l onga 
of interpretation, which includes the linguistic science proposed by 
Ricoeur in The Conflict of Interpretations. This approach contrasts with 
the short way of interpretation, which happens when semantics are ignored; 
there is a lack of self-reflection in this short way, and it also produces 
----------
(391) Cf. C. Boff. rheology and Praxis, p. 52. 
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epistemological limitations (392). 
Boff remarks on the necessity of the long way in theology for two reasons: 
first of all, to avoid this lack of reflection and self-criticism typical 
of what he calls "theologisms", and second, to incorporate the valuable 
elements coming from the criticism of religion made by the "Three masters 
of suspicion" proposed by Ricoeur: Marx, Freud and Nietzsche. 
The hermeneutical work of the long way of interpretation. consists in a new 
re-~eading of the text. which rejects a scientific. positivism. According to 
Boff, this is the first step to locating the theological discourse at a 
different level of being, which could result in new possibilities of praxis 
of liberation. AI though Boff affirms the necessity of a scientific frame of 
work, he is at the same time suspicious of the lack of questioning of the 
paradigm. The object of the long way of hermeneutics then. needs to 
incorporate a dialogue bet~en faith and ideology, and in this sense Boff 
quotes Peter Berger's work The Sacred Canopy. In this book, Berger anal yses 
sociologically the role of religion as "a human product", with a certain 
social purpose. The hermeneutics of suspicion of Boff seems to accept this 
fact, in order to produce a more "pertinent" theological discourse (393), 
(392) Cf. P. Ricoeur. The Confl lct of __ lntel'pxet~t ions. pp. 10-1. 
(393) Cf. C. Boff. Theoloc and Praxi s, p. 133. 
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3.9.0.2 Theological pertinency 
Boff's concept of pert.inency is related t.o hermeneutics, in t.he sense that 
it is only by a st.udy of interpretatIon theory related to the political, 
that his theological project can then be defined. The "pertinent" seems to 
be the "adequate" or the part.icular element of a discourse located in a 
specific cont.ext; for instance, t.he "lived experience" (v~cu) is a 
pertinent element for a theology of the political which wants to include 
this critical dimension in the facts provided by a scientific analysis. 
This is also the phenomenological task that Ricoeur has set himsel f, as 
part of his project of reconciling a reflective philosophy with an ontology 
based on human experience (39~). The reunion of the two analyses, the 
phenomenological and the hermeneutical is the core of Ricoeur's "diagnosis" 
of experience, which Boff has interest in developing in his own 
interdiSCiplinary approach for a project of a theology of the political. 
This sharing of resources and orientations from the different social 
sciences, is articulated with theology for a bett.er understanding of its 
context, in what Boff calls "a criteriology." (395) 
Ricoeur has defined the pert.inency of a discipline in relation to its 
(394) Ct. C. Boff, op. cit., pp. 68 ff. 
(395) Cf. Don Ihde, Hermeneutic PhenomenolQiY, Preface, p. XV. 
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formal object, as a "language project" which is characteristic of the kind 
of material we want to describe. Ricoeur has based his main reflections 
upon "the documents of life" and has used corrective criticism (or the 
hermeneutics of suspicion) in order to unveil the misunderstandings 
produced by a false consciousness (396). Drawing from these concepts. Boff 
considers that if the material object of the study of a theology of the 
political is "the political in itself", a mediation of social sciences is 
required to produce a necessary criticism. However. the theological 
pe,rtinency of such studies '017111 come. according to Boff. only by not 
turning the t,heological discourse into a mere socio-economic study. From 
this perspective, Boff criticises the hermeneutics of Belo and Clevenot, 
whose analyses of the modes of production in the Bible have excluded 
theological categories, such as faith, grace, etc. (397). 
This theological pertinency is dialectically related to the reference of 
the discourse, and Boff considers here the practice of an epoch~ or 
bracketing off, in order to be able to study the object undistracted from 
el ements that are not reI evant to the task of a theology of the pol it ical . 
This suspension of non-pertinent aspects of argumentation, is done using a 
critique of religion, such as the one presented by the already mentioned 
"three masters". As a result of this process, Boff hopes to open up the 
phenomena of "methodological closure" produced through history. This 
(396) Cf. P. Ricoeur, The COlttLict_.of In'terpT_e_t~Jl9.Il.~. p. 18. 
(397) Cf. M. CI ~venot. Mater 1 altst approaches to the Bib} e. AI so F. Be 10. ~ 
Material ist .T~adi!l.8 .. Qf_.!_b:~_r!9s.p_~L,_of Mark. 
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closure has happened because "non-pertinent". or improper elements of the 
religious discourse had been incorporated into the theological s~here which 
is, according to Boff, more systematic and critical by nature (398). 
Boff's analysis is intended to put the lived experience (vecu) onto the 
same level as scientific discourse. For that purpose, he follows Ricoeur's 
dialogue between phenomenology and scientific knowledge, emphasising the 
fact that the theological discourse is not. superior to the religious one 
(as v~cu), and more to the point, the experience of t.he religious phenomena 
is necessary t.o do an "epist.emological recast.ing" of the theological 
practices. Theology and praxis will be the st.arting point. of a new 
I\ethodology, where the element. of suspicion will be mediated through 
di stanc i at ion. 
The method that theology uses works by hel ping the theory to take distance 
from the object of its st.udy. and by pract.icing what Boff calls 
"theologIcal vigilance". or self-awareness of the specific project of 
theology. As we have al ready sai d~ t.hi s el ement const. i tutes the pert i nency 
of the hermeneutical discourse; here suspicion is a mediating cat.egory to 
use against t.he absolutism of scientific posit.ivism. Boff's project is to 
find a hermeneutic adequate to a theology of the political. which could 
include the categories of Otherness and Mvstery~ so often excluded by 
"epistemological totalitarianism." (399), We will consider now how Boff 
(398) Cf. C. Boff. l'h~_9~ 9$.)'_ an.~Lf_ra~l~, p. 69. 
(399) Ibid., p. 54. 
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develops th1s project. 
3.9.0.3 Biblical Hermeneutics. 
Boff defines hermeneutics aecording to Ricoeur's distinctions about the 
term, as a technl qt.le (techne hermeneut I k.~), as a medi at i on of language 
(hermeneia) and as interpretation (auslegung) (400), From the definition of 
hermeneutics as ausleguAr, Boff considers hermeneutics as synonymous with 
theology. or that. theology is a hermeneutical science in itself. This 
science of 1nterpretation is to be considered with reference to two main 
contexts, Christ.ian positivity and the Sc.ript.ures (401 >. 
Chr istian posit i v i ty is what Boff call s "the ob,J eet i ve aspect of f a1 t h" . 
for instance dogmatics and history. which work as pre-understanding for 
theological development (or "the given" to analysis>. This positivity, 
according to Boff, is based on the Scriptures. which are the foundation of 
the Christian faith. and have a privileged position in relation to other 
canonic texts. Although Boff refers to the Scriptures as an "artleulated 
whole", he establishes a hierarchy of texts, starting with the New 
Testament's preferential function over the Old, and the authority of the 
Gospels over the other New Testament writings. Here we find two interesting 
elements which we will analyse in more detail later: first, the tension 
---------
(400) Cf. Chapter one, 1. 2.1. 
(401) Ct. C. Boff', op. cit., 1'1'.132-3. 
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in Boff between a desire for epistemological "openess". and a recurrent 
reference to hierarchies (402), Second. the so called primacy of the New 
Testament over the Old, when liberation theology has done, precisely, the 
opposite. We will return to these points in our next chapter's final 
discussion. 
Boff speaks about the role of distanciation in hermeneutics. and the 
necessity to "decode" the present text. in order to "re-appropriate the 
original sense of the written message" (403)' This put.s Boff in a 
Dil theyian posit ion. which has been criticised by Ricoeur as "romantic 
psychologism" (4-04-), and gives us anot.her clue to what. we will call "the 
axis of closure/openess" of Boff's hermeneutical proposal. In another part 
of his discussion, Boff considers Dilthey's position in relation to 
Ricoeur's hermeneutical arc: explanation and understanding, or 
comprehension and explication. Dilthey had split them into different 
provinces, one belonging to "sciences of the human being", and the other to 
"sciences of nature". Ricoeur has made clear that both moments are related 
to eac.h other: understanding is a non-methodological moment which in 
hermeneut.ics is combined with the methodological moment of explanation 
(4-05). Understanding precedes explanation. and explanation develops the 
(4-02) "Hierarchy" is Boff own's term; very suggestive from a perspective of 
Interpretation; cf. C. Boff, Theology and Praxis, p. 132. 
(4-03) Ibid., p. 133. 
(4-04-) Cf. Chapter one, 1.4.1. 
(4-05) Ct. P. Ricoel1r, "Explanat.ion and Understanding", in frollLTexJ t9.. 
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understanding; any dichotomisation here Is considered dangerous. Boft 
a.grees with Ricoeur on t.his position, and calls Dilthey's episteJllOlogy 
obsolete or pass~ (406). 
3.9.1 Distanciation 
Close to the hermeneutical arch of Ricoeur, lies the concept of 
dista.nciation in its relation to praxis. It seems that at the core of the 
process of self-understanding, through appropriation and a critique of the 
illusions of the subject. there is a dialectic of explanation and 
understanding, which implies distance. Appropriation, says Ricoeur is 
contemporaneous, but invol ves a proe.ess of distaneiation from the text as 
writing, from the author, and from the oral discourse. This whole process 
of distanciation also implies that the "original project" of the author is 
no longer ae.e.esslble to us. Thus Bolf has taken into consideration the 
hermeneutical arc from RIcoeur's theory, but not its consequences, since he 
claims that the hermeneutical task is related to the original intention of 
the author. 
Boff also criticises Gad amer, adducing that there is a sort of anarchy (or 
permission for different readings in a text) in his interpretation theory, 
and a position ot "universality" in his conception. HO~"ever, there is al"3o 
a claim of universality in the Romantic task of hermeneutics, whieh, no 
Action, p. 142. 
(406) Cf. C. Boff. Q.P...!-~1.!., p. 134. 
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doubt, avoids any -plural reading of a text. Boff has taken the first 
element, and it seems that the second, related to the closure of the text 
or its opposite "anarchic reading" is at the moment an unresolved or 
unacknowledged question. 
3.9.1. 1 Hermeneutic mediation. 
There are two concepts here that we \rould like to highlight: 1) the 
function of distanciation as a mediation and 2) mediation as diagnosis. 
t) Distanciation as mediation. 
Hermeneutics as a techn6 is a mediation in itself, which is produced 
between t.he t.ext and the reader. It also implies the distance between them 
from the point of view of the closure of meaning in time, and the changes 
from the oral discourse t.o the writt.en text. Boff sees this dialectic in 
terms of the relationship between the theology of the political and the 
Scriptures as a privileged text of interpretation. The hermeneutical 
I\ediation, in the light of Christianity, is defined by Boff here in its 
relation with the Bible. Mediat.ion implies distanciation as a challenge for 
understanding, and also as a methodology of interpretation. 
2) Mediation as Diagnosis. 
Boft considers other kinds of "mediations", apart from the hermeneutical 
one, which are necessary for his theological proposition. such as the 
Socio-analytic mediation. Basic.ally he argues for an interdtsrlplin(\ry 
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approach (criteriology>, in a convergenc.e of philosophy, ethics, historY, 
sociology and linguistic.s, with which theology can share a common task. 
Thus Boff says that .. theology is a regional discourse", and needs the 
theoretical elaborations from other sciences in its disc.ourse (407). 
Ricoeur's concept of diagnosis is also a project of methodological 
convergence; to understand implies to recognise the category of .ysterv. or 
limits in our methodological approach, and in order to overcome this. 
Ricoeur proposes the notion of diagnostic or diagnosed reality. 
This diagnostic consists in supplementing phenomenology with other exterior 
testimonies such as psychoanalysis, which can help us to understand a 
phenomenon, whenever the former is not able to ful f:ll its task due to the 
limitation of its methodological nature (408). Boff also sees a logic of 
mediations: the socio-analytic testimony, which works with the political. 
and the hermeneutical one, which is theological. Both are articulated in 
his "theology of the political." 
3.9.2 The hermeneutical task 
3.9.2. t The text. 
Boff defines the task of interpretation according to Ricoeur, as a 
deciphering or "dis-imp! ication" of the symbol ic structure of meaning. 
(407) Cf. C. Boff, Theology and Praxis. p. 61. 
(408) Ct. P. Rlcoeur. Freedom and Nature: The VolunJarL~!!<l the 
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This concept is important from a theological perspective. since words 
decl are the I anguage of the sacred through t.he doubl e meaning of symbol s 
(4-09). Ricoeur, as we have already seen. defines "t.ext" in a wider sense; 
texts are written discourses but. also dreams. architechtural designs. 
cultures etc. Boff instead has opted for a definition of the text as the 
written text only, and he says that t.his is his position in the "ongoing 
war of hermeneutics", as described by RicoeuT (410). 
Boff's position can be synthesised in Ricoeur's own words: "Interpretation 
understood as restoration of meaning." (4.11), The ot.her posit ions ment ioned 
by Ricoeur in his analysis of the conflict of int.erpretation are reflection 
(as a challenge t.o the Cartesian Ego) and interpretation understood as a 
reduction of illusion. Boff has clearly taken a romantic position with 
regard to the restoration of Scriptural meaning. as the task and ob.1ect of 
a theological hermeneutic. 
3.9.2.2 The hermeneutical circle 
Boff att.rihutes the description of his hermeneutic circle of interpret.ation 
t.o Ricoeur, as the Frenc.h philosopher elaborated his theory from Heidegger. 
--,---
Involuntary, pp. 373-409. 
(409) Cf. C. Boff, op. cit., p. 134i also cf. P. Ricoeur, Freud and 
Philosophy, chapter 1. 
(410) Cf. C. Boff, Q.P_. cit. .. , p. 133. 
(4-11) Cf. P. Ricoeur. QR. ci t., chapt er 2. 
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Boff claims that the hermeneutic circle is constituted by dialectic 
relationships. governed by particular rules of production of meaning. This 
description refers to the practice of hermeneutics described by 
Schleiermacher as a "part-whole-]>art movement", or a constant process of 
back and forth dialectics, where the beginning of the circle is related to 
its end (4-12), As Rieoeur has said, this circularity in the Romanticist 
thinkers happened in relation to the understanding of the text and t.he 
understanding of themselves as interpreters, according to their pre-
comprehension of the world (4-13). 
Ricoeur has reformulated the hermeneut.ic circle el iminating two elements of 
the Romanticist hermeneutics which are the sub.1eet.ive relation between the 
intersubJectivity of the author and that of the reader. and the proJection 
of the subjectivity of the interpreter into the reading of the text (4-14), 
The hermeneutic circle of Ricoeur is, as we have already seen in chapt.er 1. 
a programme of interpretation that c.onnects two discourses, the discourse 
of the text and that of interpretation with the moment of appropriation 
which, contrary to a projection of a personal subjectivity, is instead the 
fusion of the horizons of reader and author. In this way Ricoeur has 
replied to an epistemological shift produced since Romanticism with a 
reconceptuallsation of the hermeneutic circle. 
(412) Ct. D. Hoy Couzens. The Critical Circle, pp. 2 ff. 
(4-13) Cf. C. Reagan (ed.) The Philosophy of P. Ricoeur, p. 144-. 
(414) Ct. N. Vald~s. Shadows in the Cave, p. 133. 
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Having established the notion of the hermeneutical circle of Ricoeur as a 
guide for his analysis. Boff presents a series of paired terms. such as 
"Word of God-Scripture", and "Present-Past", which dialectical relation he 
defines as "hermeneutical circles". We will examine this model in detail. 
3.9.2.3 "The hermeneutic circles". 
Boff's definition of terms in dialectical opposition as hermeneutical 
circles seems to be organised around certain characteristics of the 
relation between two concepts, and not what Ricoeur understands by a cirde 
of interpretation. Boff presents five "hermeneutical circles" for 
consideration, when in reality he is working out some pre-supposition for 
the circle of interpretation he proposes. To call them "hermeneutic 
circles" Is confusing, because we then tend to identify, at some level, the 
pair of terms presented <e.g. "present and pastil) as a text to be 
interpreted. Obv i ousl y, thi sis not the case. Bear i ng t hi sin mi nd, ~'e will 
proceed to organise Boff's contribution to a theology of the political, 
from the point or view of authority of the text, semantics, history and 
narrative. 
3.9.3 "Hermeneutic circles" (hermeneutic pre-suppositions) 
3.9.3.1 Scripture-Word of God 
The two elements which call our attention here are text and authority. As 
we have said before, Boff is concerned with the axis openness/closure of 
the text, or freedom of reading/authority of traditions. This tension is 
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manifest.ed through all Boff's works, and especially in the present one, 
when he claims that Scripture, the "obligatory and constitutive theoretical 
resource of any theological process" is to be submitted to the theoretical 
resources of the church (415). The authority of the Bible is to be taken 
into account only as read in the church's tradit.ion. It is not clear how 
Boff later translates the phrase "the church's tradition" into "the living 
spirit of a living community". In any case, he does not have the 
spontaneous readings of the CEBs in mind, but the canon of dogmas and 
tradition of interpretation of the Roman Catholic Church (416). 
The word of God, according to Boff, is not to be found in the Scripture nor 
in the community, but in the dialogue between them; word of God is here a 
term equ 1 val ent to "the teaching of the Apostl es" (417)' Thi s can be 
understood as a dialogue between Scripture <mediated by tradition) and the 
peopl e who read the text. The hermeneut leal circl e starts then with the 
mediation of traditions for reading, which seems to have taken the place of 
the "mind of the author" in Schleierl\acher, since it is the traditions 
which are the referents of interpretation. 
3.9.3.2. Creation and Perception of Meaning 
We are still in the axis of freedom of reading/authority of traditions, and 
(4-15) C. Boff, Theology and Praxis, p. 133. 
(4-16) Cf. C. Boff. Feet-On-The-Ground Theology, p. 51. 
(4-17) Ibid., p. 85. 
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this time it 1s manifested through Boff's discussion of creation -as 
"hermeneutical 1Ilprovisation"- and perception of meaning -as closure of a 
text or "semantic positivism"-. both being original concepts from L~vl­
Strauss and Ricoeur. 
Hermeneutical improvisation is described in terms of a "bricolare." «18). 
L~vi-Strauss has used the term bricol~ in relation t.o mythical thought, 
to distinguish it from scientific thought. According to L~vi-Strauss, the 
Ilythical discourse is a bricolare because it. is basically built up with a 
"collection of oddments" from ant.erior social discourses (419), meaning by 
this the het.erogenous meanings and remains of past events. Scientific 
thought inst.ead works more in the style of engineers than of bricoleurs, 
that is, using structures and hypotheses and building from them its meaning 
and results. 
As Ricoeur has noted already, L~vi-Strauss does not oppose myth to science 
because although bricolage brings the fragility of the contingent, it also 
works as a I iberator, in its effort to re-order meaningful events without 
the rest.rictions of scientific structures. Linguistically speaking, 
bricolage represents the diachronic dimension of the text, while science 
.--------
(418) "Bricolage" comes from the French bricoleur, a shuffler, "someone who 
works with his hands and uses dubious means compared to those of a 
craftsman"; this term comes from C. L~vi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, p. 19. 
Cf. also P. Rtcoeur, The Conflict of Interptetations. pp. 40 ff. 
(419) Cf. C. L~vi-Stratlss, QP. cit., p. 19. 
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stands for its synchronicity. These two dimensions are harmonically related 
in Ricoeur's thought. 
Boff uses the term bricolage as dist.inctively negat.ive, present.ing it as a 
symbol for disorder and utilit.arianism, which he defines as the privileging 
of useful meanings. at the expense of other less relevant. but still 
important meanings. Boff claims that the consequence of a hermeneutical 
bricolap is pI ural ity or a "riot.ous carnival of meaning" (420). However, 
bricolage and improvisation do not seem to be synonomous terms; the 
bricoleur has a purpose, and can hardly be called an improvisateur. The 
Babylonian myths of origins that have been used to build Genesis 1, could 
have been tla collection of oddments" and distorted recollect.ions of past 
events, but the author of t.he new myth of ori gl ns had a cl ear purpose of 
explaining the beginnings of t.he universe, and conveying a distinct.ive 
theological reflection upon the creation of humankind. 
The mythical mind works with limited material, and elements that. have not 
been produced. but that are available in the contingent state of a certain 
historical moment. In any case, a "carnival of meanin~' is not necessarily 
the consequene.e of myt.hical thought. On the contrary, myth is "the bearer 
of possible worlds" and as Ricoeur has pointed out, the univocity of 
Ileaning in thought could be more paralysing than a mul tipl icity, beCallSe it 
does not include t.he element of choice. Part.icularly in Latin America, the 
dangers have always come from the tyranny of univocal interpretation -via 
(420) C. Boff, Theology and Praxis, p. 136. 
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tradltion- and not from the risk. of openess to more meaningful options. 
Obviously, scientific th.ought is represented here by Boff as "semantic 
positivism", or the attempt to bring into interpretation the criteria of 
explanatory coherence and fal sifiability that, according to Ricoeur, social 
sciences cannot meet (421). The risk of this position is the potential for 
dogmatism and further constrictions of 'Positivism. 
Bofl wants to find a workable relationship between positivism and an 
"anarchic reading", which can represent a middle term of interpretation. 
Ricoeur has resolved this tension complementing structuralism with other 
methods of analysis. This also seems to be the position of Boff related to 
the explanat.ion of t.he text by a eomplementary use of different methods of 
i nterpretat ion. 
3.9.3.3 Structure and Meaning. 
On this point Boff clarifies his position in relation to the moment of 
explanat.ion of the t.ext. He agrees with Ricoeur that structuralism has 
proved useful in eounterbalancing the divinatory methods of Romanticism 
with the autonomy of the textual structure, but we must remember here that 
Ricoeur argues that structuralism needs to be rectified by the critique of 
illusions, that is, the illusion of the source, the author and the 
------------
(4-21) For the discussion on ideology and positivism in Rieoeur. cf. his 
book Hermeneut i c_~~!ld_J he _R1!l\an __ .scl~Jlce~. pp. 233 ff. 
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addressee. As we have seen, Boff keeps the first two, trying to preserve 
the original meaning of the Bible as intended and transmitted by tl'adition. 
From another perspective. Boff agrees with Ricoeur that meaning comes from 
the work. of the hermeneutical arch of explanation and understanding. 
3.9.3.4 Present and Past 
Following RicoeuT, Boff claims that the text is open to the world and 
history, and this is one of the reasons why writing exists, to persist, 
that is to be read and re-read. Boff is concerned hel'e with history .:'Ind 
with the reference of the text. He discards the idea that faith is a 
referential point. because faith is an element that has been invested in 
the text; in this moment he does not discuss the point of f"lith as pre-
supposition, assuming perhaps a Bultmannian position wich we have studied 
already in chapter 2. 
Boff finds thtlt the ultimate reference of the Bible is the present moment, 
as it has heen seen in the context of Gadamer's fusion of horizons. 
Ricoeur has written that there are two moments of production of meaning in 
the text, the first being reI ated to the aut.hor and the second, to the 
actual reader. The reading community belongs to a tradition of 
interpretation which is historical, but by the act 01 interpretation the 
community "interprets" itself, that is, the pre~ent 1I\0ment (4-2~)' 
(4-22) Cf. R. Barthes; P. Ricoetlr; A. V{'rgote ~t ~L_, EX~~'3~_~t 
Hermen~utique. p. 292. 
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3.9.3.5 Techne Hermeneut ike and Hermeneia. 
Boff continues trying to resolve the tension between a lixed meaning. as 
the result of a positivist int.erpretative technique, and an arbitrary 
bestowal of meaning on the text. He considers that the reading community 
replies to the text from its own context, and that. interpretation implies a 
decision about meaning (or "closure", using a term of Croatto), which 
excludes other possible readings. It is then in the applicatio of the text, 
that the meaning is completed and the re-reading of traditions becames 
actual. 
However, the Gadamerian concept of application or Anwendung used by Boff, 
should not be confused here with t.he moment of appropriation (Aneignung) 
from Ricoeur's work. As we have seen in chapter 1, appropriation is more 
related to praxis from a perspective of suspicion than application, which 
is not the final part of interpretation but rather a methodological moment 
reI ated to Gadarner's fus ion of horizons (423). It seems though tha.t Boff 
uses application as synonymous with appropriation without further 
distinction between the two concepts. 
Boff speaks of application as praxis. and as an ethical moment 01 
interpretation. Thus he says that through appl ication "hermeneutics flowers 
into ethics" (42,(,>' If we understand c.orrectl y. and by appl ication Boff 
(423) Ct. Chapter one, 1.9.5. 
(424) Cf. C. Boll. Theol ogy aniLf.r_~ll~. p. 138. 
317 
implies the appropriation of the text (425), where the reader re('.lizes the 
textual meaning. this does not necessarily imply a so called ethical 
practice. As Ricoeur has said, all ethical intention "arises in the conte>.-t 
of a situation which is already ethically del ineated." (426). Ethical 
actions depend on choices and structures of values; the history of the 
Conquista of Latin America, and the role played by the Roman Catholic 
Church in it. speaks about the right appropriation of an interpretation of 
the Scriptures. mediated by traditions, and yet, deeply unethical in its 
praxis of the dogma concerning the lack of soul of coloured people. 
3.9 ... Hermeneutical Models: In search of the circle of interpretation for 
a theology of the political. 
Before outlining his own hermeneutica.l proposal. Boff presents two models 
currently used in Latin American theology which he considers inappropriate. 
The first is the "Gospel/politics" model and the second is the 
"correspondence of terms" style of interpretation. these seem to be verv 
similar, and both are ultimately based on the "concordance" (concordismo> 
pattern which Croatto criticises as simplistic. (427). 
The basic feature of these models of interpretation is the equation of 
----------
(425) Ct. C. Bolf. Qlh __ ~l!.. p. 148. 
(426) P. Ricoeur. "The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy", in 
Philosophy Today, Fal I 1978. p. 176. 
(427) cr. Chapter three, 3.2.2. 
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categories. For instance, the Gospel is made to correspond with our 1I\0dern 
political situation; Boff finds this proposal vague and dubious, and 
regrets that it is so widely used in Latin America, for instance in the 
pattern Scripture/newspaper, or God's Word/history. The historical context 
of the Scripture is not considered by this model, and the whole exegetical 
process is submitted to the pol itical tendenc.ies of the reader without any 
element of self-criticism. 
The second model is also simplistic. although it has a degree of 
sophistication in the comparisons of terms. A typical example says Boff, is 
the equation exodus/liberation = enslavement of the hebrews/oppression of 
the peopl e (4.28). There are ot.her exampl es in the saH\e pattern: 
Babylon/Israel = captivity/Lat.in America and Jesus/coDDunity = Christian 
community/current political context. In all of these examples the 
historical context of the text is not being taken into account, and the 
task of hermeneutics is reduced to a pre-defined political result to 
obtain. Here Boff criticises Fernando Belo's ~ Mat.erialist Reading of the 
Gospel of Mark, as an anachronistic account of Jesus, where Christ is 
presented by Belo as a marxist activist, nineteen centuries before Marx. 
At the end, these correspondence models are based on a literalist use of 
the Bible, that liberation theology has already criticised when used by 
right wing reI igious groups which, through correspondence model s. have 
produced exegesiS supporting the status quo. 
---------------
(4-28> ct. C. Boff. Ope cit .. p. 142. 
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3.9.~. 1 The Correspondence of Relationship Model. 
Boff presents his own hermeneutical project as "a relationship of 
relationships". He sees in it an alternative model for a theology of the 
political, which does not have anything in common with the correlation 
model s al ready seen. It is interest i ng to note that he validates thi s 
method as "the practice of the primitive or apostolic church", and in this 
way, Boff introduces his model as part of a community of interpretation, in 
the historical tradition of Bible reading throughout centuries (~29a). 
Apart from that, Boff works in a permanent dialectical tension with the 
axis freedom of reading/authority of traditions, which seems to be related 
to categories of scientific validation in his hermeneutics. 
This correspondenc.e of relationship model considers elements pertaining to 
the context in which the different books of the Bible were originally 
produc.ed (the Sitz iIl I,eben of the text), and the history of the form and 
redaction of the books. Boff stresses the importance of historical 
criticis~ and especially the Formgeschlchte and Redaktionsgeschichte 
schools. Boff sees here two important distanciations which have been 
produced: the fixation of the canon, and the closure of meaning produced by 
tradition. The Bible is in itself an interpretation of events, and puts a 
distance between the reader and the "original event" of Jesus. The 
commentaries and'dogmatic assumption which have been later developed upon 
the Scriptures, produce a double separation or distanciation of the reader 
(4-29a) cr. C. Boff. 9,.p. cit. I p. 146. 
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from that original event. 
Boff considers the New Testament as a re-reading of the Old, and the whole 
Bible as a product of tradition; this precise point of the role of the 
apostolic tradition in interpretation plays, as Boff says, an important 
part in his correspondence of relationship ~thod. ~e will describe this 
model according to the example provided by Boff, before proceeding to its 
anal ys is. (429b) 
This model Is presented in the style of an algebraic formula, where terms 
are divided, and reduced to a minimum operation which cannot be further 
divided. The "operation" is a relationship. a term that needs some 
clarification. At the moment, we will say that Boff uses it as a Sitz in 
l-eben of different elements. This is the basic hermeneutical model 
elaborated by Boff: 









This formula is ~educed to: 




(a theology of 
the political) 
our context 
(429b) For more detail s about these di agrams. cf. C. Boff. op. cit., pp. 
14-6 ff. 
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ourselves (a theology of the political) 
= 
its context our context 
The main el ements that we need to study here are 1) Boff' s understanding of 
the operation he c.alls a "relationship", 2) how the process of "reduction" 
is produced, and 3) how can we organise such concepts in the hermeneutical 
circl e of interpretation outl ined al ready acc.ording to Boff's understandi ng 
of Ricoeur's proposal. 
3.9.t.l.l Concept of Relationship. 
We find three different definitions of "relationship" in Boff's description 
of this model of interpretation: 
a) Relationship as a Sit.z im Leben, which is basically the search for the 
historical context of an element, for instance Scripture, Jesus, theology, 
etc. It also implies the use of sociological analysis for the present 
situation of the church. 
b) Relationship as hermeneutical mediation, which follows a chronological 
pattern of authority. An example of this can be found in the first sequence 
of terms related t.o Jesus, which are t.he (primitive) Church. tradition and 
theology of the political. In this operation called "reduction", from Jesus 
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of Nazareth \Ve arrive to oursel ves/a theology of the pol itical. through (\. 
mediation of history and the church's traditions. 
c) Relationship as a connection bet\Veen message and context. Here the 
I\essage is first defined as a "vehicle of sense", and later on as "Spirit", 
in its t'NO connotations of "Holy Spirit" and "style". Context seems to be 
the socio-polltical and cultural situation which informs the Sitz im Leben 
of each first term. 
Boff does not explain how he arrives at the "message", an important 
element of t.his c.orrespondence of reI ationship model. The message seems to 
work as a pre-understanding and a production of meaning taken from the 
mediations, specifically, the traditions of the church. In general, Boff 
works in a similar style to Bultmann, if we c.onsider that the German 






Sc.i ent if ic 
Thought 
This formul a al so reI ates contexts. and can be mediated by Existent ial ism. 
The particularity of Boff's proposal then. seems to be more related to the 
introduction of socio-political mediation rather than the element of 
"relationship" in itself, but apart from that Boff even uses the same 
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concept of myth as Bultmann: Myth as a lie, and a product of a pre-
scientific mentality (430). 
3.9.4-. 1. 2 Concept of Operation. 
Boff describes an "operation", as the act of searching for an "identity of 
signification." This identity of signification is specified as 
"identification of message", and as we have seen before, the c.oneept of 
message is not explained. neIther is it clear how and when we arrived -
hermeneutically speaking- to this term. 
Accordi ng to Boff. the message Is submitted to a cont i nuous and never 
ending process. At this point we are reminded of Rlcoeur's proposal to 
postpone the final exegetical result, in order to avoid making a definitive 
reading of the text which can prematurely close the meaning. Boff is trying 
to keep the balance of the axis freedom of reading/authority of tradition. 
in a position of quasi-neutrality between positivism and hermeneutic 
improvisation. The mediation of tradition is the element that fixes the 
production of meaning, and yet Boff seems to advocate a new t1nderstandin~ 
(reading from the present). from the texts that regul ate the novel ty of 
i nterpretat:l on. 
(~30) Cf. C. Boff. Theology and Praxis. p. 140. 
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3.9.~.2 The correspondence of relationship model in practice. 
As an example of how these ambiguities of Boff's model of relationships 
work in practice, ~ will refer now to an example taken from Boff's book 
The Bible. the Church and the.Poor. which he wrote in collaboration with 
Jorge Pixley. In this case, Boff presents the following "relationship of 
relationship" model, built upon Luke 16: 19-25. (~31) 
Lazarus Then Lazarus Today 
= 
His context Our context 
The relationship between Lazarus and his New Testament context is explained 
in these terms: Poverty is an individual problem, produced by selfishness 
of the rich, whom Lazarus asks for charity in this world while waiting for 
his reward in the Ringdom of Heaven. Here Boff reads the Gospel without 
using historical criticism or any other elements to understand the 
situation; this works simply as a "fact from the Gospel", and it see1l\S that 
the message comes from this tradi tional readi ng of Luke 16: 19-25. Later on, 
t.he analysis continues in terms of the search for the concept of poverty in 
the Bible. both in the Old as in the New Testament. The conclusion of the 
study is that the category of the option for the poor in liberation 
theology is not a novelty because "it has a substantial continuity with the 
---------------.-----
( 1.31) Cf C B ff J Pixle~.·, The Bible. the Church and_J;heJ>J>J2I ... p. 6. 
.. •••• 0 ;. r .. 
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great tradition of faith" <Boff's emphasis). (432), At the same time there 
is a "formal discontinuity" produced with the tradition, due to the tenor 
of historical expression used. 
The relationship between Lazarus and his Third World context. differs in 
terms ot the modern understanding of poverty as a class problem: the ruling 
classes exploit nations who demand justice and an alternative economic 
system, which Boff allegorically ealls "heaven", Boff is using historical 
materialism here, and he continues his analysis ~th a reviewing of 
economic theories such as funct ionall sm and liberalism. 
The identity of signification can be found in the love of God for his 
people which has not ehanged through history: perhaps it can be located in 
the parallel heaven/alternative system that Boff presents us, but since 
Boff's analysis is concerned with a socio-economic analysis of the 
situation in Latin America today, the model works as a model of 
comparisons~ a sort of "negative correspondence model", although not a 
concordismo. The "love as charity" of Luke is contrasted with the "love of 
long terms relations", 01' neighbourly love of Ricoeur, this being the 
acceptabl e model for OUT' time. 
The tradition ot the c.hurch' 5 interpretation is not challenged in reI ation 
to the Scripture, except with the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic 
( 1.32) ct c Bot#· .f. Pi xl ey, on._c_i t_' .• , p. 1 t 7. 
.. ••• I, ~ 
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Church. Interpreting or tire-reading" the ScrlpVlres in se is not the wav 
Boff chooses to produce an original Jl\eaning. At this point it bec.omes 
clearer that Boff has resol ved his dial ectic.al tension in reI ation to the 
tradition of the church, which can be chall enged or c.ri t icall y accepted, 
but there is no "hermeneutics of the present" in the Scriptures. 
3.9.5 Boff and Ricoeur: Coincidences and contradictions. 
The hermeneutical circle presented by Boff is said to be based on Ricoeur'g 
own proposal (433). but as we have geen some elements of the interpretation 
theory of the French philosopher are not considered, and some are even 
contradicted. Boff has taken the following concepts from Ricoeur: 
a) A distinction in the general acceptance of the not.ion of "hermeneutics", 
as techn~ and as hermeneia. 
b) The acceptance of the via lon,a or long way of interpretation, mediated 
by linguistics. 
c) The task of interpretation, defined as a deciphering the "double 
meaning" of the symbolic language, which is constitutive of the relig-ious 
discourse. 
d) The notion ot t.he hermeneutical c.ircle. in which the interpreter has an 
active participation, putt.ing him/herself as an "active" element of the 
circle. 
e) The relevant. concept of the hermeneutical are, composed by the 
(433) ct. C. Bolf, TheQlQEY and praxis. pp. xxvii and 137. 
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complementary work of explanation and understanding. 
f> A criteriology 01' convergence of methods, including linguistic theories, 
such as structuralism, biblical criticism and SOCiology, is considered 
necessary for the task of interpretation. 
g) The importance of some el ements concerning the 1'01 e of t he metaphor in 
religious language, and the phenomenon of polysemy. 
At the same time, these elements are contradicted by Boff's somehow 
Romantic position of returning to an originfll message, not. from the 
Scriptures but from some "text. of traditions." Alt.hough Boff has claimed to 
have taken a definitive option in the "hermeneutical war", because his 
definition of text. is the written discourse, it is noticeable that he never 
fixes "the text" as such, and the onl y references to it that we have are 
covered by the expression "the tradition of the ehurch." The use of 
concepts from L~vi-Strauss. who took elements of structuralism int.o 
anthropological analysis of primitive cultures, perhaps adds some extra 
confusion in relation to Boff's concept of text. 
The Script.ure is perceived by Boff as a threat. of closure of meaning; the 
interpretation of the biblical text is not. discussed, and this seems to be 
a key aspect. of his hermeneutics of the political. The message is the 
message of traditions, from where the production of meaning evolves. It is 
true that Boff also sees a danger of closure in the traditions, but at the 
same time, he considers that t.hey challenge us to re-interpret their 
meaning. The apparent contradictions of the axis, freedom of anarchic 
reading/positivism, bec.omes clear once we real ise Boff's definition of 
text. Any element of a hermeneutic of suspicion is developed as in 
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Segundo's work.. trom the perspective of historical materialism. and in 
confrontat.ion with the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. 
3.9.5.1 The short way of interpretation. 
The Ricoeurian moment of appropriation of the text, is wrongly identified 
by Boff with Gadamer's applicatio. However. Boff's appropriation of the 
text does not differ from Ricoeur. except by the fact that in real terms, 
Boff has t.aken the short and not the long way of interpretation. The lack 
of suspicion by the interpreter him/herself, and the assumptions that are 
not challenged in the process such as the role of traditions, to the 
exclusion of the Bible are evident in his work. 
An exampl e of these el ements are found in Boff's book Feet-on-th~::-$to~nd-_ 
Theology. Latin American Christians are divided over the axis ot freedom of 
interpretation/positivism. where the first term can be equated with the 
"return to the vel' i tas hebr~Lc~", and the second, to k.eepi ng evervthi ng 
submi tted to the author i ty of the tradi t ions of the (Roman Cathol ic ) 
Church. The "improvisation ~~pitum" that Boff fears, is invariablv 
represented by "the Evangelicals" (a common name given in Latin America to 
any Christ.ian group of non-Catholic origin, e.g. historic protestantism, 
pentecostalism, Jehovah's Witnesses etc.), and confronted by the traditions 
of "the Catholics". Boff denounces the dangers of the free reading of the 
Bible made by the evangelical poor. as anarchic non-political readin~1 or 
right-wing interpretations which perpetuate the status quo. The example of 
the Catholic poor, repeating traditional prayers to "Santa Pelonia" to Ctlrc 
toothache. is not critic,ised. but regarded with benevolent eyes. as vart of 
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~o~ular religiosity. There is a lack of suspicion exercised bv Boff in 
relation to the non-neutrality of intransitive consciousness, as Freire 
coul d have said, whi ch does not respect either Cathol ics nor Evangel i cal s. 
3.9.5.2 Scientific "Bricola~lt. 
Our analysis of Boff's hermeneutical circle has brought t.o the surface 
elements from the influence of Ricoeur, and distinctive moments where Boff 
contradicts the French philosopher's theory of interpretation. This happens 
I\6.lnl y as a resul t of the need to keep t.he pre-suppositions of tradit ions 
in a difficult balance wit.h the novelty of biblical interpretation. \tlh.at 
Boff has not perceived, is t.hat his hermeneutic circle is at risk of being 
something he despises: a "bricola~" <Boff's definit.ion, and not L~vi­
Strauss). He is t.rying t.o open the process of underst.anding for a theologY 
which sit.z im leben is Latin America, in order to understand with fresh 
eyes the reality of the continent, t.hrough interpretat.ion and a relevant 
praxis. But inst.ead of allowing t.he Bible t.o spea,k a new word, from 
people's reading of the text and t.heir own ctllture, Boff is using old 
materials of tradition, contim.1ously re-arranged in a way related to 
mythical thought where the risk is non-critical perpetlJat.lon of dead 
meaning. Bec.ause Boff somet.imes equat.es t.he chure.h's traditions with 
science, we have called his met.hodology a "scientific brico~." 
The root of the confl iet in Boff's hermeneut leal praxis lies In the pl ~ce 
of traditions in his pre-suppositions, which seem to come from Gadamer's 
theory. Gadamer gives an unique plac.e in his theory to tradition. claiming 
that it "has a .justifieat.ion t.hat Is outside the arguments of reason" 
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(434-). Traditions are part of Gadamer's hermeneutics as a neces~;:\r" 
continuum for his dialogue between past. present and future. Boff has taken 
this position. affirming that any hermeneutical practice "supposes ... and 
takes a position within the flow of traditions" (4-35), ignoring that, as 
Eagleton has pointed out, Gadamer's concept of tradition does not consider 
a history of oppression, neither does it exercise an ideological sllspicion 
upon the corpus of the dogmatic tradition. 
Obviously, to refrain from an ideological suspicion upon the history of the 
church traditions. and to give them a preferential authority in 
hermeneutics seems to be opposed to liberation theology's purposes. But the 
contrary is not necessarily an anarchic reading of the Scriptures, because, 
as Ricoeur has said. the "bracketing off" of the phenomenological process 
which Boff claims to follow, is a permanent questioning of the conditions 
in which the knowledge arises. The Heideggerian c.ircle of interpretation 
also asks for a submission of the reader to the text, allowing it to 
interrogate and challenge the interpreter; it is from these elements that 
the praxis can then be liberated from non-pertinent interpretations. 
3.9.5.3 Literacy and change. 
In 1963. when Freire was called by the Brasil ian Episcopal Conference of 
(4-34) Quoted by T. Eagleton, LJterary Theory, p. 73. 
(4-35) C. Boff, Theo19n-.and Praxis, p. 139. 
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the Catholic Church to teach the leaders of what was going to be known as 
Basic (or Base-Level) Eccleslal Communities, he established the 
phenomenological principle of no differentiation between being and meaning. 
Freire knew that interpretation theories are closely linked to ideological 
values and political systems. and that a new reading which could break. with 
the domination of meaning was necessary to start a process of liberation in 
Latin America. Since that moment, the work of the Catholic and Evangelical 
groups in the continent has been associated with literacy campaigns 
following the principles of Freire, where the students educate themselves 
In cODUnunity, re-discovering the alphabet and their own 'w'Orld at the same 
time. From this movement a lot of fresh insights about people's religiosity 
were incorporated in the churches, known later as "the popular church". 
Boff somehow seems to depart from this position, seeing in the church a 
mediating Tol e, like the one assumed by Catholicism during the mlddl e ages. 
when reading was replaced by look.ing at stained-glass windows in cathedrals 
(4-36), and the Interpreta.tion of the Bible was the sole responsibility of 
the priesthood. Boff even suggests that the church shoul d cont t nue the 
people's oral tradition without introdtlClng "certificates in reading and 
writing" (437), As Boff says, the Brazil ian Literacy Movement is not a 
prerequisite for ace.ess to sal va.tion. 
AI though it is true that sal vation does not depend on the degree of 
(4-36) The Bibli~_-e.al1p~rt1!!; cf. C. Boff, feet-On-the-Ground-Theol2gy. p. 29. 
(4-37) Ct. C. Boff. QJh._~it .• p. 28. 
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education of the believer. Boff seems to be very narve in his project of a 
theology of the political which does not reflect on relations of domination 
and exploitation produced in Latin America as a result of 1lIiteT~.cv. The 
fact that Jesus did not demand a reading certificate from the apostles 
(4-38), is used by Boff to perpetuate the structure of the church where the 
priesthood Is made up of a large proportion of white men, mostly European, 
and this happens In a black country like Brazil. People's marginalisation 
on every ground, including education, is the main reason for their 
exclusion at the levels of responsIbilIty of their own church. 
It is clear that while the production of meaning is submitted to tradItions 
of interpretat.ion in the church, we will be perpetuating illiteracy. or the 
chronic inability to process information which opposes any practice for 
change In Latin America. As Freire has said, the church then perpetuates 
it.s role of "shelt.er for the masses", where the poor can be satisfied in 
their feelings of frustration, which arise from the "fatalistic" 
consciousness of the oppressed. The church becomes allied to t.he culture of 
silence and subordination. which has al ienated the poor in Lat.in America. 
(4-39). Obviously, this proposal of dependence is opposed to the ideals of 
liberation and option for the poor that Boff declares in other works. The 
hermeneutical circle of Ricoeur has been Boff's inspiration. but somehow it 
(4-38) Boff's example; cf. ~R~~_it., p. 28. The example is anachronistic, 
because Jesus demanded knowledge of the Scripture, which required stud\'. 
(4-39) Cf. P. Freire. Las Iglesias. 18 Educaci6n.~1 Pl'oceso d~Jibera<ltQ_n 
Humana~]L.t~ .. "istoria, p. 31. 
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seems that he has not taken the most radical elements of his theory, 
producing as a result, a hybrid project of interpretation which 'n-"e hav~ 
called "scientific bricolage." 
In the next chapter we will continue this reflection on Boff, Croatto, and 
Segundo's in the 1 ight. of the theory of Ricoeur which has been their 
lnspiration. We will then give our final conclusions and will mate some 
suggest ions pert i nent, to the hermeneut ical task of the Christ ian Church in 
Latin America. both now and in the future. 
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Summary 
Phenomenology has exercised a vast influence in liberation theology. mainly 
amongst Roman Catholic thinkers. The main points of influence of a 
phenomenol ogi cal herlleneut ics in liberat ion t heol ogy are the foIl owi ng'! 
1> The Bible as a text is considered to become "alive" only in relation to 
the interest of the readers who appropriate its meaning. 2) The re-reading 
of the text has replaced the author's intention. as in the Romantic 
hermeneutics. 3) The emphasis on openness and on the phenomenon of 
plurivocity in the text has been incorporated in the reading of the Bible. 
I. Severino Croatto. 
Croatto uses Ricoeur's idea of Biblical hermeneutics as part of a regional 
hermeneutics, but also as "an tlDiqlle affair." He adopts the long way of 
hermeneutics and in his search for a Rfcoeurian "convergence of methods", 
Croatto uses historical criticism. alongside other perspectives. He takes 
Ricoeur's criticism of Bultmann and the New Hermeneutics. One important 
point in Croatto is the dialectic text-truth, which gives the criteria of 
veracity of the text. In his case, such criteria is given through the 
"right actions of liberation" produced by God in the Bible. 
The problem with this approach is that it can lead the reader into two 
positions, already rejected by Ricoeur and by Croatto: a) to come back to 
Schleiermacher's psychological method and b) to produce a comparative 
exegesis (Concordismo). Croatto elaborates an alternative method, which he 
calls Sintonia (or "tuning in" of the Scriptures with the rea.lity>. The 
Sintonfa is worked upon Gadamer's "Fusion of Horizons" concept. Sintonfa is 
the relation between the horizon of the consciousness of liberation in the 
Bible, and the horizon of liberation in Latin America. Another element from 
Ga.damer which is very important in Croatto' s work, is the "historv of the 
effect". Acc.ording to this concept. there are two worlds related to the act 
of interpretation: the world of the text (as Ricoeur describes it>, and our 
present world. The first belongs to the linguistic level, but the second to 
a level of praxis. In this lev~l of praxis. one event of liberation relates 
to another. and the narrated events share their meaning with the critict:'l 
Doments of the Latin American readers. 
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One of the key contributions from Ricoeur to liberation theology. and 
especially throtlgh the elaborations of Croatto. is the relation between 
myth and ideology. Croatto advocates a demythologisation programme. based 
on Ricoeur's de-mystification proposal. It does not desymbolise the 
Scripture, but returns to the original power of the mythical narrative, rind 
encourages the production of new meaning from the Scriptures. 
Juan Luis Segundo. 
Segundo has worked on a hermeneutical circle of suspicion. elaborating upon 
Ricoeur's analysis on Nietzsche and Marx. He uses a phenomenological 
approach in his work. through the use of the epoch~. and considers that the 
experience of reality (vivencia) gives a new depth to knowledge. 
The circle of suspicion is organised into four steps: 
1) We need to consider wlt.h suspicion our own manner of experienc.ing 
reality. 
2) We should then extend such insights into the ideological superstruc.ture. 
3) We then became suspicious of current biblical interpret.ation. 
t) Finally, we start a new hermeneutical process with the new elements at 
our disposal. 
From Ricoeur's work on Freud, Segundo elaborates elements of the "master-
slave" dialectic int.o his circ.le of suspicion. To unllask the structures of 
oppression requires hermeneut.ic suspicion applied to the "I" who 
interprets. Segundo also takes into account the Ricoeurian analysis on the 
early work of Marx, concerned with the relation of labour and alienation. 
The dialogue between faith and ideology is part of Segundo's 
anthropological project.. Fait.h and ideology are broad categories related to 
the objective of human existence, which Segundo calls "happiness", and the 
way to achieve it. Segundo's preoccupat ion wi th the right methodol o.~·, as 
"ideology", is the core of his hermeneutical circle. Segundo's elaboration 
of ideological suspicion based in Ricoeurian thought, is partial. Ricoeur 
developed the positive and negative aspects of ideology, and even a 
dialectic of otherness, which is not taken into consideration by Sel.;'l1ndo. 
However, liberation theology has worked on a hermeneutic of stls-picion ,,-hlch 
follows Ricoeur, thus superseding some of the early reflection from Srgundo 
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Clodovis Boff. 
Boff acknowledges the necessity of taking the long way of interpretation. 
and highlights t.wo elements from Ricoeur's hermeneutical circle: first, the 
reflection and self-criticism of the interpret.ers, and second, the 
incorporation of the criticism of religion made by the three "Masters of 
Suspicion", Boff is int.erested in Ricoeur's concept of diagnosis. as part 
of an interdisciplinary approach for a project of a theology of the 
pol itical. 
Boff defines hermeneutics according t.o Ricoeur's distinctions about the 
term. He considers the role of distanciation in hermeneutics. and the 
necessity to decode the present t.ext. in order t.o re-ap'Propriat.e t.he 
original sense of the WTit.t.en message. Thts last point 'Puts Boff nearer to 
the positton of Dilt.hey or Schleiermacher. than t.o that. of Ricoeur. 
The "hermeneutics circles" from Boff are pairs of t.erms in dialectical 
oppositions. They work as pre-suppositions rather than interpretative 
paths. In all the "hermeneutical circles" that Boff develops. we find a 
permanent tension between "anarchy" (or freedom) of interpret.at.ion. and 
"authorit.y" (or the role of traditions in t.he church). "Hermeneutical 
improvisation" is Ii permanent. element of fear in Boff's work. and he uses 
the word br.icotage to describe such a process. 
The point is that Boff is afraid of the multiplicity of t.he discourse. 
alt.hough in Latin America the dangers have always come from univocal (and 
dictatorial) interpretation of the reality. Boff criticises the 
hermeneutical model which makes easy parallels between the Gospel and the 
present political sltuat.ionj he has a very similar posit.ion t.o Croatto's 
criticism of concordismos. However. his own method (called "the 
correspondenc.e of relationship") still keeps elements from a model of 
comparison, and is similar to Bultmann's work.. Finally. we can say that 
although Boff has been inspired by Ricoeur, he has not. taken the most 
radical element.s from his theory. His concern with hierarchies and the 
dangers of ordinary Christians reading the Bible are oP'Posed to the 
principles of liberation theology. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
1.' lMAGINAIRE AS RUPTURE 
Reflections and Conclusions 
"Cultures create themselves by telling stories of their own past. The 
danger is ... that this reaffirmation can be perverted, usually by 
1I\0nopolistic elites, into a mystificatory discourse ... The symbols of a 
community become fixed and fetishized; they serve as lies. Over against 
this, there exists the iJnaginaire of rupture. a discourse of utopia which 
remains critical of the powers." 
Paul Ricoeur. (440) 
Part I. 
4. The influence of Rlcoeur on liberation theology. 
In chapter three we have seen how three important theologians from Latin 
America have developed their methodologies from Ricoeur's interpretation 
theory. In this final chapter, we will reflect on the contribution of 
Ricoeur to liberation theology in general, and in partiCtllar in the way 
that Croatto, Segundo and C. Boff have appropriated the French 
philosopher's theory. Liberation theology has elaborated upon many 
(4-40) P. RicoeuT. in R. Kearney, Di~lo~es_~ith Cont~~mport\ryJ:_<2ntln~ntal 
Thinkers, p. 29. 
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elements from Ricoeur' s hermeneutical circle, sometimes even to the point 
of departing considerably from it, but at the same time. the hermeneutics 
of I iberation has also made a contribution to the Ric,oeurian pro-posal. 
Our thesis is that Ricoeur has contributed to liberation theology in three 
main areas, regarding 1) the identity of the Latin American people. 2> the 
search for what Ricoeur calls a "positive utopia" and 3> the praxis of 
change in the continent. We use the word' identity' here as Guti~rrez does, 
in the sense of "the opposite to al ienation" (441). These three areas are 
related t.o each other through a key element of Ricoeur's hermenetltical 
thought: l'ima,iJ.l,aire as rupture (442), According to Ricoe l lr, I'imaglnair_e 
/0 .. ,1 
(a conglomerate of symbolic socio-politic disC'ouTses belonging to a 
I 
c,ommunity) functions as the heritage of a nation; it fulfils the rolc of 
legitimization of discourse. and is related to the national sense of 
identity. However, sometimes it can work as a 'subversive' element, 
introducing crfttcisD\S to a univocal discourse. and intervening activelY in 
(441) Cf. G. Gutt~rrez, "Entre las Calandrias" in PJiginas, 100, p. 103. 
(442) The French noun imaginaire refers to the content of the collective 
imagination as distinct from the process. Paul Ricoeur in R. Kearnev. 
Dialogues wi t h Contemporary CQl1t inental_ Thi nkers, uses the phrase "the 
lmag'inaire of rupture", but he explains it as the disruptive func,tion of 
the imaginaire. as opposed to its funetion as reaffirmation. (Cf. R. 
K it pp. 24-~n. Also cf. P. Ric,oeuT Lectures on Id~olQn~n<t earney, Q.P.!- r __ , , , 
Utopia. p. 266. 
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the process of creation and renewal of every eulture. 
In the first part of this chapter then, we will reflect on Ricoeur' 5 
contribution to the methodology of I iberation theology, in relation to 
these three areas; in the second part, we will establish which Ricoeurian 
elements have most influenced the analysis of Croatto, Segundo and C. Boff. 
while considering the originality of their own proposals. Finally, we will 
demonstrate how liberation theology has also contributed to the 
hermeneutical circle of Ricoeur, providing an unique s~ace in Latin America 
for the moment of appropriation and praxis of the interpretative process. 
4-. 0.1 In search for the Lat in American identitv. 
"He came yellowish, broken, without even a Chulo (a traditional hat). He 
came back with the same clothes, but with God in his eyes ... -Which God? 
How do you know?- God is hope, God is courage. He came unpu <shrunken). 
ill. bent down. He left firm, steady as an eagle, like a young man." 
Jos~ Maria Arguedas. (4-43) 
Latin America has its cogtto bless~. broken. Argtledas, the in(\Jre lltsta 
writer from Peru who ins~ired the work of Guti~rrez with his thought, .... Tote 
--------
(44-3) J. M. Arguedas, "Todas las Sangres", in J. M. Arguedas, Obra~ 
Completas, IV, p. 413. 
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in his famous novel Todas las Sangres about ?<.n anonvmous indio who 
----_. 
symbolically represents his nation. Peru. The indio is the symbol of the 
broken people, 111, subjugated (un:pu) and poor. The discovering of God as a 
liberator (emphasised by the question 'Which God?'), is then equivalent to 
a self discovery. The cogito bless~ of Peru, the broken thought of 
centuries of alienation produced by the Conquista and colonization, finds 
in God, "its original truth". in Ricoeur's words. 
Such original truth seems to be related in Latin America to the Christian 
faith. and to the symbolic universe of the church's rituals and ceremonies. 
Dussel, in a study concerning the broken identity of the continent. has 
established two main breaking points in the history of Latin America: the 
first, produced by the Hispanic Conquista, and the second, in the XIX 
century, by neo-colonialist structures, which have been responsible for the 
culture of dependence in Latin America (4.4.4.>. 
The reason why the Latin American cultural ethos has suffered a process of 
diSintegration and assimilation, has been the profound identification 
established between the Christian faith, and a specific external model of 
cuI ture and civllizat ion. This has produced a state of "disproportion" in 
which the Latin American people live, because, as Ricoeur might say, they 
do not coincide with themselves. It means that the "self knowledge" of 
Latin America is caught between the self justification of its faults a.nd 
the lack of understanding of its possibilities. 
For Rlcoeur, there is onl y one way to heal the cogi to l>J ess~. through the 
long route ot interpretation. The use of the hermeneutical circle and the 
work of a criteriology which has been incorporated into the theology of 
liberation principally by the analysis of Croatto, Segundo and Boff. has 
produced a better understanding of the possibil ities of freedom and the 
responsibility of Christians in the process. 
The broken Identity of Latin America is due to a lack of understanding of 
its original truth, and is closely related to what Freire calls a false 
consciousness. In order to find the real subject (or addressee) of 
liberation theology. Croatto, Segundo. Boff and many others have been using 
a methodological and multidisciplinary approach. or criteriology, as 
suggested by Ricoeur. The work of a (',riteriology is important in order to 
recognise the limitations of the theological proposal in Latin America. 
where the mul tipl icity of meanings in the biblical text is accentuated by 
the cultural diversity ot the people; at the same time, poverty and chronic 
violence seem to have common roots, and need a careful socio-politic 
mediation. 
Following Ricoeur, Latin American theologians have tried to rescue their 
"discourse about God" from an absolutist discursive model. In order to do 
this, it has been nec.essary to consider other cuI tural texts alongsIde the 
Bibl e, and to study the ~rk of myths and symbol s. 
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Ricoeur's theory of myt.hs is of 'Particular relevance to the quest for 
identity in Latin America. According to his thought, the principal function 
of a myth is to integrate a community. but due to the destruction of the 
national ethos by the Conquista and colonization. which dissolved the 
religious and socio-economic systems, the national languages. science. 
culture, family structures etc, Latin America has lost many traditional 
myths, which can be found sometimes 'Partially integrated in the 
syncretistic Christianity of the continent. 
4-.0.2 The place of the collective memory in liberation theology. 
One important point from Ricoeur. which has contributed to the theology of 
liberation, is the challenge of the 'narrative order' (usually imposed by 
the dominant powers of a nation, such as the historians. for instance>. and 
the search for what he calls recollections. This collective lnemory can be 
gathered from oral traditions, old sayings of the people, gestures, dances, 
etc, but also from the surplus of meaning which can be obtained from the 
ruins of t.he monuments of the past. and the geographical "signs" of the 
colonization. For instance, the location of the ca'Pital cities in Latin 
America, founded near ports and the construction of railway lines without 
Internal connections but directed only to the ports, t.ell us of the 
Industrial history of the continent. From a religious 'Perspective, the 
images 01 Christ. as studied by Migl1ez Bonino, and the ~rshi'P of the black 
Virgin Mary (although the images have been covered with silver to produced 
the illusion of whiteness), are important elements in understanding the 
Latin American identity, t.hrough the interpretation of its symbolic 
universe. 
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The collective memory in Latin America can also be found in the social 
institutions and the design of townships, and in the poor people's language 
which carries remnants of a different grammatical structure (Quechua, 
Aymara, Guarani etc.). We concl ude then that by the use of a cr j t er I 01 ogy 
as suggested by Ricoeur. the real man and woman whose identity has been 
denied by a process of absolutism and absorption into a different system, 
can be rediscovered again. This criteriology means the dialogue of 
liberation theology with different disciplines, such as politics, 
sociology, anthropology etc. 
It is interesting to recall here, how Arguedas from his cathedra chair in 
the University of San Marcos. in Lima. Peru, started a research into the 
Quechua myths: the myth of Adaneva; Achique and the Inca king, Inkarrf. 
etc. all of them very important. in underst.anding how the people perceived 
their reality. For instance, the myth of Inkarrf explains how God created 
two humanities; the first (pre-hispanic) was imperfect., and needed to be 
destroyed to create a better. second humanity (post hispanic), which is 
associated with the birth of culture. Liberation theology. incorporatIng to 
its discourse the richness of traditions. oral poetry and legends, not only 
tries to understand t.he culture of the people whom it is addressing. but to 
contribute to the identity and self-knowledge of the continent. 
The healing process of the cogito bless~ starts. precisely. there. The 
inferiority and marginalisation of the people of the Andean region. for 
instance; their charact.eristic silence and sadness, needs to be related, to 
the mythical knowledge of being part of a first humanity destroyed by God 
due to its imperfections. and replaced by an Hispanic one. whIch has proved 
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to be the dominant force of the rest of Latin American historv. As the 
Hispanic culture is associated with Christianity in the Continent, the task 
of the theologian is t.o discover elements of subjugation brought to the 
continent by the Church, and to revise the symbolic structure of the 
ecclesial cOlnlnunfties, and any reading of the Bible, which still 
perpetuates them. 
~.O.3 Tradition and the re-creation of meaning. 
Ricoeur considers that the major contribtltion of L~vi-Strat1ss has been to 
discover how certain societies. which he calls "cold", never change their 
symbolic structures, while in others societies (called "hot"), there Is a 
continuing process of reinterpretation (and re-creation) of their mythical 
universes. In ac.cordance with that, we can say that Latin American society 
belongs to the second group, because its symbolic system has changed in 
reI ation to the chal I enges of history. In the same way, the texts of the 
church (the Blbl e in this century, and before that, the ritual s, 
festivities, etc.) have been reinterpreted ac.cording to the readings from 
the realidad. 
When Ricoeur speaks about the role of tradition in the hermeneutical 
process, he is refering precisely to this proc.ess of reinterpretation. 
"Tradition" has been defined by the French philosopher as "a diachronic 
process of reinterpretatton" (445), and this Is the same concept that 
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liberation theology uses. Tradition is then to be considered as part of the 
hermeneut ieal process; it provides the mater I al c.ons I dered 1 n t he moment of 
guessing, which, as we have seen, is a communitarian, shared pro~ess. 
The community participate in this process by fulfUling a soclallv creative 
role, developing their own myths. The interpretative work of liberation 
theology has found in the study of symbols what Ricoeur calls the 
Lebenswelt (following Husserl >. the "world of life" belonging to a pre-
reflexive stage of knowledge, and the foundation of language. Guti~rrez, 
in a recent analysis of Arguedas' novels, has pointed out the importance of 
Andean symbol s of "dirty" and "cl ean", which seem to be Intimatel y cl ose to 
a crisis of national identity; as such, they function as fundamental 
symbolS. related to "renewal of national identity" and "alienation from 
cuI tural roots" (446). 
Guti6rrez considers popular expressions such as "to clean my soul" qlm}!Ja-r 
I\i alma), and "coming back to my being" (volver a_mi .. §~r), as expression':> 
of the natives experience of alienation in the cities, and the need to go 
back, even brie·fl y. to their life and customs in the mountains. According-
to this analysis, "clean", as the opposite of "dirtv", is related to love 
and forgiveness but also to the courage to denounce the in.Justic.es suffered 
by the people. The concept of the prophetic role of the church in Latin 
America has been el aborated upon stlch symbol s, belonging to the peopl e' s 
Thinkers, p. 25. 
(4.46) G. Guti~rrez. "Entre las Calandrias", In f~n.~5. tOO. pp. 9t fr. 
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own symbolic universe. 
The hermeneutical task of reinterpreting the texts of the Latin }\merican 
real ity also impl ies t.he distinguishing between myths and mystifications. 
Ricoellr's approach to myths is exempt of unc.ritical narvety; on the 
contrary, it encourages the use of a creative imagination, which can 
challenge the myth without. falling into the error of de-symbolising its 
structure. According to Ricoellr, demythologising should not become a 
reification process. Myths and symbols. have a tendency to become "fixed 
and fetishized", and uncritical of dominant structures (4-4-7). Even the 
Bible has acquired a prescriptive order (or "exemplary". according to 
Ricoeur). However, the structure of narTativity in Ricoeur's theory 
establishes that the task of narrative is ambiguous! in a way, it is trying 
to organise t.he past, and thus, contributing to the building of a 
community's identity, but from another perspective, it is trying to fix a 
horizon of the future. The act of repetition of stories has the double 
function of closing the past, but also of projecting a future utopia. 
4.. O. 4- The community as the social agent of (·reation. 
This role of closure and cultural creation is not the task of an 
individual, but of the community, and specifically of l' imaginair~ of a 
nation. L'imag'lnaire organises t.he cultural heritage of a nation, and is 
responsible for the prescriptive form of its sacred texts and institutions. 
(447) Cf. P. Ricoeur, in R. Kearney, ~~:t .. , pp. 29 ff. 
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But it also has an "opening" function, and as such it can act as a 
deterrent to reductionlst tendencies. as a subversive element with the 
po~r to dynamic.ally re-symbolise the founding elements of a society. This 
is what Ricoeur has called "I' imaginaire" as rupture, "a discourse of 
utopia" of which the main function is to be critical of the dominant 
structures and to renew the prescriptive role of the Scriptures (448). 
L'imaginaire as rupture has helped Latin American theologians to break away 
from Eurocentric readings of the Bible, and to confront social institutions 
sanctioned by the church, which were used to BubJugate people. At the same 
time, what Ricoeur calls the "shared ima,ginaire" of the community started 
to reinterpret Christian symbols which shaped their universe, and to 
project them into the future community built utopia. The questioning of the 
"I" who interprets has been the hermeneut ieal key that 11 berat ion theology 
has incorporated in its project. The Latin American theologian, and the 
ordinary member of a church, need to ask who is the "I" who is 
interrogating the text. and therefore expose his/her own narcissistic 
attitudes. 
This is another important contribution from Ricoeur to the search for the 
Latin American identity; the process of unmasking the exegete's identity, 
not as a mere individualist act. but as part of his/her own community of 
reference. I.e illaginaire as rupture, working as a bridge between the t~lo~ 
and the arch~ of a conununity. is the element which has the power to 
(448) ct. P. Ricoeur, in R. Kearney. Q.R. __ cit., p. 29. 
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maintain a tension between tradition and creation. In this process of 
community re-creation, the inter-preters are not external observers, but are 
active participants in the work of self-knowledge. At the end, onlv in the 
community, can the exegete give an "I" to the "Ego" who interprets. 
t. 1 Praxis. 
"The past is not pass~_. 
Ri coeur (449). 
t. 1. 1 Narrative and action. 
Ricoeur has shown the interdependence between praxis and symbolic 
st.ructtl1·es. Every human act ion has al ready been represented in works of 
narrat.ive <of historical or fictional nature), and also in religious 
systems whose symbolic universes are in themselves reinterpretations of 
narrative based upon a collect.ion of memorable actions. The idea of the 
pre-figuration of a praxis of liberation in a narrative. which can be 
reinterpreted, act.ed, and resymbolised again, describes the efsegetfcal 
process of liberation theology. as described, for instance by Croatto. The 
selection of the Exodus narrative, has provided Latin America with a 
symbolic pre-figuration of the liberat.ive process, which, at the same time, 
has been rea'Ppropriated incorporat.ing elements from the 'Peoples' 
experience. 
(449) P. Ricoeur, in R. Kearney. o~c cit., p. 28. 
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The pre-figuration of praxis combined with the theory of the prescriptive 
tendency of narratlvity. has forced liberation theologian3 to demythologise 
the traditional interpretation of the Bible in Latin America. whose roots 
are related to the Conquista and coloni2ation of the eontinent. 
Christianity in Latin America still reflects elements of oppression and 
nafve consciousness: the superiority of the white man, of the language of 
the Conquistadores over the traditional languages of the natives, the 
dismissal of Amerindian values. and the encouragement of attitudes of 
resignation and passivity amongst the poor. 
4.1.2 Events and metaphors of liberation. 
Ricoeur considers that human actions suffer a process of "metaphorization". 
in which the meaning of the events are inscribed in narratives. cultural 
traditions and norms of the society. Even monuments. and other "texts" such 
as traditional dances, rituals and ceremonies, give the reader or observer 
the opportunity to perceive reality through the mediation of the literary, 
the political, the religious and the scientific spheres. However, as 
Ricoeur stresses, the reading should remain "open", that is, ready to break 
established codes if necesary, in order to produce a new interpretation of 
reality, and thus a new action. As we have already seen, ~jma~l~air~ as 
rupture already has this function in relation to the prescriptive life of r} 
society; now we can see that it also ha,s an important role "liberatinp~" the 
praxis of freedom of a community. 
Following Heidegger, Ricoeur has said th.:\t beyond a human discourse therf' 
Is a project of being-in-the-world. Such a project becomes fixed in an 
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action through a kind of ob,jec.tivisation process, very similar to the one 
suftered by an oral discourse when it is written down. In complex actions, 
as in the composition of any narrative, there are effects which escape from 
the author's original intention. and whose meaning can be aetualized or re-
enacted in different social contexts. As Ricoeur has said, "the text 
rejuvenates itself" permanently (,(,50). The hermeneutic function of 
distanciation in relation to praxis, helps us to understand that actions 
are not unnconnected amongst themselves, but belong to a historieal 
tradition and t.o the social creativity of a community. 
The study of the dialectic between praxis and symbolic structures. is one 
of Ricoeur's major contributions to the theology of liberation. ThrOllgh his 
work. on myth and action, Ricoeur has demonstrated how important is the idea 
that human consciousness is mediated through mythical expressions and 
symbolic structures. Latin American theology has been working on what 
Ricoeur calls the analysis of the constitution of the "imaginary nucleus" 
of culture, which is related to the sense of identity of a eomrnunity. 
The imaginary nucleus is the conglomerate of what constitutes culture. It 
works as a "totality", a symbolic system which expresses the economic. 
religious and pol itie. order. The way to discover this nucl eus (which 
Ricoeur also terms "hidden") is by means of the discourses of the society 
but also by its praxis. Ac.cording to Ricoeur. this nuc.leus is constituted 
by a conglomerate of foundational myths, which influenee the self-
(,(,50) Cf. P. Ricoeur. in R. Kearnev. op. cit., p. 30. 
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understanding of the society and t.he way it organises its institutional 
life. By discovering the imaginary nucleus. the praxis of a society becomes 
liberated from the prescription of the dominant elites. due to a deeper 
understanding of the process of symbol ization of national identity (4-51). 
Theology of liberat.ion has two approaches to its search for the imaginal'v 
nucleus. First. through the study of the symbol ic foundation of the cuI ttlre 
of poverty, and second by the use of a criteriology (convergence of 
methods), analysing different aspects of Latin American society with the 
resources of the Social Sciences. The study of popular cultures. re-
discovering primary symbols of the society. has been done by theologians 
such as Mel ano COllch, Aurora Lapiedra and Dussel. Mel ano Couch, in her 
article Culture of Pover~r_Culture of Dependency? (452) analyses what 
she calls the diglottic phenomena (dlglosia) of Latin America in the 
following terms. In Latin America several languages are used at the same 
time, but t.hey are not translatable. If so. we would be able to speak of 
.. bilingual ism". but in real i ty, these I anguages are 1 n mutual confli ct 
because some represent the dominant culture and others. the dominated. The 
search for the hidden nucleus. requires the use of the circle of 
interpretation of Ricoeur. because the broken identity of the people, and 
(451) Cf. "Universal Civilization and National Cultures", in P. Ricoeur, 
Hi story and Truth. 
(452) Cf. B. Melano Couch, "Cultura de Pobreza 0 Cultura de 
Dependencia?" , in I.S.E.D.E.T., Los Pobres. pp. 183 ff. 
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the "dis-organization" of life. are related to destruction and subjugation 
of the native languages (deslenguamiento) (453). 
Apart from the pre-hispanic myths, the study of Christian rituals In Latin 
America, such as processions. celebrations of "The day of the dead" (P.-1~M_ 
los muertos), and multiple expressions of syncretism, such as the -popular 
worship of the' Bandit-Saints' (Los Santos Band:ldos), 'The Saint of Death' 
(San la Muerte), etc. also deserve to be carefully studied. In this sense, 
the Peruvian theologian Aurora Lapiedra, working on the spirituality of the 
Andean region, is a pioneer of a theology in search of the mythic.al nuclei 
of the people of the Andes (454). 
t.l.3 The mythical nucleus of the poor. 
Liberation Theology has taken from Ricoeur a "panchron:lc" approach for the 
understanding of social phenomena, that is, working at the same time in a 
synchronic and diachronic dimension. Ricoeur has established that mvths can 
be distoTted, or carry a selective memory, which can make of them mere 
deviant aspects of the foundational myths of the country. However, as the 
I\ythical nuc.leus is always working in the present moment, to ignore or to 
interpret it at a narve level could be dangerous; for instance. racial 
prejudices and extrel\e forms of subjectivism which sometimes pervade 
(4-53) Ct. B. Melano Couch, QP--. _~it., p. 206. 
(4-54) Ct. A. Lapledra. "Religiosldad Popular y Mujer Andlna", In \.!!.aderJJ9_'i 
c]e Teolo!,1a, vol. vii, 3, 1986, pp. 169-76. 
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history, can easily arise. Because of the relation between praxis and 
symbolic structures. liberation theology has worked with L'imaginah:'_e as 
rupture, in order to discriminate between genuine and deviant myths. and 
the category used to do such discriminatory work, is the concept of 
I iberation. In this. we remember what Ricoeur has said: "Onl y those myths 
are genuine which can be reint.erpreted in terms of 1 fberatJod' (455). 
From this perspective then, the theme of the "option for the poor" is a 
contribution t.o the search for a mythical nucleus of Latin America. The 
poor are t.he subject of their own I iberation: from their experiences, the 
praxis of freedom can be construed. The use of the Bible in the theology of 
liberation also has the task of finding this nucleus, and as stlch creating 
a new model of action. The Old Testament book of Exodus has been chosen 
because t.here is a coincidence of 'memories' between the Israelite 
narrative and the chronicles of the conquered Amerindians, who also 
elaborated stories of escape from oppression, such as the Guarani legend of 
"the land without suffering" (La tierra sin Jnales) , The Roman Cathol ic 
Church has recently incorporated the memory of this myth in a popular mass 
called Mis8 de la tierra sin ~les. As Ricoeur said, "the question is not 
to try to repeat t.he past, but to try to find OUT roots. in order to be 
able to create something new." (456), 
( '55) P Ri in R. Kearney IUaloO"l1es with Contemnorarv Cont 1 !l~n!_al_ 
.. . c·oeur. _ Qo.::: ~ ~ 
Thinkers, p. 4-0. 
(4-56) P. Ricoeur. "Universal Civilisation and National Cultures", in 
History and. Truth. p. 275. 
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The interdependence between the symbol ie. system and the praxis of 
liberation in Latin America also means that the church must assume a 
critical role for Christianity in the continent. and a desire to establish 
a more effective dialogue with native cultures. Only by a rediscovering of 
the symbolic universe of the continent can the process of liberation and 
freedom be accomplished. because as we have seen. it is closely related to 
the search for national identity. HOW'ever, such work should not be confined 
to Latin America, but must have the horizon of humanity as a whole, because 
liberation according to Ricoeur. cannot be exclusive to one group of 
nations (4.57), One interesting implication of this is the necessity of 
establishing a genuine dialogue between liberation theology and European 
theology. The real project of Latin American theology can only be achieved 
in co-operation with the praxis (action and reflec.tion) of the churches of 
the rest of the worl d. 
~.2 A positive model of utopia. 
"The memorial dimension of Liberation Theology is essential. for it gives 
direction and continuity to the utopian projection of the future, thus 
functioning as a garde-fou against irresponsible or uncritical futurism." 
Paul Ricoeur (4.58) 
Ricoeur's contribution to the elaboration of the concept of utopia in 
(4.57) ct. R. Kearney, 9~. cit. I p. 40. 
(4.58) Ibid.,p. 30. 
libel'ation theology is manifested in two areas: first. in the relation 
bet~en utopia and efficacy, and second. in the integrative role of utopia 
In a divided community. 
~.2. t Utopia and efficacy 
Ricoeur's work on the concept of utopia comes from his reflection about 
history and ideOlogy. As we will see. l'imaginaire as rupture is again the 
key element which provides utopia with a dynamic movement. The unification 
of hist.oI'Y, due to the result of the acceptance of the model of progress in 
the XVIII Century, has resulted, according to Ricoeur. in the unification 
of our horizon of expectancy, and thus, of utopia. As a consequence of 
that, there is a chronic disconnection bet.ween our hlstol'ical experience 
(for instance, our evel'yday political life) and the utopian horizon. and a 
difficulty in conceiving such a horizon of expec.tancy as something 
concrete. In other words, utopia has become inefficacious. and as slIch 
characterized by mystification. 
The proposal fl'om Ricoeur is to l'etul'n to the polycentrism of our ever\,d"v 
reality, recl'eating the concept of "histories", and concretising' the 
community's utopia which needs to be bunt. by the action of the social 
imagination. From this ~ can infel' that only the cOJl\lJ\tmity can fix its 
horizon of expectancy, and design the paths towards It. An utopia withol1t 
means for its realiza.tion is dangerous, and equivalent to what Segundo 
calls "a faith without. ideology". and Miguez Bonino, "a faith in search of 
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eff i cacy" (459). 
Segundo seems to use the term "faith" as equivalent to "utopia" in Ricoeur, 
associating the term with the future where freedom and .justice will be 
established. Segundo has also used the term "utopia", but with the meaning 
of Rl coeur's concept of II negat 1 ve utopl a", that 1 s wi thout poss i bil it ies of 
being real ized (460), In this sense. we can affirm that "faith" for Segundo 
is Ricoeur's concept of "positive utopia", which requires two components: a 
path designed by the community of reference in order to make the uto-pia 
concrete, and second, a mythopoetic nucleus, submitted to a process of 
demystiflcation. As Rlcoeur has said t.hat. a myth is genuine only through 
the presence of liberative symbOlism, we can infer that an utopia is 
negative when the shared imagination which c.onstructed it has become 
fetishized, and Justifies any form of present oppression while hoping for Cl. 
future liberation of humankind. In this case, according to Ricoeur, an 
Ideology takes the pI ace of the utopia. 
Guti~rrez has also elaborated his concept of utopia based on Ricoeur's 
concept, although he also brings to his reflection the thought of Freire, 
and Paul HI anquart amongst others. Us i ng the same bas ie concept, Gut i ~rrez 
calls the negative utopia an "evasion from reality" which. as Ricoeur 
affirms. is a deceitful escapism because it is not related to the concrete 
(4-59) Ricoeur calls an utopia without realization a "schizo-phrenic 
discourse"; cr. P. Ricoeur, in R. Kearney, op. cit.. p. 30. 
I. 
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possibilities of a historical moment (461). The fact thlt a positive utopia 
is neither unachievable nor static, has made Gutierrez reflect on two 
elements from the conscientization process studied by Freire: denunciation 
and annunciat.ion. The horizon of expectancy is a denunciation of the 
present order. and as such requires the active participation of the 
community who announce the new order of existence which constitutes the 
utopi a. 
Somehow it seems that annunciation for Freire is a simil 0.1' concept to 
l'imaginaire as rupture. it implies a change of consciousness produced by 
the re-reading of reality by a community. through a mediation process of 
admiration (4-62>' At the same time, Freire describes the positive utopia as 
"prophetic" (463), The prophetic function of the church in Latin America is 
then a concept. closed to Ricoeur's positive utopia and t.he dynamic of 
I'imaginaire as rupture, bec,ause it announces the horizon of the "not yet", 
denouncing (or demystifying) the present, by means of a process of 
From Text to Act i o..n. pp. 320 ff. 
(462) Freire uses the Portuguese term ad-mirac;ao; originall y from Husserl , 
this concept work.s in a very similar way to the hermeneutical function of 
distanciation. Cf. P. Freire, :pedago~fa del_-.9-p-rlmlrtQ.. p. 90. Also E. 
fenomenol6gico., p. 79. 
(463) Cf. P. Freire. La~LJglesias. 10. Educaci6n y el Proce~o de __ LJt'~r~~J~TJ 
flml.HHll\ en 1 a HistorJ_~. pp. 39 ff. 
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social awareness and understanding of the complexities of the text of 
reality. The concept of utopia in the theology of liberation is also a 
hermeneutic presupposition for the reading of the Bible, especiallv in 
relation to the integrative role of the horizon of expectations. as Ricoeur 
has developed the concept. 
4.2.2 The integrative role of utopia. 
While ideology fulfills the necessity of confirming the past (because for 
Ricoeur both ideology and utopia are fruits of the social im~~n~1re), 
utopia remains open to the future. However, for Ricoeur, a positive utopia 
depends on the balance between the ideology and tradition. This 'POint is 
also related to Ricoeur's criticism of the lack of reference in 
Structuralism (464). The reference of a text works as ideology and also as 
tradition. 
An utopia based on the concept. of tradition of Ricoeur, functions as a 
point of reunion for the community. because it works from the common 
symbolic heritage of t.he social imaginaire and produces a cOJM\itment 
towards the future horizon of expectancy. with the memory of the past (the 
collective memory), Gutierrez took this aspect of utopia from Ric.oeur as 
the forc.e that mobilises society. in opposition to the negative concept of 
utopia characterised by producing social inactivity or "political 
(464) For this point cf. Chapter one, 1.6.3.1 
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dreamers" (465). 
LIberatIon theology has furt.her elaborated the soc.io-economic and -pol itieal 
focus which utopia brings int.o a society in relationship with praxis. In 
the future horizon of Latin America this shared utopia is made 01 elements 
related t.o the arrival to a new social c.onsciousness, and a social 
appropriation of culture. Guti~rrez sees that the integration of conununity 
towards their utopia tak.es the form of solidarity, both in the denunciation 
of injustice and in the common path towards their obJective. The concc-pt of 
the "Kingdom of God" as a political proJec,t and the Christian people as co-
work.ers with God (co-trabajadores del Reino) to make it a reality. is also 
el aborated from the base of the dyna.mic of pos i t i ve utop i a. 
This element of solidarity is also expressed by Guti~rrez in relation to 
Christian people and their communion with God, which he explains as 
"liberation from sin ... all explotatton. and from all dissidence amongst 
peopl e." (466)' Communion with God, then, impl les the dynamic of 
I'ima.ginaire as rupture, the creative process of tradition and the mythic-
poetic nuc.Ieus that construct an l1to-pia. To rec.laim the social tmagi!lair.~ 
Is also to recreate solidarity amongst people. because without this work. of 
co-operation none of the above mentioned processes coul d exist. 
--------------
(465) Cf. G. Guti~rrez. A..J:heo)ogy of LJber.ati 9!l. -p. 139. 
(466) Ibid. 
360 
This concept of communion with God, associated with the dynamic of a 
positive utopia seems to have been present in those Latin American priests 
who did not want to officiat.e at Eucharistic rites (Holy Communion>. The 
Colombian priest. and sociologist Camilo Torres gave up his rights to 
officiate at mass in 1965 wit.h an argument which we can synthesize in the 
following way. The mass is a Christian communal activity, and the Eucharist 
is the culmination of it, as a symbol of the proJected horizon of the 
Kingdom of God and its .Justice. The prohl em for Torres was that he 
considered this love-solidarity of the community betrayed by what he called 
"lack of consecrat.ion" amongst Christ.ians, inside and outside the church's 
structures (4-67). Wit.hout a "path towards a positive utopia" (Ricoeur). or 
"a faith with the right ideology" (Segundo), such love-sol idarity does not. 
exist. Any ut.opia of the Kingdom becomes a negat.ive utopia, whic.h 
encourages inaction or dreams impossible to fulfil. 
This is the reason why Torres, like many others before and after him. 
renounced the celebration of mass. The c.hurch does not have an efficaeiotls 
utopia, and t.hus fails to integrate the community (through love-
solidarity), making of the c.ommunal act of mass a mere ritual deprived of 
its real meaning. It. is interesting to note that Dussel has used a simtl ar 
Ii ne of refl ect:i on :i n the cons iderat i on of the work of Las Casas. Acc.ord i ng 
to Dussel. the reason why Las Casas denied the Eucharist to the governors 
.-------
(467) Cf. C. Torres, "Message to the Christians", in A. Kee (ed.), t\_R~~gt~T 
in Pol itlcal Theolo~. pp. 14·4-7. 
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of his time was that the bread was not consecrated, because it was stolen 
from the people who produced it (468). The Eucharistic bread was the 
product of exploitation and crime, the mythic nucleus of the communitv had 
become fetishized to sustain a minority in power. and the utopia was an 
ideology to be demystified. According to Las Casas, the Christian horizon 
of .justice was being denied, and the task of Christians ~"8.S to break the 
project of the Conquista and replace it with a Christianity whic.h could 
take into account the reality of the situation of the people of Latin 
America. Las Casas, as many c.enturies 1 ater Torres. was refering to the re-
creation of tradition and I' imaginaire_ as rupture, in relation to the 
Integrative role of a positive utopia. 
4..2.3 The multi-dimensional role of utopia 
Rlcoeur has found that the integrative role of utopia is twofold; it works 
with the common horizon of a nation, in an universal dimension, but it is 
(468) Ct. E. Dussel. unpublished paper delivered to the Conference "In 
Search of a Larger Christ", Edinburgh, 1985. The theme of the Euchari st 
being incompatible wit.h people's oppression run5 through the whole of Latin 
American history. In Argentina, during the XIX century. Saint Francisco 
Sol ano broke a piece of bread during a banquet wi th a rich h.~~enQ.t\<;I9. The 
story tells that blood ran from the bread, and Solano said: "I will never 
eat at any tabl e whi ch offers bread kneaded wi th the blood of t he poor." 
Cf. H. Brito, "La Organtzaci6n de la Iglesia". in CEHIT >\, 50Q. ~tiQ_~_~~ 
Cristiani~lno_ en~~~1.'~J!ttna. p. 57. 
362 
also related to the individuals of these communities who stiffer from a 
process of dehumanisation and anonymity in this society. Ricoeur calls the 
first an integral dimension of utopia. and the second, a multi-dimensional 
aspect of utopia (469), What Ricoeur calls "the face of the single" in the 
midst of an industrial society. needs to be understood in terms of the 
peasant society in Latin America. The "singularity" is the characteristic 
not so much of an individual but of Jl\arginalised groups (communities found 
on the fringes of the elites who hold the socio-economic power of any 
nation). especially the indigenous population. women. and social sectors 
with a high incide.nce of ill iteracy (4-70), 
This concept of singularity ag the option for the marginalised, or the 
"sil ent ones" as Fre ire call s them, has high! ighted a series of el ements to 
be incorporated in the theological discourse of Latin America. For 
instance. the reality of oral communication amongst indigenous groups, the 
use of Spanish or Portuguese as the official languages of the church. and 
the legitimac.y of \lsing native languages for education, theological 
research, and worship. In short, the problem of hermeneutics amongst the 
marginalised is related to basic levels of communication. 
(4-69) Cf. P. Ricoeur, "The Task of a Political Educator", in PJlilo§.otW.-Y. 
Today 17, 1973, Summer~ pp. 14-2-52. 
(470) In relation to this point. cf. for instance S. Escobar and C. Ren~ 
Padilla in Comunicaci6n. 100. pp. 89 fr. 
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The integrative role of ut.opia requires that the church value the 
experience of the marginalised people of Latin America, whose universe has 
suffered from a de-symbolisation process (a sort of Bultmannian 
demythologising) due to the lack of recognition of their languages. One can 
say that the Quechua communities in the Andean countries are not being 
taken seriously enough if their leaders cannot reflect theologicallv upon 
their reality in Quechua. Somehow, the symbol is still a prisoner of the 
elite of po~r, and unless some shared imaginaire as rupture can be 
introduced, t.he praxis will suffer a lack of dynamism in its process. 
The contribution of Ricoeur to liberation theology has been done in the 
areas of the rediscovery of the Latin American identity, the praxis of 
change and the formul ation of utopia,. These three areas are presentl v 
suffering from a problem of closure of the Latin American theological 
discourse, and a lack of self-criticism. The closure of the discourse can 
be explained as part of the tendency of the symbolic structures to become 
fetishised, thus maintaining the still ness of meaning needed by the 
mechanisms of social control. The church in Latin America participates 
actively in such mechanisms of control, and therefore. the only guarantee 
of any hermeneutics of freedom and justice is the work of the people's 
ima~inaire as rupture. 
We will now proceed to highl ight the infl uenee of Rieoeur in the work of 
Croatto, Segundo and C. Boff. and consider how the potentialities of the 
"Hermeneutics of Solidarity" have been developed by them. 
Part II 
~.3 J. Severino Croatto: 
The tension between ideology and utopia. 
All the theologians studied in chapter three manifest a tension between the 
role of the church's tradition and the necessity to open the text of their 
interpretation to a modern inter-pretatton. Sometimes, it is the biblical 
text that is the object of their attention, but often they also refer to 
the discourse of the social doctrine of the church, the structures of the 
ecclesiastic institutions or simply. the text of the complex Latin American 
reality; in this case, the object of interpretation is also the traditional 
historic account of the continent. 
However. each of these theologians has a characteristic way of confronting 
this tension. In the case of Croatto, it is manifested in three main 
aspects: 1) a tension between two methods: Conc<rr.dislIlo and SinJ:Qnia: 2) a 
t.ension in Croatto's veracity crit.eria for the t.ext (actions of 
liberation); and 3) a tension in his work wit.h myths and mystifications. 
Our understanding is that Croatt.o has resolved such tensions, although only 
partially, in his development of an utopian project organised from the poor 
as the Da of Dasein, and as the interpreting "We" who breaks with the 
narcissistic ego of interpretation. The point is that at the very bottom nf 
Croatto's work there is a permanent attempt to balance the discours p of 
utopia and ideology, which is not always stlccesful, We will proceed now to 
reflect on the above mentioned three aspectc;; of the ongoing tension of 
Croatto's thought. 
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4.3.1 Between Concordismo and Sintonia. 
Croatto advocates a hermeneutics of possibility, in which interpretation 
must be considered an ongoing and unfinished process. On several occasions. 
Croatto has referred to the scandalous situation created by the fact that 
the Bible has never been read using the tools provided by interpretation 
theories; thus, the message of the Scriptural text has been reduced to a 
concord:lsm between the biblical situation and the present day. The word 
"scandal" used by Croatto, Is very suggestive in this context: the 
scandalon (stumbling stone) of traditional hermeneutics. refers not only to 
the poverty of tools sometimes used in relation to the Scriptures. but also 
to the failure <1n the sense of cafda; fall) of the traditional 
interpretation of the Bible in Latin America. 
Concordismo (IIConcordism") is a hermeneutical position associated by 
Croatto with the use of historical criticism; it refers specifically to the 
abuse of the historical readings of the Scripture, and the closure of the 
I\eani ng of t,he text from the perspect i ve of the orlgl nal sense (I f such a 
thing could be recovered), The concordist attitude crystallizes the meaning 
of the text, and tries to apply it to any present. situation which 
resembles the situation desc.rlbed in t.he Scriptures. The fundamental ism of 
this hermeneutic is manifested in the fact that it makes comparison between 
different symbolic systems, which have been produced at the level of 
institutions <such as the Israelite monarchy) and even around patterns of 
personal relations. The conflictive aspect of the use of Concordlsm. is 
always manifested in the absence of a symbolic level of interpretation. 
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The method proposed by Croatto is "tuning in" or sin10n~a. Its objective is 
to open the text to a new interpretation. while remaining in what we have 
called the community of interpreters of the Scriptures; this is the 
importance of developing a hermeneutics of solidarity, where the modern 
interpreter keeps a critical position in the chain of exegetes of the text. 
The hermeneutics of slntonfa is then also rooted in history, in the 
"before" (detras) of the text, because the social and historical context 
condition the production of meaning of the written discourse. The tension 
between a Concordism and a Sintonfa is related to the difficulties of using 
historical criticism and. at the same time, avoiding the closure of 
interpretation. or as Ricoeur says. the prescriptive (or exemplary) role of 
the Scriptures. This is what the French philosopher considers the kernel of 
biblical hermeneutics: t.he conjunction of narrattvtty and prescrtption in 
the Bib I e ( 4-71 ) • 
Ricoeur resolves this problem related to prescription (and therefore 
closure) in the Scriptures. following Jul ia Kristeva's notion of 
tntertextuality (472). Kristeva speak.s about the transposition of one or 
more system of signs into another; according to her theory every text 
functions in terms of other texts. Hence Ricoeur understands that because 
prescriptive texts have been read in coordination with other biblical 
(4-71) ct. P. Ricoellr, in R. Kearney Dia~es with ConJempQ..raryContJnent~t 
Think.ers, p. 21 
(4-72) For the concept of Intertextualit~. cf. L Kristeva, La Rev9J.J"-1101L~JJ 
Langage Pc;>etl qtl~. 
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narratives, the Scriptures have taken an exemplary role. Croatto uses this 
concept of intertextuality in the sense that the biblical texts have no 
clear boundaries. and all the signifying systems are interwoven with 
others, producing an inexhaustible plurality of meaning: the Bible, savs 
Croatto, is "a text upon a text." (473). 
The concept of Sintonfa of Croatto incorporates the notion of 
intertextuality, and works. at the same time, with the hermeneutical 
function of distanciation as elaborated by Ricoeur. The characteristics of 
distanciation make possible the autonomy of the text, its de-
contextualization from the original setting. and the re-contextualization 
by the act of reading. Appropriation of the text is oni y possibl e thrOtlgh 
the understanding that is mediated by distance. Sintonfa differs from 
Concordism in the point that it welcomes the eventual de-contextualization 
of a text, in order to emancipate the discourse and allow it to break the 
crystallization of its meaning (which. for Ricoeur, tends to function as a 
negative ideology), 
Another important element in the concept of Sintonfa is Croatto's use ot 
Gadamer's concept of the history of the effects, which Croatto refers to as 
"positive re-readings". The effects (or actions) of liberation of the Bible 
are rescued by Croatto through the use of historical criticism, and the 
category of pueblo pobre (the poor as a nation and as the people of God) is 
the subject that "opens" the reading of the text and reveals the "beyond" 
('73) Cf. J. S. Croatto, Herl\en~utic~-.It{bLIQ.~, p. 28. 
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of the text whi~h needs exploration. The p'ueblo pobre relates itself to its 
own events of I iberatlon in history, and tunes in with the intertextual ltv 
of other liberative events in the Bible. This concept of intertextuality 
also has another interesting implication: the most radical principle 
established in the Bible. tends to subsume texts where oppression is 
Justified, according to Croatto. The theology of liberation has been 
accused of selecting the biblical texts which were convenient for a process 
of liberation, and ignoring the ones which contain oppressive elements. The 
key to understanding this selective reading is, precisely. the concept of 
intertextuality as part of the hermeneutical circle of Sintonfa in Croatto, 
which takes from Ricoeur the concept of the dynamic identity of a text. The 
text is defined as happening at the intersection of the reader re-creation 
and the discourse. The reader provides the text then, with his/her own 
al eatory intertextual I ty. 
4-.3.2 The Action of Liberation as a Criteria of Veracity. 
Is Latin America Israel or Canaan? It is obvious that for Croatto there Is 
an identification bet.ween the Latin Americans and Israel ites in their 
struggles for liberation, and keeping "God at their side." Howewer, what is 
i of W:l..at •. - c.all ft"-erindia", can be not so evident is that. t.he expel' ence :u........ I'UII 
identified with Israel's hegemonic project in the Old Testament, instead of 
the invaded Canaan (4-74). Like the Canaanites, the Amerindians lost their 
(474) As Latin Americans we do not even have a name to call our continent 
Ab Y la (or "Rine Land", from the Kl1na for ourselves. Recently. the name ya- a , r 
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land. their culture was suppressed and their gods suffered a process of 
demonlzation. The narrative of the natives after the Conquista beaT5 the 
testimony of the alienat ion produced by what todav we can call "systemat ie 
inculturization" of the Conquista; the people's personal names disappeared 
into a I ist of Spanish titles and names from the Santoral, reflecting the 
identity crises of the native writers, concerning the memories of their 
nations. For instance. it is common to read phrases such as: "In the year 3 
Acatl was born' Don Diego' Ti<;aatzin ... "; "At that time 'Don Pedro' 
MacuUx6chiti was king of Tepotzotlan ... " The writer could not decide which 
name was the correct. and the Spanish names were put between inverted 
comas. Something simil aT happens with the names of their gods; between 
Inverted comas, they are called "devils" and "she devils". Even the 
original accounts of the creation of the universe and humanity have been 
re-written as the action of "devils." (475)' 
The question now is to ask if Christianity in Latin America is a faith 
between inverted conmas, and the memory of liberation -as narrated in the 
accounts of Israel in the Bible-, are significative enough or not for the 
language of PanamA) has been adopted in theological c.irc.les, but Amer1ndi~ 
(or Americ~nd~) Is still popular. Cf. L. Boff, Good News to the PelQT , p. 
10. Also "Introduction to Abya-Yala Consultation", in Mi!li~t~rlal 
Formation. 59, 1992, p. 4. 
(475) Cf. for instance. the NAhuatl account of creation in the C6(ltc_~ de 
Chimalpopoca. p. 31. 
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descendents of the stlppressed ci vili zat Ions of the cont i nent. One of the 
difficulties that Croatto does not acknowledge. is the fact that such 
biblical events are mediated by a process of destruction and colonization, 
produced by the people who "evangelized" Latin America. Following Ricoeur'c;; 
concept of the dynamic identity of the text, which emerges at the 
intersection between the \I\.1Orld of the text and the world of the reader, we 
claim that the actualization of the I iberative narrative in Latin America 
suffers from the rejection of otherness manifested in the readers (476). 
t. 3. 2.1 The "We" as the critical cO'lUl\unfty of interpretation. 
Croatto has tried to incorporate the concept of the "We" as opposed to the 
narcissistic "I" of traditional interpretation. The "We" as the critical 
community constituted by the poor, is for Croatto the key to open the 
interpretation of the Bible in Latin America. However, he seldom cp.Jestions 
that this "We" is an almost. aseptic concept, purified of the "We" of the 
indigenous people and their symbolic universe. In other words, "the poor" 
as a hermeneutical category needs to incorporate a wider concept of 
poverty, that is, the "spiritual" marginalisat.ion of the traditional 
bel iefs of the Amerindians. Without this acknowledgement, the Latin 
American universe remains de-symbolized, and more to the point, the s\'mbol", 
of I iberation of the Bible become victims of an el ite of power. The svmbol 
is then "a prisoner of war", llsed to legit.imise the structures of 
( 1.76) Cf P Ri "The Text as Dvnamic Identity" in M. Vald~s; O. 
.. '" coeur, 
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oppression of the people they claim to liberate. 
Ricoeur has said that every human action must be understood by its ruling 
symbols (4-77). It seems that. for Croatto, the liberative actions of the 
Bible constitute the sacrality of the text. in terms of the human 
construc,tion of a discourse about God and history. While trying to 
understand the ruling symbols of the Old Testament (a preferential option 
for Croatto, as for many theologians of liberation), Croatto ignores the 
syJllbolic system which underlies the Christian belief and biblical 
interpretation of the "We who interprets" of the Latin Americans. Croatto 
has found the events of liberation in the Scripture in relation to 
political and religious subversion, for instance, the prophetic 
denouncement of Malachi against a wealthy clergy, and a religion prisoner 
of a process of colonization (478). 
However, it. is difficul t to understand the bibl ical text (to the full 
extent of the Rlcoeurian concept) If the "We" who interprets is silenced in 
its own history of liberationj the Interpretation is deprived of the world 
of the reader. This is a eommon difficulty in the theology of liberation. 
We are not referring here to the memory of the acts of liberation from an 
enlightened priesthood (which always existed, although a minority), such as 
Las Casas or Montesinos. because we want to escape from the vicious circle 
of making role models of liberators from the exceptions in the files of the 
(477) Cf. P. Ricoeur. from Text. to Action, p. 314 ff. 
(478) ct. J. S. Croatto. Not.es on t.he Pr~)1ets. photocopy. 
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oppressors. It. is import.ant to recall that. the Misione~_ Jesuiticas 'Were 
succesful in evangelizing people submitted to different forms of slavery. 
with a paternalistic system whose merit was to protect and preserve some 
segments of the Guarani culture (such as the language). but the Chamanes 
(religious leaders of the Guarani people) ~re the ones who organised 
various insurrections against the dependency and abuses of the established 
system (479), The Chamanes addressed their own people as adults. and they 
appealed to their responsibility toward their Guarani nationi not 
surprisingly, they identified the Jesuist as their enemies. because they 
gently persuaded people to abandon their own beliefs and traditions. From 
there they inferred that political independence could not be achieved. 
Michel Foucault has said that every society has Its policy of truth (480). 
Biblical interpretation in Latin America has had five hundred years of 
cooperating actively with the ideological system which has kept the 
continent in a chronic state of underdevelopment of it.s own posslbll itles. 
During four hundred years the Bible was not available for people to read or 
simply to have at hOJne. and although the situation has changed recently. it 
does not mean that the church has opened biblical interpretatton to what we 
have called the world of the "We" who interpret tn Lattn America. If the 
Bible is now accessible, the readers are still living in a culture of 
(4-79) For this point, cf. M.C. Llboreiro, "La Evangeltzaci6n en la 
Colonia", in 500 Mios de Cristianismo en Ar..g!tlltlna. p. 47. 
(4-80) Cf. M. Foucalt, p_oower/Knowledge: Selected Intervlews~n~tQtll_er 
Writings. 1972-:.1977. 
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silence. The poor still need to speak a foreign lan~lage (Spanish or 
Portuguese) in which they express themselves in simple terms, but find 
difficult to understand or conceptualise their own experiences, because 
they are linked to their native language (481). Liberation theology fails 
to recognise the legitimacy of the use of mother tongues in theological 
developments, and the unique insights that could come from the contribution 
of the traditional agraphic societies of Latin America. 
The phenomenological approach proposed by Croatto uses an intimate contact 
with the studied subject. which requires the acknowledgement of feelings, 
intuitions. even dreams, and any observation taken from everyday life. It 
becomes obvious that the poor in Latin America are margina.lised from anv 
methodology where the subJective relates to the objective; their syrnboli(' 
universe has been suppressed and biblical interpretation has its own policy 
of truth. in which the poor are only partially included. 
4..3.2.2 The "Caananization" of the hermeneutical circle. 
Our main cone.ern is that Croatto should introduce an experience of 
difference in his hermeneuties. that we have called the "Caananization" of 
the interpretation process. It is necessary to understand this proposal in 
the light of t.he dialectic "Sameness-Otherness" (du M~me etc d~_-.l'_Al,lt.Le) 
(4.81) Cf. R. Paredes, "Theological Education for Marginalised Indigenous 
Groups". in C. Ren~ Padilla (ed.), New Alt.ernatives in Theological. 
Edu~.!\t.lon, pp. 141-57. 
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of Ricoeur, and in the understanding of the other in his otherness, of 
Gadamer (482). Rlcoeur, in his analysis of the narrative identity and the 
agent of action, distinguishes two concepts: ips~it~ (from the Latin 
demonstrative pronoun ipse/ipsa/ipsum: him/herself, itself) and identlt~ 
(froll the Latin idem/eadem/idem: t.he same). The difference bet.ween the 
"sameness" (1dentit~) and the "selfhood" (ipselt~), is that the second has 
an element of change, of a dynamic structure implied in the narrative which 
contributes t.o the constant reftguration of the narrative identity (a 
dynamic concept for Ricoeur). Instead of that, the "sameness" defines 
itself (its m@met~) In terms of its permanency In time. 
The point is that the identity as "selfhood" is constituted by alterity, 
(otherness), which saves it from the limitations of "sameness". This 
dialogical dimension between Sameness (Meme) and Otherness (Autre), has 
ethical, moral and theological consequences (~83). 
To sununarise, we can say that for the poor. "to find thelnSelves In the 
Scriptures" means that they need to find the alterity. and the different 
( 1.82) Cf 'D St ns L' AnprentissaD'P des SiD'!les. Lecture __ d~ Pal,lJ---.RlcoeurL ... . ..u. eve. 'F'- 0-: ~ 
pp. 225 If. AI so P. Ricoeur, Onesel t as Another. 
(4-83) For instance, Ricoeur wrote that. "1' ami tie n~cesstt~_l '-autre L I' ~\.11r!"_ 
1\' enJoint d' etre .1uste" ("Friendship needs the other; the other will make 
me rejoice of being a Just person"). Cf. B. Stevens. Ope cit .• p. 291. 
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meanings that do not necessarily result in contradiction <contrarv to 
Boff's opinion) because the identity of the text is constituted by that 
which defies the permanence of the same (484). 
Canaanazing biblical interpretation is then to accept and ~lcome the 
irruption of the alterity in the text. and to open up a dialogue where the 
criterion for truth could come from a dialogue where the experience of 
Israel could be understood in its possibH ity ot experiencing the 
different. or in an aesthetic experience of otherness. But this would imply 
that the Latin American readers will experience their being in the 
dialectic of "finding the We who interprets" in the otherness of their 
experiences. It would have implications far beyond the biblical reading: in 
the praxis of appropriation of their reading, and in the c.otnmunitartan 
construction of the utopia of freedom for the continent. It will complete 
the hermeneutical proposal of Ricoeur. which is ontological: through the 
mediation of the text. and thanks to its temporal dimension it is possible 
to find the identity of oneself in the otherness. L.~.Jmarinaire as rupture 
is the element which makes this possible. This dialectic of Sameness-
Otherness (~me et I' Autre), is the force which will pToduce a 
revolutionary praxis from the marginalised people in Latin America. 
(484) ct. Chapter Three. 3.9.5. It Is important to take into account that. 
for instance, the constant features of a character define the sameness 
(~met~) of a person. Thus. Botf is somehow accentuating the same. at the 
expense of the different. 
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The poor as the Da of Dasein requires a broader vision of what constitutes 
poverty, the process of marginalisat.ion of peasants. women and migrant 
workers in the continent, and the interrelation of this with their "non-
beingness". and deep alienation from po~r. The Guarani people use the same 
term for "word" and "soul". We can say then that Latin Americans lost their 
soul (religious experience) and word (language> at the same time (485). 
Only what we have called a process of Caananization could make the '29bre~ 
readers and writers of their own biblical text (486). 
4.3.3 Myths and Mystifications. 
The use of historical criticism by Croatto and his search for the origins 
of the text while working with etymology, create some cont.radictlons with 
his use of post-modern hermeneutical theories. The t.ensions are focused 
around the closure produced by the search for the original message of the 
Bible, in a kind of source-influences study, and the post-modern concepts 
(Gadamertan hermeneutics, Ricoeur's methodology et.c.) that the text is open 
ended, and indeterminate. Croatto uses a soft approach t.o historical 
criticism, looking more for probabilities than definite meanings. but he 
(485) Quoted by B. Mel aDO Couch in!. S. E. D. E. T., Los Pobres, pp. 183 ff. 
(486) The concept of readers as writers comes from Stanley Fishi it refers 
to the fact that t.he interpretative community constitute the properties and 
determine the shape of what they read. Cf. S. Fish. Is there a text~tn_t_ltls 
class? 
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does not discuss the historical discourse in se, that is, that events do 
not speak for themselves, but the historian or Interpreter does (487), The 
risk of Croatto's work. as presented in his latest book Isaias 1-39, is to 
produce a recollection of meaning. or establishing a chronological 
authority as interpretative key. Ricoeur challenges the concept of historv 
and the way that discurs i ve events are studied. 
De-mystification, as a pol itical process, is the act of unmasking the 
sameness of the text. and in our case, the search for the al teritv in the 
Bible; it works here as a kind of de-ideologization project. This element 
of alienation (or ips~it~) is the key element of praxis. De-mythologtstng 
instead, is a concept that implies the de-symbolisatlon of the mythical 
language. and as such, is an unacceptable proposition for Ricoeur and for 
Croatto. However, Croatto's use of historical criticism does not rescue 
elements of plurality in the discourse. More to the point. the dialectic 
"God of liberation vs. gods of 01>pression". or "YHWH vs. Baal", although 
redefining who is YHWH for the theology of liberation, implies the 
exclusion of the Other in the form of a different culture. 
However, when Croatto chose the image of the NAhuatl god X61 ot I for the 
cover of his book Lfberaci6n y Libertad. Pautas Hermen~cl1t icc,~b he wa~ 
identifying X610tl (twin brother of Quetzalc6atl, the principal god of the 
NAhuas) with YHWH. The el ement that unites them Is that both are gods of 
(487) Cf. H. White, "Historical Pluralism" in Cr1tic~t InCUlJrx-. 1986. 12. 
pp. 4-80-93 
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liberation. since X6lotl. according to the Maya religion, carries the 
symbols of the victory of light over darkness. It ~ understand correctly. 
tar from suggesting a return to the NAhuatl or Inca pantheons in search of 
God, Croatto seems to have an incipient project of a cultural dialogue. 
sadly neglected in Latin America where ChristianIty has always been a 
reI igion of imposition, with "the cross and the sword." This suggested 
dialogue between YHWH and X610tl will then require a de-mystification 
process, and a new reading (or WTiting> of history. In this way. the poor 
of Latin America will be able to speak from themselves, and from. their 
rejected cultural traditions. This dialogue will enrich the praxis or the 
poor and the praxis of the church, which needs to became the Other to also 
rediscover itsel f. No doubt this dialogue w111 not. onl y contribute to the 
biblical intepretation project of the theology of liberation, but will also 
open new ways to Christianity. and being Christian amongst the oppressed. 
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i.( Juan Luis Segundo: 
The Circle of Suspicion applied to the Ideological Text. 
The hermeneutical circle of Segundo is, as we have already seen, a circle 
of suspicion, against which any praxis related to the goal of liberation of 
Latin America is tested. According to Segundo, such proposals are 
'ideologies'. and could come from the Bible, the life of tTesus or the 
social doctrine of the Catholic Church; the goal (or 'Faith' in Segundo's 
terminology) requires efficacious means and therefore, an ideology which 
can be related to the desirable end (the utopia of liberation). 
On these grounds, the Bible is defined as a text which can produce several 
Ideologically different programmes of social liberation. and therefore, a 
contradictory final message. To produce a hermeneutics of liberation from 
the Bible will then require to "mutilate" the text, choosing the suitable 
parts and discarding the inappropriate ones. The text of the Bible does not 
have relevance for Segundo. It is interesting to notice that Segundo Is not 
the only one to maintain this position in reI at. ion to the Scripture's 
integrity; Croatto has said that the Bible "is too big as a book" and that 
"it would be sufficient to have it red\.lced to a few significative texts." 
. 
Croatto also commented that a group of workers who attended one of his 
Biblical Seminars told him: "we have had enough of reading the Bible. Now 
we need act ion." «(88 >. 
(488) From a private conversation with Croatto, 1983. 
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The difference between Croatto and Segundo. concerning the use of the 
Scripture, is related to Biblical authority. Croatto, following a 
Ricoeurian perspective, finds that the authority of any text is produced bv 
the fusion of hori2ons of expectation <ego an utopia of liberation) between 
the text and the reader. To deny authority to the reader can be equivalent 
to denying his/her participation in the process of re-creation of meanin~. 
At the same time. Ricoeur considers that the tensions between di fferent 
theological discourses in the Bible, are related to the confrontation of 
distinct narrative structures. For instance, the conception of time that 
underl ines t.he books of Ezra and Nehemias is due to the form of 
"chronicles", while the prophetic texts, use a different concept of time 
more coherent with the narrative of "oracles" (489), 
This element of consolidation and dislocation of time, presented in the 
Scriptures, adds a creative dimension to the interpretation of the 
discourse about God in history. The preference of Croatto for prophetic 
texts, is a preference for the time of the oracles, which is dynamicallv 
linked to the future and the re-creation of our concepts of God and the 
hist.orical mission of the Church. In Croatto's hermeneutical work, there 
are elements of L'imaginaire as Tupture and the de-construction of the 
subject's illusion, through an exercise of self-criticism by the reader. 
confronted with the world of the text. 
-----------
( "89) Cf P Ri "Philosonhical and Biblical Interpretation", in [tOJ1\ .. ... coeur, r' 
Text to Ac;t ion.. pp. 94- If. 
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Segundo, instead, emphasises the theory of ideology, defined in a negative 
sense, as the ul tirnate authority of the Bibl e. AI though Ricoeur has 
inspired his "circle of suspicion", it is also true that the French 
philosopher did not want to establish a false dialectic "True 
interpreter/Ideologue"; and more to the point. Ricoeur has denounced the 
lack. of perception about the fact that ideology is "the thought of mv 
adversary, the thought of the other." Thus Rl coeur adds "He (my adversary. 
the ideologue) does not know it, but I do." (4-90), 
Segundo does not tak.e into ac.count the notion of a c.ritique of ideology, 
which requires a permanent work of interpretation (and self criticism>, 
through what Ricoeur has called the "Long Way" of hermeneutics. that is, 
the process of explanation and understanding done in the terrain of 
linguistics. In opposition to Rlcoeur, Segundo not only has not perceived 
the discourse of "the other" in the Bible. but has resorted to an external 
coneept of textual authority, which seems in debt to Dil they in the pursuit 
of an original meaning (from God andlor the biblieal writers). 
4..4. t Elements of Marxist interpretation in Segundo's work 
The desire to find a neutrality in his definition of ideology. and the 
opposition between "symbols" and "causes" in the context of liberation 
theology c.omes from Segundo's background in Marxist interpret at ion (4-91). 
(490) P. Ricoeur. From Text to Action, p. 24-8. 
(491) cr .. J. L. Segundo "Capitalism versus S0cialtsm: Crux Thcologica". in 
382 
His concept of ideology allows him to relate a critique of the modes of 
product i on in Lat in AmeY' I ca to the syst em of the tradi t i onal theol ogl cal 
discourse in the continent. Segundo tries to avoid the position of tTuth 
versus falseness which any concept of ideology implies. in order to exclude 
a position of external authority, which tends to repeat the vicious circle 
of power. The discarded discourse becomes ideology'. and the ex-ideology. 
becomes the "other", marginal ised from the dialogue. The Marxist concept of 
Ideology also excludes the symbolic, privileging "reality" instead. 
The problem with t.his position is. however. the difficulty in 
distinguishing between the "real" and the "symbolic". since such a 
distinction comes from socio-historical definitions. and is not therefore 
ontologically given (4-92). At the saine time, material stTuctures are also 
symbolici Segundo has a discourse about. symbolic (theological) systems of 
oppression in Latin America. Apart from that. we can see in Segundo a 
preferential option for the text of Latin American oppression. the meanin~ 
of which is reI atcd to the confl iet of c1 asses. The church has prodl1c~0 a 
misrepresentation of the signification of the text. and as a result of 
that. they bear responsibility for the invislbil ity of the poor as 
believers. 
R. Gibell ini <ed.), Frontiers o.CJ]l.eolQgy in Latin Ai\ertca .• p. 247. 
(492) for this discussion ct. J. Frow. Marxism and Literao_ His!or.y. 
chapters 2-3. 
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This analysis (which is an oversimplification of Eng-el's The ConditioJL~f 
the Working Class in Enrland) (493), is responsible for Segundo's position 
concerning the church: the structures must change, and in order to do 
the interpretation circle which has supported the church needs to be 
challenged with a circle of ideological suspicion. 
so, 
Following the discussion in Segundo concerning the fields of the symbol ic 
and the real, we will add that, in Segundo's opinion the concept of the 
Kingdom of God needs to be concretised as a revolutionary project which 
includes a concrete praxis of "the cause" of struggle. The lack of 
concretisation of the Kingdom is ineffective, and remains in the sphere of 
the analogical or symbol ic. The criticism that we can make to this concept 
comes from Ricoeur himself. because Segundo's "concretisation" of the 
symbolic is a necessary historical option which. nevertheless should be 
aware of the danger of de-symbolising or reducing important symbols of the 
Christian faith to an univocal -ideological- discourse. The fact that 
Segundo considers it necessary to use manipulative strategies to mobilise 
people to act for the cause of liberation theology, deeply contradicts his 
former concept of "divine education" or an ongoing pro.ject of historical 
participation with which God convokes people to becal\C sub.jects and not 
objects of their own society. 
This concept, which has received the influence of Freire's Pedarogy of th~_ 
(493) Cf. J. Frow, Q..P-. clt~., chapter 2. 
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Oppressed, Is also linked with Segundo's idea of God: "God--who-is-
society", which we have considered an interpretative key in the 
hermeneutics of solidarity of liberation theology. The problem is that any 
pre-supposition of a dialogical process between God and God's people 
towards a "positive ut.opia" (borrowing Ricoeur's terll) of the Kingdom is 
dismissed by an univocal interpretation of Christian symbols, and a 
declaration on the need to manipulate the masses in order to obtain the 
political obJective of liberation. Freire would say that if liberation is 
not part of the process, then it will never be part of the result. 
Curiously, Segundo claims that his main interest in the Bible is related to 
the "divine education" process, which helps us to understand for instance, 
the development of ideology (or "faith". in Segundo's terminology>. 
However, he does not have a clear proposal to implement the dialogical 
method in relation t.o issues of oppression and liberation. 
Segundo's criticism of Bultmann, based on the lack of questioning of the 
Christian mil ieu of the de-mythologising method. has not been carried to 
its final conclusion. The circle of suspicion should have been incorporated 
into the dialogue on faith and ideologies amongst the marginal masses, who 
have always been silenced in relat.ion to the two main themes of Latin 
America: religion and politics. In these two themes, the pueblo has always 
been a mere object and not.- a subject of it.s own history. at the Dercy of 
the elites of power. The differenc.e between Segundo's revolutionary 
"vanguards" and the controlli ng el i tes is mi nimal, as the fa ilure of 
popular guerilla movements has proved in Latin America. 
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The questioning of the Cartesian Ego by Ricoeur also includes a criticis~ 
of ideologies, in the sense of an unmasking of the producers of knOWledge. 
Segundo has criticised the ideOlogy of the Bible. the Church as an 
institution and society, but unless he affirms the necessity of a 
dialogical process, the ideOlogy of the theologians remains unacknowledged. 
and therefore uncritical. As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, 
according to Ricoeur, the positive utopia requires a solidarity work of the 
conununity's imagination and self-criticism; otherwise. the utopia becomes 
perverted and a negative factor related to the mechanism of social control 
and legitimation of oppression. The transformation of social and 
ecclesiastical structures requires a collective de-ideologisation. the 
product of a conscientisation process of textual and social interpretation. 
~.4.2 Contradictory definitions of ideology. 
The problem with Segundo is in part his contradictory understandings of 
"ideology". He has tried to show that ideology is a neutral concept. and as 
such is exempt from value-Judgements; in the actual development of his 
thesis (his ideology. using Segundo's terminology>, he accepts that non-
neutrality is impossible. This is, precisely. a crucial category of 
interpretation for liberation theology. the non-neut.rality of faith (as 
hi ) and ideol o'"' (the proposed way to reach such utopia. or a goal to ac eve OJ 
an end). Segundo's book The Liberation of Theology was an early 
contribution to the criticism ot the claims of neutrality of the circle of 
interpretation used in the church's analysis of Scripture. dogmas and 
social doctrine. The traditional circle of interpretatton is not a non-
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neutral ideology, neit.her is the one proposed by Segundo, which has ~ 
definite bias towards the poor and Marxist criticism. 
Segundo has formulated a concept related to "efficacious methodology"; his 
circle of suspicion tries to unmask unrealizable proposals as "faiths" 
without "ideologies", or in Segundo's own words "dead faith" (494). 
According to his criteria, nobody has fulfilled the criteria of efficaciolls 
methodology, not even Jesus; we may wonder if Segundo is suggesting that 
Jesus' faith was also dead (he has already admitted that Jesus committed 
ideological mist.akes), This analysis comes from Segundo's interpretation of 
Camus' Call&"U1a, when he affirmed that "nobody has been able to reach the 
goal which has been proposed" (495). One question that we may ask here is 
why Camus' Caligula has been chosen by a Latin American theologian to 
elaborate a concept related to Latin America's project of liberation. The 
answer lies in Segundo's lack of dialogical criteria of interpretation. It 
is doubful that Basic Ecclesial Communities c.ould come with such paradigms 
of interpretation. However, Segundo shows the absence of an interpretation 
theory at work in the rich indigenous mythology of Latin America. 
However, Segundo changes his position concerning inefficacious 
methodologies as "dead faith", when he considers that the failure of a 
politician who cannot reach his/her final goal could mean the proof of the 
--------------------
(494) Cf. J. L. Segundo, La I,iberaci6n de I a TeoLQg1 a , p. 158. 
(495) Cf. J. L. Segundo. EI HombrJLg~,-JI.U-CUlJ~~esJl_s d~~_Nazl!reth, p. Ii. 
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pol itician' s "purity of intention and methodology" (4-96). In this case, 
Segundo does not consider that the polit.ician's fait.h is dead, because 
according to the theologian~ the criterion of politics is different from 
t.hat of social doctrine. The criterion of the pol itician is purity of 
intentionality. and in the social doctrine it is the results. The problem 
is that as a consequence of this style of reasoning. Segundo has stopped 
the discourse on faiths and ideologies. since "purity of intention" can be 
understood as part of a moral terrain. and not related to his previous 
theory that onl y the goal reached determines the val tle of the actions. 
Therefore, we have discovered another contradiction in his concept or faith 
and ideology. which started as a theory of efficacious methodology of 
liberation, but also admits inefficacy. as an important proof of authentic 
values in the case of a politician. 
4..4.3 The contribution of Segundo to liberation theology 
The contribution of Segundo to liberation theology has been the development 
of a hermeneutic of suspicion inspired by Ricoeur, although he did not 
develop an interpretati ve methodology htmsel f. In this case, as we have 
said before. his proposal is a "short way" of interpretation. However, the 
originality of Segundo (and the same can be said in a way about Croatto and 
C. Boff) is the incorporaton of political suspicion into the discourse of 
liberation theology in Latin America. Segundo's concept of "efficacious 
love", understood as commitment to transform the situation of oppression in 
.-----------------
(496) Cf. J. L. Segundo, Q.p-. cit., pp. 22 ff. 
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Latin America, is the moment of appropriation of the hermeneutical circle, 
or praxis of change of the present circumstance- of our ~ society. The 
difficulties arise due to the nature of the ""hort """y" f ~ -~ 0 interpretation. 
The IOOment of appropriation of int.erpretation comes too fast, without 
having previously followed the route of symbols and the language of myths. 
as, for instance, Croatto has tried to do. 
There is a tendency in Segundo to produce an univocal discourse. without 
the participatory project which was anticipated in his early concept of 
"God-who-is-society", a key towards a hermeneutics of solidarity. This is 
what is lacking in Segundo; a dialogical work with the category of the 
poor, which needs to include t.he Latin American's syJl\bolie universe, 
elements of a theology of culture, and the action of l' imaginaire as 
rupture, to allow the communitarian work of buiding an utopia, and the 
means to reach it too. The dismissal of the possibility of a different re-
reading of the Scriptures on the grounds of contradictory goals, is related 
to his lack of interest in people's participation in the "reading of the 
text of reality"; thus, the element of manipulation of the masses arises. 
We believe that Segundo has not taken the most radical thought of Ricoeur, 
and has brought his proposed circle of interpretation to a premature end. 
However, in spite of t.he difficulties in Segundo's ideas that we have 
highlighted, the merits of incorporating the unmasking of the "pol it leal 
Ego" into liberation theology will alway be recognised in his work. The 
circle of suspicion has influenced many different theological positions in 
liberal and evangelical circles alike, challenging the characteristic non-
political approach of traditionalist sectors, and helping the more militant 
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groups (Christians and non-Christians) to produce a necessary self-
criticism of their praxis. Perhaps, the most promising sign of the effect 
of Segundo's circle of suspicion can be seen in the new ecumenical 
understanding between a diversity of Christian denominations, such as the 
ones which work together in the Latin American Council of Churches (eLAl). 
The link between these churches, some of them of missionary extraction, 
others of immigrant movements or even native initiative, have been found 
not in their theological thought, or life-style. but in a basic 
hermeneutical suspicion about the traditional role of the churches in Latin 
America. Such ideological suspicion has been extended to their 
interpretative methods, and. as a result of that, the circle of suspicion 
has been incorporated in opposing traditions, from Pentecostalism (e.g. ~a 
Iglesia de Dios in Argentina) to the Reformed Churches. The future 
development of the work of CLA! (or the CEBs of ecumenical character) is 
yet to be seen, but Segundo's reflections conc.erning the unmasking of 
ideological discourses in Latin American theology has already had a 
substantial influence in the praxis of Christianity in the continent (497). 
~.5 Clodovis Boff 
Interpretation and Illiteracy. 
We have already synthesised t.he basic points of the influence 01 Ricoeur in 
------
«(97) For the influence of the "circle of suspicion" in Evangelical 
circles. ct. M. Branson; C. Padilla (eds). Conflict and Cont~~t. p. 66. 
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Boff's hermeneutical circle, concerning the need of a Via Longa of 
interpretation, the task. of interpretation, the use of a criteriolo8)'. and 
basically. the work of the "Hermeneutical Arc" of Ricoeur, that is, the 
relation between explanation and understanding (498). We have also noticed 
difficulties in some of Boft's definitions, for instance, his position in 
the "on going hermeneutical war" concerning what do we mean by text. He 
considers that a "text" is a written discourse, but obviously, such an 
approach creates some problems for a theology ot the political (Boft's own 
model ). whic.h "reads" more than one text in order to understand the 
complexity of Latin American reality. We have also discussed his 
interpretation ot the Anwendung of Gadamer (applicatio), which Boff 
contuses with the final moment of appropriation of the hermeneutical 
circle. which is really. a methodological monent concerned with the fusion 
of horizons. The other difficul ty that we have detected in Boff's work. 
which is more important, is his use of the concept of bricolage, originally 
from L~vi-Strauss (499), 
4.5.1 Interpretation and legitimisation of dominant structures. 
However, the main concern we have about Botf's proposal can be summed up 
as a tension bet.ween interpretation and illiteracy, which also implies that 
Also cf. Padilla's paper "Toward a Contextual Theology for Latin America", 
in op. cit., pp. 81 ft. 
(498) Cf. Chapter three. 3.9.5. 
(499) Ibid., 3.9.3.2/5. 
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he has an ambiguous position in relation to ideology ( I iti i as eg m sat ion of 
structures of power), and the role of tradition (as the fluent dialogue 
between the elements of identity in a cOlM\unity, and its creativity. 
projected to a future utopia). As a result of this, Boff'g hermeneutical 
circle lacks a very important element: l'imaginaire as rupture, and 
consequently. his whole anthropology is affected. 
We have defined the concept of illit.erac.y as an inability to process 
informat.ion, which goes beyond people's common skills in reading, WTiting 
and numeracy. Such an inabil ity is not an intrinsic element of Latin 
American people, but a.n acquired characteristic. which is the result. of the 
convergence of different factors. From a diachronic perspective. such 
elements are basically relat.ed to the exclusion of vernacular languages 
from public spheres of representation and responsibility. For the 
indigenous people, the relation between Spanish or Portuguese and their own 
mother tongues is equivalent to the dialectic of power and marglnalisation 
to which they have been submi tted dur i ng centur i ea. Apart from thl s, 
agraphic societies such as the Latin American ones. have always felt a 
sense of inferiority in front of text.s; since the Bible has never been 
available to the people, except in recent years. it Is easy to understand 
the inference of power and aut.hority which t.he poor associate with the 
literate priesthood who read t.he Script.ures. Surprisingly, Boff supports 
the mediation of the church in quest.ions of interpretation, and even 
dismisses any I iteracy programme as a threat to indigenous oral cui tures. 
The colonial system brought to t.he continent an alliance between "King ,,".1 
Priesthood", and the imposition of a univocal interpretation of life and 
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the sacred. This means t.hat a hermeneutical circle which served the church, 
has also served the claim of legitimacy of many undemocratic states rather 
than allow popular decision making. From a synchronic perspective. the most 
important ruptures with this chronic process of illiteracy have been 
Freire's conscientizat.ion programmes. 
The literacy campaigns proposed by Freire, do not equate salvation with 
writing skills, but instead make interpreters of people who were previously 
I\ere passive recipient.s of the interpretation of the elites of power. The 
conflict between proc.esses which favour creation of meaning and 
epistemological openness, and the "true meaning" of the Script.ure according 
to closed church tradition, is a conflict. between allowing people to become 
1 iterate or I etting them remain illiterate. The hermeneut.ical mediat ion of 
the church required by Boff is symbolically related to the "reading elites" 
of Latin America; curiously, the via lon~ of hermeneutics proposed by 
Boff, whieh includes self-criticism and serious reflection on 
interpretative processes, is incompatible with the privileged reading of 
any group. 
4-.5.2 The axis "Anarchy/Authority" in Boff's proposal. 
Boff's fears are relat.ed t.o the production of anarchic meaning. and what he 
specifically calls a "carnival of new meanings." His whole discourse is 
I iti of aut.hority/anarchy; for instance, elaborated upon dialectica oppos on 
f text.s (the sunremacy of the New Test aaent Boff speaks about hierarchies 0 r" 
over t.he Old Testament. although liberation theology has stressed, 
precisely, the contrary), and he also opposes the original meaning or the 
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Scripture (as preserved in the tradition of the church) with a brfcolage or 
hermeneutical improvisation (Boff's own understanding of Levi-Strauss). The 
Dlltheyan position ot the supposition of such a thing as "original 
meaning', departs considerably from the via longa of Ricoeur, where the 
reader recreates the text as received. 
The discussion on the possibilities of popular hermeneutics becoming a 
bricolage, (according to Boff's own negative interpretation of the 
concept), shows a Bultmannian influence in his work, which makes him take 
an even greater distance from the hermeneutical circle of Ricoeur, which he 
claims to follow. The point is that Boff has not challenged the opposition 
between "primitive mind vs. scientific mind" in his analysis, and therefore 
at the background of his discourse there is a dismissal of myth as a 
language, which pecul iar characterist.ics are related to expressing the 
experience of the sacred. 
If myth is equated with lies, or misrepresentat.ions produced by primitive 
minds, then we can understand why I' imaginaire as rupture in the 
interpretative process is dist.rusted as anarchic and misleading. More to 
the point, the so called "anarchic readings" are seen as backward 
interpretations, which tend to perpetuate politically oppressive systems. 
The interesting thing is that Boff associates freedom of reading with 
fundamentalist. reI igious groups, which al though they have returned the 
Bible to the people, do not necessarily allow their meaberships to produce 
interpretations which have not. been properly sanctioned by their 
1 no'" read the Bi bl e, t here are {\I way~ traditions. However, because peop e " 
new elements added to the process ot interpretation of the Scriptures, 
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which do not need to be backwards It seems that t th 
. . a. e core of Boff's 
argument, there is a fear of liberation, although the declared goal is 
freedoJa. 
t.5.3 A misleading hermeneutical circle of liberation 
To summarise Boff's pOSition, ~ find that he tries to keep a theoretical 
balance bet~en two irreconcilable poles: a traditional hermeneutics. which 
work.s as a closed discourse or legitimation of politieal structures, and a 
hermeneutical circle such as the one proposed by Ricoetlr, which is mobile 
and participatory. As a result, Boff produces a hybrid project whic.h we 
have called a "scientific hrfcolage" (using Boff' s own definition). that 
is. the non-critical perpetuation of the interpretation of the church 
(which in this case becomes in Ricoeur's words. a tradition of 
legitimisation or ideology). This Is combined with a Bultmannian process of 
actualisatlon of the New Testament message, in his model of "Correspondence 
of Relationship". The "substantial continuity" with the great tradition of 
faith that Boff uses in this model, is actualised from a socio-economic 
analysis perspective. Although this method is far from being a Concordlsm, 
it works froll a base of comparisons between the times of the Bible and the 
Latin American reality. 
Boff has substantially rejected any hermeneutical project Involving 
l'imaginalre as rupture, because he does not agree in the role or tradition 
as a permanent re-creation of meaning. shared by a community, which is the 
one which builds its own utopia, in this case of freedom. His 
"hermellp.utical c.ircles" are in reality, pre-suppositions for 
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interpretation, worked out in the fashion of dialectical pairs. Although we 
have found such terminology confusing and misleading, unfortunatel", it has 
been adopted in some theological circles in Latin America, with the result 
of an oversimplification of the hermeneutical process originally being 
discussed, and as presented. for instance, by Croatto. The definition or 
the hermeneutical project (also called, "hermeneutical spiral"), as the 
"circularity between reality and Bible", although correct in principle, 
tends to produce a short way of interpretation. Boff has fallen into the 
difficulties of trying to avoid radical options, while using a Ricoel1rian 
theory; Ricoeur's methodology, instead, shows an integrity of principles 
which cannot be merged in order to achieve a vacillating result, and a 
balance between elements which cannot stand together. Literacy and 
interpretation in Latin America are part of the same process of development 
and liberation, and there is no such thing as a neutral position between 
univocal discourses of legitlmisat.ion, and the poor, as subjects and 
protagonists of their own history. 
Part III 
4-.6 The Contribution of Liberation Theology to Ricoeur's hermeneutics. 
Croatto, Segundo and Boff have been lnspired by I' imaginaire as rupture of 
Ricoeur, and yet, each of them has produced a different proposal of 
Croatto has followed Ricoeur's theory more c1osel~ thIn the I nterpretat ion. 
others. while Segundo has st.ressed the ideological suspicion of the "three 
and Ni et.2sche. Boft's work on Ri coeur has been masters", Freud, Marx 
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curtailed by an ambivalence with regard to the position of authoritv of the 
church, regarding a hermeneutics where the poor, as the reader, can 
participate actively. However. the hermeneutical circle which is currently 
being elaborated in Latin America. has been deeply influenced by the 
contributions of these hermeneuticians, which, at the same time, are tested 
in the practice of Basic Ecclesial Communities (CEBs). 
Many of the difficulties faced by the CEBs, for instance in relation to the 
opposition of the church to ordain leaders from the communities, in spite 
of the shortage of priests, and probl ems cODe.erning the authority of the 
church and the clear political option 01 the CEBs, are closely related to 
the contradictions and difficulties we have found in the hermeneutics of 
Croatto, Segundo and Bott. Segundo's idea that the masses need t.o be 
manipulat.ed t.oward the utopia of liberation. or Boff's ambivalent attitude 
concerning the amount ot trust to give to the popular church's own 
interpretation. are cont.inually recreated in the praxis of the life of the 
communit.ies; the interesting thing is that answers to these crises come 
from the communities themselves. Whether the church will listen to them. or 
not. is still to be seen. 
Because the hermeneutical function of the CEBs is the moment of 
appropriation of the theology of liberation, it also provides a dynamiC 
source of ongOing criticism, which goes beyond any academic thought. Here 
Is where the originality of t.he hermeneutical circle of liberation lies. 
and paradoxically. it Is also the place where I' imaglnaire as rupture is 
Ri ' Ject of a philosophv of put Into action. thus completing coeur s own pro . 
action. The eEBs own characteristic is the otherness (ipseit~) or its 
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I\embers; it is, prec,isely the alterity of its own lif hi h e w c produces ~ 
different meaning, taking distance from the sameness (~met~) of the 
church's interpretation. This Is then the place where an ongoing 
"Caananizatlon" of Scriptures takes place. challenging the same (m@me) froll 
the otherness of the marginalised. 
4-.6. 1 Sharing I' imaginaire as rupture in the Basic Eccl esial 
Communities. 
The work of the CEBs is produced at two levels: first of all. subverting 
the symbolic political discourses from church and society, and thus. making 
an effective rupture of I' imaginaire which is not anymore shared by the 
community, because it has become an ideology. Second, the CEBs have the 
potential strength to heal the Casita Bl esse of l.atin America, by the sel f-
discovery of people's real identity in the "Ve" who interprets its own 
symbolic universe. 
As an important consequence of that, we can now expl ain a concept whi ch has 
been misunderstood in the theology of liberation, related to the project of 
the Latin American "new man/woman", This concept has been currently 
understood in terms of a socialist utopia, and criticised for its lack or 
theoretical support. However. we consider that the "new man/woman" is 
related to the project of being-in-the-world, which goes beyond any human 
discourse and tends to become obJectivised in human actions. The CESs stYle 
ot work, 
re-enacts or actualises this project, thrOtlgh a natural funct ion or 
dlstanc f at ion produced from the phys i cal (and ep ist el\Ol ogi Col I) I o(',~t ion t n 
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the church's structures. Therefore. the actualisation f 
o the being-in-the-
world of the Other is the result of the praxis of the Christian Base 
Communities, in their re-reading of their symbolic universe through the 
Bible, elements from popular religiosity (where the myths have been 
preserved) and discussion of reality. 
4..6.2 The appropriation of transformation. 
Labour, work and action. three elements which Rfcoeur considers important 
in the disclosure of the "I" who interprets. are present and "alive" in the 
interpretative community of the CEBs. This then is the contribution of the 
hermeneut.ical circle of liberation theology to Ricoeur: the disclosure of 
the "We" of the Latin American pueblo who, interpreting its life and faith 
and sharing I' imaginaire as rupture, does an effective poJesJs of social 
transformation, through the revealing ot hidden structtlres of economical 
and linguistic oppression. The appropriation of a liberatlve hermeneutics. 
like the one elaborated by Ricoeur, is tested and enriched in the daily 
appropriation ot the poor communities who re-interpret the Scriptures, 
their reality and their faith. 
Liberating the "We" and understanding that poverty Is the l!..~ of Daseln, the 
Word of God, which, borrowing Rfcoeur' s terminology, can be said to be- "the 
positive ideology and ultimate utopia" of the Christian people, w111 also 
be liberated t.o recover again its power and freedom. The strength of the 
revol utionary praxis f'rom the marginalised, 15 based In the dial ect Ic 
Sameness-Otherness (M@me-Autre), from which an authent ic "Her In{'neut t C5 of 
built. The CEBs have been shown to be Instrumental In Sol idarity" can be 
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the dimension of transformation of reality. implied in every hermeneutic, 
and particularly in Ricoeur's hermeneutical circle. Further advances on the 
hermeneutical circle of liberation theology. as inspired by Ricoeur. ~111 
now come in Latin America from the work of the Basic Eccl esial Communit ies. 
'.6.3 The future task of liberation theology. 
Croatto has defined liberation theology as a hermeneutics of liberation. 
The future then. lies in the developJl\ent of its dynamics of i nterpretat Ion. 
Liberation theologians have criticised Ricoeur's hermeneutical circle on 
the basis that he did not take into consideration the socio-political and 
economic situation. Thus. they claimed that liberation theology had gone 
further in the hermeneutical circle. being suspicious of the social 
background in which theological ideas are immersed. As far as we have 
studied Ricoeur, and his contribution to liberation theology methodology. 
this accusation seems to be without foundation. Ricoeur's purpose is and 
has been to work in a philosophy of action. adding a new dimension to the 
"abstract discussions about language" (500). Such a dimension is composed 
of the dialectic of work and power, and a philosophy of language which 
tries to liberate the discourse from it servitude to the elites of power. 
Croatto, SegundO and Boff have developed such a dialectic in their work, 
and although they have different approaches to Ricoeurian hermeneutics, 
(~OO) Ct. P. Ric.oeur in B. Melano Couch. HerDen~utica Met6dict\. p. 262. 
they agree on two points. First of all, that no interpretation Is 
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its definitive, and second, that the circle of interpretation must keep 
dynamics. This means the welcoming of new elements to enlighten the pra-ds 
of liberation theology. and the eventual changes in the hermeneutical 
process i t.sel f. 
The question of the original ity of liberat.ion theology's hermeneutical 
circle can be found in the following point.s: 
1) The addressee is different; the option is made for the poor. as 
addressee. 
2) The hermeneutical process is based on a collective work of 
interpretation. This is the reason why we see cont.radictions in it. 
3) The moment of appropriation is a collective moment too. 
From t.his, we can say that. Ricoeur's work has had a pastoral influence in 
the Latin American churches, which is obviously manifested in the 
communitarian religious life of the CEBs. Each CEB is in an ongoing process 
of appropriation of a new projec.t of the worl d, and eventuall y. they will 
transform the hermeneutical c.ircle too. To study the CEBs as communities of 
interpretation is beyond t.he scope of the present thesis. No doubt this 
will be t.he the next step to be taken in the study of the development of 
the Ricoeurian hermeneutical circle, as it is being used and transformed by 
the work of the church of the poor in Latin America. 
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